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cannot, and will not be abdicated, and "that he would spurn the idea of accept

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ing any indemnification from the usurper "of his throne, and the murderer of one " of the relatives of his family. He may continue banished from his native country; he may be forced to becorac a wan"derer upon the face of the earth: he may "be in misery and penury for the remain"der of his life, but there is one treasure, "of which neither usurpers nor cold calculating politicians are able to deprive him"his honour. Under any situation he will "be able to exclaim with his illustrious an"cestor, Francis I., that our honour re"mains, though every thing else is lost." -If Louis XVIII be a man of any turn for gaiety, he must be highly amused with the inconsistency of the blundering blockheads, whom his arrival has thrown into such anxiety. First he is a king, and ought to be received with royal honours; next he is no king, "his Majesty is changed into "his Highness," and, as he never has been a king, we are under no obligations to acknowledge him as such, nay, it would be a violation of the compacts, wherein we have, repeatedly and solemnly, acknowledg ed Napoleon. But, now, when there is a talk of his abdicating, of his giving up his title and his claims, as the successor of the former king of France; now he is a king again; and, it would be "a cruel injury to his character" to suppose bin so base as to give up that title, which title we will not acknowledge to be hi, due. Now, he ought "to spurn at the idea of accepting any in"demuification from the usurper of his

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throne," whose legitimate authority, be it observed, we have solemnly acknowledg ed; and, he is to "become a wanderer upon the face of the earth; to live in pentry and misery for the remainder of his life," rather than accept of a. comfortable maintenatice from the hands of Napoleon, This doctrine may suit our purposes; but, if Louis XVIII has not lost his senses with his crown, this doctrine will be matter of high diversion for him. "Honour!" It is ho

nour which is to prevent him from accepting of the means of existence; though, observe, honour does not induce us to acknowledge him as king. Oh! that is quite another thing. That might be injurious to us. It might expose us to a prolongation of the miseries of war. Well, and is not the case similar? We do not acknowledge him, because it might prove a source of misery to us; but, he is not to acknowledge Napoleon, though it would procure him a security against misery. Who does not see, that this shameful inconsistency arises from a mo tive as shameful, that is to say, from the fear, that the abdication of Louis would tend to confirm the power of Napoleon, and to make him more formidable to us. commend the French king for having, if the fact be so, put our good people to the test in this way. It is like the device of the girl, who asked one lover, whether he would advise her to marry another lover." No," said he," to be sure I would not."-" Well, then," replied she," do marry me yourself, if you

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please." Nothing could be more reasonable or fair. Louis XVIII comes, and says: "I am, by right, king of France; "but, as I cannot assert this right, to any

effect, without your hearty concurrence, "and as I have no cstablishment in the "world at present, and may, finally, want "bread, though I wear this splendid title, I "intend, unless you will support me in my "claims, to resign them to Napoleon, who "offers me a certain settlement in conse

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quence of such resignation." And, what do we say: "We cannot support you in

your claims; for we have, by re "peated and solemn acts, acknowledged "that you are not king of France; but, "if you give up those claims (which we will not acknowledge you to have), you are the basest man upon the face of "the earth." In one short sentence, this is our language. "To acknowledge you as

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king of France would be injurious to us, "and, therefore, you may call yourself "what you will; yet, as it is convenient "to us, that Napoleon should have a rival living, we would rather that you should live in misery, with the title of king of France, than obtain a comfortable "settlement by the resigning of that "title."--This is the language of the hearts of those, who have been concerned in this transaction; and, we may be assur ed, that Louis XVIII is well acquainted with the fact, and will be at no loss what to do.I think, for my part, that the rational thing would be to accept of a settlement from Napoleon. Some men, indeed,

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that the people of so many countries should hate illustrious persons, and love despicable persons? The people were seduced by the principles of the revolutionists." But, how came it to happen, that illustrious rulers were not able to prevent their people from being seduced by despicable teachers? This is the way, in which the natural reason of man, proceeds in examining all the alledged causes of the triumphs of the French; and, say what we will, the general impression, at last, is, that those triumphs are due to superior wisdom and superior valour. It is evident that the fall of the princes of the continent might have been prevented by their cordially uniting together against France; and, for their not doing so, we are, by such writers as Mr. Gentz, referred to divers petty jealousies and intrigues. But, after all, we are compelled to deduce those jealousies and intrigues from the grand cause, a want of wisdom joined

in the place of the Bourbons, would stake their lives against that of their rival. The family is numerous; and, somehow or other, they would, one or more at a time, find their way to the metropolis of France, to the palaces of the Emperor, or to his tents, and would cease not, until either they had destroyed him, or he had destroyed them. But, this is not their turn. They have, almost to a man, given the world convincing proofs, that they prefer safety to danger, and luxury to hardship. I remember a gallant Vandean saying to me : Why do not "some of the Bourbons stir? I have lost seven brothers in the war for royalty; "and, numerous as the royal family is, not "one of that family has yet ventured his "life. Nothing is more easy than for any "one of them to get to Paris, there to as"semble twenty followers, ready to fall by "his side; and with these he might sally "out upon Buonaparté, at a moment when "no such thing was apprehended. Sup-in most cases to a want of valour. We may pose them to be cut to pieces. That is "better than living like beggars; but, the "possibility is, that they would triumph. "Yet if they prefer the life they now lead, as I fear they do, I have nothing to say against it, only that they should candidly say so, and not suffer their loyal adherents to expose their lives for nothing."'

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Many are the princes and royal families that we have seen assailed and overturned; and, what instances have we witnessed of bravery on their part? Have we seen one, nay only one, who has ventured his life for the preservation of his title or his dominions? Have they not all, without a single exception, run away at the approach of the French generals? And, is there a man amongst them whose desperate circumstances, have produced acts of bravery? Ah! we may revile Napoleon and his generals ; we may call them by all sorts of degrading names; we may remind the world of their having been serjeants, corporals, and drumboys, while at the same time, we bestow the epithet "illustrious" upon the princes who have fallen before them; but, there is a sort of natural reason in the mind of man, which renders this language of ours of no effect. This reason asks how it has happened, that so many illustrious persons, having all the powers, civil and military, of Europe at their command, and in their possession, should have been defeated by a set of despicable persons, having, when they started, no power, civil or military? The people

of the several countries were traitors to "the former, and friends to the latter." But, here, again, how came it to happen,

continue, therefore, to call the conquerors despicable persons, and the conquered illustrious persons; but, it will avail us no thing, either at present or in the future; and, I am convinced, that those who are the most forward in holding this language now, would, in case of a reversed state of things here, be the most forward in holding an opposite language.--The devil certain ly has a greage against the "Learned Lan

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guages," and has availed himself of this opportunity of indulging it. Louis XVIII. is, it seems, amongst other things, an excellent "classical" scholar. On his ar"rival," says the Morning Chronicle, "at "Gottenburgh, the magistracy of that town "waited on him, and read him an, in

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Justration of the inutility of Latin and Greek in the performance of great actions in the world. Every one can draw a comparison between the atchievements and the present situation of Louis XVIII and Buonaparté; nor does it require the spirit of prophecy to foretell how they will stand upon the page of history. Yet, according to the notion of the "learned," Buonaparté is an ignorant fellow. I shall be told, perhaps, that the atchievements of Buonaparté are not to be cited in support of my opinion respecting the inutility of what are called the "learned languages;" but, why not? The conqueror of Europe has been reproached for not knowing how to spell, and the person of whose throne he has got possession is now held up to our admiration as a found sholar; as speaking Latin with "classical elegance." This, then, is an instance for me to cite, and a striking instance too. Here is a man, so 66 ignorant" (to use the epithet of the learned), that he did not, a little while ago, know how to spell; and he has not only placed himself at the head of a great nation; but, has subdued many other nations, and has made a new distribution of almost all the territory of Europe, not forgetting to cause to be issued laws, or decrees, relating to government in all its branches and departments. In short, the greatest conqueror and the greatest lawgiver that Europe ever saw. And yet he hardly knows how to spell; and is, according to the notion of my correspondent, ScoTO-BRITANCUS, but one remove from a Savage But, do I pretend, that, if Buonaparté had what is called a classical education, he would have been less likely to arrive at his present greatness? Yes, I do; and, I think, it is very reasonable to suppose, that, if, from his infancy, he had had Latin and Greek sounds dinned into his head; if he had passed the flower of his youth in counting syllables upon his fingers, in writing nonsense verses, and in reading Latin and Greek books; if, in short, he had, almost necessarily, contracted the habit of regarding a knowledge of words as the greatest of hu man endowments, he never would have attained to so complete a mastery in that sci

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Helder, with his Royal Highness the Duke of York (who, by-the-bye, is also a Doctorof Laws), was, but a few years before, a grenadier serjeant. Whether the learned Doctors of St. John's College, Oxford, admitted his Royal Highness as one of their learned body before, or after, the capitula tion of the Helder, I am not certain; but, it is pretty evident, that the learning, which entitled him to the dignity, must have been acquired previous to that epoch; and, yet it did not appear, that he was, in any great degree, an over-match for the ignorant" grenadier serjeant.--There remains one topic, not sufficiently dwelt upon in my lest, namely, the granting of sums out of the taxes for the support of Louis XVIII, which grant is strongly recommended by all the news-writers, as far as my observation bas gone. So, as a correspondent observes, because the superior genius and valour of Buonaparte and the will of the French people elevate a new dynasty in France, we are to support the wants of the exiled family; we are to oppose the effect of genius, the consequences of imbecillity, or the caprices of fortune, with resources drawn from the exertion of our industry, the labour of our nation, and the sweat of the poor. Where, again, I ask, is this to end? With numerous place-men and pensioners of our own, are we also to support every exiled stem of roy alty and aristocracy. Who can tell what exiled monarchs and princes and nobles are yet to come? The business of exiling does not appear to be half completed; and, if we are to give support in one case, why not in another? Thus, in a few years, we may have to maintain half the former monarchs of the world. I am quite at a loss to con ceive, not only how such grants (out of the earnings of the people) could be attributed to generosity, but how they could be reconciled to justice, or to prudence. Should peace be wanted, and peace must be made in time, how are we to get rid of the person, who, under whatever title we may support him, has claims to the throne of France? But, setting aside all consideration connected with peace, I object to the expense, which is already great, and which, if we be con

ence, which, more than any other, perhaps,sistent, may, and probably will, become demands an extensive acquaintance with men and things." But, Buonaparté has men "under him who are learned." Here again, the devil shows his spite against the Doctors; for, it is notorious, that the chief of his generals and ambassadors have risen from the ranks of the army; and, if I mistake not, the very general who negociated and concluded the famous capitulation at the

enormous. Let it be recollected, too, that the whole of the expenses, on this and similar accounts, will be ascribed to royalty. The consequence, may easily be foreseen, and, if there be any wisdom left, it will be avoided. With what justice can the people of these kingdoms be called upon to support any exiled family? Is there any one from whom they have ever received any benefit?

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There appears to be no reason in the thing. If, indeed, it was resolved to support Louis XVIII. as king of France, and to make war with a view of placing him upon the throne of that country, the matter would be different. The grant, if made, would then be a national measure, for an avowed national purpose, and there was a time when such a measure might have been proper. But, now, there is neither justice nor common sense in it; and, one would suppose, that it would be rendered unnecessary by the choice of the prince himself, who, if not acknowledged king of France, would, if he be a wise man, prefer a perfect obscurity, in which a man may be very happy, to that splendid misery, in which a parliamentary grant would support him.

NOVEMBER 14, 1807.-On the Defence of Ireland. [754 th influence than the government? How came the people to be so much disposed to listen to French emissaries? The French no lon-. ger preach liberty and equality. They come, and they tell you they are coming, for the sole purpose of conquering, of overturning your government, and taking possession of the country. And yet, from the moment. they get upon the frontiers, not a man of the country can be made to stir hand or foot. against them; nay, the only hope, that seems to be entertained, is, that the people will not actually rise in arms against their own government-There must be some. cause for this, very different from the intrigues and instigations of French emissaries; and, it well behoves every government, which is, as yet, unassailed, to examine, by times, whether, if the hour of trial should come, it will have reason to apprehend the natural effects of such a cause.

PORTUGAL. -Nothing decisive seems, as yet, to have taken place, with respect to the fate of this country. It appears unaccountable that the French should have so long delayed to take actual possession of it; but, hearing nothing except through partial channels, we must leave the reason for this delay to future developement.- In the meanwhile, we are told, that our traders there have packed up, and are ready to sail away, except, indeed, those who seem to think, that they shall make a shift to live and get money under Napoleon's government. The breaking up of this branch of trade will not do England any harm at all, in my opinion, though it may produce great individual loss and distress; and, I think, I can safely defy any one to shew, how it can possibly diminish our resources for war, or our means of comfort in peace; while, on the contrary, I can easily shew, how those resources and those means have been diminished by this branch of trade, which produced us nothing but luxuries in exchange for the useful productions of our land and our labour. Another view to take of this coming revolution in Portugal, is, as it affects royal governments in general. We are now told, flatly and plainly, that there are designs formed, by the people of Lisbon, upon the life of the Prince Regent; and, that, by way of defence, troops have been called in from the country places. Troops! Good heavens! are there troops, then? It is not yet a month ago, since we were assured, that the Prince Regent was adored by the people, who were ready, to a man, to follow him to the Brazils.But, it seems, that it is the French who have fomented discontents amongst the people. "French emissaries!" This is always the case. But, how happens it that French emissaries became possessed of more

I have received no second letter from Scoto Britannus; and I must defer, till. my next, what I have further to say upon. the subject of the poor laws.

Botley, Nov. 12, 1807.

ON THE DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

(Being Mentor's Second Letter) SIRI address you for the second time, again grounding my claims to your attention, on the proposition that if "Ireland also be conquered by him." A proposition is conquered by Buonaparte, England will notwithstanding the pains which your correswhich still appears to be incontrovertible, pondent M. H. has taken to prove the contrary. He argues from the successful resistance of the people of France, in opposing the enemies of their new system of government; I argue from the failure of all the princes of the continent, in endeavouring to rouse their subjects in defence of their old regimes; and, when I do so, I certainly have the best of the argument, and maintain my position as far as this mode of arguing bears upon the important proposition to remain explained on question. But, I shall not permit this most such shallow reasonings as that, which may be collected from the history of other nations. I shall examine what Ireland would be if she was a province of France, and what danger England would have to encounter if such an event ever came to pass. Three weeks possession of Ireland would enable Buonaparte to form an army of from one to two hundred thousand Irishmen; these he would provide with the arms taken from the yeomanry, and the militia, and out of the several depots. The private soldiers of the Irish militia, who would join his standard,

and those of his own troops would afford a sufficient number of drill serjeants; whilst the French subaltern officers, and serjeants, would be perfectly competent to supply the place of officers to this immense army. To any one in the least degree conversant with the numbers of the Irish people; with the great proportion which the poor bear to the rich; with their inclination to join the French if successful in conquering the country; and with their natural love of fighting, this statement will appear to be a most faithful one. With such an army once established, liable as England will be to be herself momentarily invaded, any attempt to reconquer Ireland must be wholly out of the question; and Buonaparté therefore, will have full opportunity to arrange his military preparations in Ireland for an invasion of England. From Ireland an attempt of invasion must be more formidable than from any other quarter of Europe; because, the British navy cannot keep at sea in the Irish channel. From Milford Haven to Liverpool, there is no harbour in which any thing larger than a frigate can enter; to the northward of Liverpool there is no harbour even for a frigate. If a gale of wind comes on in the Channel, the custom is for every vessel to make the nearest port in order to avoid shipwreck; and, therefore, if Buonaparté was in possession of Ireland, and wished to send his troops to any part of the Welch or English coast, it would be necessary for him only to wait for the termination of a gale of wind, to be sure of having the channel to himself. Let us then suppose the whole population of Ireland at his command, and formed by his officers into large armies; let us suppose his French troops, and those of his allies, ready to embark from all the ports of Denmark, Holland, France, Spain and Italy, can any man be vain enough to flatter himself, that the people of England would be able to save their country from conquest? Can we look with confidence to such a result in the talents of the commander-inchief? Or in those of the numerous generals whom he has selected to lead our gallant forces? Or in the counsels of our ministers, or in the zeal and patriotism of our people? The people of England once certainly lived. under a constitution of government, which they would have defended against all foreign invaders; but, can it be supposed that the present race would be fired with the same zeal, which stimulated their forefathers in their virtuous exertions to defend it; now, that it exists, more as a shadow of what it once was, than as a possession of transcen

dant value and importance? On the whole, Sir, may I not then safely conclude, that if Ireland is conquered by Buonaparté, England must also be conquered by him? It seems as if he was waiting to put his threat of invasion into execution, until he shall have completely invested England by a successful invasion of Ireland. He already covers the North East coast with Denmark, Holland, and the northern parts of France; and he covers the southern coast with Normandy and Brittany, and had he but possession of Ireland the investment would be complete. Seeing then of what advantage Ireland would be to him, to enable him to carry into effect his favourite project of invading England, can any man doubt of his whole mind being devoted to the arrangement of measures for securing the conquest of Ireland? And having such a certainty before us of what his interests are, and of what the most constant occupation of his mind must be, is it not downright madness to withhold from the people of Ireland any boon which may se cure their attachment to the connection with this country? If, Sir, I was to write for ever, or, if the House of Commons were to debate night after night on the state of Ireland, the truth is, that every thing that can be said about Ireland may be resolved into this short statement: Buonaparté must have Ireland in order to make sure of success, whenever he invades England; whilst England must secure the possession of Ireland in order to be safe from conquest. The way Buonaparté has to obtain Ireland is by the aid of fleets and armies; the way that Eng land has to secure it, is by acting with hones ty and justice towards the people of Ireland. The question then for the people of England to decide upon is this, whether or not they will secure their own safety by permitting their conduct towards Ireland to be governed by principles of honesty and justice. If they are honourable and just towards Ireland, they may depend upon it, that they will have nothing to fear from Buonaparté; but, if they are not, they had better begin to count the months and days for which they will be able to boast of their freedom and indepen dence. For, rely upon it, that the period is not very distant, when a trial will be given to the security of England's possession of Ireland; and when it will be proved whether the act of Union, the Irish army, and the hearts of the people of Ireland, are all or any of them such bulwarks as they are commonly considered to be. I must make the continuation of this discussionn, the subject of another letter.-MENTOR.

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