his ambition, even in the most trifling things, that he must plunge into desperate difficulties. He was of an order of minds that by na ture make for themselves great reverses. But in all of the question that touches upon England, I can not doubt, I never doubted, that the most decided stretch of our means was due, not merely as a duty to Russia, but was in every view of it the most discreetly economical, the most considerately prudent, the most plainly wise, as well as the most grand, the most magnificent, the most worthy of the cause and of the name of England. He requested to know of the noble lord at the head of the military department, why he did not send his reinforcements, when he knew of the state of affairs between France and Russia? He had been told, that lord Wellington thought that between Christmas and March was the proper time for sending them. Though that was unques tionably the best season, yet it afforded no sufficient and solid ground for acting upon, under all the circumstances, Might not our commander, in the operations, have gained a victory, or suffered a failure, either of which might require additional support? That opinion could not justify ministers. It was true, that the efficiency of our force was desirable in all our possessions at home or abroad; but common rules might not apply to extraor、 dinary cases. In case of conquests in the East or the West Indies, which required more troops in those quarters, the ordinary regulations respecting the sending them out would not be taken as invariable

rules.

How much more strongly did this apply here! Did not go vernment see the approaching con, flict of Russia and France, in time sufficient to show the propriety of

1813.

increasing our military strength in Spain early in 1812? If their lordships would grant a committee, he pledged himself to show them, that the reinforcements wanted were ready in the early part of the year. Ministers talked about reinforcing only between Christmas and July, as if it would be a sort of outrage and insult to the feelings of the commander in chief to do so! Men are sent off at the chosen period.: but on what principle, he again demanded, were the rest kept back till after th ebattle of Salamanca, when, they say, they sent all the men they could? Well these men were sent at the equinox, suffering in the greatest degree even while their vessels were riding at anchor; and they did arrive at Lisbon in November, at a season when the roads were in such a state as to make an immediate junction impracticable. When told that men ought only to be sent at the proper season, how happened it, but through improvidence, that these troops were detained till they were at last sent out at the very worst season? [His lordship went into a variety of other details, in which we regret that our limits will not allow us to follow him.] He had no doubt that the noble lord (lord Bathurst) would rise and answer him but he desired a clear, a direct, and satisfactory answer he wished to be informed why the noble lord had not sent out his troops in time to be of service to the cause of the peninsula? He trusted that the noble lord would not revive the days of Marlborough, and bring down the heroes of antiquity, for the purpose of illustrating his arguments by comparative views and reference to past ages; but that he would candidly submit to be tried by what he had really done, and by what was then actually passing. "I am not," continued

H

continued the marquis Wellesley, "to be told that all things have been conducted with wisdom and true policy; that every thing is as it ought to be, because lord Wellington is satisfied; nor am I to be told, because lord Wellington is satisfied, that therefore the parliament is satisfied,-the people of England are satisfied, and the country is satisfied. There is in such an assurance a very strange and striking singularity of statement, accompanied by an unaccountable absurdity of inference. Why (am I not justified in asking) were his plans rendered abortive? Why were his objects defeated? Why did heretire before the very army hehad conquered? Why did the co-operation the Sicilian expedition fail him, at the very crisis when he most wanted, and most relied upon, its assistance? But if the marquis of Wellington be satisfied, let me put it fairly to the house, and to the noble lord, can that he a reason why all inquiry should be stopped? What grounds has the nation for being satisfied, unless, indeed, it be a just ground of satisfaction, that because their general, in want of the means of doing more, has done his duty? I cannot, my lords, consider this as a reason why your lordships and the country ought to be satisfied. I stand before your lordships to assert the vigour of the British empire, to maintain the strength and copiousness of our resources, and to uphold the magnitude of our means. I contend, that inquiry has become necessarv, though solely for the purpose of ascertaining from what causes, and by what neglect, the system adopted with respect to the prosecution of the war in the peninsula has proved weak and defective. We find in the tanure and discomfiture of our in

veterate enemy, a strong argument in favour of this inquiry. For what has been the result of the triumphs of our ally, and of the defeats of the enemy? The vast armies which he marshalled and led with all the proud anticipation of victory, and the full confidence of success, have perished. Yet is he still allowed to wield the sceptre of dominion, and to raise his baleful crest in France. But what has enabled him to do so? It is because ministers have not hesitated to declare that England is unequal to the contest in which she is engaged; that her vigour, her resources and means are inadequate to maintain the war in the peninsula; and that she has tried every effort, and strained every nerve, in vain. I say, my lords, it is impossible that you can sanction the principle, that England is so reducedso worn out-so exhausted, as to be unable to carry on the war, with that proud and conscious sense of the strength and energy which she must and does possess. Although she has been foiled in the expected accomplishment of her wishes and object; although she has not attained that exalted station in the scale of national glory and national prosperity to which she had a right to aspire, were her native means and resources but wisely and providently applied-I feel, and I trust your lordships feel with me, that her vigour and energies are competent to meet greater trials, and surmount difficulties still more serious and perplexing. I am, therefore, my lords, justified in thinking that you will not, by your vote this night, sanction the weakness and inadequacy of the country in such a cause, and that whilst she is struggling for objects equally dear to her in erests and to her glory." His lordship concluded one of the

ablest

ablest speeches ever delivered in parliament, by moving, "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the circumstances and result of the last campaign in the peninsula of Spain."

Lord Bathurst began by observing, that no inferences could be drawn of any dissatisfaction felt by the marquis of Wellington, in consequence of the allusions made by the noble lord who spoke last, to the causes why the marquis of Wellington ought not to be satisfied. For himself, he could safely say, that there existed every convincing proof that the marquis of Welling ton was perfectly satisfied with the conduct of his majesty's government on the subject of the war in the peninsula. Yet, although he entertained no apprehension of being contradicted in that decided statement, he should not therefore think himself justified in maintaining that their lordships ought to be satisfied, if a full and proper case were made out as the proper ground of inquiry. He certainly would not follow the noble lord through all his statements and assertions; but when the noble lord maintained, that the system pursued with respect to Spain was fundamentally wrong, he felt it his duty to press upon the noble lord the justice and necessity of supporting his assertion by authentic proofs. What, he would ask, were the circumstances of the campaign which were made the subject of such reproach to his majesty's government? Badajoz was taken; and after the capture of that strong fortress, the battle of Salamanca was gloriously gained, the siege of Cadiz was raised, and Seville was cleared of the French troops. Were these events no proofs of the triumph of the British arms? and was it no circumstance

of moment and congratulation, that 20,000 prisoners and 80 pieces of cannon had been taken? These, he begged leave to say, were great and glorious results. Was the occupying one of the best armies, commanded by the best generals of France, to be considered as nothing? When the noble lord undertook to support his assertions, by remarking on the advance of the marquis of Wellington to Salamanca, he forgot the fact, that it was the plan of the marquis of Wellington himself. He should be equally explicit in assuring the house, and the noble lord, that no engagements had been made with the marquis of Wellington on the part of his majesty's government; that no proposals had been made by him to them; that they had received no representations from him; and that the plan upon which he had formed and conducted his operatións was entirely his own.

He

The noble lord, when he complains of the paucity of force sent out, must have forgotten that the unfortunate disturbances in the beginning of last summer required the presence of some regiments, particularly cavalry. He forgets that the 40,000 troops on home service were necessarily extended over England, Scotland, and Ireland. (A cry of Hear, hear! from Lord Grey and other res.) understood this expression of feeling as alluding to the catholic claims, and their supposed effects; but he merely stated the fact of the distribution of the troops over the united kingdom. Many of the regiments, it should also be recollected, were skeletons, sent home for the purpose of recruiting, re. freshment, and the recovery of their health deteriorated in active scrvice. The greater part were mere H 2 second

second battalions, employed in receiving and disciplining recruits; very few of them could muster more than 500 men, and he would ask, could they admit of large drafts being made from them? He would not presume to follow the noble marquis into all the points of his elaborate speech; but there were one or two matters, connected with the military expenditure of the country, to which he must shortly allude. The noble lord seemed to suppose it an easy thing to increase our foreign expenditure by an additional million. But besides the raising of the money, it was difficult to calculate the effects of such application. A million sent abroad was not like the same sum spent at home; a considerable part of it was lost by the unfavourable exchange; and the addition of such a sum, operating still further on the exchanges, might affect the whole of our foreign expenditure. If, for instance, you resolved to expend 12 millions instead of 11, such might be the effect in the present state of the course of exchange, that it might in fact require 15 millions, instead of 12, to attain your object. When the continent was open to our commerce, the foreign expenditure of the country operated as a sort of bounty on the export of our manufactures; thus indirectly assisting our industry and resources: but, unfortunately, the establishment of the continental system had diminished our exports at the moment when our foreign expenditure was largest, doubly, in this way, depressing the course of exchange. One word with regard to licenses He would assert that, in point of fact, they were lately the only means of trading with a great portion of the continent. But as far

as licenses were concerned, the ba lance of trade was in our favour and thus they enabled us better to support the burthens which the exertions of the country required.

Lord Grey and lord Boringdon spoke in defence of the motion, and the lords Aberdeen and Liverpool against it: the last in conclusion said: The noble marquis had stated, that the expenses of sending out an army would only be the difference of keeping them abroad and at home. This was not exactly true; the difficulties of supe porting an army abroad should be taken into consideration. The support must arise either from supplies, specie, or credit. The first were necessarily limited, and became more difficult, and less available, in proportion as the army marched further from the coast. As to the second, there had been no limit but practicability: notwithstanding the state of the market, and the price of bullion, more specie had been sent out in the last than had been supplied in the two preceding campaigns. The resources arising from credit had necessarily been greatly affected by the state of exchange, which all over Europe had been unfavourable to England, and by the disturbed state of South Ame rica; owing to which latter circumstance, only eight millions of dollars had been imported into the peninsula, instead of the 35 millions sent in time of peace. This proved that there were necessary limits which the expenses of the country. could not exceed. But, said the noble marquis, why not send an army of 50,000 men? Because, to send such a force, without the means of supporting it, would not be to strengthen, but to weaken lord Wellington. Whatever could be done, the ministers had done:

they