from the first and throughout that the trustee | held the property in trust for the mother and the three sons. (5) Because the father, from the date of the deed to the time of his death, recognized the premises as acquired and held for the benefit of his wife and their three sons. (6) Because the mother of the three sons, after the decease of the first husband of complainant, recognized her as interested in the property, and continued to do so at all times throughout her life, until about the time she conveyed the lot in question to the respondent. Courts of equity, beyond all doubt, possess the power to grant such relief, and the proofs, in the judgment of the court, are such as to entitle the complainant to such a decree, unless the remaining defense set up by the respondent must prevail. Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L., 149, 186; Cochrane v. Willis, 34 Beav., 359, 366. Such a decree, of course, cannot now be made against the trustee, as he is not living; but the executors, as contended by the complainant, are competent to perform that duty, and she prays that the decree may be adapted to the present state of the parties. Suppose all that is true; still it is contended by the principal respondent that the decree below is correct, because the claim is barred. Much discussion of that defense will not be necessary, beyond what is required to ascertain the facts. Both the deed and her will bear date September 28, 1872, and the proofs show that she was at the time in a low, depressed state of mind, and that she departed this life within one year subsequent to the execution of those instruments. Prior to that, and throughout the whole period subsequent to the death of her husband, the proofs show that she uniformly recognized the complainant as the owner of a moiety of the lot and the improvements, and always required her to pay one half of all repairs, taxes, insur-hood of the mother of her first husband, except ance, and other expenses of the property. By the terms of the original deed the prop erty was conveyed to the trustees, subject to the payment of taxes, assessments and ground rent, to and for the sole and separate use, benefit and behoof of the mother and her three sons during her lifetime; and after her death to the three sons as tenants in common in equal parts, with the provision that if the mother during her lifetime should deem it advisable, she might sell and convey the premises; and that, in that event, the further trust was raised and created that the trustees or the survivor of them, upon her application and with her consent signified by becoming a party to the conveyance, might sell and convey the lot and improvements for the best price which could be obtained for the same, without any application to a court of law or equity for that purpose, and to invest the proceeds thereof upon the same trusts in such other property or manner as the mother should direct, and for the same use, benefit and behalf. Provision was also made that if no such sale and re investment was made during the lifetime of the mother, then the trustees were to sell the same for the sole use and benefit of the three sons or the survivor or survivors of them, share and share alike, until the youngest should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, when the trustees might sell and convey the same at the request of such survivor or survivors, and divide the proceeds to the survivor or survivors, share and share alike. Taken as a whole, the proofs show, to the entire satisfaction of the court, that the lot in question was purchased and conveyed to the surviving trustee upon the same trusts as those raised and created in the first deed; and that the trustee, through mistake, failed to have those trusts properly declared in the deed of trust to him as he should have done; and that the prayer of the bill of complainant, that the deed of the lot and improvements in question ought to be reformed and the rights of the complainant be ascertained and adjudged as if the deed in question contained the same trusts as those raised and created in the original trust deed, is reasonable and proper and should be granted. When the father died, the complainant was living on the premises, and she continued to reside there most or all the time during the widow. while she lived with her second husband, and when he died she returned to live with her mother-in-law. During all that time the proofs show that she was constantly recognized as the lawful heir to the estate of her deceased husband, until about a year before the decease of of the mother, who also resided on the premises. Prior to that, the rights of the complainant were unmistakably recognized, and nothing of consequence had occurred to indicate any intent to call her just right in question. Soon after that, however, the respondent commenced an action of ejectment against her to recover possession of the entire lot and improvements, she still being in possession and, doubtless, hoping and expecting that her rights would yet be acknowledged without the necessity of expensive litigation. Expectations of the kind not being realized, she filed the present bill of complaint. Laches are imputed to her; but the court, in view of the circumstances and of the embarrassments growing out of the obvious defects in the conveyance intended to secure her rights, is of the opinion that the evidence of laches is not sufficient to bar her right to recover in the present suit. Without more, these remarks are sufficient to show that the defense cannot be sustained, and it is accordingly overruled. Two or three remarks will be sufficient to show that the objection that the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to enter the required decree against the executors of the deceased trustee cannot be sustained. Jurisdiction as between the complainant and respondent is unquestionable; and, if so, it is clear that the fact that the trustee, if living, was a citizen of the same State with the complainant would not defeat the jurisdiction in a case where he is a mere nominal party, and is merely joined to perform the ministerial act of conveying the title if adjudged to the complainant. Where that is so, the executor, in case of the decease of the trustee, if authorized by the law of the State to execute such a conveyance, may also be joined in the suit under like circumstances, merely to accomplish the like purpose. Where the real and only controversy is between citizens of different States, or an alien and a citizen, and the plaintiff is, by some positive rule of law, compelled to use the name of another to perform merely a ministerial act, who has not nor ever had any interest in or control over it, the courts of the United States will not consider any others as parties to the suit than the persons between whom the litigation before them exists. McNutt v. Bland, 2 How.. 9, 15; Browne v. Strode, 5 JOSEPH M. DOUGLASS, Pf. in Err., v. PIKE COUNTY, MISSOURI. (See S. C., 11 Otto, 677-688.) Cranch, 303; Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall., State construction of statute-latest decision-rule 172, 177 [78 U. S., XX., 179, 181]. Cases arise in the Federal Courts in which nominal or even immaterial parties are joined, on the one side or the other, with those who have the requisite citizenship to give the court jurisdiction in the case; and where that is so, the rule is settled that the mere fact that one or more of such parties reside in the same State with one of the actual parties to the controversy, will not defeat the jurisdiction of the court. Decisive authority for that proposition is found in a recent ruling of Mr. Justice Miller, in which he states, to the effect, that mere formal parties do not oust the jurisdiction of the court, even if they are without the requisite citizenship, where it appears that the real controversy is be tween citizens of different States. Arapahoe Co. v. R. Co., 4 Dill., 277, 283. Nothing is claimed of the executors in this case except that they shall perform the minis terial act of conveying the title, in case the power to do so is vested in them by the law of the State, and the court shall enter a decree against the principal respondent to that effect. From all which it follows that the complainant is entitled, as between herself and the principal respondent, to the relief prayed in the bill of complaint; but the court, in view of all the circumstances, will not proceed to determine either the proportion of the trust property which belongs to the complainant or the amount she is entitled to recover of the said respondent. In stead of that, those matters are left to be ascertained and determined by the Circuit Court, with authority, if need be, to refer the cause to a master to report the facts, with his opinion thereon, subject to the confirmation of the Circuit Court. of construction-effect on bonds. highest court of a State has given to a statute of the State as part of the statute. 1. This court treats the construction which the 2. But where different constructions have been not follow the latest decisions, if thereby contract given to the same statute at different times, it will rights which have accrued under earlier rulings would be injuriously affected. construction in respect to a statute the same effect 3. The true rule is, to give a change of judicial in its operation on contracts and existing contract rights that would be given to a legislative amendment: that is to say, make it prospective, but not 4. The rights of the parties in regard to municipal bonds are to be determined according to the law as it was judicially construed to be when the bonds in question were put on the market as commercial 5. This rule applied to bonds of a county in Missouri. [No. 155.] retroactive. paper. Argued Jan. 5, 6, 1880. Decided Mar. 29, 1880. Ned States for the Eastern District of Mis ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit souri. This was an action brought in the court below by Jos. M. Douglass, the plaintiff in error, against the defendant in error on certain coupons detached from bonds, alleged to have been issued by the defendant in error in behalf of Cuivre Township, under the Township Aid Act of March 23, 1868. The defendant demurred to the petition, and the demurrer was sustained by the court below, upon the ground that the Act under which the bonds in question were issued was in conflict with section 14, article 11 of the Constitution of Missouri, adopted in 1865. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff sued out the present writ of error. Messrs. John H. Overall, J. O. Broadhead and Frederick N. Judson, for plaintiff in error: The point raised upon the other side is, that since the decision of this court in Cass County V. Johnston, 95 U. S., 360 (XXIV., 416), the Supreme Court of Missouri in the cases of State v. Brassfield, 67 Mo.. 331, wherein two Judges, out of the five constituting the court (two not sitting), made the decision, and Webb v. Lafay ette Co., 67 Mo., 353 (two Judges dissenting). has decided the Township Aid Act of 1868 unconstitutional, and all bonds issued under it void. Executors of the trustee, in such a case as the complainant alleges, are, under the law of the State, the successors of the deceased trustee, and that, as such, they may execute whatever remains executory in the trust at the time of his decease; from which it would follow, if that be so, that it will be the duty of the executors of the deceased trustee in this case, when the rights of the complainant are fully ascertained, to make the necessary conveyance to perfect her title to the same extent as the trustee might do if in full life. Express authority is reserved to the Circuit Court to ascertain the rights of the complainant as if the trust-deed was reformed, and to make the necessary decree to perfect her title in such mode and form as the law of the State and the practice of the state cited, State, ex rel. R. R. Co., v. Linn Co. Ct., courts authorize and provide. Crafton v. Beal 44 Mo., 504; Ranney v. Baeder, 50 Mo., 600; 1 Ga., 322; Brown v. Tucker, 47 Ga., 485. State v. Sanderson, 54 Mo., 203, dissenting opinCosts in this court will be taxed to the prin-ion of Judge Napton, 67 Mo.. 371; Township of cipal respondent in favor of the complainant, Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall., 666 (86 U. S., but no costs will be allowed against the other XXII., 227); State v. Miller, 50 Mo., 129. two respondents. Decree reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the court. Cited-19 Blatchf., 197. To break the force of these decisions, counsel Mr. Thos. J. C. Fagg, for defendant in error: NOTE.-Municipal bonds; how affected by change of ruling of highest court of State,or by change in Constitution. See note to Mitchell v. Burlington, 71 U. S., XVIII., 350. Counsel also contended that the Supreme Court of Missouri had not, in the cases decided by it previous to 1878, directly decided the Act in question to be constitutional. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: The United States Courts will be controlled | pany, association or corporation, unless two by the decisions of the State Courts after the is- thirds of the qualified voters of such county, sue of bonds, when the question is one that de- city or town, at a regular or special election to pends upon the construction of a local statute. be held therein, shall assent thereto." All the obKing v. Wilson, 1 Dill., 555; Gelpcke v. Du- jections presented were considered by the court, buque, 1 Wall., 175 (68 U. S., XVII., 520); Ol- and in conclusion it was said: The county cott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678 (83 U. S., court having made the subscription, the comXXI., 382); Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall., 575 (75 pany is entitled to the bonds.' It is quite true U. S.. XIX.,490); Supervisors v. U.S., 18 Wall., that the precise objection which has since been 71 (85 U. S., XXI., 771); Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 raised was not then urged or considered; but Wall., 50 (76 U. S., XIX., 594); Pine Grove the alleged discrepancy between the Act and Township v. Talcott, 19 Wall., 666 (86 U. S., the Constitution was just as apparent then as it XXII., 227). is now, and Judge Dillon, in Foote v. Johnson Co., 6 Cent. L. J., 346, says: Suits, in great numbers, on these township bonds have been brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for this district, and they have been defended by the ablest lawyers in the State, upon every ground that they conceived open to them; but this difference between the phraseology of the Constitution and the Act, so patent that it could not escape attention, was never presented or urged in any case, so far as either of us recollect, as invalidating the Act." In Cass Co. v. Johnston, we attributed this to the fact that in other cases it had been substantially decided that the language of the Act and that of the Constitution were, in legal effect, the same, and at that time took occasion to look somewhat critically into the rulings on that subject. We have again examined that question, and are satisfied with the correctness of our former conclusion. It is thought, however, that we did not give sufficient effect to the case of State v. Sutterfield, 54 Mo., 391. As to that, we said the question presented related to another clause of the Constitution, and that the decision was placed expressly on the ground of a difference between the two provisions. In this it is urged we were in error. The clause of the Constitution there under consideration was article 4, section 30, which is: "The General Assembly shall have no power to remove the county seat of any county, unless two thirds of the qualified voters of the county, at a general election, shall vote in favor of such removal." Under this provision of the Constitution a statute was passed providing for elections in such cases, to the effect. "If it shall appear by such election that two thirds of the legally registered voters of said county are in favor of the removal of the county seat of such county, then," etc., In the opinion the court say: "There is no doubt that, in general, when an election is held to determine the choice of a candidate, or the determination of some question of public policy, the plurality required by law, whether it be a bare majority or two thirds or three fourths, is determined by the result of the vote cast, without regard to the number declining to vote; and this is upon the ground that a failure to vote is assumed, or may be presumed, to be an acquiescence in whatever result may be produced by the action of those who feel a sufficient interest in the election to go to the polls and vote, and for the further reason that in most cases there is no mode by which the number of absentees can be ascertained. We are asked to reconsider our decision in Cass Co. v. Johnston, 95 U. S.,360 [XXIV.,416], because since that case the Supreme Court of Missouri, in State v. Brassfield, 67 Mo., 331, and Webb v. Lafayette Co., 67 Mo., 353, has held the "Township Aid Act," which we sustained, to be unconstitutional. The question presented, as we view it, is not so much whether these late decisions are right, as whether they should be followed in cases having reference to bonds put out and in the hands of innocent purchasers when they were announced. In the Cass County case we said that the Supreme Court of the State had often been called on to construe and give effect to the Act, and had never before that time in a single instance expressed even a doubt as to its validity. We have again examined all the cases, and find that what we then said was true. Judge Dillon, who filled the office of Circuit Judge in the Eighth Circuit with such distinguished ability during nearly all the time the Act was in operation from its original passage until after the recent decisions, remarked in Westerman v. Cape Girardeau Co., 7 Cent. L. J., 354: "A hundred cases-and I do not think I exaggerate-have been brought on these town ship bonds in the Federal Courts of this State, and prior to the decision in Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S., 569 [XXIII., 747], none of the able lawyers defending these cases ever made a point that the Act of March 23, 1868, was unconstitutional." The reason is obvious. At the very outset it was thought best to take the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State on that subject. The Act went into operation in 1868, and in 1869, State v. Linn Co., 44 Mo.,504, was decided. There a township had voted to subscribe to the stock of a railroad company, and the county court had made the subscription; but after this was done the court refused "To deliver the bonds, for the alleged reason, only, that the Act under which the subscription was made was unconstitutional and void.” An application was then made for a mandamus to compel the delivery of the bonds; and the only questions presented by the counsel for the respondent in the argument of the case, as shown by the report, were those of constitutionality, and especially Our Constitution in regard to the prowas it urged that the Act was repugnant to arti- posed removal of county seats, it seems to me, cle 11, section 14, which, quoting from the opin- hardly admits of two constructions. It prohibits ion, "Declares the General Assembly shall not the Legislature from removing them unless two authorize any county, city or town to become thirds of the qualified voters shall, at a general a stockholder in or loan its credit to any com-election, vote for the removal. The words do * * * not imply an acquiescence or negative sanction, | majority of the resident voters who shall vote or a negative assent inferred from absence, but at such election under the provisions of this a positive vote in the affirmative; and the number Act." Acts of 1860–61, p. 60, sec. 2. In adaptof votes required is specifically named, and there ing this to the new constitutional requirements, is no difficulty in ascertaining what that num- this is the language used: "It shall be lawful ber is, since the same Constitution provides for for the county court of any county, the city a registration, and points out who qualified vot- council of any city or the trustees of any incorers are; and the statute in this case uses the porated town, to take stock, etc., provided that words legally registered voters,' and requires two thirds of the qualified voters of such countwo thirds of them to vote for the change." The ty, city or town, at a regular or special election court then refers to the case of State v. St. Jo- to be held therein, shall assent to such subscripseph, 37 Mo., 270; State v. Binder, 38 Mo., 450, tion." Gen. Stat. Mo., 1865, p. 338, sec. 17. and State v. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo., 103, and says: This, it will be seen, is the exact language of the "In none of these cases, however, was there any Constitution itself, and the intention evidently examination of or construction given to the pre- was to leave its meaning to be ascertained by cise language of the constitutional provision now judicial construction. By another statute passed under consideration. *** The present case, at the same session of the Legislature, the charhowever, presents very different considerations. ter of the City of St. Joseph, which had before The question of removing county seats was re- authorized subscriptions to the capital stock of garded by the framers of the Constitution as of railroad companies if a majority of the real essufficient importance to require very stringent tate owners in the city sanctioned the same, provisions in that instrument, and an examina- was amended so as to require that question to tion of the laws in force on this subject, at the be submitted "To a vote of the qualified voters time of the adoption of the new Constitution, will of said city, and in all such cases it shall reshow the great importance of requiring a strict quire two thirds of such qualified voters to sanccompliance with its provisions." We think, tion the same." Acts of 1865–66, p. 269, sec. then, we were not in error in supposing that the 1. At the same session, in amending the charcourt believed there was an essential difference ter of the Town of Clarksville, evidently to ac between the two provisions of the Constitution, complish the same object, this is the language and especially so as the Judge who delivered employed: "After first having obtained the conthe opinion of the court in State v. Sutterfield, sent of the inhabitants, as required by the Conby his dissent in the later cases of State v. Brass-stitution of the State." Gen. Stat. Mo., 1865, field, and Webb v. La Fayette Co., clearly indicates his disapproval of the effect upon the question now under consideration which was then given that case. p. 254, sec. 1. At the February Term, 1866, of the Supreme Court of the State, that court was called on. in State, ex rel. Bassett, v. St. Joseph [supra], to give The legislative recognition of the difference a construction to the Act amending the charter between these two clauses of the Constitution is of St. Joseph. Under that Act, an election was equally apparent. The Constitution went into held on the 13th of January, 1866, to vote upon effect in July, 1865, and it became the duty of the question of an issue of bonds, and four hunthe Legislature, at its next session, which com- dred and four votes were polled, of which three menced in November, to adapt the old laws to hundred and thirty-six were in favor of and the new order of things. In this connection, it fifty-eight against the measure. The mayor re must be borne in mind that the provision for a fused to sign the bonds after the vote was taken, registration of voters was first introduced into and a mandamus was asked to require him to the policy of the State by this new Constitution. do so. The only reason he gave for declining The then existing law regulating the removal to sign the bonds was, that He was in doubt of county seats provided that "Whenever three whether the matter was to be determined by fifths of the taxable inhabitants of any county, two thirds of the votes polled at the special as ascertained by the tax list made and returned election, or by two thirds of all the voters resilast preceding the application, shall petition the dent in the city, absolutely, whether voting or county court praying a removal of the seat of not." In the argument, in support of the apjustice thereof to a designated place, the court plication for the writ, the attention of the court shall appoint five commissioners," etc. R. S., was called to the fact that there was "No reg Mo., 1855, p. 514, sec. 1. To meet the require- istry law by which the qualified voters in the ments of the new Constitution on this subject, city could be ascertained," and it was further an election was provided for, and it was enacted said, The votes cast at the last election for that if it should appear by such election that city officers and the votes cast at said subsetwo thirds of "the legally registered voters quent election furnish the only correct criterion were in favor of the removal, commissioners to ascertain the number of qualified voters in should be appointed to perform the same duties the city at the time said special election was prescribed in the old law. Gen. Stat. Mo., 1865, held." In the opinion, mention is also made of p. 223, secs. 20-22. Here it is evident the Leg- the number of votes polled at the next preceding islature had in mind both the provision for reg- election; but the court, after stating the exact istration of voters and the somewhat unusual question put by the mayor as indicating his own requirement that two thirds of the qualified vot- doubts, uses this direct and unmistakable laners of the county should vote for the measure. guage: "We think it was sufficient that two The old law respecting the subscription by the thirds of the qualified voters who voted at the county courts to the capital stock of railroad cor- special election authorized for the express purporations was as follows: "It shall not be law-pose of determining that question, on public ful for the county court of any county to subscribe to the capital stock of any railroad company, unless the same has been voted for by a notice duly given, voted in favor of the proposition. This was the mode provided by law for ascertaining the sense of the qualified We are, then, to consider whether, under these circumstances, we must follow the later decisions to the extent of destroying rights which have become vested under those given before. As a rule, we treat the construction which the highest court of a State has given a statute of the State as part of the statute, and govern ourselves accordingly; but where different constructions have been given to the same statute at different times, we have never felt ourselves bound to follow the latest decisions, if thereby contract rights which have accrued under earlier rulings will be injuriously affected. The language of Chief Justice Taney, in Roan v. Runnels, 5 How., 134, expresses the true rule on this subject. He said, p. 139: "Undoubtedrespect the decisions of the state courts and, from the time they are made, regard them as conclusive in all cases upon the construction of their own laws. But we ought not to give them a retroactive effect, and allow them to render invalid contracts entered into with citizens of other States which, in the judgment of this court, were lawfully made." Afterwards, in Ohio Ins & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How., 416, the same learned Chief Justice, after reiterating what he had before said in Rowan v. Runnels, uses this language: "It is true the language of the court in that case is confined to contracts with citizens of other States, because it was a case of that description which was then before it. But the principle applies with equal force to all contracts which come within its jurisdiction." This distinction has many times been recognized and acted upon. Supervisors v. U.S., 18 Wall.,71 [85 U. S., XXI., 771]; Fairfield v. Gallatin Co. [ante 544]. Indeed, if a contrary rule was adopted, and the comity due to state decisions pushed to the extent contended for, "It is evident," to use again the language of Chief Justice Taney, in Rowan v. Runnels, "that the provision of the Constitution of the United States, which secures to the citizens of another State the right to sue in the courts of the United States, might become utterly useless and nugatory." The true rule is to give a change of judicial construction, in respect to a statute, the same effect in its operation on contracts and existing contract rights that would be given to a legislative amendment; that is to say, make it prospective, but not retroactive. After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is, to all intents and purposes, the same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment. voters on that question. There would appear to be no other practicable way in which this matter could be determined." It is true, the bonds voted at this election were not to be used in payment of subscriptions to the stock of railroad companies, but the law construed was the one in which provision was made for such subscriptions. Following this, at the October Term, 1866, of the same court, was the case of State v. Binder, 38 Mo., 450, in which similar language in another statute was construed, and State v. St. Joseph cited as establishing the doctrine "That an election of this kind authorized for the very purpose of determining that question, on public notice duly given, was the mode contemplated by the Legislature as well as by the law for ascertaining the sense of the legal vot-ly, this court will always feel itself bound to ers upon the question submitted, and that there could not well be any other practicable way in which such a matter could be determined. And," continues the court, "certainly, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it may be presumed that the voters, voting at an election so held, were all the legal voters of the city; or, that all those who did not see fit to vote (if there were any) acquiesced in the action of those who did vote, and so are to be considered as equally bound and concluded by the result of the election. Rex v. Foxcroft, 2 Burr., 1017; Wilcox, Corp.,546." Certainly, after these two decisions, made under the circumstances that attended them, and with the mind of the court directed by counsel in their argument to the registration laws, it might fairly be assumed by the Legislature to have been judicially determined that the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters voting at an election duly called and notified, was the legal equivalent of the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters of an election precinct. Hence, it was that the session of the Legislature which began in January, 1868, and as soon, probably, as the effect of these decisions had become generally understood, to avoid all future doubts as to what was meant, the equivalent language, as construed by the courts, was used, instead of that of the Constitution itself. And so we find not only in the Township Aid Act, but in other Acts depend ing for their authority on the same clause of the Constitution, the requisite assent of those voting at an election was deemed by the Legislature to be the assent of the qualified voters. It was under this state of facts and the law that State v. Linn Co. [supra], was heard and decided. Other objections to its constitutional validity than those which had formerly been considered were raised, argued and decided in favor of the law. From that time forward, and until long after the issue of the bonds now in question, the law was treated by the courts and the people as valid and constitutional. No law yer, asked for a professional opinion on that subject, could have hesitated to say that it had been settled. It would seem as though every question which could be raised had in some form, directly or indirectly, been presented and decided. While some of the decisions were rendered before the passage of the Township Act, it is so clear that the peculiar language of that Act was the consequence of those decisions that we do not deem it unreasonable to give them all the effect they would have if made after wards. So far as this case is concerned, we have no hesitation in saying that the rights of the parties are to be determined according to the law as it was judicially construed to be when the bonds in question were put on the market as commercial paper. We recognize fully, not only the right of a state court, but its duty to change its decisions whenever, in its judgment, the necessity arises. It may do this for new reasons, or because of a change of opinion in respect to old ones; and ordinarily we will follow them, except so far as they affect rights vested before the change was made. The rules which properly govern courts, in respect to their past |