DISCOURSE XL.

PART II.

IT now remains that we confider the text as furnishing us with a principle of reafon and equity applicable to many cafes.

It is the more neceffary to make this inquiry, because the rule in the text is liable to be mifapplied, unless we carefully attend to the reafons upon which it is founded, from which only we can learn in what cafes the rule is applicable, in what not. The mercy of God is the beft pattern that we can copy after, and our Lord has recommended to us, to be merciful, even as our heavenly Father is merciful. Since therefore God fpares the wicked who deferve punishment, nay, who are ripe for final deftruction, for the fake of the righteous, that they may not partake in their fufferings, what fhall we fay? Is it reasonable that men fhould act in like manner that magiftrates, who are difpenfers of temporal punishments, fhould releafe the guilty, because of the innocent who are nearly concerned in the fortunes of the guilty, and who muft share either in the fhame or the lofs of the punishment?

At first fight perhaps you may imagine there is a parity of reafon in these cases; and yet upon farther confideration you will find, that the fame reafon which justifies God in delaying the punishment of the wicked, would condemn the magiftrate fhould he permit the guilty to live unpunished.

To come at this view clearly, we must attend to the difference between the reafon of juftice, and the rules of juftice. By the rules of juftice, I understand the general principles and maxims of justice by which the laws of all countries are governed and directed. By the reafon of juftice, I underftand the fountain from which all maxims and all laws are derived, which is no other than right reafon itself for laws are not just, as partaking of the authority of the lawgiver, but as partaking of his reafon. And hence comes the diftinction between good and bad laws, though both derived from the fame authority; which fhews, that authority, though

it

may make a valid law, yet it cannot make a good one, unless acting upon the reafon of juftice. Now between the reafon of justice and the rules of juftice there is this great difference; the reafon of juftice takes in all circumftances of every cafe, and therefore cannot err in its judgment; but the maxims of juftice have no relation to the particular circumstances of any cafe, but are formed upon general abftracted ideas, and consequently they of ten may and do fail, when they are applied to fingle inftances from whence it often happens, that the reason of justice, and the maxims of juftice, ftand in direct oppofition to one another. And this gave occafion to that proverbial fpeech, Sum

mum jus, fumma injuria; for the words in themselves, unless you have refpect to the different rules to which they refer, are a plain contradiction. For it is not to be affirmed, that what is fummum jus according to this law, is, according to the fame law, fumma injuria: but the truth of the proverb is to be understood by referring the parts of it to their proper rules. Summum jus regards the written law, Jumma injuria regards the original reafon of all law. And then in many cafes it happens, that the letter of the law contradicts the reafon of the law and the cause of this I before obferved, becaufe laws and maxims of law have no regard to the circumftances of particular cafes, which circumftances nevertheless do sometimes entirely alter the nature of the cafe.

Hence it plainly appears, how liable we are to mistake, as long as we form our judgments by applying general rules of law or equity to particular cases. Thus, for inftance, it is a right maxim of juftice, that all finners fhould be punished; and the maxim is derived from the certain difference of virtue and vice, from the ends of reward and punishment, which are adapted to promote virtue, and difcourage vice. Place then before you a particular finner by the rule of juftice he muft die ; but what if it should appear, from the circumstances of his cafe, that you cannot punish him confiftently with the ends of justice, that is, you cannot promote virtue, or difcourage vice, you cannot distinguish good from evil in his cafe, but muft afflict both alike? What will you fay? Shall the general maxim prevail contrary to the very

reasons upon which the maxim itself is founded? Or fhall the reasons of juftice and equity prevail to fuperfede a general law, which is not applicable to the present cafe?

Now there is the fame difference between the judgments of God, and the judgments of men, as there is between the rules of law, and the reason of law for men are tied down to judge by the rules which the law prescribes; but the judgment of God does not arise from any rule or maxim of law, but in every instance follows the reafon of the thing to be judged of; otherwise his judgments would not in every cafe be reasonable. It is mere weakness that makes men go by rules; and because they are not able to judge accurately upon all emergent cafes, therefore they have general rules for their direction. But how abfurd would it be to imagine God as acting by any fuch rules, as having recourse to ftated laws or maxims for the direction of his judgment in particular instances? As reason is in all cafes the fountain of justice, and of all laws and principles of law, fo the divine reason, which is perfect, is in every case the true measure of justice. From hence it evidently appears, that fince the judgments of God are not formed upon the general notions and principles of juftice which we are converfant in, thofe notions can be no fafe rules for us in the examination of the ways of Providence, because our rules do not always extend to the reason of particular cases; but the judgments of God do always regard the reasons and circumftances of every cafe.

Farther these confiderations will help us to

form diftinct notions of juftice and mercy, and difcover to us, if not what they always are, yet at least what they always fhould be. Juftice is thought to be a thing fixed and certain, and to have its proper bounds and limits, which it cannot tranfgrefs without lofing its name; but mercy is taken to be of a more variable, uncertain nature, to have no rule to go by, but to arife from the will of the governor and confequently we usually speak of juftice and mercy as oppofites to each other, and suppose that mercy can have no place, unless justice recedes to make room for it. What does or may happen in the world we are not concerned to inquire; our bufinefs is to fearch after the true notions of juftice and mercy, not the corrupt practices in either. Now mercy and juftice would not be diftinguished, were it not for the intervention of general and particular laws, which often fall very heavy upon particular perfons; whence it is that we complain of the rigour and hardness of the law: but were men perfect both in their reafon and in their wills, fo that they could neither judge amiss nor act amifs, they would then do that which is exactly right and reasonable in every cafe, and there would be no room to correct the rigour of juftice by the interpofition of mercy; for there is no rigour in that which is perfectly right and reasonable. For confider what are the pleas for mercy do they not arife from the circumftances of the perfon, or the action, which fhew that the law is too hard in his 1 cafe, and that he ought in reafon to be eased against the extremity of the law? But had all these circumftances been weighed in the firft judgment,