diffolving Parliaments. But how can this have any dangerous effects? He must call a new Parliament, at least once in seven years. And though the law requir ing that the Parliament should meet once a year, if ne- › ceffary, might be evaded, and has been evaded, under pretence that it was not neceffary; yet, in the prefent circumstances, fuch an evafion cannot take place: nor is it likely that it ever can, in any time to come; becaufe, while the fupplies are only granted from year to year, the meeting of Parliament is fo neceffary, that the army would be, ipfo facto, difbanded, the intereft of the national debt would remain unpaid, and the whole bufinefs of government would be at a ftand, if any year fhould pafs without a meeting of Parliament.

away.

The king has the power of appointing officers, civil, ecclefiaftical, and military, and of granting places and penfions; and, by this means, may indirectly bribe members of Parliament, and bring them over to the court fide. But this part of the prerogative is likewife under fuch regulations, that it cannot cafily become hurtful; for-1. The most important offices are given for life, fuch as thofe of the judges, bishops, and others. Though the king can give them, he cannot take them And if once a man has obtained what was the aim of his ambition, his gratitude will hardly influence him to vote, either to the diminution of his own confequence as a member of the legislature, or in oppofition to his party, or to his confcience, if he has any. How often have we seen a young clergyman in Scotland cringe to a patron for a prefentation: and, as foon as he had obtained it, profecute his benefactor for an augmentation of ftipend; because he knows, that he cannot recal his gift? Men are not more grateful to kings, than to others who do them a

like favour.-2. According to law, no perfon can enjoy a feat in Parliament, who is concerned in the management of any tax, impofed fince the year 1692; nor any who enjoys an office under the crown, created fince

no

the year 1705 : more can any commiffioner of prizes, of the navy or victualling office, nor any comptroller of army accounts, agent for regiments, or clerk in any of the offices of the revenue; nor any who enjoys a penfion from the crown during pleasure, or for any specified term of years. So that if a member of Parliament accepts any of thefe, he not only lofes his feat, but is incapable of being re-elected.-3. If any member accepts any office from the crown, of what kind foever it be, unless it be an officer in the army or navy accepting a new commiffion, his feat is thereby vacated: and if it be dangerous for him to continue in Parliament, the blame cannot ly upon the crown; but upon the people who choose him anew.

Befides thefe legal provifions against the bad effects of court influence; experience fhews, that neither offices, nor dignities, nor penfions, are fufficient to flop the mouths of those who are difpofed to join the oppofition. In fact every office in the gift of the Crown operates two ways. They who thirft for thefe things, hope to obtain them, not oftener by voting for the court, than by roaring against it. Thefe bawl out against every measure of government, good or bad, in hopes that administration will come up to their price. And after an office has been obtained, they who enjoy it do not on that account flick to the court party. How many instances have we feen of men eating the bread of government, and yet lifting up their heel against it? It may be odious to mention names; but plenty of inftances will occur to every one.

Morcover,

Moreover, every attentive person may fee, and every true friend of his country will fee it with pleafure, that when the tide of party runs highea, and when the court has the greateft majority on its fide, if a measure is propofed, that is manifeftly contrary to the interest of the nation, all the influence of the court is not able to carry it. Thus the Duke of Richmond's Fortification Bill was loft by a great majority; and fo was the Scots Militia Bill, though adminiftration was frengthened by the intereft of all the Scotch Members. In matters of fmaller importance, court influence, or attachment to a party, may fway a majority in either. Houfe. But I hope there are still as many Britons in Parliament, of independent fortunes, and independent fpirits, as will ever be able to prevent any party, whatever their influence may be, from doing any material injury to the country.

:

"But our king has alfo the power of making peace " and war, and of entering into treaties with foreign "nations and hence he may involve us in a ruinous war, and subject us to new taxes to defray the expence; or he may enter into alliances difgraceful or expenfive to the nation. And where fhall we find re"drefs?"True; fuch powers belong to the king: but if he enter into any war, prejudicial to the nation, he cannot carry it on without money; and money he cannot have, till it is granted by Parliament. Or, if he enter into any treaty, which brings any expence upon the nation, that treaty cannot be carried into effect till the Parliament grant him the requifite fum. The Court will, therefore, take care how they enter into any war, or any fuch treaty, till they have fecurity that Parliament will fecond their views: becaufe they well know that the House of Commons, as keepers of the national

purfe,

purfe, have it always in their power to defeat their intentions, and expofe them to fhame among furrounding nations. Yea, they have power to impeach the minister who advised the pernicious measure; and to bring him, if he deferves it, to the block. Thus the minifter's fafety lies in his pleafing the nation; as he muft juftify every measure in the Houfe of Commons, in the face of those who want to fill his place, and who exert every talent to expose his errors or mistakes.

Again we are told, that "kings are very expenfive "things. This nation pays no lefs than a million year"ly to a man, for nothing but what any cobler might "do as well: and all this might be faved by fending "over him and his family to Germany."They, who fpeak in this manner, neither know what they fay, nor whereof they affirm. They labour under two capital mistakes. 1. That million of money, which is called. the Civil Lift, does not all go to the maintenance of the king's family. From it are paid all the salaries of the judges, the officers of ftate, and officers of the household; all the expence incurred either by the refidence of foreign ambaffadors at our court, or for maintaining our ambaffadors abroad;-befides penfions, fecret fervice money; and, in a word, the whole expence of the civil government. Whatever money is laid out by administration, it must be taken from this fum, unless it is otherwife exprefsly provided for by Parliament; as well as what goes to the maintenance of the king's family *. It muft, therefore, be either very ignorant or very wicked in men to cry out of all this expence as incurred

Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1. p. 331. Encyclopædia Bri

tannica, article CIVIL LIST.

Moreover, every attentive perfon may fee, and every true friend of his country will fee it with pleafure, that when the tide of party runs highed, and when the court has the greatest majority on its fide, if a measure is propofed, that is manifeftly contrary to the intereft of the nation, all the influence of the court is not able to carry it. Thus the Duke of Richmond's Fortification Bill was loft by a great majority; and fo was the Scots Militia Bill, though adminiftration was frengthened by the intereft of all the Scotch Members. In matters of smaller importance, court influence, or attachment to a party, may sway a majority in either Houfe. But I hope there are ftill as many Britons in Parliament, of independent fortunes, and independent fpirits, as will ever be able to prevent any party, whatever their influence may be, from doing any material injury to the country.

"But our king has alfo the power of making peace " and war, and of entering into treaties with foreign "nations: and hence he may involve us in a ruinous

war, and subject us to new taxes to defray the ex

he can

pence; or he may enter into alliances difgraceful or "expensive to the nation. And where fhall we find re"drefs?"True; fuch powers belong to the king: but if he enter into any war, prejudicial to the nation, he cannot carry it on without money; and money not have, till it is granted by Parliament. Or, if he enter into any treaty, which brings any expence upon the nation, that treaty cannot be carried into effect till the Parliament grant him the requifite fum. The Court will, therefore, take care how they enter into any war, or any fuch treaty, till they have fecurity that Parlia ment will fecond their views: because they well know that the Houfe of Commons, as keepers of the national

purfe,