it was evident that Bonaparte was resolved to preserve the line of the villages at any expense of men, the Prussians were at last drawn off.

Hitherto the allies had been the assailants; but towards the evening, Bonaparte, having called in that division of his army which was near Leipsic, and collected all his reserves, made a most furious attack from his left on the right of the allies, while at the same time he supported and covered this attack by the fire of several batteries advancing. The allies seem not to have expected, or been prepared for, this movement; and therefore found it necessary to change the front of the nearest brigades on the right, and to order up the whole cavalry from the left to the right, to turn this attack: but before the cavalry could arrive, night put an end to the combat; the allies remaining in possession of the dis. puted villages, and of the line on which the enemy had stood.

The subsequent operations are not very clearly detailed in the of ficial accounts which the allies published respecting the battle of Lut zen. Orders, it is said, were given to renew the attack on the morning of the 2d of May: "but the enemy did not wait for it; and it was judged expedient, with reference to the general posture of the cavalry, not to pursue." In fact, the allies the next day commenced their retreat; and in consequence of this retreat, Bonaparte claimed the victory in the battle of Lutzen. But that it was by no means such a victory as he had been accustomed to, or had reason to boast of, was sufficiently evident even from his own account, and from the extreme pains which were taken in France to represent it as such. Cardinal Maury issued orders for

Te Deum on the occasion, in language that would have disgraced the meanest sycophant of the most corrupt and despotic Asiatic court: according to him, the genius of the emperor was again triumphant: in his last address to the legislative body, when he informed them that he was going to put himself at the head of his troops, he had foretold what had happened: after the prodigies which he had performed, the rank to which he had raised France, it was scarcely possible to regard him as mortal. Such was the language of cardinal Maury!

When once the allies had deter. mined to retreat (from whatever cause or with whatever object they came to this determination), it was of the utmost consequence that Bonaparte, superior as he was in numbers, should not throw himself first upon the Elbe, or get into the rear of the allies, so as to endanger their communication: they therefore continued their retreat in the line of the river Mulda: but its banks not affording any tenable position, they afterwards retired through Dresden, in order to occupy a defensive position behind the Elbe. They were thus conse quently obliged to give up Dresden to the enemy: but if all circumstances are taken into consideration, their retrograde movement must be deemed prudent and skilful. The consequences of avoiding a decisive action with Bonaparte, of drawing him on by degrees from his resources, and at the same time weakening him by attacks, or by acting on the defensive in favour able positions, had already been proved in the Russian campaign. Bonaparte, on the contrary, was anxious to bring the campaign in Germany to a speedy issue: he

must

must have known that a suspicion had gone abroad, and had found its way even into the minds of his own subjects, that he was no longer the child of fortune; and this suspicion he could drive out only by a victory as splendid and decisive as those of Jena or Austerlitz. The result of the battle of Lutzen, it is true, he had represented in this light; but he could not hope that he would long succeed in concealing its real character from the French nation. After the victories of Jena and Austerlitz there was little or no opposition: all was triumph on his part: all was submission on the part of his opponents. If therefore, as he knew must be the case, the allies still fought after the battle of Lutzen,-if his own progress was slow and difficult, his claim to victory in that battle would be denied.

But though Bonaparte was not decidedly victorious, yet the retreat of the allies, especially the circumstance of their yielding up Dresden without opposition to the French, rather injured their cause in Germany. The Saxons, whom they had invited to take up arms against the tyranny of France, perceiving how little able they were to protect them, began to incline towards Bonaparte; while the king of Saxony more than ever yielded himself up to his plans and wishes.

While the French head-quarters continued at Dresden, their army received considerable reinforcements, so as to form a mass little short of 200,000 men. They were divided into three armies: the principal, consisting of the 4th, 6th, 11th, and 12th corps, and the young and old guards, were collected opposite the position which the allies had taken up at Bautzen,

about thirty miles from Dresden : this army consisted of about 100,000 men, under the personal command of Bonaparte. The second army, which was about 50,000 strong, commanded by Ney and Lauriston, moved at the same time from Torgau on the right of the allies. The third army, which was composed of the troops under Victor, Sebas. tiani, and Regnier, and amounted to between 40,000 and 50,000, were marching from Magdeburgh, in the direction of Berlin.

About this time, that is, the middle of May, count Bubna arrived at Dresden with a letter from the emperor of Austria to Bonaparte : from what occurred afterwards, there can be no doubt that he brought proposals for an armistice, with a view to a general pacification: and it is worthy of remark, that the same French papers which announced the arrival of the im- " perial ambassador, give an account of the departure of Beauharnois for the north of Italy; which circumstance seems to prove, that even at this time Bonaparte anticipated the hostility of Austria, and had resolved to assemble an army on her southern frontier. At the same time that the count de Bubna was sent to Dresden, count Stadion was dispatched to the head-quarters of the allies. The emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia, it is said, agreed to the proposal of the emperor of Austria for an immediate suspension of hostilities; while Bonaparte eluded it, by saying that he would accede to it as soon as a congress was formed. The emperor of Austria, in order that his mediation might be the more ef ficient, gave orders to place his army on the full war establishment; and, what was certainly no favourable indication to Bonaparte, inY 4

trusted

trusted the command of the Bohe mian army (which was nearest the scene of military operations) to prince Schwartzenburg, at whose conduct in the Russian campaign Bonaparte had expressed strong dissatisfaction.

Hostilities, in the mean time, went on the allies, as we have already mentioned, retreated from the line of the Elbe to Bautzen, where their whole front was covered for several miles by the river Spree: their first line rested its left on the heights which overhang this river; while its centre was placed behind Bautzen, and its right at the village of Niemschutz: this position was naturally very strong and advantageous; but they moreover took those precautions which marked their skill and judgement. Another line was formed and strengthened by field works, at some distance in their rear, near the village of Hochkirken. Here they coolly and confidently waited the attack of the enemy.

Bonaparte had joined his principal army before Bautzen on the morning of the 19th of May, and spent the whole of that day in reconnoitring the strength and position of the allies: his force in this place consisted of the 4th, 6th, 11th and 12th corps, amounting in all to about 80,000 men; besides 12,000 of his guards, 14,000 cavalry, and a very numerous and powerful artillery. The right wing was formed of the 12th corps, under the command of Oudinot: the 11th, under Macdonald, formed the centre; and the 6th, under Marmont, formed the left: Mortier had the command of the guards, which were stationed in reserve: the cavalry were commanded by general Latour Maubourg. Bertrand was posted beyond Marmont,

on the left, for the purpose of threatening the right of the allies, and also that, if it were necessary, he might detach a division to communicate with the other great ar my which Bonaparte had ordered to move up from a village about 30 miles to the north of Bautzen. This army consisted of about 60,000 men, composing the 3d, 5th and 7th corps, under the command of Ney, Lauriston and Regnier. Bonaparte meant, by means of this army, to turn the right of the allies, while he himself attacked them in front. In this part of his plan,` however, he completely failed..

Such were the arrangements and strength of each party before the battle of Bautzen. On the 19th Bertrand detached a division, which was intercepted, and beaten with considerable loss: at the same time Ney, Lauriston and Regnier, moving forward to join Bertrand, were opposed with very inferior numbers by D'York and Barclay de Tolly; and after three hours very hard fighting they were only able to gain possession of a small village, at too great a distance from the proposed scene of action to enable them effectually to follow out the original plan.

These were only preliminary movements: on the 20th the grand attack began. The first object of the French was to force the passage of the Spree, which was effected (with dreadful loss from the fire of the artillery of the allies) by the corps under Oudinot, Macdonald and Marmont: the contest lasted seven hours, and the French at length accomplished their object, only by the very great superiority of their numbers. As soon as the enemy had gained the opposite banks of the river, the allies retired to their second position :-this was

SO

so strong, and the day already so far spent, that the French did not attempt to force it. The result of this day's engagement was, that the enemy occupied the village of Bautzen; but they took no artillery, no trophy of any kind, and scarcely any prisoners.

Bonaparte the next day made another attempt to turn the right of the alli; but in consequence of the failure which Bertrand's corps had experienced on the 19th, he was still further from his object than before. This general had, indeed, passed one of the branches of the Spree; but he could not form a junction with Ney, in consequence of the allies retaining possession of the heights on his right, between that general and himself.

On the 21st the battle was most obstinate and bloody: the left of the allies was attacked by Oudinot and Macdonald, but notwithstand ing their superiority they made scarcely any impression upon it: at the same time Ney, Lauriston and Regnier made an attack on their right: Ney advanced fighting along the banks of the Spree, as far as the village of Prielaitz, of which he gained possession; but he was soon afterwards driven from it with very considerable loss. As the occupation of this village was of the utmost consequence to his future operations, and indeed to his success, Bonaparte ordered the whole of the reserve to be brought up, under the command of Soult. The allies, in consequence of this movement, were obliged to turn their force from attacking Ney to defend themselves against Soult; and Ney, taking advantage of this circumstance, advanced again in front, and thus the whole French force was at last brought into action together. The allies, however,

still continued to maintain their ground; nor did they begin to retreat, even according to the French account, till four hours after the reserve under Soult was brought up. Their retreat appears to have been conducted in a very orderly manner; and an attempt made by the cavalry of the enemy to cut off, if possible, some part of the artil lery and baggage, was completely unsuccessful. The loss of the French, in this obstinate battle, was very severe: indeed, like the battle of Lutzen, though Bonaparte gained ground by it, he gained it at such an expense of men, and with such a conviction of the bravery and skill of the allies, that he must have been very unwilling to have obtained many such victories. But the most alarming circumstance which occurred during the battle of Bautzen was the desertion of a whole battalionof Wurtemburghers, as well as a body of Saxon troops, -a circumstance which decidedly proves that the victory of the French was not so great as Bonaparte represented it, while it must have convinced him, how little dependeuce he could place on the German troops.

The allies continued their retreat for several days successively: on the 24th of May their head quarters were within eighteen leagues of Berlin.

We have mentioned, both in the account of the battle of Lutzen and of Bautzen, the great superiority of the French: this seems a surprising and unaccountable circumstance. According to the statement given in our gazette, the army of the allies, in the latter battle, did not amount to 60,000 men, while the force of Bonaparte is calculated at 120,000. With this very great disproportion, the allies stood no

chance

chance with their opponent, unless they persevered in their plan of retreating; only offering resistance where their interiority was compensated by the strength of the position which they were enabled to

occupy.

While one part of the French army advanced towards Berlin, another took the route into Silesia. On the 24th, Ney, Lauriston and Regnier forced the passage of the Neiss, and on the 25th, that of the Queiss: after the passage of the latter river, three divisions of Macdonald's corps attacked the allies, in the hope of intercepting their retreat; but they failed in their purpose. The allies, after this, seem to have deviated from the direct line towards the Oder, and to have moved upon Schweidnitz: this change in the direction of their retreat probably was occasioned by their desire to occupy the strong places of Silesia, and by their hope that Bonaparte would not dare to follow them so far into that country. In this, however, they were mistaken; for he pushed one divi sion so rapidly after them, as within ten days after the battle of Bautzen to have advanced 100 miles into Silesia.

The emperor of Austria, in the mean time, was exerting himself to bring about an armistice; and from the frequent mention which was made of it in the French papers, it was evident that Bonaparte was anxious that it should take place. At length on the 4th of June it was concluded; it was to continue, on all points, till the 20th of July: the line of demarcation for the allied army extended from the frontiers of Bohemia to the Oder, through Bettlern and Althorf: the line of the French army extended from Bohemia Lahn, and thence

along the course of the river Katz, bach to the Oder: the space between the respective lines of demarcation, including the city of Breslau, was declared neutral. By this agreement, nearly the whole of Prussia was left in the occupation of the allies; the whole of Saxony and the Rhenish confederacy in that of the French: the fortresses of Dantzic, Zamose, Modlin, Stettin, and Custrin, in which were French garrisons, and which were besieged by the allies, were to be victualled every five days. As the actual state of Hamburgh, at the period of the conclusion of the armistice, was not accurately known to either party, it was agreed that, if it was only besieged, it should be treated like other besieged towns; and in this part of Germany the Elbe was to be the line of demarcation between the belli gerent armies. Hostilities were not to recommence till six days after the denunciation of the armistice at the respective head quarters.

It is difficult to determine on which side the advantage of this armistice lay: both were probably desirous of it; and as the emperor of Austria pressed it with great earnestness, each party readily agreed to it, in the hope of gaining his assistance, or avoiding his hostility. It was, however, extremely unpopular throughout Germany, and especially in the Prussian states; so much so, indeed, that the king of Prussia deemed it ne cessary to issue a proclamation, in which he declared that the armistice was not sought for by the allied powers that Bonaparte had requested it; and that the allied powers would make use of it only to reinforce their armies, and attack the enemy of Germany, at its expiration, with more vigour.

Bonaparte,