PARLIAMENT FAVORS PEACE; THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY. necessity to England - with three of the greatest powers of the age in Europe and her most populous colonies in arms against her and with all the European nations unfriendly. The Russian and Austrian courts interposed to bring about a general peace, but the British ministry could not relinquish the hope of detaching the United States from the general negotiations.* On November 27, 1781, Parliament convened, and in his speech from the throne the king urged that the war be prosecuted with renewed vigor.t The answers of both houses were in accord with the spirit displayed by the king, but the debates were very animated, and the feeling throughout the country clearly pointed against the continuance of the war. On February 22, 1782, after the recess, General Conway introduced a resolution against the further prosecution of the war in America. On that day the motion was lost by a single vote, but * Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 53-54. † Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 507-508. The last day of the year 1781 witnessed the release of Henry Laurens from the Tower of London. He had been incarcerated early in October, 1780, and was treated with great injustice and harshness. Various efforts were made to induce him to yield, but he steadfastly resisted them all. The "long and painful farce," as Dr. Ramsey calls it, ended with Laurens' unconditional release. See A Narrative of the Capture of Henry Laurens, of His Confinement in the Tower of London, and So Forth, 1780, 1781, 1782, in Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society, vol. i., pp. 18-68, and the documents, letters, etc., in same, pp. 69–83. 299 when it was taken under consideration again a few days later it was carried and the address was sent to the king.* On March 4, the Commons resolved "that the House would consider as enemies to his majesty and the country, all those who should advise, or attempt the further prosecution of an offensive war on the continent of North America." Consequently, as the country seemed to have lost confidence in the ministry, Lord North and his associates re signed their offices on the 20th.† With Lord North's resignation disappeared all purpose of conquering the colonies and all hope of maintaining in its impurities the personal and arbitrary government of George III. Though the king hated the Whig party, of whom the Marquis of Rockingham was the leader, he was finally compelled to accept a new administration headed by Rockingham as Secretary of the Treasury. Lord Shelburne was appointed Secretary of State for the home and colonial departments, and Charles *Bancroft, vol. v., p. 530; Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., pp. 452-453. Bancroft, p. 531; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 512-513. W. B. Donne, Correspondence of King George III. with Lord North 1768-1783, vol. ii., pp. 393-398. Albemarle (George Thomas, Earl of), Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, vol. ii., pp. 451464; Hale, Franklin in France, vol. ii., p. 48; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 532-534; Donne, Correspondence of George III. with Lord North, vol. ii., p. 415. 382441A PEACE OFFERS TO CONGRESS; SHELBURNE'S ATTITUDE. James Fox became Secretary of State for foreign affairs.* One of the first measures of the new administration was to appoint Sir Guy Carleton commander-in-chief of the British forces in America in the place of Sir Henry Clinton and to authorize Admiral Digby and Carleton to negotiate for peace. One of the objects in making these appointments was to secure from Congress an agreement for peace separate from their allies. Early in May, Carleton arrived in New York, and, informing Washington of the new powers conferred upon him, requested a passport for his secretary so that he might present the dispatches of the ministry to Congress. Washington immediately forwarded the communication to Congress, but at that time the bill enabling the king to conclude peace with America had not become a law. Moreover, as there was no positive assurance that the commissioners had power to grant any other terms than those which had already been rejected; as Congress suspected that this move was simply a ruse to gain time; and as it was resolved not to enter into any treaties without the consent of the allies, the passport was refused.† Fox and Shelburne were incompat *Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 5. Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 524. See also Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. x., pp. 2, 6, 8-11, 30; Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iv., pp. 291-294 (ed. 1788). ible in temperament and each was suspicious of the other, the one fearing that the other would assume authority in matters pertaining to his department. Thus they dissented on the manner in which the colonies should be treated in the future negotiations for peace. Fox claimed that on May 23 the cabinet had adopted a minute which practically recognized America as independent, and therefore, if the American commissioners represented an independent country, the negotiations would naturally fall under his (Fox's) jurisdiction. Shelburne, however, disagreed with Fox's construction of the minute and claimed that the colonies could not be independent until after the treaty of peace; therefore the negotiations properly came into his department. The dispute was soon settled, for on July 1, 1782, Rockingham died and was succeeded by Shelburne. Fox immediately resigned.* Shelburne was in perfect accord with the king's determination to prevent an open and absolute recognition of American independence.† McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, pp. 5–6. Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 533. Dr. Franklin left upon one of his papers the following memorandum: "Immediately after the death of Lord Rockingham, the king said to Lord Shelburne, 'I will be plain with you, the point next to my heart, and which I am determined, be the consequence what it may, never to relinquish but with my crown and life, is to prevent a total, unequivocal recognition of the independence of America. Promise to support me on this ground, and I will leave you unmolested on every other, and with full power as the prime minister of the kingdom.”” PEACE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED; OSWALD'S MISSION. Congress had already made preparations for peace. John Adams had been appointed commissioner a long time previous, but as his business soon involved him in difficulties with Vergennes, four additional commissioners were appointed: Franklin, Jay, Henry Laurens and Jefferson. † Upon the shoulders of Franklin and Jay rested the chief responsibility of negotiating a peace treaty, and their principal fear was that France would feel offended if negotiations with England were conducted independently. For some time France had sustained the war in America both by money and troops, and she was practically the head of the Armed Neutrality which was formed to fight England. Vergennes therefore feared that the machine which he had organized in opposition to England would crumble to pieces upon the conclusion of the war and that France would gain nothing for her share in bringing independence to America, except ruined finances and the qualified friendship of America. Spain *For the overtures to Adams from the English ministry see John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 355 et seq. † Secret Journal of Congress, June 13, 14, 1781; John Adams, Works, vol. vii., p. 486. Jefferson, however, never left America (Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. i., p. 72, vol. iii., pp. 49-50, 307-309, 310-314, 315-316); at the time of his appointment Laurens was a prisoner in London; and Adams did not arrive at Paris until October, being busy negotiating a treaty at The Hague. Neither Adams or Laurens therefore took a prominent part in the earlier negotiations. For some time Jay had been in Spain seeking acknowl edgment of independence and also a loan and did not arrive in Paris until June 23. VOL. III-20 301 was only eager to acquire territory for herself, which was the chief motive impelling her to enter the alliance. Being anxious that the American commissioners should not leave France in the lurch by making an independent treaty, the French envoy in America induced Congress to instruct the commissioners that they should "make the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our general ally, the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge and concurrence, and ultimately to govern [themselves] by their advice and opinion." * In the meantime, shortly after the new ministry assumed office in England, Richard Oswald was sent to France to sound the court and also Franklin on the subject of peace.t In April Oswald went to Paris, and shortly afterward was followed by Thomas Grenville, who consulted with Vergennes regarding preliminaries for a general peace between the belligerent powers. During the negotiations the British court acted with a sort of sullen acquiescence in results which they had not the power * Secret Journals of Congress, June 15, 1781; Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iv., p .505; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 144-163. † Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., p. 456; Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 54, 57; John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 358. Hale, Franklin in France, vol. ii., p. 54 et seq.; Fiske, Critical Period of American History, pp. 12-13; John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 359. 302 OSWALD AUTHORIZED TO TREAT FOR PEACE. to prevent, and they endeavored to perplex the negotiations as much as possible by interposing annoying difficulties, etc.; they also endeavored to deprive the United States of every advantage which could be wrested from them.* Vergennes informed Oswald that the French court were ready to treat for peace, but could do nothing without the consent of all the allies. He also expressed the desire that Paris be the meeting-place. When Oswald opened negotiations with Franklin, the latter suggested that England relinquish Canada of her own accord,† but Shelburne informed Oswald that under no conditions would reparation be made; he furthermore said that "no independno independence [would] be acknowledged without their [the loyalists] being taken care of." Oswald was instructed to insist upon the payment of all debts due English subjects and the restoration of the Loyalists to the full enjoyment of all their rights and privileges. Moreover, the English territory was to extend as far as the Penobscot. ‡ These subjects furnished the main topics to be discussed in the On the negotiations leading up to England's consent to arbitrate, see Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 461475, 525-544, and on the final negotiations, see pp. 545-553, 562-581. See also J. B. Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. i., chaps. i.-vi. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. v., p. 541; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, vol. iii., pp. 243-244; Pellew, John Jay, p. 173. Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, vol. iii., pp. 188-189; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 537. peace negotiations, the Newfoundland fishery dispute being added subsequently. On April 18 Oswald went back to London, and on May 4 returned to Paris with the assent of the British cabinet to treat of a general peace, the meetings to take place at Paris. He was authorized to treat with the commissioners of the "colonies or plantations," and to conclude with any person or persons whatsoever, a peace or truce with the said colonies or plantations."* Jay did not think Oswald's commission suitable, for the United States had long since ceased to be colonies or plantations, but Franklin considered the commission satisfactory, and Vergennes agreed with him. Adams' opinion coincided with Jay's. The attitude of Vergennes in this matter did not in the least please Jay, who suspected that France intended. to make every possible use of America and then cast her off in favor of Spain.† Referring to the arguments advanced by Vergennes, Jay said in a letter: Neither of these considerations had weight with me; for as to the first, I could not conceive of any event which would render it proper, and therefore possible, for America to treat in any other character than as an independent nation; and as to the Hale, Franklin in France, vol. ii., p. 50; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 536 et seq.; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, vol. iii., p. 249; John Adams, Works, vol. vii., pp. 632, 641. Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., p. 480 et seq.; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 175–181. MARBOIS' LETTER; RAYNEVAL'S PROPOSITION. second, I could not believe Congress Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. vi., p. 20; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 181-183. Morse, Life of Franklin, p. 367 et seq.; John Adams, Works, vol. i., pp. 365–367; vol. iii., pp. 299, 301, vol. vii., pp. 606-607, 610, 660-663, 665. See also Oswald's journal as quoted by Hale, Franklin in France, vol. ii., p. 107 et seq.; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 538-540; Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 73-74. See also Adams' letter of October 31, 1782, to Livingston, in Adams' Works, vol. vii., p. 653. Gouverneur Morris fiercely resented such servile subservience, and in a letter to Jay denounced Congress with considerable warmth, saying: "That the proud should prostitute the very little dignity this poor country is possessed of would be indeed astounding, if we did not know the near alliance between pride and meanness. Men who have too little spirit to demand of their constituents that they do their duty, who have sufficient humility to beg a paltry pittance at the hands of any and every sovereign,- such men will always be ready 303 At this juncture Jay came into possession of a letter written by Marbois, secretary of the French legation in America, to Vergennes which tended to confirm his suspicion of the French court. The letter criticized the United States in general, and in particular the opposition of Samuel Adams to any treaty which did not assure to the States the right to the Newfoundland fisheries.* Jay now felt certain that France intended not only to prevent America from obtaining a share in the fisheries but also to limit westward extension, and that Vergennes was playing double between Spain and the United States. He knew Spain desired to exclude the Americans from the Gulf of Mexico, and to do this she must keep the States from acquiring territory, and confine them to the region east of the summits of the Appalachian Mountains.† Gérard Rayneval, one of Vergennes' secretaries, now approached Jay on the subject of the boundaries, saying that America was presumptuous in laying claim to the West. He said the American demands were ill-founded and should be materially curtailed. ‡ He subsequently sent to Jay a memoir to pay the price which vanity shall demand from the vain."-See Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, p. 120. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. v., pp. 238-241; John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 368; Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., p. 483; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 188-189. † McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 14. John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 373. |