83. Origin of Parties (1774-1783)

BY JOHN ADAMS (1812)

This letter, written long after Adams had retired from active life, was addressed to William Keteltas, who, at the beginning of the War of 1812, had written a pamphlet called The Crisis. · For Adams, see No. 53 above. -Bibliography: Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, VII, 296-299; Alexander Johnston, American Politics, v-vii; Channing and Hart, Guide, § 160.

I

Quincy, 25 November, 1812. HAVE received your polite letter of the 6th of the month and your present of the "Crisis." You will excuse a question or two. In page first, you say, "Our administrations, with the exception of Washington's, have been party administrations." On what ground do you except Washington's? If by party you mean majority, his majority was the smallest of the four in all his legislative and executive acts, though not in his election.

You say, 66 our divisions began with federalism and anti-federalism." Alas! they began with human nature; they have existed in America from its first plantation. In every colony, divisions always prevailed. In New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and all the rest, a court and country party have always contended. Whig and tory disputed very sharply before the revolution, and in every step during the revolution. Every measure of Congress, from 1774 to 1787 inclusively, was disputed with acrimony, and decided by as small majorities as any question is decided in these days. We lost Canada then, as we are like to lose it now, by a similar opposition. Away, then, with your false, though popular distinctions in favor of Washington.

In page eleventh, you recommend a "constitutional rotation, to destroy the snake in the grass; " but the snake will elude your snare. Suppose your President in rotation is to be chosen for Rhode Island. There will be a federal and a republican candidate in that State.

Every federalist

in the nation will vote for the former, and every republican for the latter. The light troops on both sides will skirmish; the same northern and southern distinctions will still prevail; the same running and riding, the same railing and reviling, the same lying and libelling, cursing and swearing, will still continue. The same caucusing, assemblaging, and conventioning. John Adams, Works (edited by Charles Francis Adams, Boston, 1856), X, 22-23.

84. "Memorial to the Sovereigns of America"

(1783)

BY THOMAS POWNALL

For Pownall, see No. 26 above. Here he strikes the key-note of American policy. - Bibliography: Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, VII, 524; John Adams, Works, X passim.- For other discussions of the American policy, see Nos. 106, 147, 148 below.

TH

HIS Memorial hath stated and explained the operation of the internal self-working Principle, as the first cause of union in Community, which by one common energy of universal attraction creates (as in nature by natural principles) one common center, to which the several energies of each and all tend and conspire. If human nature, and a community of human beings, could be found perfect as to reason, truth, and wisdom; not to be perverted by passions; not to be seduced and corrupted by vicious affections; this attractive principle would alone be efficient to the End of union in Government. This is not the case; God hath therefore been pleased to superadd another cause, arising from the very defects and depravations of man, which operates from without. This compresses men against their repulsive fears and jealousies of each other, against the repellant temper which frauds, dissentions, violence, and attempts at domination, raise amongst them, by a still stronger compulsive power into closer contact, and mutual alliance for common defence. It is happy for a State, especially for a newlyestablished State, when this external cause continues to act; and acts to one and the same end in aid of the internal principle.

It is, on the other hand, an unfortunate and dangerous crisis to young and rising States, if the external compressive cause, which hath been found useful to a State, by rendering internal peace and union necessary, and hath been in that line of efficiency applied as part of the political System, ceases to act. . . . now that the Imperium of Great Britain resides no longer within the Empire of the United States; now that the British Nation is removed from within the Dominion of those States; now that the States dwell almost alone on their great Continent, and are absolutely the Ascendent Power there; if the true spirit of liberty. . . and the genuine spirit of Government, does not act by the internal attractive principle of Union strongly and permanently in proportion as the external compressing cause of confederation is removed, the Americans will experience the same Fate and Fortune, and be driven, by the same miseries, to the same ruinous distress which the States of Greece and the city of Rome had wretched experience of.

It is, however, peculiarly happy for the American States, whatever be the force and temper of this internal principle with them; that an external compressive cause is not wholly taken off. When they consider the difficulties which they will have to render the line of Frontiers between their Empire and the British Provinces in America a line of Peace; when they experience in fact and practice the difficulties of preserving it as such; when they speculate upon the almost numberless, and, at present, nameless, sources of dispute and contention, which may break out between them and Spain; when, in the cool hours of unimpassioned reflection, they begin to be apprized of the danger of their very Alliances; they will see that this compressive cause does not cease to act. . . . If they improve the feelings which the States will from time to time experience of danger to the interest of the General Imperium from external force, so as to work the impression, which fears of that external power creates, to a permanent habit of union and confederation, as a principle of their Empire, never to be remitted, diminished, or departed from for a moment, these States will derive internal Union and Stability to their Government from those very dangers, or the fears of those dangers, which threaten it. If, on the other hand, it should unfortunately become the system of their Politics, that, divided into parties, each ascendant party of the time should, by reference to, and the interposition of, those external powers, aim to strengthen their own interest, the state may retain its sovereign Station; but their own Rulers will scarcely be the Sovereigns: the Reason of State will be no longer its

own reason; and its Liberty will, even while it seems to act in all its forms, be bound down by the predestination of External Powers. The several States, or several Parties in the States, instead of coalescing by one uniform general attraction to the common center, will become like the blood of life in a fever, clotted into partial diseased coagulations of faction, having the most violent repulsion amongst each other...

... This Memorial . . . will only repeat what the Memorial addressed to the Sovereigns of Europe stated as a maxim (rather a fundamental Principle) of American Politics: "That as Nature hath separated her from Europe, and hath established her alone (as a Sovereign) on a great Continent, far removed from the Old world and all its embroiled interests, that it is contrary to the nature of her existence, and consequently to her interest, that she should have any connexions of Politics with Europe other than merely commercial; that she should be a FREE PORT to all Europe at large, and in reciprocity claim a FREE MARKET in Europe; and that she should have no commercial treaties with any European Power partial to such power and exclusive to others; but that she should give and enjoy a free Navigation and an open trade with all." Fundamental Principles similar to these, although they may not have been able to prevent her from forming some connexions, some alliances, may yet, if a system of Politics is founded on them as decided maxims of State, and invariably and uniformly pursued, preserve her from the entanglements in which she might be otherwise involved, and guard her against the dangers which the consequences of those connexions may lead to. Although a bold and daring, or a lucky stroke, may succeed for the hour or the season, or in the transient small affairs of Individuals ; yet nothing but System, as it arises from the nature of the State, will be efficient to any permanent purpose . . . The conclusion upon the whole is, that, if the New Sovereign Republic of America hath the right conscious sense of natural liberty and political Freedom; if it is animated with, and actuated by, the genuine Spirit of efficient Sovereignty; if it hath had the wisdom to harmonize itself within according to this Spirit, and to form a grounded and permanent System towards All without; secured against itself, armed against the Strokes of fortune, and guarded against the malignity of Man; it is established as Nature herself, and will Command one may not only wish, but as of Nature herself one may pronounce ESTO PERPETUA.

Thomas] Pownall, A Memorial addressed to the Sovereigns of America (London, 1783), 37-52 passim.

85. An Opinion of Hamilton (1792)

BY SECRETARY THOMAS JEFFERSON

Jefferson was the organizer of Democratic-Republicanism, and Madison was his first lieutenant. Although Hamilton was not mentioned in this letter to Washington, he was nevertheless the man whose measures were criticised. For Jefferson, see No. 10 above. Bibliography: Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, VII, 302303; Channing and Hart, Guide, § 160.

PHILADELPHIA May 23. 1792.

...

HEN you first mentioned to me your purpose of retiring from the government, tho' I felt all the magnitude of the event, I was in a considerable degree silent. . . . I knew we were some day to try to walk alone . . . The public mind . . . was calm & confident, and therefore in a favorable state for making the experiment. Had no change of circumstances intervened, I should not, with any hope of success, have now ventured to propose to you a change of purpose. But the public mind is no longer confident and serene; and that from causes in which you are in no ways personally mixed. . . .

It has been urged . . . that a public debt, greater than we can possibly pay before other causes of adding new debt to it will occur, has been artificially created, by adding together the whole amount of the debtor & creditor sides of accounts, instead of taking only their balances, which could have been paid off in a short time: That this accumulation of debt has taken for ever out of our power those easy sources of revenue, which, applied to the ordinary necessities and exigencies of government, would have answered them habitually, and covered us from habitual murmurings against taxes & tax-gatherers, reserving extraordinary calls, for those extraordinary occasions which would animate the people to meet them: That though the calls for money have been no greater than we must generally expect, for the same or equivalent exigencies, yet we are already obliged to strain the impost till it produces clamour, and will produce evasion, & war on our own citizens to collect it: and even to resort to an Excise law, of odious character with the people, partial in it's operation, unproductive unless enforced by arbitrary & vexatious means, and committing the authority of the government in parts where resistance is most probable, & coercion least practicable. They cite propositions in Congress and suspect other projects on foot still to increase the mass of debt. They say that by borrowing at of the interest, we might have paid off the principal in 3