France was then preparing. The great grievance which the ruler of France alleged against the courts of St. Petersburgh and Stockholm was, that they did not push their hostility far enough against us, in furtherance of his views to accom. plish our ruin. This was not, however, the sole object of his going to war with Russia. He was stimulated by the defeats in the peninsula, which had tarnished his lustre, and he sought to find some compensation in conquests against the great power of the North. At the very moment when he made this demand of stricter enforce. ment of the continental system, he was himself relaxing it for his own advantage. In the January preceding he had invaded Swedish Pomerania. He afterwards offered to Sweden, if she would attack Russia with 40,000 men by the way of Finland, that he would support Sweden in her attempt to recover that country. Russia could hard. ly be supposed, in that case, well able to defend Finland at a moment when she was attacked by all the power of France on the Vistula. He was ready to agree that a desire of territorial acquisition, distinct from military security, was unwarrantable; but if territorial acquisition had been the object of Sweden, it would have been more advantageous to have closed with the proposals of Bonaparte, than to have entered into an agreement with Russia. That the possession of Norway was necessary to the military security of Sweden in case of variance with France, was a fact which could be easily made out. It was only in 1808 that an army in Norway took the field, with the view of compelling Sweden to accede to the views of France. The possession of Nor1813.

way was in the hands of a power, which, from her continental pcssessions, was necessarily under the control of France; and it was the policy of the North to exclude from the Baltic the power and influence of France. Without an intimate alliance with Sweden, and a permanent scurity on the side of Finland, Russia could not have resisted and repeiled the French in the manner she did; and the retreat from Moscow, though it might have been attended wi h loss in many respects, could not perhaps have been attended with loss of reputation. He should be prepared to defend the treaty between Russia and Sweden on the principles of self-detence. The character of Denmark was to be taken into account; that character was unveiled in 1808, when she issued a declaration of war against Sweden, altogether uncalled for on any justifiable grounds, and merely be.. cause such was the will of France. Sweden could only be connected with France, and regain possession of Finland, or stand and fall with Russia. She chose to look to her preservation, by seeing herself secure on this side of the Baltic, with an alliance with the great military power of Russia on the other side, and not to rely on the conduct of a timid power like Denmark. But though he felt that Russia and Sweden were justifiable on the ground of self-defence, and not on the base principle of self-aggrandisement, he would contend that Russia had then just cause of war against Denmark, because Denmark had done that which was a legal cause of war. At the period

alluded to, Denmark was not called on to send her troops to accompany the French army, but to furnish a corps to occupy the shores of the

M

Baltic,

Baltic, from which the French troops had been withdrawn to the attack of Russia. Oldenburg, a territory occupied by the Danish troops, was a territory closely connected in interest and feeling with Russia. He had no hesitation in stating, however, that the engagement between Sweden and Russia was solely entered into for the purpose of uniting the two great powers of the north in their resistance to France; for Sweden, if she chooses, may be an independent power. With respect to the share which the government of this country had in this affair, he would state that the treaty was first communicated to this country early in July 1812; and if the war had not exploded in the North against Russia, he believed this country never would have heard of it, and that it never would have been attempted to be carried into execution. With respect to Denmark, the first proposition was in the month of February, stating that they were ready to negotiate a separate peace with us. But what were the terms of their proposal? Why, a surrender of all our conquests from them, and also of their navy. Was it possible that they could have made such a proposition with any hope of its leading to peace, particularly when it is remembered that they proposed a separate peace? It was not probable that Denmark expected that we should treat with her indepen dently of our allies. But even.six weeks before the proposition from that country, our ambassador at Stockholm (Mr. Thornton) was empowered to treat with Denmark there, but conjointly with Russia and Sweden. This proposal was rejected by Denmark, who refused to treat with us, except separately;

was

which clearly showed that she did not wish for peace with this country. But besides the terms already mentioned, she required further, that we should guaranty the whole of her posessions-among the rest, Norway. As Bonaparte aware of these terms, he could not be ignorant of the answer which this country was likely to give. It was not true that the treaty between Russia and Sweden, or our treaty with the latter, was the cause that Denmark at present was an enemy instead of an ally. The noble lord concluded by saying, if the conduct of ministers deserved such a cen sure as that contained in the present address, that they were unfit for their places. He must there. fore oppose the amendment.

Mr. Canning said, that the na❤ ture of the subject, and the situa ation which he had formerly the honour to hold, made it natural for him to wish to give his opinion to the house upon the present ques tion. He did not at all censure this measure on the ground of im morality, but as opposing a very serious obstacle to the conclusion of a peace. He must say, also, that, without entertaining any illiberal suspicions, he thought Eng land had sufficient experience of the versatility of European politics to make it advisable for her rather to retain Guadaloupe for some time in her own hands; and when it was considered how often the Crown Prince of Sweden expressed his attachment to France, and how often he had even expressed his wish for an alliance with her, he did not think that less caution was necessary now than in ordinary cases.

He considered that this cession might be a material obstacle to a peace. Bonaparte might make the restitution of it a point of

honour;

honour; and if we were bound to guaranty it to Sweden, then he might insist on retaining far more than its value, or than he would retain if it was to be given up. He concluded by repeating, that his great objection was not to the assisting Sweden to gain military possession of Norway, nor to the cession of a colony to her as the price of her active co-operation in the continental war; but to the principle of guarantying, what we had no right to guaranty, the permanent possession of that to which the right had not been established by treaty.

Mr. Whitbread denied that, in the worst times of the French revolution, he had heard arguments more hostile to good government than had fallen from the honourable gentleman the diplomatist who had spoken last-and other honourable gentlemen, this evening. As well might France say that Ireland was disaffected from the government of this country, and that, therefore, she was warranted in endeavouring to effect the junction of that country to Spain, as we were warranted in saying that Norway was not well affected to Denmark, and, therefore, that we were entitled to enter into a treaty to separate her from Denmark, and to render her subject to Sweden. He had come down to the house full of all those prejudices against the treaty which it was naturally calculated to produce; and though the noble lord (Castlereagh) had made what he might call an exceedingly good speech, he had not taken the sting out of it, nor enabled him (Mr. Whitbread) to say that he did not still condemn the treaty. We had now been at war for twenty years in the struggle in which we were now engaged, and

1

in this struggle we had acted various parts. We had seen Russia, without complaint or remonstrance on our part, not like a friend, but like an enemy in the basest manner, deprive Sweden, whom we now jointly pretended to regard as a friend, of her territory-taking advantage of the imbecile state of that country to deprive her of Finland. The time had now come that Russia was afraid of the encroachments of France-it then became necessary for her to endeavour to make up a friendship with Sweden; but to do so, she did not say that she would restore to Sweden Finland, but that she would assist Sweden in wresting Norway from Denmark. Did any man suppose, if Russia had been willing to give up Finland to Sweden, that there would have been any necessity to procurethe accession of Sweden to the treaty in question, to rob Denmark of Norway? He conceived the present treaty to be a most unworthy act of diplomacy. As to the panegyric passed by the noble lord on the person who now filled the throne of Sweden, he did not object to it, though he thought it strange, applied as it was to one who had been raised from the ranks, and who had been selected by the Swedish people to fill their throne, in imitation of the glorious example set them by this country. He was happy to hear the person alluded to was so deserving of commendation; but he would rather not have seen him a party to such a treaty, to which he (Mr. Whitbread) could not give his support. The house then divided on the original motion

For the motion
For the amendment

115 224

The report, which charged the duke of Leeds with having violated the law and the privileges of the house, having been accordingly read,

Mr. Swan said, in bringing for ward the motion which he was about to submit to the house, he had no political interest to answer, and no resentments to gratify. The chairman of the committee had de clined to submit any motion to the house on the report, although the majority in the committee was 11 to 3. The house ought to be informed of the proceedings of the committee: the committee were unanimously of opinion, that those voters who had benefited by the corrupt influence which had been proved had disfranchised themselves. He should be sorry to say any thing against the noble duke alluded to in the report, or the bonourable members returned; but he conceived it incumbent on him in this case to lay before the house the nature of the transactions which had taken place, and to state the nature of the constitution of the borough of Hellestone. The learned gentleman proceeded to observe, that three of the aldermen,

who had got the majority of influence into their own hands, managed that influence for the Godol phin family, which family had in return paid the parish rates of Hellestone from the reign of queen Elizabeth to the year 1804, when, in consequence of some disagreement, the duke of Leeds lost the patronage of the borough. Then a baronet, who was understood to think that the best plan for making his way to the house was (as others were supposed to have done) by the possession of borough patronage, became patron of the borough in lieu of the duke of Leeds. Subsequent to as well as before that period, it was notorious that the seats were sold for 5000 guineas each; and such practices took place, as, to adopt the language of the right honourable gentleman in the chair, our ancestors would have shuddered at the very mention of. But the new patron (sir C. Hawkins, we presume), having soon ceased to retain his influence, in consequence of a resolution of that house, the duke of Leeds was again invited to resume the patronage; which invitation his grace accepted, upon the terms of an agreement, by which his grace became pledged to pay the town rates in return for the power of nominating the representatives. This fact was proved before the committee; and the re

sult

sult of the agreement was to afford the duke of Leeds an opportunity of deriving a profit of 8007. a year from the patronage of the borough, while each of the voters, being relieved from the payment of town rates, was insomuch bribed to vote for the members recommended by his grace. The manner of managing the patronage of this bo. rough he thought it not amiss to describe to the house, because it was pretty generally the system in Cornish boroughs. The patron was not allowed to have any direct connection with the voters. All the patronage was distributed by the leading members of the corporation, in such a way as to preserve their own consequence in the borough, and to render the voters dependent on themselves alone. With this view the personal interposition of the patron was studiously excluded, while the business of the borough was managed by those upon whom he was to depend for the retention of his influence; every favour he grants being so conveyed that the obligation shall be felt rather towards the agent than towards the principal or patron. And by whom was this system of cumming and corruption arranged and conducted? Why, chiefly by clergymen.-Yes, wherever bribery, corruption, treating, intimidation, or political persecution, or any species of undue influence or dirty work, was to be managed, the clergy, who ought to shrink from and reprobate such practices, were the most active and prominent agents. In the case of Penryn, which had so justly provoked the indignation of that house, it would be remembered that the reverend Mr. Dillon was a principal agent; in the case of Tregony, also, a clergyman was among the foremost in delinquen

cy; and in the case under consideration, he found the reverend Messrs. Trevelyan and Grylls among the most active in the works at Hellestone. Indeed the duke of Leeds lost ground considerably in the borough, as it appeared, from his neglect or incapacity to procure a living for the son of a clergyman. But no patron could in fact retain his influence in a Cornish borough, who had it not in his power to make a return of church patronage. The learned member, adverting to the case of Crogan, now a prisoner in Newgate for merely offering to sell a seat, put it to the house to consider whe ther the distinct agreement of the duke of Leeds, stated in the report before the house, could be consistently overlooked, or rather whether it was not deserving of exemplary punishment? In consequence of this agreement, the noble duke introduced Mr. Hammersley the banker, and Mr. Home the barrister, at the last election, by a letter under his grace's own hand, addressed to the mayor of the borough. With Crogan's example then in view, he asked, whether the house could, with due regard to consistency of character and duty, grant impunity to the duke of Leeds? In fact, if it were not meant that rank should give protection, and that poverty alone should expose a criminal to the prosecution of that house, it was impossible to let the conduct of the duke of Leeds, in this case, escape the visitation of the law he had so seriously offended. The learned gentlenian expressed his regret that the solicitor-general was not a member of that house, in order that it might have the advantage of that learned genticman's opinion, which he knew to