British and Russian ambassadors, afraid that this letter, if delivered, might irritate the King of Prussia, and alienate him from their cause, prevailed upon Count Lövenhjelm not to deliver it, and the King of Prussia was led to conceive that he had been sent not to him, but to the Emperor of Russia. Count Lövenhjelm wrote to the King of Sweden, and urged him to recal the letter, but Gustavus wrote back a preremptory order to deliver the letter, and observed, that he was not a man to put up with a refusal to receive his letters.

"The King of Sweden was so much provoked that he threw up the command of the Russian troops, and refused to allow any Swedish troops to leave Pomerania. At last the Russian minister, Alopæus, in some measure pacified him by receiving the letter, and promising to send it to the King of Prussia. In consequence of this misunderstand ing, the projected invasion of Holland was prevented, and an army of troops, paid by Great Britain to act against France, was recalled without attempting any thing.

"At last a declaration was obtained from Prussia, that no attack was intended upon Pomerania; but still the King of Sweden continued to negotiate, insisting upon a declaration, from that power, that the Swedish troops would not be molested in Hanover, or on their march to Holland. The Swedish troops were then allowed to approach Luneburg; the king regulated their line of march himself, and frequently ordered them to stop for the night in villages that did not exist. No provisions were provided, and they who were ordered to form magazines

were left ignorant where they were to be placed; the guards and king's regiment were left without shelter at the end of November, and in the most dreadful weather.

"Meanwhile, after the surrender of Mack, the capture of Vienna; and the battle of Austerlitz, the Swedish troops were ordered to march into Hanover. They took possession of Harburg, and attempted the most iniquitous exactions, which it was found impossible to enforce. The Emperor of Austria had been forced to accede to a treaty dictated by Buonaparte, and the Emperor of Russia had retired in disgust to Petersburgh. The situation of the Swedes became critical. Louis Buonaparte menaced them in front, while Augereau and Baraguay d'Hilliers threatened their rear. Thus situated, Gustavus offered to resume the command of the Russian troops, but was informed that it had already been bestowed on the King of Prussia, who had expressed his determination to occupy Hanover, and protect the north of Germany from the war.

"The British troops, who had never lost sight of their transports, returned home; and the British ministry iutimated to Gustavus that any attempt on his part to protect Hanover was superfluous; but his enmity to Prussia induced him to remain on the left bank of the Elbe. He insisted that the King of Great Britain should officially desire him to retreat; but was informed that such a step would be authorizing the King of Prussia to occupy Hanover. The Prussians continued to advance: Gustavus prudently retired himself, but left Count Lövenhjelm with 1800 men, and peremptory orders to fire upon the Prussians if

they

they attempted to cross the Elbe. A long negociation took place with the British ministry which it is needless to detail: mean while the Swedish troops were all withdrawn except about 300; the Prussian alliance with France became publickly known; the troops of the King of Prussia advanced, refused to fire upon the Swedes, opened a passage for them to retire, and when the Swedish soldiers fired, and prepared to fight, the Prussian officers declared that there was no wish whatever of entering into hostilities with Sweden. Gustavus immediately blockaded the Prussian ports, and ordered the towns upon the coast to be bombarded, unless they agreed to pay for their security. This extraordinary step was persisted in notwithstanding the remonstrances of Great Britain and Russia, and notwithstanding the risk of the loss of Pomerania; till at last the King of Prussia, who was now preparing for the impending conflict with France, agreed to evacuate Lauerbourg. The Swedish troops took possession of that dukedom, and soon after Count Lövenhjelm occupied Ratzeburg.

"The King of Prussia was now too far advanced in his unfortunate and fatal quarrel with France, to pay any attention to the petty efforts of the King of Sweden. During the short but decisive war between Napoleon, and Prussia and Russia, nothing short of infatuation can account for the conduct of Gustavus. He was urged repeatedly by the French to make peace, and offered his own terms. How far the French were sincere in these offers it is impossible to say. For my part, I firmly believe that if the King of Sweden had entered zealously into

1913.

the new system which Buonaparte established immediately after the conquest of Prussia, and had excluded all British vessels from his harbours, in that case Buonaparte would have allowed him to retain his territories, and he would have avoided the Russian and Danish war. The consequence would have been that the Baltic would have been more completely shut against British commerce, and Russia would have been obliged to alter her politics at a more early period than she has done. She might have even made common cause with Austria in the late short and disastrous war which that power carried on against France. It was probably fortunate for Europe that this did not happen. So miserably poor was the conduct of Austria, such a want of abilities, firmness, and patriotism was displayed by the Emperor of Austria and his family, that no assistance either from Russia or Britain would have been of the least avail. The late invasion of Russia, and the loss of three or four hundred thousand men was a greater blow to Buonas parte than could have been inflicted by any two of the continental powers united against France.

"During the whole of the Prussian war the Swedes remained quiet, in Pomerania, in consequence of an armistice with the French army in that district. But as soon as the peace of Tilsit was concluded, the King of Sweden declared the armistice at an end, and refused either to renew it, or enter into any negotiation with the Emperor of France, Swedish troops, amounting to a few thousand men, were speedily driven into Stralsund, and that town, which had been entirely neglected, was not capable of making much defence

F

The

against

1

against a besieging enemy. But the king, relying upon assistance from heaven, refused either to give it up, or to make any preparations to defend it. But when the French advanced, and began to throw up batteries, he prudently withdrew to Rugen, and soon after the town was abondoned to the enemy.

"About 8,000 British troops were lying in Rugen, under the command of Lord Cathcart. The British ministry formed the project of seizing the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, and sent a sufficient fleet and army for that purpose into the Baltic. The command of the army was given to Lord Cathcart, and he was ordered in consequence to withdraw his troops from Rugen, and land them in the island of Zealand. This order being communicated to the King of Sweden, he not only refused to allow them to go; but though he had only 800 Swedes at most, threatened to throw the whole British army into prison. At last he was pacified, the British troops were carried to Zealand, and the result of the expedition is sufficiently known. The King of Sweden with drew to Soonia; and the island of Rugen, not being capable of defence, was speedily evacuated by the Swedish troops.

"It was firmly believed by all the Swedish gentlemen with whom I conversed on the subject, that at the meeting at Erforth, between Bonaparte and the Emperor of Russia, it had been agreed upon that Sweden should be divided between Russia and Denmark, and that the river Motala and ridge of mora ains that runs north from it, should be the boundary between these two kingdoms. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that at the treaty of Tilsit it had been agreed upon to

force Sweden to accede to what Bonaparte chose to call the continental system. Russia speedily announced this resolution to the King of Sweden, and urged him to unite with Russia and Denmark, in ‘an armed neutrality, similar to that of 1780 and 1800. This Gustavus had peremptorily refused. He must have been aware therefore, from the beginning, of an impending war with Russia and Denmark; yet no preparations were made to resist the threatened invasion. Unless we consider a treaty with Great Britain, and a subsidy from that power of 1,200,000l. annually as a preparation.

"The war lasted little more than a year, and notwithstanding the prodigious disparity of force, if we consider the situation of Sweden, the zeal of her population, and the great number of troops she had on foot, not fewer than 100,000 men, there can be little doubt that, with commón prudence, and with the assistance which they would have received from Great Britain, they might have been able victoriously to oppose the enemy, and maintain the integrity of the Swedish dominions. But the conduct of the King bid defiance to all prudence and common sense, and made it impossible either for his generals or ministers to be of the least service to their country.

"The Russians invaded Finland on the 11th of January 1808, with an army of about 30,000 men. The Swedish troops in that country amounted to 9540 men, 6261 of whom were posted in the north, and 3279 in the south. Besides this, Sveaborg, a very strong fortress, built upon several islands, on the south coast of Finland, had a garrison of 6000 men. The small band

of

of Swedish troops near the southern frontier, under the command of Lieutenant-General Von Klercker, retired before the enemy, after making a gallant and spirited resistance. The object was to make good their retreat into East Bothnia, in order to join the Finnish militia, and the army of the north. General Count Cronstedt, who retreated by another road, succeeded in his object, in spite of the inclemency of the season, and the opposition of the enemy, and joined the main army with little loss. Field Marshal Count Klinspor took the command of the division led by Von Klercher, at Tavastehus. It was repeatedly attacked by the Russians, particularly at Pyhäjocki and Sikajocki. In the last of these, General Adlercreutz distinguished himself at the head of the Finns; broke through the centre of the Russians, took several hundred prisoners, and compelled the rest to retreat. No immediate attempt however was made by the King of Sweden, either to reinforce his small army in Finland, or to concentrate his troops for the defence of his kingdom.

"But as soon as he heard of the invasion of Finland by the Russians without any previous declaration of war, he immediately ordered Mr. Alopæus, the Russian minister, to be confined to his house, his papers to be seized, and information to be given to him, that he had no longer any diplomatic character. The governor of Gottenburg was ordered to seize the papers of the Russian Consul, and to confire him to his house. A courier sent from Russia to the Russian ambassador at Stockholm was arrested, and his dis'patches published. Next day, a declaration of war on the part of Denmark was received, The Danish

ambassador was ordered to leave the kingdom, and the hour of his depar ture fixed, and these orders were conveyed to him by means of a military officer.

"Meanwhile the whole of South Finland was occupied by the Russians; the important fortress of Sveaborg was shamefully given up by the treachery of Vice-Admiral Cronstedt; and the islands of Oland, which were not defended by any military force, were occupied without opposition by a detachment of Russians. As the season advanced, when the ice round these islands began to break up, and all communication with the neighbouring continent was interrupted, the inhabitants rose upon the small Russian force left to protect their conquest, and made them prisoners of war. Thus these islands were recovered without difficulty, and the same thing happened to some Russian soldiers who had landed in the island of Gothland, and taken possession of it.

"But Gustavus was now intent upon the conquest of Norway, and of the Danish islands in the Baltic, and therefore gave himself little concern about what took place in Finland. The Swedish army on the western frontier, amounting to about 12,500 men, were ordered to enter Norway in two bodies, and they were spread over so great an extent of country, as to form a very weak and inefficient line. They gained some advantages at first, but being left totally unsupported, and even without a supply of provisions, they were soon obliged to retreat into their own country, and take up a defensive position. Gustavus had already altered the whole of his plans, and had determined, with the assistance of a body of British troops,

"He had from the commencement of the war solicited an increase of the subsidy from Britain, and a body of troops to enable him to oppose his enemies with more efficacy. The Swedish ambassador at London, aware of the desperate state of his country, had prevailed upon the British ministry to send 10,000 men to Gottenburg, under the command of Sir John Moore, pledging himself that they would be immediately landed and treated with the greatest attention at Gottenburg, till a plan for their future services should be concerted between the King of Sweden and Sir John Moore. The troops were accordingly sent under the following conditions stipulated by the English ministry: that the troops should be under the immediate command of their own general, that they should not be obliged to march to any great distance from their transports and vessels of war, and that it should be in the power of the British ministry to recall them whenever their services should be requisite in any other quarter. When the British troops arrived at Gottenburg, the King of Sweden prohibited them from landing; and when he was applied to for the purpose by the British ambassador, he answered that he considered the application as an insult, and expected therefore that it never would be repeated. Sir John Moore came to Stockholm to form a plan of operations with the King. The first proposal of Gusta vus was, that the British troops should unite with a Swedish army, and invade the island of Zealand. Sir John Moore answered, that he was expressly prohibited by his instructions from joining in any such scheme. This refusal greatly irri

favourite project, from which his ministers and generals had in vain attempted to divert him, by showing that he was not provided with a sufficient quantity of troops, or warlike engines, to make an attack upon Copenhagen with any chance of success.

"His next proposal was that the British troops should land in the neighbourhood of Petersburgh, in order to make a diversion in favour of the Swedish army in Finland. Sir John Moore declined this plan, observing that it was very well conceived if the object of the King was to give the Russians some thousand British prisoners of war; but that the neighbourhood of Petersburgh was at too great a distance to be of any service as a diversion to the Finnish army.

"Driven from these two objects, the King of Sweden again turned his attention to Norway, and proposed that the British troops in conjunction with the Swedes should make a new invasion of that country. Sir John Moore replied, that the British troops had been already confined for two months on board their transports, greatly to the injury of the health both of the men and horses; that it would be the beginning of August before the Swedish troops could be ready to take the field, a period much too long to continue on board the vessels. that account, since the King of Sweden had no immediate occasion for the British troops, he was determined in obedience to the orders of his own government, to return home. The King urged him to remain at Gottenburg, at least till new dispatches arrived from the British government. Sir John Moore at first consented to this; but when he went

On

home,