"gument is infinitely to be deprecated. The "law of nations indeed has no impartial "minister to pronounce its judgment and "enforce its decrees, like the municipal "laws of a particular country, but no cne "will deny that that established usage, that "general opinion, and the habit of more or "less accommodating the conduct of na"tions to the recognized principles which "have been laid down in the code of public "laws, have tended to mitigate the abuse of power, and to afford protection to those "who were incapable of self-defence. This visionary law, as it is now called, was of "real practical utility; and though it was

imperfect in its sanction, the law of na"tions received in modern times, and so largely improved, has contributed as much, perhaps, as any positive institution whatever, to the superior civilization, happiness, and tranquillity of Europe.-There can be no doubt, however, that if the law "of nations, which is in its nature and end a "restraint upon force, is violated systematically by one nation to the injury of ano

ther, that other is released from its obliga"tion to such other nation; for the plainest reason of self-defence, because no one 66 can be bound to submit to a rule of re"straint upon his force, from which his adversary takes the advantage of being exempted. With respect to France, there"fore, we undoubtedly have the right of "exercising the law which she practices. "This however, does not give us any right "to release ourselves from the obligations "of the law of nations towards others of "whom we have no reason to complain. "Because France has been unjust towards "Switzerland or Hamburgh, we have no " right to be unjust towards Portugal or "Denmark.- What then is the precise

ground of justification of our conduct to"wards the latter? It is, first, the assump❝tion that France would ask Denmark to "join in the war against us; and, secondly, "that Denmark would be obliged to submit "to that demand. It may be admitted, "though it is by no means proved, or cer"tain that France would have sought to "draw Denmark into the war; but next, "" are we sure that Denmark would have

submitted? It is quite clear, that at any "time Buonaparté could have seized Hol

stein, but he has not done it; nor did he even complain of the Danes last Novem"ber for defending their frontiers and kil"ling some of his troops belonging to Ber"nadotte's army, when they came on Da"nish ground. But because he could do "that, it does not follow that he could have

"taken the island of Zealand and the Da"nish fleet. The loss of Holstein, &c. must "have been much felt by Denmark, but "she knew that in a naval war with Eng"land, she had to lose more perhaps than "the amount of the temporary loss of Hol"stein, and it is highly improbable that she "would have yielded up her fleet to Buona"parté, and gone to war with England to save Holstein. Buonaparté had no means "whatever of attacking the island of Zea "land, and a few English frigates could have "secured the passage of the Great Belt, by "which alone troops for its subjugation "could have been sent. Unless, however, "the danger of Buonaparté getting the Da"nish fleet was most imminent, we had no

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right to seize it, merely to guard against "that contingency. The main question of right then, in the present proceeding, re"solves into this simple proposition. Was "it certain, that Buonaparte would get the "Danish fleet if we did not take it? Unless "this proposition be made out with the

strongest degree of evidence, our attack upon Denmark is unjustifiable, because "it is not necessary to our own defence."In matters of this sort we ought not to be "satisfied with general apprehensions. It

is clear, that to get rid of our apprehen"sions we inflict very severe calamities up"on a nation acquitted of any previous hos"tile intention. Are we quite certain that "at the bottom of this business, there may "not be a so t of cowardice not very credit"able? The danger dreaded perhaps was "considerable.. Had Denmark joined "France with all her military marine, must "the country have been undone? We

hardly think it. But the right of self-de"fence, against evils less than utter destruc"tion, may have justified us. Possibly it

may. But still as fear is a rash and a cruel "counsellor, we should weigh well its ad"vice. If, in a shipwreck two people are on a plank which can bear but one, the one may push the other off; but he ought "to be fully sure of it before he drowns his

companion. So here, before we sack and "destroy Copenhagen, we ought to be "" pretty sure that England could not be safe "without the Danish fleet. It is no an

swer to say, that Denmark might avoid "these.calamities by submission; for sub"mission is the greatest national calamity, "and it is our right to impose it, or the evils "of refusal, that is in dispute.-The King of Prussia's attack upon Dresden is, as far as we recollect the incident in ver "modern times, nearest to this business of Copenhagen, The King of Prussia's con

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writers, there are no three who agree with each other upon scarcely any one point of great and general importance; their books contain merely the history of what sech and such nations have done in such and such cases, together with the opinions of the writers respectively as to what ought to be the rules for the conduct of nations towards each other; each writer observing, however, that, unhappily, these rules are frequently set at nought.- -The editor of the Morning Chronicle says, that no one will deny, that established usage, that general opinion, that the habit of regulating the "conduct of nations by the recognised principles which have been laid down in "the code of public laws, have tended to mitigate the abuse of power, and to "afford protection to those who were incapable of self-defence." Of the tendency of usage, of general opinion, and of habit, we will speak by-and-by; but, why will Mr. Spankie talk of "a code of public "laws?" When we talk of a code of laws, we mean something, that has a real existence; something that we know where to find; something that contains a description of the acts commanded er forbidden, and which takes care to provide a punishment for transgressors. But this "code" of Mr. Spankie's has no real existence; it is no where to be found; no man, or body of men, have ever had authority to make this code; no nation has ever recognized the existence of such a code; and there is no power on earth, either appointed or selfcreated, to cause its provisions or its maxims to be put in force. Is it not absurd, then, to talk of "a code of public laws?" And was there ever any thing more completely a creature of the imagination ?”

But, as far as the writings of Grotius and others have operated as a code of laws; as far as they have had an effect upon the conduct of nations, I do deny, though Mr. Spankie asserts that no man will deny it; I do deny, that they have "tended to mi"tigate the abuse of power, and to afford protection to those who are incapable of "self-defence; and, in support of this denial, I have no need of any thing more than this universally acknowledged truth," that, in all cases, where laws can, with impunity, be set at defiance by the strong, the weak are in a worse situation than if there was no law at all, the law being then, in fact, nothing more than an instrument of oppression. Thus is it amongst the individuals composing a nation, whose laws may be set at nought by the more powerful, while the weak are kept in complete sub

Dilcounts, 4

abuse of power," but the rivalship of the strong, their mutual jealousies, their quarrels with one another, and the necessity, which, for their own sakes, they have, at various times, been under, of affording protection, and even of granting favours, to nations incapable of self-defence. France afforded protection to the American States; England afforded protection to Holland in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; the little States of Germany were, each in its turn, protected by some great power against some other great power, and tranquillity and happiness were frequently promoted thereby; but, in all this, the "code of public laws," of which Mr. Spankie talks, had not even the most trifling share; and. now, when all this rivalship is at an end, when all mutual jealousies and all quarrelling between great powers upon the continent are extinguished by the overwhelming influence of one pow er; now it is, that Mr. Spankie would hold up, for our strict observance, his "code of public laws."-But, this gentleman is so condescending as to allow, that, if there be a nation which sets, this code at defiance its enemy may also set it at defiance, with respect to it; because the latter "cannot be "bound to submit to a rule of restraint

upon his force, from which his adversary "takes the advantage of being exempted. "Therefore, with respect to France, we "have, undoubtedly, a right of exercising "the law which she practices." More than this we need not ask in support of the seizure upon the Danish fleet and naval arse. nals; for the law (if we must use the term), which she practices, is, to suffer up nation to remain neutral with regard to England, if that nation be placed within the reach of her power. After having gone thus far, it is, therefore, something not much better than nonsense," to talk about our being still bound by the law of nations towards other powers, and especially those within the reach of France; for, it is in setting that law at defiance with respect to other powers, and not with respect to ourselves, that France gains an advantage" over us. "Because France has been unjust

towards Switzerland and Hamburgh, we "have no right to be unjust towards Portugal or Denmark." This, with submission

HALE

to Mr. Spankie, is not the way to state the proposition. He should have said: Because France has seized upon every port and every fleet and every arsenal in Europe, as far as she has hitherto gone, for the evident, and even for the avowed purpose of annihilating the maritime superiority of Great Britain, Great Britain has no right to seize upon any port or any fleet or any arsenal that may yet remain unseized on by France; and, the proposition, thus stated, I am not afraid to leave to the impartial judgment of the reader. The main question of right," says Mr. Spankie, after having spoken of the probabilities and the improbabilities of Napoleon's forcing the Danes to take part in the war against us : The main question of right," says he, "in the present proceeding, resolves itself into this simple propo"sition was it certain that Buonaparte "would get possession of the Danish fleet, "if we did not take it?" Now, in my views of the matter, this question, so far from being the main question of right, in this case, is of very trifling importance; for, the probabilities, in my opinion, are on the opposite side, it being pretty evidently the interest of Napoleon to leave the Danes in the enjoyment of that sort of neutrality, which they might be expected to enjoy while a French army lay upon the confines of Holstein, that is to say, a neutrality which would have been much more injurious to us than war on the part of Denmark, as it would have kept open a passage for naval stores from Russia to all the ports of Holland, France, and Spain, and also for a Russian fleet, if, as there is reason to sus. pect, that power entertains views hostile to England. The question, therefore, is not, whether Napoleon would have got the possession, or the active use, of the Danish feet, but whether he would have got, in fact, the command of the Island of Zealand and of the Danish government; and, that he would not have been long in getting this, I think, most men will readily allow. The comparison of the two people upon a plank, at sea, is, therefore, inapplicable; for, it is not the possession of the Danish fleet merely that is, or, at least, that ought to be, the object of the present enterprize, but the place where that fleet happens to lie, and which place, in our hands, is the key to a very important part of the world Mr. Spankie, in the anecdote about the king of Prussia, again urges the want of proof, on our part, that Denmark would have joined France in the war. I think it is rather unreasonable to call for proof of the fact, that, in one way or another, France

would have converted Denmark to her purposes against England; but, all that I want to justify the seizure, is, proof of this: that, by suffering the Island of Zealand and the Danish government to pass under the command of Napoleon, or even by suffering Denmark to retain its neutrality, the Baltic would have been kept open for a communication between Russia and all the numerous sea-ports in the possession of France; and this proof is to be found by merely looking at the map of Europe. The holding of the key to the Baltic is an object of vast importance. With that key in our hands, what are the ports of Prussia and of Russia? Not only there do we make our power felt. All the nations thither trading must feel it; and, Mr. Spankie may be assured, that, amongst the other good effects of this enterprize, we shall have to reckon a complete setilement of our dispute with the American States. He says, in this same paper of his (7th September), "It is reported that Mr. Munro has received instructions from the Government of Ame"rica, desiring him positively to insist on our relinquishing the rights of searching any of their vessels for men, whatever "their rank or condition may be. They do "not require us to give up the right of "search for merchandize; but they declare, "that they will never permit any of their "vessels, whether ships of war or merchant

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men, to have their men taken out, after "they have left their ports." Now, grating as it may be to Mr. Spankie and to my friend of the Independent Whig (who has answered not one of my arguments); grating as it may be to them to see these high-spirited friends of theirs give way, give way they must; and, which they hear of the affair of the Island of Zealand, they will be ready to hang themselves at the recollection of their folly. Their silly and inalicious merchants and captains, assembled at St.Petersburgh, together with certain Russians, for the purpose of celebrating the anniversary of Anierican independence, toasted "the "liberty of the seas not supposing it pos sible, that they would have to ask of this hated England (to see the fall of whom they were on the tip-toe) the liberty of even looking at those seas again.Mr. Spankie, in conclusion, commiserates the lot of the human race, now that we have, apparently resolved to follow the example of France, in setting at nought his much respected "code of public laws;" and, though I doubt not at all the sincerity of his commiseration, I do greatly doubt the soundness of the opinions whence it has proceeded

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So far from thinking, with him, that this conduct of ours, will render war altogether bloody and exterminating; that it leads to the destruction of society; that it renders entire conquest to the one belligerent or the other not merely a point of ambition, but of necessity; so far from thinking thus, my opinion is, it will have a tendency to diminish the horrors of war, to preserve civil society, and to prevent entire conquest by one or other of the two belligerents, that is to say, by France; for, as to our aiming at universal conquest, nobody thinks it, and Mr. Spankie knows, that the faet is not so. Fracce has conquered all the continent of Europe worth speaking of; and we are now endeavouring, by following her example, to prevent her from becoming mistress of the islands and seas. She has laid all her plans for effecting this object;: she has even made great progress in the way of preparing ports and fleets; we, by acting upon her example, are endeavouring to put a stop to that progress, and to place ourselves in a situation to say: "if you will be "the sole sovereign of all the land, we will "be the sole sovereign of all the sea. You "make power the standard of right, and so "must we." Now, though I can easily conceive, how this may tend to subject all Europe to two powers, I cannot for the life of me see how it tends to subject her to one. Rome and Carthage are of great utility, by way of comparison, when we are speaking of two nations contending for superiority; but, until it be made appear to me, that the circumstances of Europe now are similar to those of the time of the wars of Rome and Carthage, and especially until I am shown that Carthage was the undisputed mistress of the sea, the comparison will, with me, have no weight at all in the argument. I cannot possibly perceive any physical or moral necessity of the destruction of one or the

other of the two powers" proceeding from the principle upon which we are now acting. Acting upon this principle will, if any thing can, check the ambitious strides of Napoleon; because it will soon convince him, that, to take possession of countries is perfectly useless with a view to subdue us, which is now the only great object that remains for him to accomplish. But, it seems that Mr. Spankie has made a wonderful discovery, namely, that a peace, in all probability, "might be attained without any sacrifice of "honour or of power," and that, therefore, this desperate proceeding was unnecessary. And, is he really serious? Does he think, that we ought to make peace with France, leaving all the ports and all the fleets and all

the arsenals of Europe at her command and the sea open for their operations? Does he think, that, with all this increase of naval means in her hands, a peace of two years would not be unto us inevitable destruction? He means, I suppose, that Napoleon would leave us the Cape and Malta, would restore Hanover to our king (its Elector), and would refrain from demanding a surrender of our maritime rights; but, would this place us upon a footing with France; would this remove the influence of Napoleon from Spain, Italy, and the North of Europe; would this afford us a chance of being able to preserve ourselves against his meditated attacks? In two years of peace he would have a hundred sail of the line to bring against us; and, though we should certainly defeat him at first, he would be able to make us exhaust ourselves even by our victories. "What, "then, are we to have eternal war?" The duration of the war depends not upon us, any more than the duration of a chace depends upon the fox; but, if there be any way in which we can put an end to the war, other than that of yielding our country to the adversary, it is the way which our ministers are now pursuing; because in that way they will convince him, that the longer he continues the war, the greater our relative power will become. But, this single act, of which we have been speaking, will be nothing, if not well followed up. It is to be considered, I hope, merely as a beginning of a new and vigorous system of warfare. Haying locked up the Baltic, we should next demand tribute of the Americans, and of all neutral ships, if there be any, that swim upon the sea. The coasting trade of France Spain, and Italy should be narrowly watched; and, an option might be left with our cruizers to make prize or take ransom. The whole of the seas should be proclaimed to belong to England, which they do in virtue of the same right upon which Napoleon claims the continent, namely, the right of conquest; and, then, when we came to talk of peace, we might grant him a certain degree of freedom upon the seas, in order to. induce him to make such surrenders of countries, ports, and arsenals, as would enable us to lay down our arms with safety. This system of acting would, at once, give a new turu to, men's thonghts and a new tone to their language. We should no longer hear people describing our country as fallen, as being one amongst the number of those which had become little in comparison with France; and, I am inclined to hope, that the editors of the Morning Chronicle and the Edinburgh Review would cease to advise us