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gative over the other; and the crown's having a negative over both.

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For although it would be ruinous to liberty, if the executive power were precifely in the fame hands with the legiflative; yet it is a very great advantage, that the king, to whom the execution of the laws is entrusted, should be one branch of the legiflature, and have a negative upon the whole. If this were not the cafe, he might be obliged to act against his judgement and confcience, in executing laws which he could not approve: Hence, not only would he be a flave upon the throne; but occafion would likewife be given to fuch remifsnefs and partiality in the execution of the laws, as, in process of time, must enfeeble the constitution. On the other hand, if the executive power were in the hands of the whole legislative body, there would be none to call them to account for mal-administration: They might not only make what laws they pleased;they might likewife 'execute the laws, or fuffer them to ly dormant, just as it should fuit their own intereft or ambition. With us, as foon as a law is past, they who compose the two Houfes of Parliament have no more to do with it than any other fubject. The execution of it paffes into other hands. And they who are to execute it, must be anfwerable to them who made it, if its execution be neglected or perverted; while they who made it are as much fubject to its operation as any other perfons in the kingdom.

This fuggefts another peculiar advantage of our conflitution: that as all ranks of perfons enjoy the rights of free men; our legiflators can never have any interest in oppreffing their inferiors; but every law that is detrimental to them, must prove hurtful alfo to themfelves. Moft members of both Houses of Parliament,

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are men of landed property. It can never be their inte reft to oppress their tenants and dependants; because they would thereby disable them for paying their rents, and fo diminish the value of their own eftates. Thus the people employed in agriculture are fafe from any fear of oppreffive laws, unless the majority of both Houfes of Parliament fhould becore fo infatuated as to ruin themfelves, with a view to ruin their country. They who are employed in manufactures, and in trade, have an equal fecurity, though it may not be so readily perceived, at firft view. It is plain that the increafing number of trading and manufacturing people muft increase the confumpt of provifions; this increases the demand for the fruits of the earth, and, of course, advan ces the price; and this again advances the value of land. Accordingly, the rent of land is advanced, in moft parts of Scotland, one half, or more, fince our trade and manufactures began to flourish. And notwithstanding this, land that fold at twenty years purchase, not many years ago, now fells at thirty, forty, and even fifty years purchase of the present rent. This may be partly owing to improvements in agriculture; but that it is likewife owing, in a great measure, to trade and manufactures, is plain from this circumftance, that this rife in the value of land is moft remarkable, in those places, where these are most attended to. Befides, it is plain, that, by means of thefe, the luxuries of life can be enjoyed by all ranks of perfons, at a much easier rate than they otherwife would be. We can furely wear filks and cottons, manufactured at Manchester, Glafgow, and Paifley, much cheaper than when they were all imported from Spain or the Eaft-Indies. Now, can any man fuppofe, that our legiflators will be fo blind to their own intereft, as to deprive themfelves of all thefe advantages

advantages, by willingly crushing trade, or cramping manufactures? It is true, that many of them are but little acquainted with thefe matters: hence trade has fometimes been hurt by thofe laws which were intended to promote it. But we are every day in lefs danger from this quarter. A good number of perfons have feats in Parliament who are as deeply engaged, both in manufactures and in trade, as any others in the nation. And this will be more and more the cafe, as trade and manufactures are extended. Much attention will be paid to their judgement, in framing laws relative to these matters: and whenever any law of that kind is found, by experience, to be hurtful, there can be no reafon to doubt but it will be repealed,

In other countries, where there is a hereditary monarchy, and a hereditary nobility,-the nobility have an intereft in taking part with the crown to opprefs the people. But, with us, it is the intereft of the peerage to protect the people from oppreffion: and, accordingly, whenever the liberties of the people have been in real danger, the nobility have ever been as active for the prefervation of them as the people themselves could be.This is owing to the very great difference between the ftate of the British peerage and that of the nobility in other countries. In France, for inftance, their nobility amounted to fifty thousand. They enjoyed exemption from all taxes and public burdens, except a very inconfiderable share of the land-tax. They held the common people in all the bondage of feudal vaffalage; and difdained to intermix with them by marriage, or by engaging in any kind of trade. They treated the common people as if they had belonged to an inferior fpecies of beings. All the defcendents of the nobility were nobles: they formed a nation within a nation: and

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their interefts were directly oppofite to thofe of the reft of mankind. The fame is the cafe in Spain, with this difference, that their Hidalgos are ftill more numerous, and their contempt of the people more fupercili ous. In most other nations of Europe it is little otherwife. But, with us, all the nobility, including the Scottish peers, do not amount to fix hundred. They are subject to all taxes, and contribute to the expences of the ftate as the commóns do. As individuals, they have no jurifdiction over the meanest of the people. They not only intermarry with the commons; but their children fink into commoners, and mingle with the crowd. Many of them betake themselves to trade, to agriculture, and even to manufactures. The eldest son only enjoys the peerage; and even he is a commoner during his father's life. Thus, as they derive their ho nour from the king; and, to preferve their own luftre, muft fupport that of the Crown:-fo their intereft is the fame with that of the people; and, for the fake of their own families, they must watch over the people's rights because any encroachment upon them would af- . fect their own children as much as thofe in the lowest ranks of life.

But, if ever the nobility fhould find, or think it their intereft, to opprefs the people; they cannot have it in their power, while our conftitution remains. One branch of the legislature is always chofen by the people: and it must be the fault of their electors if the members of the House of Commons are not men of abilities and of intel grity; for surely a competent number of such men may ftill be found in Britain, degenerate as the times are. If any law, prejudicial to the people, fhould pafs in the House of Peers, even though it were fupported by the whole influence of the Crown,-the Commons have

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power to reject it. Every attentive perfon must have obferved, that, fince the Revolution, the Houfe of Commons is the moft powerful branch of our legiflature: and long may they continue to be fo! for, while that is the cafe, the people of Great Britain can never be oppreffed; unless they are betrayed by their own chofen reprefentatives.

Paffing many other advantages of a political nature, which I do not confider myself as qualified fully to difcufs; one thing that should recommend our conftitution, in a peculiar manner, to diffenters of every denomination, is, that its genius is more tolerant, and more favourable to religious liberty, than that of most other nations. know that fome penal laws, on account of religion, are ftill in force; and others are only fufpended. Were administration rigorous in the execution of exifting laws, we might be ftill expofed to confiderable hardships. But we all know and feel that we enjoy a degree of religious liberty, which our fathers would have purchased at a great expence, and to which our brethren in other countries are abfolute ftrangers. We are allowed to worship God according to the dictates of conscience: and no man is punished for maintaining, nor even for propagating his religious opinions, if they are not deftructive of the public peace. We are fubjected to no additional taxes, nor to any pofitive inconvenience, beyond our brethren who adhere to the religious eftablishment. We enjoy the fame protection, in our perfons, our property, and our civil liberty, as they do. Even in our religious affemblies no man is fuffered to disturb or offer us any violence. We labour, indeed, under fome legal incapacities, which, to a few ambitious perfons among us,, may feem hard: but how tiffling are thefe in comparison of the privileges we enjoy! And