rations. These two places were very strong, especially St. Sebastian, which indeed, both from its natural position and from the skill and labour which the French had expended on its fortifications, was not inferior in strength to any place in the peninsula, with the single exception of Gibraltar. Through out the whole of the two revolutionary wars in which the French have been engaged, and particularly during the last war, they have selected for the defence of places likely to be besieged their best troops, and placed at their head such officers as were not only of the most obstinate and persevering bravery, but as also possessed great experience and skill in engineering. Scarcely a single place in the peninsula had fallen into our possession except after a gallant defence, and with a considerable loss on our part. It was not therefore to be supposed that either St. Sebastian or Pampeluna would be reduced easily or soon; especially when it was known that Soult had taken the command of the army, and that he had encouraged the governors of these fortresses to expect that he would with as little delay as possible advance to their relief.

The powers with which this general was invested by Bonaparte were of a very extensive and almost unprecedented nature he was appointed lieutenant-general of all the armies in the peninsula, and authorised to act in every respect, and on all occasions, as his own judgement directed. His first object and endeavour was to re-organize the troops; to collect such as were scattered and dispersed; and to reinforce them by every means in his power. This was difficult in the actual state of France and of Bonaparte; but it was still more

difficult to put that spirit and feel. ing in them which might enable hum again to lead them forth to combat with those who had often defeated them, with the smallest prospect of success. This however the French general attempted; and as he could not expect that St. Sebotian or Pampeluna would hold cut very long, he was under the necessity of hastening his measures; and at last of proceeding to action, with an army only partially recruited in strength and spirits, or restored to discipline and organization.

In the mean time lord Wellington was not idle: he was well aware that Soult had taken the command of the French armies, and that he would soon resume offensive operations; it was therefore of importance to prosecute the siege of St.Sebastian with vigour. It seems to be part of the plan of lord Wellington's military operations, in most cases to prefer the assault to the gradual reduction of a place; and under most circumstances this mode is attended with great advantages; not the most trifling and unimportant of which is, that the gallantry of the troops, by being kept in play and exercise by assault, is much more likely to increase, than during the tedious and routine operations of a siege. The great object of a general ought undoubtedly to be, to infuse into his soldiers a most unshaken belief of their superiority to the enemy: and this belief can by nothing be so much strengthened, as by their carrying by assault places protected and defended with the utmost skill of French engineers, and the utmost bravery of select French troops. Even in a comparison of losses, it may be questioned whether in most instances, as many men are not lost by a protracted siege as by a vi

gorous

gorous assault: but undoubtedly the preference must be given to the latter mode, whenever a saving of time is an object of great conse. quence, or whenever the enemy's army is at hand; for it seldom happens that the besieging force is so strong, as at once to carry on the siege and oppose the army which comes to the relief of the besieged place.

Towards the end of July, the division of the British army, under sir Thomas Graham, commenced the siege of St. Sebastian: at this time Soult was at Bayonne : his Jine extended along the river Adour, from Bayonne to Oleron; his right rested on the former place, his left on the latter: one of his advanced guards was at St. Jean Pied de Port, and the other at Puerto de Bera. In this position his army was almost mixed with that of the allies at Irun, Lesaco, and Maya. The 1st and 5th divisions of lord Wellington's army, under the command of generals Pack and Bradford, were at this time before St. Sebastian, under general Graham; the 7th light division was posted on the right of the river Bidassoa, of course within the line of the Spanish frontier, and near to Lesaco: the Gallician army, under the command of Giron, was at Iran; Longa, with his troops, was between Irun and Lesaco; the 3d, 4th, and 6th divisions, which had been sent in pursuit of the enemy and to observe Pampeluna, were withdrawn from the latter place, and ordered to rejoin the main army: the 2d division, and the troops under Silviera, occupied respectively the two great passes of Roncevalles and Maya-the one from Pampeluna to Bayonne, and the other from Pampeluna to St. Jean Pied de Port: the Spanish corps,

under the command of O'Donnell, continued to blockade Pampeluna. The force under lord Wellington consisted of about 40,000 effective British troops; 25,000 Portuguese; the same number of Spaniards, under Giron and O'Donnell; besides those under Longa and Mina, and the guerillas. The force under Soult cannot at this time be so accurately ascertained, but it probably amounted to upwards of 60,000 men. Lord Wellington's objects were to reduce St. Sebastian as speedily as possi ble; to blockade at first and ultimately to reduce Pampeluna; and, while he was carrying on these two operations, to watch and defeat the movements of Soult. Soult's object of course was to raise the siege of St. Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, either by a direct attack on the British, or by such a series of movements as would compel lord Wellington to withdraw the besieging portion of his armies.

The first object of sir T. Graham was to establish a battery against a convent, which the enemy had fortified and occupied in force, about six hundred yards from the works of St. Sebastian. On the 14th of July the battery was opened, and the convent was so far destroyed as to warrant the attempt to storm the building, and a redoubt which protected its left flank. This operation completely succeeded, and the British troops were established at the convent, and at a village immediately below it. Soon afterwards two practicable breaches were effected at St. Sebastian; and on the 24th of July orders were given to attack them : the assault was most obstinately and heroically made; but it did not succeed; and our loss on the occasion was very great. On the

very day when this unsuccessful assault took place, Soult having made all his arrangements, and collected the right and left wings of his army, with one division of his centre, and two divisions of his cavalry, at St. Jean Pied de Port, attacked general Byng's post at Roncevalles with between 30,000 and 40,000 men. As soon as general Cole was aware of this, he moved to the support of general Byng; and though their united divisions were very far inferior in numbers to the French, they maintained their position throughout the day: towards the evening however the enemy turned it, and the British were withdrawn in the course of the night. While this attack was going on under marshal Soult in person, two divisions of the centre of his army attacked sir Rowland Hill's position on the Puerto de Maya, and at first.compelled part of our troops to give way but general Barnes's brigade moving up to their support they regained their position: at this juncture, general Hill being informed that general Cole was retiring from his position, thought it expedient to withdraw his troops likewise.

As soon as lord Wellington was apprised of these events, he took such measures as might enable him still to continue the siege of St. Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, even while he was engaged with the enemy; for a general battle was now almost certain. On the evening of the 27th his lordship joined the 3d and 4th divisions. The first attack of the enemy was made on a hill on the right, which was defended by one battalion of the 4th Portuguese regiment: this regiment maintained its position with great steadiness and bravery,

and, imitating the British, completely succeeded in repulsing the French with the bayonet. As, however, this hill was of great importance to the issue of the engagement, inasmuch as, if it had been turned, a road to Pampeluna might have been opened, the Portuguese troops were reinforced by the British 40th and two Spanish regiments; and in consequence of this reinforcement, the enemy were not able, notwithstanding their repeated and most obstinate attacks, to make any impression on this position.

On the morning of the 28th the 6th division of infantry joined the army, and lord Wellington gave orders that they should occupy the heights on the left of the valley of the Lauz, where they were supported by the 4th division. Scarcely had they taken up this position when they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy; but their front was so well defended by the fire of their own light troops from the heights on the left, that the enemy were soon driven back with immense loss. As they were now in a very difficult and dangerous situation in the valley of the Lauz,in order to extricate themselves from it, they commenced an attack on the height on which the left of the 4th division were posted; and of this they obtained possession; but their success and triumph were only momentary; for they were soon driven from it by the 7th caçadores, supported by major-general Ross at the head of his brigade of the 4th division. The loss of the enemy on this occasion was very great. The battle was now general along the whole front of the heights, which were. occupied by the 4th division; and it was every where favourable, ex

cept

cept where one battalion of the 10th Portuguese regiment was posted. Against this battalion the enemy advanced in such superior and overwhelming numbers, that it was compelled to give way; and in its retreat exposing the right of major-general Ross's brigade, the enemy were enabled to establish themselves on the British line; and major-general Ross was compelled to withdraw from his post. As soon as lord Wellington perceived this partial defeat, he ordered the 27th and 48th regiments to charge, in the first place, that portion of the enemy's troops which had succeeded in establishing themselves on the height, and next those on the left of them. These orders were in. stantly carried into execution in the most gallant and successful style; nothing could withstand the charge of these regiments. British soldiers know that the bayonet is, in a most marked and peculiar sense, their weapon: and the enemy are equally sensible, that when British troops employ this weapon they are invincible. The enemy by these charges were driven from the heights with great loss, and in the utmost disorder and confusion; and victory was again restored to the British in the only place where it seemed to be dubious or wavering. While these charges were carrying into execution, the 6th division moved forward to a situation in the valley nearer to the left of the 4th: as soon as this movement took place, the attack on this front ceased entirely.

The assault of the enemy on our left wing was not carried into execution with the same skill or bravery. As soon as lord Wellington found that general Cole, as we have already noticed, had changed his position, he directed general Hill

to march by Lauz upon Lesaco: that part of the enemy's force which had been in front of general Hill, as soon as they observed his line of march, followed him, and arrived at Ostez on the 29th. Their object was, by an attack on this division of the British, to endeavour to turn the left of the whole army, as they found that they could not make any impression on the front: they were moreover induced to this attempt, in consequence of their own numerical strength in this part of the field of battle, and their having occupied a position on the mountains which seemed little exposed to attack. They commenced their operations by reinforcing with one division the troops which were opposed to ge neral Hill, at the same time retaining their position on the mountains, where their principal force was posted: but the troops which had hitherto occupied the heights opposite the 3d British division were drawn in to their left; and during the night of the 29th they occupied in considerable strength, the top of the mountain opposite the 6th and 7th divisions: their right, by these movements, was thus connected with the divisions destined to attack general Hill.

But lord Wellington was resolved that they should no longer be the assailants: he therefore or dered the earl of Dalhousie to obtain possession of the top of the mountain in his front, and thus turn the right of the enemy; while general Picton was directed to cross the heights on which the left of the enemy had been posted, and thus turn their left by the road to Roncevalles. His lordship at the same time made the necessary preparations and arrangements to attack the front of the enemy, provided

success

success should attend the movements, and the operations on their flanks should be successful. As soon as the earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain, general Pack turned the vil lage of Sorausen, which was instantly attacked and carried by the 6th division. The front of the enemy's main position was attacked by general Cole; and though it was very strong and difficult of access, they were obliged to abandon it: in their retreat a great many prisoners were taken.

As soon as lord Wellington was convinced that these operations would be successful, he detached troops to support general Hill: the enemy had appeared in front of him late in the morning, and immediately commenced an extended movement on his left flank: in consequence of this, he was under the necessity of withdrawing from the height that he had occupied near the Lizaco to the next range. In this position he maintained himself, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to dislodge him from it. In the mean time, by the retreat of part of their line, the British troops who pursued them were placed in the rear of that which was attacking general Hill. Thus having this general in their front, and lord Wellington in their rear, they judged it necessary to commence their retreat; and on the 31st they occupied the pass of Donna Maria. His lordship directed general Hill and lord Dalhousie to pursue them to this place on their arrival at the foot of the pass, they found the enemy ascending the hill in great haste; while the 7th division, moving on a road parallel and to the right of that by which general Hill was advancing, was pressing closely upon them. It was found impos

was

sible to cut them off, as their rear had begun to ascend before gencral Hill's arrival: great annoyance was however given to the enemy in his retreat, till at last he took up a strong position at the top of the pass, with a cloud of skirmishers in his front: here he was attacked by lieutenant-general Stewart, who succeeded in forcing back the skirmishers to the top of the hill. Lieutenant-general Stewart, on this advantage, pressed forward; but coming on their main body, he found them so numerous and strongly posted, that he was obliged to withdraw till he was reinforced by the 7th division. In this attack lieutenant-general Stewart wounded, and major-general Pringle took the command of the division: the attack was again renewed, while the 7th division pressed them on the other side: both these divisions, emulating one another in glorious and strenuous effort, gained the summit of the pass about the same time; the enemy retiring in good order, but after having sustained a very considerable loss. Our success in this point would have been both more decisive, and more speedily and completely gained, had it not been for a very thick fog, which prevented our troops taking that advantage of the situation of the enemy which they might otherwise have done.

Notwithstanding Soult was thus most signally defeated, two divisions of his army still continued posted on the Puerto de Echalar, and nearly the whole army behind the Puerto. On the 2d of August lord Wellington therefore resolved to compel him to quit these positions: accordingly he directed the 4th, 7th and light divisions to advance by the valley of the Bidassoa to the frontier, for the purpose of dislodg