than we did thirty years ago for our bread, our meat, and our houses; we also pay much more than we did at the former period towards the support and exigencies of the nation; but in both cases the increase is only partly nominal, though, it must be confessed, it is more strictly and completely nominal with respect to the price of commodities than with respect to taxation. The real mode of calculating the increase in both cases, of estimating that part of the increase which is a real burden, is to compare it with the increase in the wages of our labour, or in the profits of our trade and profession: if we find that we get as much more for our labour (taking that word in its most comprehensive sense) as we pay for our provisions, &c. they cannot be said justly to be raised to us: and if we also find that the rate of our labour has risen proportionately to the increase of taxation, then taxation is actually no more to us than it was thirty years ago. It is not the case however, as we have already remarked, with respect to taxation; except perhaps with the lower orders of the community; for, as government has always been sparing of them in taxation, it is probable that their wages have increased in a greater proportion than the taxes which they pay; while, on the other hand, there is reason to believe that it has not increased in an equal proportion to the increase in the price of commodities. The reverse, it is believed, is the case with most other classes: the wages of their labour, generally speaking, has risen nearly in an equal ratio to the increased price of commodities, while it has not nearly done so in proportion to the increase of taxation. It is also evident, that those who possess only a fixed income must suffer irreme

diably, and very greatly, both from the rise in the price of commodities and the increase of taxation.

But, in the second place, taxation has not increased actually within the last thirty, forty, or fifty years, so much as it appears to have done; because the number of people who pay the taxes is now much greater than it was at those periods. When we talk of the national debt of Britain having been only one hundred millions half a century or more ago, and of its being nearly one thousand millions now, we should take into our account, that at the former period our population was scarcely one half of what it is now; both debts have indeed been incurred, and the interest of them is paid, by the people of Britain; but assuredly the number of payers affects in no small degree the amount of each person's contribution. If we suppose that, when the debt was one hundred millions, the population of this country was only one half of what it is at present, then the real debt paid by the nation will not be increased nearly in the same proportion in which it appears to be: in fact, on this supposition, being distributed over twice the number of people, each person's contribu tion is only five times greater than what it was when the debt was only one hundred millions, instead of being ten times greater; and if to this consideration we add the former one, that the price of all labour is at least double what it was when the debt was one hundred millions, and consequently that each person pays only one-half what he appears to pay; this again will reduce it from five hundred millions to two hundred and fifty millions. In other words, on these suppositions, there are twice the number of people to pay the debt that there were when it was only one hundred millions, and the value

of money has decreased at least one half since that period. After all, however, there must be a considerable portion of error in these speculations: but of this fact there can be little doubt, that though the interest of the national debt, and the taxes laid on for the expenses of government, press very heavily on many parts of the community, that pressure is not nearly so great in proportion as the increase of taxation; for, if we may credit history, Britain found nearly as great difficulty in paying ten millions of taxes annually, as she now does in paying nearly fifty millions. It is this circumstance, on which our attention is principally fixed, which astonishes the world, and which, though it exist among ourselves, we hardly know how to explain. It would be irrelevant to the nature of the present work to enter on a formal and long explanation of it; we shall merely observe, that as all real addition to taxation, as well as all real increase of personal expenditure, must be paid for by additional profit; in it we are to look for the means by which we have supported and do support our present enormous taxations; and that our additional profit, in a national point of view, has obtained its increase from improvements in our machinery; from increased labour and additional skill; and particularly from the operations of large and accumulated capital: for from these sources all real taxes must ultimately be paid; and while the inhabitants of Britain can increase their trade and commerce in proportion to the increase of their taxes, they will be paid without difficulty. Of this truth, and of the general truth upon which this is founded, that the spring of Britain's power and wealth arises from her trade and commerce, Bonaparte

was perfectly aware; and his mea sures therefore, as we have seen, were directed to the exclusion of that commerce from the continent. The effects of this exclusion on the continent we have already adverted to: its effects on Britain we must now consider. Besides using his utmost efforts to shut out ourcommerce from the continent, Bonaparte had contrived to embroilusin a war with America with the same object in view. Thus, our manufacturers being in a great measure deprived of a market were in a deplorable condition; trade languished throughout the land; and the consequence was, that it would have been extremely rash, if not utterly impracticable, in the minister, to have loaded a narrowed and impeded commerce with fresh taxes. Under these circumstances Mr. Vansittart came forward with his new plan of finance, which we shall now proceed to explain.

The funding system was first introduced into this country early in the 18th century; and from this period till the close of the American war, though some attempts had been made to establish a sinking fund, they were soon abandoned; the principal object of our fi nancial measures being to provide for the immediate expenses of the year, by borrowing such sums as were necessary for the extraordinary expenses, and laying on taxes to such an amount as would pay the interest of the sum borrowed. Peace was regarded as the proper season for paying off the debt; and during its short intervals, the schemes for establishing a sinking fund, to which we have already adverted, were set on foot; but they were so ineffectual, as between the peace of Utrecht and the close of the American war to have paid off only 8,330,000l. In consequence of the depressed state of

public credit at the close of this war, and the great expenses which it had occasioned, Mr. Pitt laid the basis of a sinking fund by the acts of 1786 and 1792. It is not necessary here to inquire, whether he adopted the most provident and œconomical scheme; whatever were the merits of it, he adhered to it most strenuously and closely. When the first French revolutionary war commenced, Mr. Pitt thought it sufficient to supply the military and naval expenses by loans, permitting the operations of the funding system to go on towards the gradual redemption of the debt., In 1797, however, in consequence of the increased expenses of the war, and of there being no prospect of its conclusion, he determined to make an attempt to equalize the income with the expenditure of the country. Accordingly in 1798 he established a general tax on income, intended, with the aid of some other war taxes, "to provide within the year for a considerable part of the public expenses, and also to repay, within a few years after the conclusion of peace, all debt contracted beyond the amount of the sinking fund in each year.' In the years 1803, 4, and 6, lord Sidmouth and lord Grenville adopted plans for increasing the national income: the object of the scheme of the latter (which is more generally known under the appellation of lord Henry Petty's scheme) was to lessen the necessity of additional tax-, ation; on the simple but certainly improvident plan of borrowing the interest as well as the principal, and of mortgaging the war taxes. Taking the average of the public expenditure (exclusive of the sinking fund) for the years 1806 and 1807, it was rather more than 60,000,0001; while the national income for the latter year was only

59,700,000. By taking the ave rage of the next three years, 1809, 10, and 11, it appeared that the net produce of the public income was about 64,000,0001. This, with the addition of the taxes imposed in 1811 and 1812, would seem to leave a considerable surplus beyond the amount of the expenditure in 1807, when the expenditure was' greater than the income; but the increased charge of unredeemed debt since that year was to be added to the expenditure. In order, therefore, to equalize the receipt and expenditure of the country, on an average of the years 1809, 1810, and 1811, the amount of the sum to be provided was estimated at 9,000,000l. Mr. Vansittart was fully sensible, to use his own words, that" to raise this sum by an immediate imposition of new taxes, in addition to the great exertions already made, would be considered as a very heavy burden; and one, the severity of which might be felt still more sensibly, from an apprehension, by no means unreasonable, that such a sacrifice might even tually prove to have been unnecessary, as many supposable and even probable cases may arise during the continuance of the war, in which it would be possible very considerably to reduce our expenses."

All therefore which ought to be expected from a permanent war system was, that it should provide for such a scale of expense as would necessarily arise out of the state of war; without including the pay. ment of such sums as extraordinary/ exertions had rendered, or might render necessary. At first sight it may appear that the sinking fund is really part of the national expenditure; but it ought to be considered, that by cancelling a certain portion of the debt, each year, it reduces

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reduces the debt really incurred to the amount in which the sum bor rowed exceeds the sum to be redeemed: the equalization of the public expenditure and income therefore may justly be considered as a principal advantage of the sinking fund, no less than the actual redemption of the debt. The first object the sinking fund has already effected; at least so far as the expenditure consists in the usual charges of the war, and does not include its extraordinary charges. As therefore the sinking fund had thus completely effected one of its objects, Mr. Vansittart thought that its arrangement might be altered without violating the provisions of the act of 1792; while at the same time, by this alteration, the weight of further burdens, which it might be found necessary to impose on the nation, would be diminished. In order to point out the beneficial consequences of this proposed alteration in the arrangement of the sinking fund, the consequences which it had actually produced on the redemption of the debt require to be considered. On the first establishment of this fund in 1786, the debt was 240,000,000!.; at the time when Mr. Vansittart came forward with his new plan of finance, this sum had been completely redeemed, in a great measure by the operation of the sinking fund of 1786; but partly also by the provision made for the redemption of loans since contracted, and in a small degree by the purchase of life annuities. By the act of 1792, provision is directed to be made for the redemption, within 45 years, of all debts contracted subsequently to the passing of that act; and within that limit, power was left to parliament to regulate the mode of redemption; and this power it has exer

cised at different times. In the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, no provision was made for the immediate reduction of that part of the loan which was charged upon the income tax; but it was proposed that these sums should be redeemed by prolonging the tax after peace was restored. In the year 1802, when the income tax was repealed, and other funds were provided for paying the interest of these loans, parliament again exercised its discretionary power, as granted to it by the act of 1792, and thought it unnecessary to make immediate provision for the redemption of the principal; leaving this to be effected by the prolonged operation of the sinking fund already existing.

From this statement, Mr. Vansittart contended it was evident, that the financial measure he proposed was not contrary to the spirit of any act of parliament regarding the sinking fund; and that its principle had been recognised and acted upon in previous years; for the enactments of the act of 1792, the principal and most important one on the subject, would be fully complied with, so long as provision was made, in any manner, for the redemption of each respective portion of the public debt, within forty-five years from the period in which it was contracted. Mr. Vansittart further contended, that it would be equally consistent with the act of 1792, "either to redeem any number of loans, by applying to the separate redemption of each, the distinct portion of the sinking fund created at the time of its being contracted, or by applying the whole fund, in the first instance, to the total redemption of the first contracted loan, and afterwards to that of the several succeeding loans, in their respective