under any of the views of it which they respectively took, was interested for reasons which we have already stated.

Nor was the question less important when considered in its relation to government. It was evident that they had a difficult and delicate part to act. On the one hand, the manufacturing classes called upon them to do them what they conceived to be merely justice, in opening for them a market for their commodities; and this call they conceived they were at this period more bound to obey, since all other markets were closed. Government also felt that they had a higher duty to perform, and that the views and arguments of those who expected from them the civilization, if not the conversion, of the Indians deserved the most serious consideration. On the other hand, there were motives, some perhaps not quite pure or patriotic, which, disposed government to incline to the side of the East India company; while they were on good terms with them, they might expect their support in parliament, which was no trifling consideration: but, setting aside this circumstance, government conceived it to be their duty to take care that, by throwing open the trade suddenly and completely, they might not injure that very manufacturing and commercial interest which they were disposed to benefit; or that, by admitting all classes of people to our East Indian possessions, they might not render the condition of the natives worse instead of better, or perhaps prepare the means for the loss of our possessions there altogether. The subject, thus delicate, extensive, and important,

government seemed to have considered deeply and impartially; and their decision to grant a renewal of the charter to the East India company, under certain restrictions, satisfied the moderate and impartial part of the nation.

Before we proceed to a brief statement and examination of the general arguments for and against a renewal of the East India charter, (for our limits must necessarily render it very brief,) we shall, in order to leave the main subject completely open to our view, consider one or two of the collateral and subordinate points of discus sion. In the first place, it was strenuously disputed, whether, if the trade were made free, it should be extended to the most important out-ports in Great Britain and Ireland, or only confined to the port of London. That this should be a subject of dispute, may seem strange; and many people will be at a loss to conceive by what argument the London merchants, who objected to the monopoly of the East India company, could defend their own claim to monopoly. These arguments were indeed very futile, and display very clearly and lamentably the selfish views, as well as the confined information, of the commercial world. In the first place they contended that, if the trade were opened to the out-ports, those ship-owners, and all other descriptions of people in the metropolis, who had either embarked their capital in the service of the East India company, or who depended upon it for employment and support, would be greatly injured: but even granting that this would be the case, (though by this we furnish ourselves with an answer to

the argument, that the trade, if opened, would be found so very unprofitable that it would revert to the East India company,) might not the same plea be urged in defence of the continuance of all monopolies? Is it not the fact, that whereever they have been long established, many people must depend upon them for employment and support? and is it to be endured, that their annihilation should be objected to, and solely because those who have enjoyed the advantages of them will by their annihilation be stript of those advantages? If these principles were admitted, indeed, no public evil could be removed; for the existence of every public evil and abuse is connected with the pecuniary benefit of individuals, who consequently would be injured by what would prove advantageous to the nation at large. The second objection which was urged against extending the East India trade to the out-ports was, that in these ports there was neither the capital nor the other means necessary to carry it on: but, if this were the case, is it not evident that the trade, though nominally granted to the out-ports, will, in fact, centre in London? But is there' not reason to doubt the accuracy of this state. ment, when it proceeds from those who would be benefited by its truth? What, in fact, is the substance of this argument ;-We are exceedingly anxious that the outports should not partake of the East India trade, because, in fact, they are not able, from want of capital, &c. to partake of it?-Why then this opposition to their claim? why this apprehension? Lastly, if it was objected on the part of the London merchants, that by extend

ing the trade to the out-ports, smuggling would become much more general, extensive, and easy; this may be true,-but one would think it is a consideration for government, not for the merchants of London.

The next collateral and subordinate topic related to the trade with China. It was soon ascertained, that government intended to throw open the trade to the East Indies, but to continue the exclusive trade to China in the hands of the com pany. To this scheme it was ob jected, that it would in fact leave the most lucrative branch of traffic, and that which, if opened, would afford the greatest relief to our manufactures, in the possession of the company, and thus confirm their monopoly in that particular point in which it ought most espe cially to have been annulled. This statement could not be denied; for, by the company's own showing, it was evident that the China trade was very profitable: but in de fence of the plan of government in this particular, it was with great plausibility urged, that the cha racter and disposition of the Chinese government were of such a singular cast and tendency, that it would be impossible to trade with them, except through the medium of a company; that, if the trade were open, our sailors would be continually involved in disputes with the Chinese; and that the necessary consequence of these disputes would be, that we should be expelled from China altogether. In reply to this it was observed, that the Americans, who traded pretty extensively to this country, not under the management of a company, has not, in fact, been

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involved in disputes with the Chinese government, nearly so frequently nor so seriously as our seamen had been; and that the same methods which had kept them free from disputes, might, if adopted and strictly enforced, equally preserve our men from disputes. The evidence given before the house of commons, however, on this point, uniformly tended to prove that the American seamen were more steady and regular, and better behaved than ours; and consequently that no inference could be drawn from the circumstance of their trading peaceably with the Chinese without the means of an exclusive company.—As we are on the subject of the American trade with China, it may not be improper to advert to one supposed fact, on which the advocates for an open trade there were much disposed to rely. They contended that the profits of the East India company from this trade, and especially from the article of tea, were very great; much greater than they ought to be, or would be if the trade were thrown open; and in proof of this they stated, that a certain description of tea, which at the company's sales was generally sold for about 3s, 6d. per pound, (independently of duty,) might always be purchased in America for less than one shilling per pound. In reply to this it was observed, that the Americans certainly could afford to sell their East India commodities cheaper than we could, because their ships were navigated at much less expense; but it was denied either that the company had an unfair profit on tea, or that the Americans could sell the same description of tea so much below its price at the company's sales. The company

could not possibly derive an unfair profit on this article, because, by the express. terms of their charter, they were obliged to put up all their teas to public sale, at a very small advance (we believe on most descriptions of eas of not more than one penny per pound) on the prime cost and expenses of that article; hence, all advance above this sum must depend upon the bidders; and, if it were great, should be charged to the company. That the Americans could not sell the same description of tea so much cheaper, as was alleged, than the company sold it, was proved by the unexceptionable evidence of many persons well acquainted with the tea trade in China, who gave testimony to the prime cost of these descriptions of tea in that country, by which it appeared that it was below the price at which the Americans sold it in the United States. And they accounted for the circumstance very satisfactorily: all teas were first offered to the agents of the East India company, and such as were rejected by them were then offered to, and generally bought by; the Americans; so that, in fact, though the names and descriptions of the teas sold in America and at the company's sales might be the same, their qualities were very different. We have thought it right to enter into this explanation, because the circumstance of America having teas so much cheaper than we have them, was considered as a strong reason for opening the Chinese trade.-.After all, with respect to the trade, government were probably wise in not opening it at present, but waiting till they saw all the effects of laying open the East India trade. Having thus considered these P 3.

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two collateral and inferior points, we shall now proceed to the discussion and examination of the grand and leading question, Ought government to have thrown open the trade, or not? We have already adverted to the argument respecting monopoly; and it may be further remarked that the principles of political economy, on which the objections to monopolies of all kinds are founded, are so fundamental and comprehensive, that the circumstance must be very peculiar indeed, which takes any particular monopoly out of their view and operation. It must be acknowledged at the same time, that even Adam Smith, than whom no man was less disposed to qualify or limit the general principles of the important science which he has contributed so largely and successfully to illustrate, is disposed to be of opinion that the East India monopoly was allowable and beneficial. But by this he could not mean that it should never terminate; because, though at the first establishment of the trade it might be necessary, and though, when once established, it might produce such relations and consequences in the state of commercial society as would render its continuance necessary, if not essential; yet the time must arrive, when its destruction, like the destruction of all other monopolies, would be adviseable. At that period, when ever it arrived, it could be defended, not on the grounds on which it was originally established, but on distinct and peculiar grounds: these were accordingly stated, in reply to the general objection, on the score of its being a monopoly; and the sum and object of them was, that throwing open the trade, so far from proving beneficial, would be injuri

ous to the company, to the merchants and manufacturers, to the nation at large, and to the inhabitants of the East Indies. These objections we shall state and examine more fully, in the order in which they are here given.

In the first place, the destruction of the East India monopoly would be injurious to the company. Re specting this, two things are to be considered: whether it would be really injurious, at least to the extent which it was contended it would be; and, if it would be injurious, whether the consideration of this injury should influence the decision of government in a paramount or material degree. By the statements and accounts of the East India company themselves, it ap pears that the monopoly trade has not been advantageous to them; therefore it may be contended that they cannot have much reason for apprehension, if the trade were opened. But we should be disposed to go further, and to maintain that the probability is, that the throwing open the trade, by producing competition, would compel the East India company to be more attentive to the management of their concerns, and thus remove one cause of their pecuniary embarrassments; for, as has been already observed, monopolies are seldom profitable to the companies which possess them, both because the absence of competition renders them negligent, and because each individual is more interested for himself than for the company. But, granting that the East India company would be materially and permanently injured by throwing open the trade, surely the consideration of this injury ought not to weigh against the interests of the nation at large, or even against

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the interests of any part of it who could be benefited by a trade from which they have hitherto been excluded. The sole question seems to be, whether the public benefit, or the benefit accruing to any class of the nation, by throwing open the trade, would not be greater than the injury inflicted on the East India company by this measure: and this naturally brings us to the second ground of objection to the opening of the trade, viz.

That it would immediately prove highly injurious to the British merchants and manufacturers, and that even ultimately it would not be nearly so advantageous to them as they anticipated and expected. The first part of this assertion rested on the known character of our merchants and manufacturers; on the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed; and on what their conduct had been on former occasions somewhat similar. Their known character led them to speculate, too often, with much more rashness and ignorance than judgement and information; and this speculating disposition, at all times perhaps characteristic of men in trade, had been much increased by the peculiar nature of the trade of these islands for some years; since by its frequent embarrassments, and by its being sometimes very flourishing, and at other times quite depressed, a spirit of gambling and desperate speculation had seized upon a large portion of our merchants; and this spirit was very likely to display it self in all its energy, at a time when their goods were so much accumulated, and when their appetite for speculation must have been keenly whetted by long abstinence. But there was a case nearly in point :Scarcely had the intelligence of the

capture of Buenos Ayres reached this country, when goods of all descriptions were exported thither; and it was a matter of doubt, whether the ignorance or the rashness displayed on this occasion were more to be censured. The cousequences are well known: the first adventurers made large fortunes, adventured again and were ruined; and this ruin extended to many who at first were cautious, but whose caution deserted them when they learnt the success of their more daring brethren. If the infatuation, and consequent ruin, were great in the case of Buenos Ayres, how much greater were they likely to be if the trade to the East Indies were opened! It became therefore the duty of government (the enemies of a free trade exclaimed) to guard the merchants and manufacturers from this ruin. On the other hand, it was contended that merchants should be left at perfect freedom to act as their own interests and experience may direct; since, "when a body of men pay for their folly, all out of their own pockets, we need not fear that it will be a folly of very long duration." At the same time, it must be allowed that it would be a desirable thing to prevent rash and ruinous speculation. But then there is great danger of government, if it does interfere, not interfering with judgement or impartiality; and there is still greater danger from admitting the principle and precedent, that government have a right to interfere in regulat ing and directing the trade of indi viduals; so that, upon the whole, even allowing that government in some cases might do good by its interference; yet as, in a much greater number of cases, it would probably do mischief, and this mis

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