ing the enemy, by a combined attack and movement of the three divisions. It so happened however that the 7th division, by crossing the mountains, arrived before the 4th division; and without waiting for the coming up of their companions, major-general Hill's brigade formed itself for the attack, with a regularity and gallantry which his lordship says he had seldom seen equalled: and notwithstanding the superior force of the enemy, the strong position which they occupied, and the formidable resistance which they made, they actually drove them from the heights. At the same time major-general Kempt's brigade of the light divi. sion drove a very considerable division of the enemy from the rock which formed the left of the Puerto; so that by these successes no enemy was left on the field within this part of the Spanish frontier. The loss of the enemy in the battle of the Pyrenees, for so this battle is denominated, was about 15,000 men; of whom 4,000 were made prisoners: our loss was between 2,000 and 3,000 killed and wounded.

It appeared from a proclamation by marshal Soult, addressed to his soldiers, and found on some of the killed or prisoners, that his object and expectation was not merely the relief of Pampeluna, but ulte rior operations; and for the purpose of these, he had along with him a train of artillery, and a considerable body of cavalry, which could have been of no use till he descended from the mountains of Navarre, and this of course he could not possibly do till he had beaten and driven back the British army. It is not however, perhaps, always safe to infer, what were either the plans or the hopes of an

enemy from his address to his soldiers; because he must hold out to them the prospect of advantages, which probably he himself does not anticipate. On the proclamation which he issued to his troops, therefore, we are not disposed to lay much stress; and even the circumstance of his having along with him a train of artillery and a body of cavalry, by no means proves that he was sanguine in his expectation of victory: of course he thought the changes in his favour, otherwise he would not have been the assailant; and he was naturally desirous, if he should prove the conqueror, of being able immediately, by artillery and cavalry, to take every possible advantage of his success. The convoy of provisions which the enemy endeavoured to introduce into Pampeluna, under cover of Soult's attack on lord Wellington, was intercepted, and the troops under whose escort it was were dispersed.

We have dwelt more fully and minutely on the battle of the Pyrenees, than we did on the battle of Vittoria, from several considerations in the first place, although the defeat of the enemy in the bat tle of Vittoria was more signal and decisive than their defeat in the battle of the Pyrenees, it was not achieved by so much glory on our part: as there was less skill display. ed by the French general, and less bravery by the French troops, in the battle of Vittoria, so there was of course room and occasion for less skill and bravery on our side. Indeed it may perhaps be justly observed, that in this battle the enemy put forth a smaller degree of military talent than in any other of their battles in the peninsula : there was little previous masterly arrangement; apparently no judi

neral Robinson-the remainder of the same division being in reserve: the whole operation was placed by general Graham under the immediate direction and superintendence of sir J. Leith, who commanded that division.

As soon as the column filed out of the right of the trenches it was exposed to a very heavy fire of shells and grape-shot; at the same time the enemy explod ed a mine, which did great da mage, but did not hinder or check the progress, or damp the ardour, of the assailants. As soon as they came near the breach, they were convinced it was not nearly so practicable as it had appeared at a distance: indeed sir Thomas Graham represents the external appearance of it as very fallacious. The difficulties in the way of the troops entering by it were almost insupportable, since notwithstanding its great extent there was only one point where it was possible to enter, and there only by single files: on the inside of the wall there was a perpendicular scarp of at least twenty feet to the level of the street: under these circumstances, the only accessible point lay in the narrow ridge of the curtain itself. The enemy, besides these advantages, had employed their time, during the suspension of the operations of the siege, in every means of defence which military art and skill could deyise; and thus, covered themselves by intrenchments, they were ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry on both flanks of the approach to that point, where the breach was practicable.

The British troops were brought forward from the trenches in succession, and advanced to the assault with the most cool and persevering bravery-but they could effect nothing: no man outlived the

attempt to gain the top of the ridge. The engineers in vain used all their endeavours to form a lodgement for the troops; for though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the musquetry of the enemy, yet the immense quantities and the position of the stone rubbish rendered all their efforts unavailing. Sir Thomas Graham, in these perilous and embarrassing circum. stances, was convinced that, unless a part of the curtain were occupied, a secure lodgement could never be obtained. In this desperate state of the attack,” to use his own words in his official dispatch to lord Wellington, "after consulting with colonel Dickson commanding the royal artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain: a heavy fire of artillery was directed against it, passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example." In the mean time part of major. general Bradford's Portuguese brigade offered to ford the river

near its mouth: this offer was ac cepted, and proved of considerable service, while the 1st battalion of the 13th regiment and a detachment of the 24th advanced over the open breach and across the river, under a very severe fire of grape-shot: these troops afterwards occupied a small breach on the right of the great one, and afterwards the right of the great breach.

By this time the effect of the fire of the batteries against the curtain was very visible; and therefore ge neral Graham resolved to make a great effort to gain the high ridge at all hazards, while at the same time he ordered an attempt to be made to storm the horn-work: for this purpose the 2d brigade of the 5th division moved out of the

trenches,

Trenches, under the command of colonel Charles Greville; while the 3d battalion of the Royal Scots, and the 38th regiment, fortunately arrived to assault the breach in the curtain just at the moment when the enemy were thrown into confusion in consequence of an explosion on the rampart of the curtain. The narrow pass was now the scene of a most desperate combat; our troops pressing forward to occupy and retain it; while the enemy, sensible of its importance, defended it with great obstinacy: at last this pass was gained; and the troops on the right of the breach having about the same time succeeded in forcing the barricadoes on the top of the narrow wall, made their way into the houses that joined it. The assault had now continued up wards of two hours, under circumstances which called for all the heroism of British soldiers; but at last a firm footing was obtained.

Nothing now could restrain or oppose the impetuosity of the troops; and in less than an hour from this time the enemy were completely driven from all their defences which they had construct ed in the streets, and retreated to the castle, after having suffered a very severe loss. The whole town was now in possession of the British.

Perhaps never were the steadiness, coolness, and perseverance of British valour put to a more arduous trial than on this occasion; never were the skill and presence of mind of British officers more requisite: but they ultimately triumphed; and by their triumph completely proved that British troops, when judiciously led on, are equal to the overcoming of all difficulties, and that nothing within the compass of 1813.

valour to effect, is too mighty for their efforts.

:

Some time after the capture of the town of St. Sebastian, a most serious charge was brought, in one of the Spanish papers, against our troops, for wanton and deliberate cruelty towards the inhabitants: and it was moreover alleged, that the officers, instead of repressing, encouraged the violence and disorder of the men. Such a charge was repelled with the solemnity and directness which became a nation so jealous of its honour as the British it was proved that the officers, and especially general Graham, had done all in their power to restrain the impetuous violence of the troops; and that they had succeeded almost completely in their efforts: it was further made manifest, that those soldiers who had been found guilty of outrage against the inhabitants of St. Se bastian 'had been immediately pu. nished in the most exemplary manner. It may be indeed admitted, without a very serious or peculiar charge against the discipline of the British army, or against the character of British soldiers, that they might, after taking a town by assault, with their indignation inflamed by the resistance which they had experienced, and their grief still fresh at the death. of their brave com. panions, have committed many outrages against the inhabitants, even though those inhabitants were of a friendly nation: but the accusation is false, if it go to charge the British soldiery, generally, with a cruel disposition; and still more calum◄ nious, if it assert that British officers are in the least disposed not to repress and punish all outrage and violence, even where the usages and rights of war may seem to justify or excuse this conduct.

U

As soon as general Graham had gained possession of the town of St. Sebastian, he directed his efforts against the castle; and his fire was so effectual and destructive, that on the 8th of September a flag of truce was hoisted by the enemy, and after some discussion the terms of surrender were agreed up on: by these terms the French troops were made prisoners of war, to be sent to England. By the reduction of the town and fortress 2,600 men were made prisoners: our loss was very severe, though not more so than the nature of the operations might have rendered probable.

We have judged it expedient to narrate all the events respecting the fall of St. Sebastian without interruption; but it will now be proper to detail the particulars of an attempt which Soult made to relieve that place. As soon as the fire against it had been recommenced, the enemy began to collect the greatest part of their force in such a manner, and to such a position, as left no doubt in the mind of lord Wellington, that it was his intention to make an attempt to relieve St. Sebastian. The approach to it was covered by three divisions of the 4th Spanish army, under the command of general don Manuel Freyre: these troops occupied the heights of San Marcial and the town of Irun: on their left, and in the rear of Irun, they were sup ported by some British troops; and on their right by general Longa's division. Notwithstanding these precautions to prevent Soult from penetrating to the relief of St. Sebastian, lord Wellington judged it expedient to send reinforcements to this point, as he had no doubt that the attack, whenever it was made, would be made in a desperate man

ner, and with a large body of troops. In all his arrangements on this occasion to meet and defeat the attempt of the French, his lordship displayed that minute and comprehensive judgement in military affairs, for which he is so eminently and justly distinguished : he saw every thing with the eye of a soldier: he anticipated every movement and operation which the enemy could make; and he most effectually guarded against even the possibility of his ultimate success.

Before day broke, on the morning of the 31st, a very large French force crossed the river Bidassoa by the fords, as the bridge had been de stroyed in that place: as soon as ever they got to the other side of the river, they commenced a most desperate attack along the whole front of the position of the Spanish troops who were stationed on the heights of San Marcial. Never before did the Spaniards behave with such gallantry: his lordship in deed seems to have been resolved to afford them an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, if they were so disposed; for though there were British troops near them, in order to support them if there should be necessity for it; yet it would ap pear that these troops had direc tions to permit the Spaniards to reap all the glory of repulsing the enemy. Soult, on the other hand, seems to have anticipated easy and complete success, from the consi deration that he was about to attack Spaniards only; and he was evidently much surprised and disappointed when he found that they withstood his attack with such cool and determined bravery. Wellington expressly states, that the conduct of the Spanish troops on this occasion was equal to that of any troops that he ever saw engaged,