viously concluded with Sweden, by which we had guarantied Nor way to that power, operated principally against the success of count Bernstorff. Thus we perceive, that, at the commencement of 1813, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, were decidedly against France. Great Britain indeed could lend little military aid in Germany; but she was fighting the cause of Germany in Spain; and, as usual, she was liberal in her pecuniary assistance. The emperor Alexander put forth all his might all the resources of his extensive but unwieldy empire were cheerfully devoted by him to the cause in which he was embarked. Prussia, greatly exhausted by the exactions and contributions of France, could not bring into the field very numerous armies: but her soldiers were animated by the best spirit; her generals were experienced, and not only incorruptible, but animated by a deep hatred against Bonaparte; and her peasantry were eager to rise in defence of their sovereign and their country. The army which the crown prince had landed in Pomerania was composed of most excellent troops; brought into a high state of discipline under his own immediate inspection, and feeling towards him the most profound respect, and the most implicit confidence. Notwithstanding the reverses which Bonaparte had sustained, and the strength of the powers which were now united against him, yet it was natural to feel apprehension respecting the issue of the approaching campaign. The eyes and hopes of Europe were therefore directed towards the emperor of Austria: should he take an active part against his son-in-law, the success 1813. of the allies would be certain: should he be neutral, his very neutrality, by showing that he no longer was afraid of Bonaparte,that at length he durst refuse that assistance, which doubtless would be demanded,--must prove advantageous to the allies: of his decided and zealous hostility to them they could entertain no fears; since, in the Russian campaign, at that period of it when the event was doubtful, the Austrian auxiliary army had very faintly or reluctantly co-operated with the French. The' hopes of the allies, with respect to Austria, were raised by an event which occurred early in the year: for the auxiliary army of that power, which had been censured by Bonaparte for not keeping open his line of communication when he was compelled to retreat, entered into a convention with the Russians, and agreed to remain neutral. It was for a long time doubtful, whether Bonaparte, in the German campaign which he was about to commence, would have the assistance of Murat and his Neapolitan troops; as it was well known, that when Bonaparte committed the command of the remnant of his army to him, on his deserting it at Smorgonie, Murat almost immediately after the departure of his master also quitted Russia, and set off for Italy; indignant at the obstinacy which had sacrificed so many men, and put the sovereignty of both into such imminent jeopardy. Murat however, probably persuaded that his own power and that of Bonaparte must stand and fall together, at length consented to resume the command of the cavalry in the German campaign. Such were the forces on each side: but, on the side of Bonaparte, Y all all the troops belonging to the kings The allies were so true to the principles on which they declared they were determined to carry on the war, that they made not the least effort to shake the power of Bonaparte in France, by encouraging the partisans of the Bourbons there: their object really was to free themselves from French tyranny: they had no wish to interfere with the internal concerns of France. But the princes of the house of Bourbon thought the reverses of Bonaparte presented an opportunity which they ought not to neglect, of appealing to the French nation; and accordingly an address to the people of France was issued in the name of Louis XVIII. It was a cold and lifeless performance, which did not seem to come from the heart; and which certainly was not calculated to warm the hearts of those to whom it was addressed. It even stooped to flatter the senate of Bonaparte. It appeared from the answer given by ministers in parliament to some questions put to them respecting it, that they had neither authorised nor advised its publication. CHAPTER XX. The Russians spread themselves over the north-west of Germany-enter Hamburgh-Joy of the Inhabitants at their Liberation-their Joy of short Continuance-the French advance against it-distressed State of this City-Great Britain lends no Assistance—the Crown Prince refuses to send Swedish Troops to defend it-the Danes at first defend it, and afterwards suffer it to be taken by the French-Position of the grand Allied Armies-and of the French Armies-Bonaparte's Object in the Campaign -is at first successful—the Allies retire from the Saale, and concentrate their Forces on the Elster-they determine to attack the French-Movements for that Purpose Battle of Lutzen-the Allies remain Masters of the Field, but afterwards retreat-the French advance to Dresden-prepare to attack the Allies at Bautzen-dreadful Battle there-the Allies again retreat the French occupy great Part of Silesia—Armistice concluded. HAVIN AVING thus detailed the means with which each party prepared himself for entering into the mighty contest which was about to take place, we shall, before we proceed to the narrative of against Hamburgh; and this devoted city could expect no mercy from them if it again fell into their possession. They had been plundered before: their youths had been dragged away by the conscrip tion; but this would be mercy compared to what they must suffer if the French again entered their city. They therefore prepared every means of defence: the youths pressed forward to enrol themselves: the utmost alacrity and zeal prevailed: but unfortunately discipline and skill were wanting; and the enemy were greatly superior in numbers. As the Russians naturally expected to be joined by the people of Germany, as soon as they were freed from the dread and the presence of the French, they conceived it to be their policy to spread themselves as much as possible: accordingly, early in 1813, their light troops pushed down the banks. of the Elbe towards Hamburgh. The liberation of this city was desirable on many accounts: it had suffered more perhaps than any other city in Germany by the oppression and pillage of the enemy: if it were freed from them, commerce might again be carried on with Great Britain; and the Germans, seeing trade and industry revive, would be the more willing to rise against the French, and to unite with those to whom they were indebted for those blessings. For a considerable length of time before the Russians actually arrived, the inhabitants of Hamburgh were tantalised with the hope of their near approach: at length they entered the city; and never was joy superior to the joy of the Hamburghers on this occasion. They saw their deliverers: they again breathed the air of freedom: the period of their oppression and depradation they trusted was at an end. But their joy and tran. quillity and liberty were to be but of short duration. The Russians had run over more country than they could keep possession of: the French, having rallied and collect ed their scattered forces, advanced Under these critical circumstances, the people of Hamburgh looked for assistance to Great Britain: a few gun-boats sent up the Elbe might have protected the city-but they came not: Britain, to whom the possession of Hamburgh by the French was highly detrimental, did not stir in her defence. The enemy came nearer; they gained possession of the suburbs: the armed inhabitants of Hamburgh fought with remarkable bravery,→→ but their bravery was in vain. They then applied to the crown prince of Sweden: he had a large force in the north of Germany, which hitherto had been inactive, and part of this, it was supposed, he might have spared for the protection of the city. But he refused to divide his troops :-Hamburgh, he said, would follow the general fate of the war. If Bonaparte were decidedly beaten, it would become permanently free; but to beat him decidedly, it was necessary not to draw off any part of the allied army for minor objects. The inhabitants of Hamburgh now gave themselves up for lost: they prepared themselves for the immedi ate capture of their city; when Y 2 the the Danes from Altona most unexpectedly offered their assistance. The motive and object of the Danish government in thus opposing Bonaparte are not known: that they were sincere at the time there cannot be any doubt, for they proved their sincerity by the firm resistance which they made to the French troops. At last, probably after they found that the mission of their ambassador to the court of St. James was likely to be fruitless, they withdrew their protection from Hamburgh; but not until they had stipulated with Davoust, who commanded the French army, that the citizens should not be plundered quite so much as he otherwise would have plundered them. Many other places in the northwest of Germany, of which the Russians had obtained temporary possession, soon fell again into the power of the enemy: indeed this part of the plan of the campaign seems to have been arranged with little skill, policy, or foresight, by the Russians, as it would have been much more wise in them to have secured what they wrested from the French, rather than to have exposed the inhabitants to the sharpened fury and revenge of the enemy. We have already mentioned that Bonaparte left Paris, early in the month of April, to take the command of the army: the principal body of his old troops, the remnant of those who had escaped out of Russia, were under Beauharnois in the neighbourhood of Magdeburgh: but as soon as Bonaparte assumed the command of the new levies, this general began to move towards the upper part of the Saale, with a view to form a junction with him; while he, on his part, debouched from the Thuringian moun tains. At this period the main armies of the Russians and the Prussians were concentrating in the neighbourhood of Leipsic ;Wittgenstein's head quarters being twenty miles to the north, and Blucher's thirty miles to the south of that city, while D'York was in advance of Wittgenstein. The two main armies of the French evidently intended to form a junction near Jena. The left, under the command of Ney, about the middle of April was in front of Erfurt; while the corps of Bertrand, which formed the extremity of the right wing, had at the same date reached Cobourg: in the rear of Ney, at Gotha, Marmont was posted, and Berthier behind him. On the 19th of that month there was a sharp affair be tween a body of Prussians and the advance of Ney's corps under the command of Souham: the contest took place near Weimar: the Prussians behaved nobly: they drove the enemy thrice through that town; but at length were obliged to yield to superior numbers, and retreated behind Jena. Towards the end of April, the advanced. posts of the adverse armies were on the opposite banks of the Saale, and it was evident that a general engagement would soon takeplace. So far Bonaparte had been successful in carrying his plan of the campaign into execution; for his plan evidently was, to concentrate his forces on the right bank of that river, near the extensive plain of Lutzen. His army, superior in numbers to the army of the allies, he hoped would on this plain fight to great advantage. It seems to have been the intention of the allies, by the early junction of Blucher and Wittgenstein, to have com pelled pelled Beauharnois to have retreat ed; but their junction having been delayed, the French general was enabled to move up the Saale, while Ney descended its left bank, and Bertrand its right. During the movements necessary for this purpose, the French, though they ultimately effected their object, encountered a formidable opposition; for Lauriston and Macdonald endeavoured for three days successively to force a passage at three points, and it was only at the third attempt that they succeeded. In consequence of these movements on the part of the enemy, it was judged prudent for the allies to re-, tire from the Saale, and concentrate their forces on the Elster. On the morning of the 1st of May the emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia arrived at Borna with the reserve; and the last division of general Tormasoff's corps having crossed the Elbe a few days before, and moved forward by forced marches towards the Elster, the whole allied army was by the afternoon of the 1st of May collected in the neighbourhood of Borna on the plains of Lutzen. The soil in this part of Germany is dry and light, the country uncovered and open; but there is considerable variety of hill and dale, with many hollow ways and millstreams, the former not discernible till nearly approached. In the course of the 1st of May count Wittgenstein reconnoitred the country, and the situation and movements of the enemy: the great masses of the French were between Lutzen and Weissenfels; but there were several indications that they intended to move in the direction of Leipsic. In consequence of these movements and indications on the part of the enemy, count Wittgenstein gave orders for several columns of the allied army to cross the Elster, and proceed down the course of a rivulet which falls into the Saale. He thus hoped to turn the right of the French between Lutzen and Weissenfels, while their attention was directed to his left between Weissenfels and Leipsic. The French occupied a strong position: behind them was rising ground, and a string of villages; in front there was a hollow way and a stream of considerable depth: here they awaited the attack of the allies. The natural strength of their position was much increased by an immense quantity of ordnance which was distributed throughout the line and in the villages; besides batteries in the open country supported by masses of infantry in solid squares. As it was of the utmost consequence to force the enemy from the line of villages which he occupied, the plan of the allies at the commencement of the engagement was to attack Grosgorchen, the principal of them, with artillery and infantry; and, while this attack was going on, to pierce the enemy's line to the right of the villages with a strong column of cavalry, in order if possible to cut off the troops in the villages from support. For this latter enterprise the cavalry of the Prussian reserve were selected: they advanced with great steadiness and gallantry; but when they reached the hollow way, the show- . ers of grape-shot and musketry to which they were exposed, rendered it impossible for them to proceed. Here the conflict was most desperate and sanguinary: the Prussians, having partially succeeded in breaking into the squares of the enemy, committed great carnage: but as |