employers. Even when the object and purpose of such argument and persuasion is to make it impossible for the employer to carry on his business without coming to the terms proposed by the advocates, the law can not interfere. The right of free opinion, and free speech, and free action, within the bounds of law, are of more importance than any man's business, and so the law will not undertake to protect his business at the expense of these.

But the moment the attempt is made to overbear the will of those who wish to enter or continue in the employers' service that moment the bound is overstepped and the means used become unlawful. B has just as good a right to work for A as C has to refuse to work for him, and any attempt to compel him to leave the service when he desires to remain in it is unlawful. It is a wrong against B and it is a wrong against A. It makes no great difference what the means employed may be. It may be done by threats of injury; it may be done by calling vile names; it may be done by obtruding constantly and offensively upon his presence; it may be done by calling attention to him in public in disagreeable ways; it may be by following him about the street or waiting for him where he must pass; it may even be done by importunities and entreaties if made and offered by such numbers and in such a manner as to be a serious source of annoyance and molestation tending to destroy that peace of mind which lawabiding citizens of a free community have a right to dwell in. In short, it may be done by any means which have the natural effect to override and overbear the will of a man of ordinary firmness and move him to do what he does not wish to do for the sake of escaping from those who thus pursue and worry him.

It may be that C really believes that it is for the interest of B as well as for the interest of C that B should quit the employment of A. It may be that C believes that it is for the interest of all his fellowworkmen that B should quit the service of A, and that nobody should work for A upon the terms which A offers. C may be thoroughly convinced that the conditions of labor will be greatly improved if A is compelled to conduct his business in some other way. All these considerations are of no consequence in determining what the law is and should be in a case like the one supposed. There is something more important than fair wages, and that is the right to work for any wages the workman is willing to accept. There is something more important than an eight-hour day, and that is a free day. Any enhancement of wages, any lessening of the hours of labor, any improvement in the conditions of employment, would be too dearly bought by the surrender of the smallest fraction of individual liberty under the law. Workmen themselves are the last men in the world who should willingly suffer the loss of such a right. That is about all they have gained, or that has been gained for them, in the long struggle for rights which have been going on since the beginning of organized society. Individual men, even great classes of men, may lose sight of its importance for a time in their desire to secure some coveted advantage, but the law does not lose sight of it, and so long as the ancient landmarks of our jurisprudence are observed these rights will be safe.

No better definition of freedom has ever been given than this: That one man's liberty ends where another man's liberty begins. Union men would think themselves unjustly treated if they should be impor

tuned and besought, picketed, followed about the streets, and made objects of ridicule and contempt because they refused to leave the union, or because they refused to continue in the service of an employer they did not care to serve. They should be willing, and the law requires them, to treat their fellow-laborers as they would insist upon being treated under the same circumstances. It makes no difference how large may be the majority of those who believe that their interests are best protected inside the union nor how few and deluded are those who take the opposite view. It makes no difference how great an obstacle to the laudable purposes of the union a few misled or disloyal associates may be. It is a question of individual right. Those who wish to surrender a part of their individual freedom of action. for the sake of the larger benefits that may be gained through union have an unquestioned right to do so. The law recognizes their right and gives standing to the union itself, but the right of those who choose to remain outside is just as sacred and inviolable in the eyes of the law.

The real difficulty in the present case has been for the court to satisfy itself by the mere reading of affidavits exactly what has occurred. Such of the parties as have shown themselves in court have presented a very favorable appearance. It is difficult to believe that such men have deliberately intended to transgress the law. So far as they may have done so they must have been carried away by zeal for their cause, and probably without fully appreciating the meaning and effect of their acts. But in deciding what probably did occur we are to remember that the union and its members were carrying on what seemed to them a sort of warfare to secure better conditions for themselves and their fellow-craftsmen. Being out of employment themselves, many of the defendants devoted their whole time to winning the strike. It was a matter of intense personal interest to them. They appointed committees, which they themselves styled "vigilance committees," and other committees on the eight-hour day. They were so eager to prevent the complainants from securing employees to take their places that they boarded the trains and traveled many miles away from the city to meet and argue with men who had been employed to come and work for the complainants. They employed every form of argument and persuasion to induce them not to enter the employment at all, or, if they had already entered it, to abandon it at once. They endeavored to persuade the complainants' workmen to join the union and take the strike benefits, although such workmen were men who they now say were entirely unworthy to associate with honorable men. They were willing to pay one man over $40 to induce him to leave the city, beside cashing for him an order upon his employer for nearly $20 of wages. They followed and besieged the workmen with arguments and entreaties whenever they appeared upon the street, and carried on a systematic campaign with the avowed purpose of depriving the complainants of all their workmen. It seems entirely clear that in many instances they pursued this course with those who had plainly told them that they did not care to be argued with and only desired to be let alone. These things are referred to as showing the eagerness and zeal with which the union and its members have been animated. When the complainants' employees have given as a reason for not joining the union the fact that they were already under contract. with the complainants, or some of them to work for stated periods,

the defendants have been quick to inform and earnest to convince them that their supposed contracts were absolutely worthless. Some contracts which have been shown the court are beyond all doubt binding contracts, and if the defendants believed that they were not, that belief can hardly excuse them. Some of the affidavits made by the defendants in reply to those supporting the bill do not, like the others, meet the issue squarely. They do not attempt to state the conversation which did occur, but characterize it with general expressions which quite likely take their color from the interest of the affiants. In many instances the defendants have succeeded in persuading or inducing employees of the complainants to go away. A considerable number of those so quitting have made affidavit that they did so of their own free will and accord. Others say that they left under the sort of pressure that has been referred to above. It was naturally to be expected that those who were persuaded to quit the complainants and join the union would not willingly give further aid or comfort to the side they had left. It has been strongly argued that it is absurd to suppose that any unlawful pressure could have been used upon those who did finally consent to join the union or who did, after the acts complained of, go to the union headquarters and talk freely with the officers of that body. Such argument proceeds upon the theory that the intimidation must have been of personal violence, and of such a character as to entirely drive away the person against whom it was used; but that is not the most common nor the most effectual method of overbearing the will of the new employee. Such threats, if resorted to at all, would be the last resource, and would only be used against those who could not be brought in by the milder forms. of coercion. The court is inclined to believe that on some occasions there were covert suggestions of personal injury as being likely to result to those who continued to oppose the purpose of the union; but however this may be, it has little doubt that workmen in the employ of the complainants who were bound by contract to serve them for stated periods have been induced by the defendants to break their contracts and leave the service, and that many others who would have entered the service or were already employed and would have continued in the employment, have been withdrawn from the service of the complainants by acts of the defendants which have amounted to coercion under the rule above stated.

It would be tedious and would probably serve no useful purpose to analyze the affidavits and make distinct findings of fact in regard to particular witnesses. The question is not whether the proof is so satisfactory that if the proceeding were one brought to have the defendants punished for contempt of a previous injunetion the facts would be found sufficiently established to justify fine or imprisonment. It is rather a question of probable cause. The application is for a preliminary injunction to remain in force until the case can be fully tried. Upon all the testimony taken together does it fairly and reasonably appear that the bounds of law recognized and stated above have been overstepped so often and to such an extent as to justify the belief that the complainants' rights are being invaded and will continue to be invaded and their business threatened with ruin unless the court shall interfere! After a careful and deliberate examination of the testimony the court finds itself possessed by an abiding conviction that the case

is one which calls for its aid, and that the defendants ought to be enjoined, pending the suit, from interfering with the complainants' conduct of their business by attempting to persuade their employees, who are under contract, to quit their service, or by attempting to coerce their other employees into leaving their service, or attempting to coerce others from engaging in their service.

The bill also prays for an injunction against the use of the boycott, Some expressions in articles issuing from the defendant union during the early stage of the controversy hinted of interruptions and delays that would attend the performance of work by the complainants for their customers, and upon that ground recommended such customers to employ only union shops. But the later emanations from the union seem to have kept carefully within the bounds of the law, and it is considered unnecessary at this time to issue any injunction against a boycott. If the occasion for such an injunction should arise it can be moved for hereafter.

[In the supreme court of the District of Columbia. Byron S. Adams et al., defendants, v. Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, and others, complainants. In equity No. 26005. Docket 58.]

INJUNCTION ORDER.

This cause having been heard upon the motion for a preliminary injunction, it is, after due consideration,

Ordered that an injunction issue restraining the defendants, said union, and all members thereof, and all persons acting under their authority, from interfering with any of the complainants in the conduct of their business for the purpose of preventing them from conducting the same in their own lawful way, or of compelling any of them to yield to the demands of the defendants touching the manner in which such business shall be conducted:

1. By attempting to induce any of their employees who are under contract to remain in their service to break such contracts and leave said service, or

2. By attempting to coerce any of their actual employees into leaving their service, or any of their intending employees not to enter their service, by the use of personal violence or any threat of the same, by use of opprobrious epithets applied to such employees, by following such employees about the streets against their will and request, by persistently surrounding and importuning and entreating such employees against their will and request. By meeting and intercepting such employees on their way to and from work for the purpose of doing any of the things above forbidden, by harassing, annoying, or molesting such employees, by any other means of the same general nature as those above forbidden. Such an injunction to remain in force during the pendency of this proceeding or until the further order of the court. The undertaking required by rule 43 to be first filed. WENDELL P. STAFFORD, Justice.

Marked filed March 30, 1906.

[In the United States district court for the district of Alaska, second division. E. W. Johntson, plaintiff, v. Federal Labor Union, Nome City, Alaska, et al., defendant.]

ORDER OF INJUNCTION.

Now, on this 15th day of August, A. D. 1905, this cause coming or to be heard upon the application of the plaintiff for a restraining order and injunction against the said defendants and against all other persons whomsoever acting in collusion or in connection with them, or any of them, and all other persons, restraining all such persons from in any way doing or attempting to do any of the acts complained of in the complaint herein; and it appearing to the court by the complaint and the affidavit of John Rigby, filed herein, that a restraining order and injunction should be issued during the pendency of this action, or until further order of the court, in accordance with the prayer of the said complaint, and the plaintiff having given a bond in the amount fixed by this court:

Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the said defendants, and each and all of them, and all persons acting in connection with them, and all persons whomsoever. are hereby restrained and enjoined from in any way or manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or in any manner delaying or stopping the building and construction of the improvements at the mouth of Snake River, in Nome, Alaska, by the said plaintiff or anyone acting by, through, or under him, and of the buildings, structures, construction, or machinery now being built or placed upon or hereafter to be built or placed upon the same or any part of the said improvements, and from picketing the works and business of plaintiff, or from interfering in any way with any of the employees of plaintiff, and from compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats. intimidation, persuasion, force, or violence, any of the employees of the plaintiff to leave the employment of plaintiff, or to refuse or fail to perform any of their duties as employees of said plaintiff, and from attempting, by threats, force, or violence, to prevent any person whomsoever from entering the employment of plaintiff, and from aiding, assisting, or abetting in any manner whatsoever any person or persons to commit any or to attempt to commit any of the acts aforesaid.

And it is further ordered that this injunction order shall be in force and binding upon said defendants from and after the service upon them, severally, of this injunction order, or from the time that any of said defendants have knowledge of this order, or upon the reading of this injunction order or a copy thereof to any of said defendants by any person, or by the publication of this order by posted or printed copies thereof, and upon all persons whomsoever, whether named or not, when they shall have knowledge of the making of this order. Done in open court this 15th day of August, 1905.

Witness the Hon. Alfred S. Moore, judge of the United States district court, district of Alaska, second division, and the seal of said court hereto affixed this 15th day of August, A. D. 1905.

[SEAL.]

Attest:

ALFRED S. MOORE,

United States District Judge, Second Division, District of Alaska.

GEO. V. BORCHSENIUS, Clerk. By ANGUS MCBRIDE, Deputy.