458 DEBATE ON REPRESENTATION. South Carolina). Gerry said that often the worst men would succeed in getting into the legislature;* Wilson and George Mason argued in favor of popular elections;† while Dickinson declared that one branch of the legislature should be drawn immediately from the people and that the State legislatures ought to choose the other. by a vote of ten States that the second branch should be chosen as Mr. Dickinson suggested.|| On June 7 it was decided Thus far all had gone comparatively smoothly, but the rock upon which the convention split and nearly foundered was the subject of representation in the two legislative branches of the government, the question being first brought up by William Patterson of New Jersey on June 9.§ Judge David Brearly of New Jersey spoke first against basing the representation on population and he was followed by Patterson, both using practically the same arguments. Brearly said that according to the Virginia plan Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania would carry everything before them. He said that "It was known to him, from facts within New Jersey, that where large and small counties were united into a district for electing representatives for the district, the large counties always carried *Ibid, vol. i., p. 84. † Hunt's ed. of Madison's Writings, vol. iii., p. 101; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 8485, 86. Ibid, vol. i., p. 89. Ibid, vol. i., pp. 94-101. § Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 23. their point, and consequently the large States would do so. Virginia with her sixteen votes will be a solid column indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia with her solitary vote and the other little States will be obliged to throw them. selves constantly into the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. · * Is it fair, then, it will be asked, that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virginia? He would not say it was. What remedy, then? Only one: that a map of the United States be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into thirteen equal parts." After saying that the Convention should keep within the limits prescribed in order that it might not be charged with usurpation, Patterson said: "A Confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all state distinctions must be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation.” † He said also that— * "there was no more reason that a great individual state contributing much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one. Give the large states an influence in proportion to their magnitude and what will be the consequence? Their ambition will be proportionately increased and the small states will have everything to fear. * Shall I submit the welfare of New Jersey with five votes in a council where Virginia has sixteen?" James Wilson of Pennsylvania spoke in favor of the population basis, pointing out the absurdity and Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 110; Fiske, Critical Period, p. 247. Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 111. Fiske, Critical Period, p. 247; Hunt, Madison's Journal, p. 112. THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION. injustice of giving 150,000 men in one part of the country as much weight in the government as 750,000 in another part. "The gentlemen from New Jersey is candid," he said. "He declares his opinions boldly. I commend him for it. I will be equally candid. * * * I will never confederate on his principles." Gunning Bed ford of Delaware was especially violent He said: "Pretenses to support ambition are never wanting. The cry is, where is the danger? and it is insisted that although the powers of the general government will be increased, yet it will be for the good of the whole; and although the three great states form nearly a majority of the people of America, they never will injure the lesser states. Gentlemen, I do not trust you. If you possess the power the abuse of it could not be checked; and what then would prevent you from exercising it to our destruction? Sooner than be ruined, there are foreign powers who will take us by the hand. I say this not to threaten nor intimidate, but that we should reflect seriously before we act." Rufus King rebuked this speech by saying, "I am concerned for what fell from the gentleman from Delaware- take a foreign power by the hand. I am sorry he mentioned it and I hope he is able to excuse it to himself on the score of passion." * According to Martin, "the convention was on the verge of dissolution, scarce held together by the strength of a hair," the delegates from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia favoring representation in proportion to their importance, while the delegates from Connecticut, New • Fiske, Critical Period, pp. 249–250. VOL. III-30 459 York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland opposed it from various motives. Patterson said that the small States could not be compelled to accept disagreeable conditions and that New Jersey [would] never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose here but on his return home [would] do every thing in his power to defeat it there."* Again Wilson asked: * "Are not the citizens of Pennsylvania equal to those of New Jersey? Does it require one hundred and fifty of the former to balance the latter? If the small states will not confederate on this plan Pennsylvania and we presume some other states would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each state is sovereign, all are equal, so each man is nat urally a sovereign over himself and all men are therefore virtually equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of Civil Government? He cannot. As little can a sovereign state when it becomes a member of a federal government. If New Jersey will not part with her sovereignity, it is vain to talk of a government."+ However, the small State men were no match for their opponents, and on June 11 a motion was carried in favor of " equitable" rather than equal representation. Seven States (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia) voted for proportional representation in the first branch, and three (New Hunt's ed. of Madison's Writings, vol. iii., pp. 133-134; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 113. Hunt's ed. of Madison's Writings, vol. iii., p. 135; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 113114. 460 THE NEW JERSEY PLAN. York, New Jersey, and Delaware) against (Maryland being divided),* while the vote stood six to five for proportional representation in the second branch,t Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia voting in favor, while Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland voted against.‡ The remaining topics of the Virginia plan were now taken into consideration until June 13 when the last one was disposed of. The committee of the whole then reported to the House, and the next day was fixed for the consideration of the report.|| Patterson of New Jersey now obtained permission to submit an entirely different plan and on June 15 he read the New Jersey plan, which was as follows: 1. Resolved, That the Articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected and enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union. 2. Resolved, That, in addition to the powers vested in the United States in Congress by the present existing Articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods or mer chandise of foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the United States, by stamps on paper, vellum, or parchment; and by a * Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., pp. 340, 343; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 119-120. †Thorpe, Story of the Constitution, p. 122 et seq. Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 121; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 344. || McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, pp. 211-212. The nineteen resolutions in the report are given in Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., pp. 365-367; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 134-137. postage on all letters or packages passing through the general post-office;- to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper and expedi ent: to make rules and regulations for the collection thereof; and the same, from time to time, to alter and amend in such manner as they shall think proper: to pass acts for the regulation of trade and commerce, as well with foreign nations as with each other;— provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures, and penalties, to be incurred for contravening such acts, rules and regulations, shall be adjudged by the common-law judiciaries of the state in which any offence contrary to the true intent and meaning of such acts, rules and regulations, shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits and prosecutions for that purpose in the superior common-law judiciary in such state; subject, nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law and fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the judiciary of the United States. 3. Resolved, That whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the Articles of Confederation, the United States in Congress be authorized to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that, if such requisitions be not complied with in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-complying states, and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same; provided, that none of the powers hereby vested in the United States in Congress shall be exercised without the consent of at least states; and in that proportion, if the number of confederated states should hereafter be increased or diminished. 4. Resolved, That the United States in Congress be authorized to elect a federal executive, to consist of persons; to continue in office for the term of years; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the executive at the time of such increase or diminution; to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment during their time of service, and for ...... years thereafter; to be ineligible a second time, and removable by Congress, on application by a THE NEW JERSEY PLAN. majority of the executives of the several states: that the executive, besides their general authority to execute the federal acts, ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct all military operations;- provided, that none of the persons composing the federal execu tive shall, on any occasion, take command of any 461 9. Resolved, That a citizen of one state, committing an offence in another state of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had been committed by a citizen of the state in which the offence was committed.* The debate upon the New Jersey troops, so as personally to conduct any military plan began immediately, Wilson com enterprise, as general, or in any other capacity. 5. Resolved, That a federal judiciary be established, to consist of a supreme tribunal, the judges of which to be appointed by the executive, and to hold their offices during good behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine, in the first instance, on all impeachments of federal officers, and, by way of appeal, in the dernier ressort, in all cases touching the rights of ambassadors; in all cases of captures from an enemy; in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which foreigners may be interested; in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal revenue: that none of the judiciary shall, during the time they remain in office, be capable of receiving or holding any office or appointment during their term of service, or for ..... thereafter. 6. Resolved, That all acts of the United States in Congress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby, and by the Articles of Confederation vested in them, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, so far forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states or their citizens; and that the judiciary of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any state, or any body of men in any state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated states, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties. 7. Resolved, That provision be made for the admission of new states into the Union. 8. Resolved, That the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every state. paring it with the Virginia plan and pointing out that the essential differences were that the Jersey plan proposed a single branch legislature which would derive its powers from the States and an executive of several persons, while the power of the legislature to act on national concerns was limited, though the executive had power to compel obedience by force. Up to this time Hamilton had hardly spoken, " partly from respect to others who superior abilities, age and experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments, as expressed by his colleagues, he could by no means accede." But on June 18 he arose and delivered an able speech in which he said he did not like either of the plans presented but thought the Jersey plan the best. It was merely the Articles of Confed * Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the American Constitution, App. xv. See also Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 370; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 139-142; Gilpin, Madison Papers, vol. ii., p. 862 et seq. McMaster, vol. i., p. 444. For further details of the whole debate on the Jersey plan, see also Bancroft, vol. vi., pp. 231-238; McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 213. et seq.; Hunt, Madison's Journal, pp. 143–151. Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 152. eration revised and extended.* He then presented the following eleven resolutions, which embodied some of his ideas regarding government:† I. The supreme legislative power of the United States of America is to be vested in two distinct bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate; who together shall form the Legislature of the United States, with power to pass all laws whatsoever, subject to the negative hereafter mentioned, II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people, to serve for three years. III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good behaviour. Their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. In order to do this, the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal, or resignation of any Senator, his place to be filled out of the district from which he came. IV. The supreme executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governor, to be elected to serve during good behaviour. His election to be made by electors chosen by the people, in the election districts aforesaid; or by electors chosen for that purpose by the respective Legislatures provided that if an election be not made within a limited time, the President of the Senate shall be the Governor. The Governor to have a negative upon all laws about to be passed - and (to have) the execution of all laws passed - to be the Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces and of the militia of the United States to have the entire direction of war when authorized or begun - to have, with the advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of making all treaties to have the appointment of the Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 59 et seq.; Gilpin, Madison Papers, vol. ii., p. 828 et seq.; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 371 et seq.; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 152 et seq.; Thorpe, The Story of the Constitution, p. 125. Lodge says (pp. 62-63) that undoubtedly Hamilton knew that his plan had no chance of adoption but that his chief aim was "to brace the minds of his fellow members and to stimulate them to taking higher ground than the majority of their constituents demanded." † Lodge's ed. of Hamilton's Works, vol. i., pp. 347-369; Hunt's ed. of Madison's Writings, vol. iii., p. 197; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 162-164. See also Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the American Constitution, App. xiv. heads or chief officers of the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs to have the nomination of all other officers (ambassadors to foreign nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate-to have the power of pardoning all offences but treason, which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate. V. On the death, resignation, or removal of the Governor, his authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate (until a successor be appointed). VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war-the power of advising and approving all treaties-the power of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers, except the heads or chiefs of the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs. VII. The Supreme judicial authority of the United States to be vested in twelve judges, to hold their offices during good behaviour, with adequate and permanent salaries. This court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellate jurisdiction (from the courts of the several States) in all causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the citizens of foreign nations are concerned. VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute courts in each State for the determination of all causes of capture, and all matters relating to their revenues, or in which the citizens of foreign nations are concerned. IX. The Governor, Senators, and all officers of the United States to be liable to impeachments for mal and corrupt conduct, and upon conviction to be removed from office, and disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit. All impeachments to be tried by a court, to consist of the judges of the Supreme Court, chief or senior judge of the Superior Court of law of each State-provided that such judge hold his place during good behaviour and have a permanent salary. X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void. And the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governor or President of each State shall be appointed by the General Government and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is Governor or President. XI. No State to have any forces, land or naval -and the militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them. |