defence with extraordinary indulgencies. By two statutes, enacted fince the Revolution, every perfon indicted for high treafon fhall have a copy of his indictment, a list of the witneffes to be produced, and of the jury impanelled, delivered to him ten days before the trial; he is alfo permitted to make his defence by counfel-privileges which are not allowed to the prifoner, in a trial for any other crime: and what is of more importance to the party than all the reft, the testimony of two witneffes, at the least, is required to convict a perfon of treason; whereas, one pofitive witnefs is fufficient in almost every other species of accufation.

We proceed, in the second place, to enquire in what manner the conftitution has provided for

though he may have been committed by a fecretary, or other high officer of ftate, by the privy council, or by the king in perfon: fo that no fubject of this realm can be held in confinement by any power, or under any pretence whatever, provided he can find means to convey his complaint to one of the four courts of Westminster Hall, or, during their recess, to any of the Judges of the fame, unless all these several tribunals agree in determining his imprisonment to be legal. He may make application to them, in fucceffion; and if one out of the number be found, who thinks the prifoner entitled to his liberty, that one poffeffes authority to restore it to him.

its own preservation; that is, in what manner each part of the legislature is fecured in the exercife of the powers affigned to it, from the encroachment of the other parts. The fecurity is fometimes called the balance of the conftitution; and the political equilibrium, which this phrafe denotes, confifts in two contrivances-a balance of power, and a balance of intereft. By a balance of power is meant, that there is no power poffeffed by one part of the legislature, the abufe, or excefs of which is not checked by fome antagonist power, refiding in another part. Thus the power of the two houfes of parliament to frame laws is checked by the king's negative; that, if laws fubverfive of regal government fhould obtain the confent of parliament, the reigning prince, by interpofing his prerogative, may fave the neceffary rights and authority of his ftation. On the other hand, the arbitrary application of this negative is checked by the privilege which parliament poffeffes, of refusing fupplies of money to the exigencies of the king's adminiftration. The conftitutional maxim, "that "the king can do no wrong," is balanced by another maxim, not lefs conftitutional, "that "the illegal commands of the king do not justify "thofe who affift, or concur, in carrying them

"into execution;" and by a fecond rule, fubfidiary to this," that the acts of the crown acquire not a legal force, until authenticated "by the fubfcription of fome of its great officers." The wisdom of this contrivance is worthy of obfervation. As the king could not be punished, without a civil war, the conftitution exempts his perfon from trial or account; but, left this impunity fhould encourage a licentious exercife of dominion, various obftacles are opposed to the private will of the fovereign, when directed to illegal objects. The pleasure of the crown must be announced with certain folemnities, and at-. tefted by certain officers of ftate. In some cases, the royal order must be fignified by a secretary of state; in others, it muft pafs under the privy seal; and, in many, under the great feal. And when the king's command is regularly published, no mifchief can be achieved by it, without the miniftry and compliance of thofe to whom it is directed. Now all who either concur in an illegal order, by authenticating its publication with their feal or fubfcription, or who in any manner affift in carrying it into execution, fubject themfelves to profecution and punishment, for the part they have taken; and are not permitted to plead or produce the command, of the king, in justifi

VOL. II.

P

juftification of their obedience*. But farther; the power of the crown to direct the military force of the kingdom, is balanced by the annual neceffity of reforting to parliament for the maintenance and government of that force. The power of the king to declare war, is checked by the privilege of the house of commons, to grant or withhold the fupplies by which the war muft be carried on. The king's choice of his minifters is controlled by the obligation he is under of appointing those men to offices in the ftate, whe are found capable of managing the affairs of his government, with the two houses of parliament. Which confideration impofes fuch a neceffity upon the crown, as hath in a great measure fub

*Amongst the checks, which parliament holds over the administration of public affairs, I forbear to mention the practice of addreffing the king, to know by whofe advice he refolved upon a particular meafure: and of punishing the authors of that advice, for the counfel they had given. Not because I think this method either unconftitutional or impro

but for this reafon-that it does not fo much fubject the king to the control of parliament, as it fuppofes him to be already in fubje&tion. For if the king were fo far out of the reach of the refentment of the houfe of commons, as to be able with fafety to refufe the information requested, or to take upon himself the refpenfibility enquired after, there must be an end of all proceedings founded in this mode of application.

dued

dued the influence of favouritifm; infomuch that it is become no uncommon fpectacle in this country, to fee men promoted by the king to the highest offices and richest preferments which he has in his power to bestow, who have been diftinguished by their oppofition to his perfonal inclinations.

By the balance of intereft, which accompanies and gives efficacy to the balance of power, is meant this-that the respective interefts of the three eftates of the empire are fo difpofed and adjusted, that whichever of the three fhall attempt any encroachment, the other two will unite in refifting it. If the king fhould endeavour to extend his authority, by contracting the power and privileges of the commons, the house of lords would fee their own dignity endangered by every advance which the crown made to independency upon the refolutions of parliament. The admiffion of arbitrary power is no less formidable to the grandeur of the aristocracy, than it is fatal to the liberty of the republic; that is, it would reduce the nobility from the hereditary fhare they poffefs in the national councils, in which their real greatness confifts, to the being made a part of the empty pageantry of a defpotic court. On the other hand, if the