two countries engage in war. Can it be true, that persons who have expatriated themselves under such circumstances, can be bound to allegiance to their original country? Could such have been the understanding of any of the persons concerned? It does seem to me to be at war with the plainest principles of reason and humanity. In this case, the population is thrown off upon the principle of self-preservation in respect to the original country; it is received into the second, upon the principles of humanity; and afterwards, forsooth, it turns out that they are bound to be the enemy, or at best, but inefficient friends to the country in which they reside; into which they have been hospitably received, and by the laws of which they have been protected. Doctrines leading to such consequences cannot be true. But, sir, it is the practical consequences of this pretended right of Great Britain, of which we have the greatest cause to complain. Under the pretext of impressing English sailors, thousands of native-born American seamen have been forcibly dragged from their ships, their country, and friends, and compelled to endure a state of military imprisonment on board British ships of war, to fight against those who were not their enemies, and for those who had despoiled them of their liberty, and all which can endear life to man. It is true, the British Government disavows this practice, but it is equally true that it is persisted in; and it is equally true, that they are not ignorant that such must be the consequence of the practice of impressment. Gentlemen here lay great stress on what they are pleased to call the necessity of Great Britain's exercising this practice in order to secure her maritime power, which power, they say, is necessary to preserve her existence. I do not admit, sir, that the overgrown power now possessed by Great Britain is necessary to her existence; but, if it is, it is no argument with me for abandoning any of our rights. This doctrine of necessity, as applied to the British navy, is extremely vague; and if settled as a principle, would lead to consequences, by a very plausible kind of reasoning, which would destroy the maritime rights of every other nation. The naval superiority of Britain is necessary to secure her existence; the naval superiority of Britain cannot be supported without just as much of the commerce of the world as she deems necessary to effectuate this object; therefore, Britain ought to have the monopoly of all commerce; she ought to carry for all; she ought to buy and sell for all, if necessary to support her navy. Gentlemen, I hope, are not prepared to admit this; but really, when we see the various attempts which the British Government have made to change the old settled principles of national law, or rather to introduce new principles, I am compelled to believe she desires something like such monopoly. I am, for one, not prepared to yield to the correctness of her reasoning as to the necessity of pursuing such a course for the security of her national existence, or the existence of her Government; neither am I, admitting its correctness, willing to surrender 13th CoN. 2d SESS.-46 H. of R. any of our rights as an independent nation, in order to secure that object. Let us stand firmly by our own rights, and depend upon our own exertions for security. Sir, I will not enter into an examination of the question, whether this war was declared at the precise point of time when it ought. I will not endeavor to prove that it ought to have been declared sooner, or that the declaration ought to have been postponed awhile. We are engaged in war, and the great desideratum seems to be, in what way we can most probably get out of it without loss or disgrace. Neither will I undertake to investigate the question, whether this war has been skilfully conducted or not. I feel unable to say that it has been ably managed; it does seem to me, that the means furnished have not been well directed to the end. But this does not furnish to my mind a sufficient argument for withholding the means. When we furnish the means, we have done our duty; the responsibility will not rest on us; and I am entirely averse to take on myself the responsibility that might be consequent upon a denial of the means. I will now come to the question presenting itself more directly by the bill under consideration. This bill proposes to authorize a loan, the object of which is to procure money to defray the expenses of the war. We have passed sundry bills with a view to the prosecution of the war, which are all dependent, as to their efficacy, upon this; all of which will be entirely lifeless without this. This is necessary to add sinews and give motion to the whole machinery. Is it not expedient to pass it? I hold that it is. In reflecting upon this subject, I have concluded in my mind, that it is always expedient, when a nation is engaged in a state of war with a strong Power-with a Power capable of taking advantage of its errors and endangering its rights-to prepare amply and prosecute the war vigorously, without reference to the original cause of the war. I would pursue this course, sir, because I would be unwilling to put to hazard any of the unquestionable rights of the nation, by a feeble and inefficient course of warfare; because, sir, I would rather the nation to which I belong would have it in its power to dictate the terms of pacification than to be dictated to. I am not willing to admit, that as an individual, there are not many acts of injustice which I would rather suffer than do; in which I would rather be acted upon, than be the actor; but, sir, I will frankly declare, that I would rather take upon myself the proper dividend of almost any act of injustice to a foreign nation, than my portion of the disgrace that might be consequent upon a war feebly and inefficiently prosecuted. The nation against which we are making war, is ' a strong nation; of this we have ample evidence; very recently by her prowess, and through the means of her financial resources, the gigantic power of Bonaparte has been broken and dissipated in Spain and Portugal; she has been the very soul, the animating principle, and given sinews to that formidable league on continental Europe, which has defeated and driven the Emperor 281963 of France within the limits of his own empire. Have we then nothing to fear from her enterprises upon the supposition of remissness or negligence on our part? I apprehend we have. We present to her enterprises a frontier of about four thousand miles, vulnerable to her and her red allies at many points; already has she seized and held for more than a year, one of our territories; it is still vulnerable; one of our States is feeble in population, and in a manner severed from the rest of the nation. If we are remiss, will she not have it in her power to seize upon some weak point and hold it, demanding as the price of restitution some commercial sacrifice not before brought into view? She may tell you, we will not yield this advantage without an equivalent; this equivalent may be some restriction on your commerce; or it may be the entire use of the lakes, with barrier towns on this side to secure that object, or both. Have we any pledge that our enemy will not have the disposition to make the most of any successes consequent upon our negligence? The history of her usurpations, exactions, and bloodshed in India, will answer the question; and the affair of Copenhagen will guaranty that answer. Sir, the history of all nations and ages will admonish us against remissness or negligence in the conduct of a war. I will cite one or two examples. The history of the origin, progress, and termination of the second Punic war, between Carthage and Rome, exhibits to us an awful warning against any the least remissness. The ostensible origin of that war was the territorial limits of the two nations in Spain. Rome admonished the Carthagenians against crossing the river Iberus, and against molesting the people of Saguntum, her ally; she was probably right in so doing; she claimed not anything of Carthage in Africa. The Carthagenians regarded not her admonition; a large, well-disciplined army under Hannibal, the General of Carthage, the great est warrior of the age, commenced its march for the invasion and subjugation of Rome; this army crossed the Pyrenees, traversed the length of Gaul, crossed over the Alps, and fell down upon Italy; several great battles were fought, in which the arms of Carthage prevailed; and by the great victory of the Carthagenians at Cannæ, the power of Rome seemed to be almost annihilated; it seemed to be limited to the walls of the city. Here was an important crisis in this war; immediately after this victory, the Republic of Carthage ought to have amply and promptly supplied their General with fresh troops and money. Carthage was remiss; the consequence was, that the power of Rome revived; and finally, the fate of Carthage was settled on the plains of Zama. She was compelled to sue for peace; she lost her possessions in Spain; she yielded Rome tribute, and was ignominiously restricted in her navy and commerce. Now, sir, although I do not indulge a fear that it will be as bad with us as with Carthage; yet I cannot but fear, that through negligence, we may lose much; that we may be compelled to submit to terms disgraceful in themselves; FEBRUARY, 1814. and as I would, as a Carthagenian, have regretted the lack of the means which, in all probability, would have led to the subjugation of Rome, in preference to the losses and degradation of my own country, without reference to the cause of the war; so, as an American, I would regret that we should sustain any losses, or be compelled to submit to degrading terms; and I would the more regret it, if it should seem to be the consequence of negligence. I would prefer that we could dictate the terms of peace, rather than be dictated to, without any reference to the cause of the war. A strong example, sir, to show how unreasonably nations at war will rise in their terms with success, is exhibited in the celebrated war in Europe for the succession to the Spanish throne. In that war, Lewis XIV., with the greater part of the Spanish nation, was arrayed on the one side, contending for the right of a Bourbon to the throne; on the other, the Emperor of Austria, the United Provinces of Holland, and England, contending in favor of a descendant from the House of Hapsburg. In the progress of the war, Louis was so hardly pressed, that he offered, in order to secure his own dominions, to withdraw his forces from aiding his connexion; but so much were the allies elated with their success, that this would not satisfy them; they demanded that he should turn his arms against the competitor of the Bourbon family, his grandson. He refused this, and the result was such as it ought to have been. I am decidedly of opinion, that it is expedient to authorize the loan. The honor, interest and safety of this nation, I believe, require it. I will vote, sir, for this loan, with a view to pave the way for a vigorous prosecution of the war; and I am decidedly opposed to any legal geographical limit to our military operations; I am unwilling that we should by law, as some desire, confine our exertions to our own territory. If we were thus to limit ourselves, the enemy would have it completely in their power to choose the time and place of battle, and could never be expected to fight us but when they were able to beat us: if we marched an army to any point of our frontier to oppose and give them battle, they would not be there unless able to beat us; but you would immediately hear of some incursion into our territory in some other part; march an army to this second point, and you will not find them unless in sufficient force to beat you. Again, sir, under this system of confining ourselves to geographical limits, the enemy will be permitted to make the utmost of any victory obtained near our borders, whilst on the other hand the crossing the line in flight will save their routed armies. I cannot consent, sir, to shield a flying foe by an act of Congress. I wish, sir, to see this war conducted according to the best rules of the art: the sum of which is, to produce to our enemy the greatest possible loss of blood and treasure by the least possible loss on our side. I believe this will be better effected by concentrating a sufficient force and making an invasion of their territory, than by waiting for their enter |