engaged. Indeed it may be remarked, that the nearer the Spanish forces approached to the frontiers of their country, the greater was the prospect of expelling the enemy, the more resolution and valour did they display: and his lordship knew well how to encourage and bring forth this increasing ten dency to discipline and bravery: by appearing to place confidence in their bravery and steadiness, he made them brave and steady. But to return to the particulars of this attack. The French, notwithstanding they received fatal and unequivocal proofs of Spanish valour, renewed the attack several times; but on every occasion they were repulsed with the same gallantry and determination. Finding at length they could not succeed in this mode of attack, they threw a bridge across the river a little above the high road: this they were enabled to do in consequence of the course of the river being immediately under the heights on their side of it, on which they had placed a considerable quantity of cannon. As soon as this bridge was erected, a large force passed, and uniting with those who had crossed by the fords, they made another desperate attack on the Spanish position. Still they could make no impression: the Spaniards, proud of the former repulses which they had given the enemy, and sensible that the eyes and expectations of the whole British army were placed upon them, exerted themselves to the utmost: at length the enemy, find ing all their efforts on that side fruitless, took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm and retired. In this affair the Spaniards had all the glory, as the British woops who were posted on each flank were not in the least engaged during the action. About the same time that the French made this attack against the Spaniards on the heights of San Marcial, they crossed the river lower down in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade: here they were partially successful; as the British troops, which were directed by lord Wellington to move up to the support of the Portuguese, found it impossible to maintain the heights between the Lezaco and the Bidassoa: but their success was merely temporary; for, having failed in their at tack on the Spaniards, by which their situation on the left of the Bidassoa was becoming every mo ment more critical, this part of the enemy also retired in the course of the night. But they found their retreat less easily effected than they had expected; for, in consequence of the rain which had fallen during the evening, the river was so much swollen, that the rear of their co lumn was under the necessity of crossing at the bridge of Vera; and before they could do this, they had to attack the posts of major general Skerret's brigade of the light division: it was impossible to prevent them from passing the bridge; but the passage was effected under a very heavy fire, and the enemy's loss was very considerable. Thus defeated in all his attempts, marshal Soult was compelled to leave St. Sebastian to its fate. In order fully to appreciate the bravery of the allied army on this occasion, it ought specially to be recollected, that these desperate attacks of the enemy were repulsed only by a very small portion of their forces, and at the very moment at which the town of St.Sebastian was taken by storm. U 2 CHAP CHAPTER XVII. Affairs in the North-east of Spain-Difficulties and Obstacles in the Way of Lord William Bentinck's Operations from the Composition of the Army which he commanded-from the Backwardness of the Spaniards-and from the Force of the Enemy, and the Character of their General-He advances against Tarragona, but is obliged to retreat-He returns to Sicily, and General Clinton takes the Command-Lord Wellington resolves to cross the Bidassoa, and establish himself securely and permanently in France-bis Movements and Operations for that Purpose-attacks the Positions of Soult-gallant Behaviour of the ndalusian Army on this Occasion-Remarks on the Bebaviour of the Spanish Troops on different Occasions-Lord Wellington takes up a Position between the Nive and the Adour, while Sault retires into bis intrenched Camp before Bayonne-the Blockade of Pampeluna committed solely to the Spaniards-Surrender of that Place-Lord Wellington fortifies the Passes of the Pyrenees-crosses the Nive, and commands the Navigation of the Adour-desperate Attack on him by Soult, who is repulsed, and quits bis intrenched Camp-Reflections on the Termination of the peninsular War. WE E shall now direct onr attention to the operations and the state of affairs in the northeast of Spain: it has been already mentioned, that on sir John Murray's disgraceful re-embarkation and retreat, lord William Bentinck judged it necessary to leave Sicily and assume the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army: much was justly expected from the known talents and activity of his lordship; and it was hoped that, at last, this army would at least retrieve its character, even if it did not very essentially or effectually co-operate with lord Wellington. It was indeed of great consequence in many respects, that the east and north-east of the peninsula should if possible be freed from the presence of the French: the inhabitants, and especially those of Catalonia, are the most active and industrious of all the Spaniards: they possess the good qualities of the nation with but a compa ratively small proportion of their bad and debasing qualities: if therefore their country could once be liberated from the tyranny of the enemy, it was to be expected that they would act with more decision and effect for the common cause than any others of their countrymen. Besides, this part of Spain is uncommonly fertile, and is better cultivated than the greatest part of the peninsula: and in the exhausted state of the country, it was of great consequence to rescue from the enemy such lands as would contribute to the support of the people and the armies." But lord William Bentinck had many difficulties and obstacles to overcome. In the first place, the composition of his army was not of the best description: of the discipline and valour of the British part of it there could be no doubt: but a considerable proportion consisted of Sicilians; and when we come to notice the affairs of that island, it will too evidently appear, that not withstanding the dislike the Sicilians had to their old government, which the British showed a zealous and sincere desire to reform, and render less oppressive to the people; notwithstanding the examples of French oppression, which they had either witnessed or heard of on the neighbouring continent of Italy, from which also the British were anxious to free them; there was among many of the Sicilians -to use the mildest term-a disinclination towards the British; and this disinclination, it might be reasonably apprehended, existed and operated among the Sicilian troops which lord William Bentinck had under his command. Besides, these troops, even though their fidelity and steadiness of attachment could have been depended upon, were very deficient in discipline, skill, and valour: they added to the numerical, but not much to the real, strength of the army. : as invaders into France,-must have In the third place, Suchet, to whom lord William Bentinck was opposed, was a general of very considerable talents; certainly not equal to Soult, but perhaps next to In the second place, lord Wil him of all the French generals who liam Bentinck, even with this army, had commanded in the peninsula : on the supposition that the whole he was remarkably active; very had been equally effective with the popular with his army; and by his British part of it, was not in suffi- decision and energy, mixed too cient force, without the Spaniards, often with cruelty, had kept the to cope with the French under Spaniards in that part of the counSuchet and the Spaniards in this try very much down. Probably, in part of the peninsula were not of point of talent, lord William Bena superior description to the Spa- tinck was not inferior to his opponiards along with lord Wellington. nent; but he did not possess his Indeed there were circumstances experience: he had been little ac which must have operated to ren- customed to European warfare, esder them less effective troops, un- pecially that kind of it which the less the Spaniards are totally un-situation and circumstances of the like all other men: the victories peninsula required. which lord Wellington had achieved; the glory he had won; the services which he had rendered their country; the near prospect, if not the absolute certainty, of its secure and permanent liberation, and of their entering in their turn Such were the principal difficulties and obstacles which his lordship had to encounter when he assumed the command of the AngloSicilian army: and it is to be lamented, that the British ministry did not pay more attention to this US army; army; that they did not increase both its numerical and its real strength. Lord Wellington evidently took the probable successes of this army into his calculation, when he arranged the plan and operations of the campaign for 1813: he was undisguisedly disappointed at its inactivity while under the command of general Frederic Maitland; and at its absolute want of success when under sir John Murray. Greater prospect of success no doubt was held out when lord William Bentinck took the command and management of it but a general of the most consummate talents and skill requires time before he can organise and discipline inferior woops: and when circumstances will not admit of this time; and when moreover the numerical strength is inferior to the attainment of the object in view, it is impossible that the mere appointment of a good general should be of much avail. Lord William Bentinck,however, was resolved not to be inactive; and his first enterprise was against Tarragona, that place from which sir John Murray had filed. On the 2d of August his lordship reached the neighbourhood of Tarragona, where he was joined by a Spanish division under the command of the duke del Parque. According to the plan he had formed, he intended to have taken up a position on the river Paya, about two leagues beyond Tarragona, for the purpose of covering the siege of that place if he had found it advisable to undertake its reduction. When how ever he came to reconnoitre the country, it was found that the river, on which he intended to have taken up his position, presented no place proper for that purpose. Under these circumstances, his lordship next thought of pushing on to the Elobregat, a river which falls into the sea about four miles from Barcelona: this plan seems to have entered his thoughts, from the hope that, if he could occupy the ridge of hills which overhang this river, he might have fallen separately on the advanced division of the French army which was posted at Villa Franca, before it could be joined. by the main body from Barcelona. As this attempt however was extremely hazardous, and indeed could not, with any prospect of success, be carried into execution unless his own army was reinforced, he determined to await the expected and promised junction of a body of Spanish troops under the command of general Sarsfield : this general, however, from some cause not explained, was very dilatory in his motions; and in the mean time marshal Suchet concentrated the whole of his army in Villa Franca. It was at the least computation 25,000 strong; he having been reinforced by a body of troops under Decaen. As soon as Suchet had taken up this position, he resolved to act on the offensive: his first attempt was to get at lord William Bentinck's army by the road along the sea-coast; but in this attempt he was completely and gallantly frustrated by the fire of some British gun-boats: he was therefore compelled to take a circuitous inland route, through Valls and Reus, in order to reach Tarragona. Lord William Bentinck watched the movements of the enemy with great judgement, and colonel lord Fre deric Bentinck was particularly employed and distinguished on this occasion. He reconnoitred the column of the enemy as it was ad vancing on Valls. On this occasion a smart affair took place, highly creditable ereditable to the Brunswic hussars; for, though they were engaged with a very superior number of the ene my, they came off victorious. Suchet however at length succeeded in approaching Tarragona; and as his force was so much greater than that under lord William Bentinck, his lordship judged it prudent to retire: he effected his retreat in the best order, at first to about twelve miles distance from that place, and subsequently about nine miles further to Hospitalet. Lord Wellington, in his official dispatch to ministers, decidedly gave it as his opinion, that lord William Bentinck had acted very properly in retiring from Tarragona: and Suchet himself seems to have been disappointed with the result of his advance; for, after having blown up the works of that place, he fell back to the point from which he had set out; thus abandoning a considerable portion of Catalonia to the allies. Nothing of consequence occurred in this part of Spain from this time till the beginning of September, when lord William Bentinck again advanced, and pushed his troops on all sides to the very posts of Barcelona. Suchet, determined to repel them, came on with a very large force the advanced guard of the allied army consisted of three Spanish regiments and a bout eleven hundred Germans, Calabrians, and Portuguese. For several hours they made a most gallant and vigorous resistance against the greatest part of Suchet's army; but being overpowered by the numbers opposed to them, they were at last forced to give way: in their retreat they were under the necessity of abandoning two fieldpieces and two mountain-guns. In Consequence of this advance of the enemy, lord William Bentinck judged it advisable to retire again to the neighbourhood of Tarragona. While he was in the act of retiring, the French, with their su perior cavalry, made many at tempts to harass and throw his troops into disorder: but all their attempts were fruitless, principally in consequence of the gallant charges made by the 20th light dragoons and the hussars of the king's German legion. The enemy, perceiving that he could make no impression,retreated behind the river Llobregat. Soon after this affair, circumstances rendering it expedient that his lordship should return to Sicily, the command of the allied army devolved upon general Clinton. re Suchet, in his official account of this affair, magnified it into the greatness and splendour of a victory: according to him, nearly the whole of the allied army was engaged; and their defeat was signal and decisive. But at this time it was absolutely necessary to present the French people with something that looked like victory in the bul letins from the peninsula: specting the operations and defeat of Soult, the French government were most profoundly silent; though there is reason to believe, that this silence only gave room for suspicions and apprehensions even more gloomy than the actual state of affairs. As therefore the French government could not publish any bulletins respecting Soult's army; and as at this time the operations of the grand army under Bonaparte in the north of Germany presented nothing satisfac tory, Suchet was probably directed to make up as favourable a report as he possibly could. It is however to be lamented, that while every |