But the title indicates that other purposes than revenue may be found in the provisions of the Act. Looking, then, to the section in question, which makes no mention of revenue whatever, which enacts a law against conspiracies in the most general terms, we are of opinion that it was one of the other purposes of the Act to pass this general penal statute, and that an offense punishable under that section alone is not a crime arising under the revenue laws, though the overt act necessary to be alleged may be one affecting the revenue of the United States. It follows that the plea of the Statute of Limitations of three years is good in bar of the first two counts of the indictment, and is bad as to the third and fourth; and it is ordered to be so certified to the Circuit Court. UNION CONSOLIDATED SILVER MINING COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. JAMES D. TAYLOR. (See S. C., 10 Otto, 37-42.) Possession of tenant in common, not adverse— Nevada Statute of Limitations-finding of facts-mining claim-immaterial evidence. 1. The possession of one tenant in common is not adverse to his co-tenants. 2. The Statutes of Limitations of Nevada are held by the Supreme Court of that State to except foreign corporations from their protection. 3. A special finding of facts by the court need only find the ultimate facts, not the evidence. 4. A written conveyance is not necessary to the transfer of a mining claim. 5. The admission of immaterial or irrelevant evidence is no sufficient reason for reversing a judgment, when it is apparent that it cannot have affect ed the verdict or the finding injuriously to the plaintiff in error. [No. 35.] Submitted Apr. 18, 1879. Decided Nov. 10, 1879. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of th The case is stated by the court. Exhibits A. and C. referred to in the opinion, are as follows: Exhibit A, attached to the deposition of John W. Mackey. Mining deed. Book A, page 456, C. C. R. VIRGINIA CITY, Sept. 20, 1859. This is to certify that we, D. B. Cook, J. Cook and E. Payne, have this day sold, bargained and conveyed all our rights and interest in a certain set of mining claims, to A. Kennedy & Co., said claims being situated as follows: lying and being in the Virginia district, north of the Comstock claims, and situated on the Comstock and Penrod vein; for and in consideration of which, A. Kennedy & Co. agree to prospect the same thoroughly, and when pay dirt is struck, then Cook, Payne & Co., agree to pay one half of the expense and come in equal partners to the same, Kennedy & Co., receiving one undivided half of six hundred feet. Witness. D. B. COOK, JAMES COOK, E. PAYNE. S. McFadden. Filed Sept. 7, '60 at 24 P. M. Rec'd Sept. 8, '60 at 3 P. M., page 548, Vol. B, Kinsey's records. To the admission in evidence of the said exhibit A, counsel for defendant excepted, on the grounds that the same is not a deed and not an instrument under seal; that it conveys no interest in the premises; that it contains no words of grant or conveyance, and is immaterial and is irrelevant to the issues. Exhibit C. GOLD HILL, Utah Territory, This is **show that I, Edward Payne, have this day admitted David B. Cook into the claim north of the Comstock and Co.'s stakes, as an equal partner in the six hundred feet of the quartz lead, and known as the Comstock lead and running north of the Comstock stakes, and also give the power to manage that claim, to work or let as he, D. B. Cook, sees fit. EDWARD PAYNE, JAMES COOK. Recorded at request of C. H. Reynolds, August 29, 1862, at 4 P. M. Exhibit C was objected to, on the same ground as Exhibit A. Messrs. D. L. Smoot and H. L. Thornton, for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. E. F. Deal, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: This was an action of ejectment brought to recover the possession of an undivided interest, equal to five feet, of a mining claim and lode, part of the Comstock lode, and situate in the Virginia Mining District, in Storey County, State of Nevada. Under an agreement of the parties the case was tried by the circuit court without a jury. A finding of facts was made and on that finding a judgment was given for the plaintiff, Taylor, that he recover the undivided five feet for which he sued. The Mining Company now assigns four errors, in the record; the second, third and fourth raise the question whether upon the special finding of facts the plaintiff below was entitled to the judgment which was given. These assignments, therefore, may be considered together. The court found as facts that the parties were tenants in common of the mining claim known as the Un. ion claim, for an undivided interest in which the suit was brought; that they claimed and derived title from the same source, namely: Payne and Cook, the original locators of the claim; that one Solomon Wood, on the 11th day of October, 1862, was the owner of at least an undivided fifty feet of the claim, having derived his title thereto regularly from the original locators, and that on that day he sold and conveyed by deed to the plaintiff an undivided five feet of the claim, describing it as "Five undivided feet interest in the claims of the Union Company, located upon the Comstock silver lode; said claims consist of three hundred feet bounded north by the claims of the Sierra Nevada Silver Mining Company, and on the south by the claims of the Ophir Silver Mining Company." The court further found that during the years 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864, the original locators of the Union claim, and others deriving title from them, including Wood, the immediate grantor of the plaintiff and the plaintiff himself, expended over $30,000 in prospecting and devel- | Statute of Limitations. Such a bar, therefore, oping the claim, though the plaintiff personally does not exist, unless the ouster took place anhad done no work upon it since 1863, nor had any terior to the commencement of those two years; been done for him, except so far as the work and as that is a matter of defense, it should apdone by his co-tenants can be considered work pear affirmatively, to be of any avail. done for him; still further the court found that after the plaintiff's title had been acquired, namely: on the 30th day of September, 1863, C. H. Reynolds and others, all of whom had derived title from the original locators of the mining claim, sold and conveyed all their interests therein to a California corporation, styled the Union Gold and Silver Mining Company; and that, on the 27th day of May, 1874, that company sold and conveyed all its interest in the Union claim to the defendant, a California corporation, organized in and under the laws of that State. The court further found that the defendant and its grantors had been in possession of the ground in controversy during more than two years before the commencement of this action; and were in possession when the suit was brought, and had been for more than five months before that time in possession of the Union claim, which extends on the Comstock lode a distance of three hundred feet, including the ground in dispute. Another fact found is that the plaintiff made no demand to be let into possession of the premises before commencing his action, but that the defendant was in the exclusive adverse possession before that time, and had in fact ousted the plaintiff from the possession. Upon these facts it is evident that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, unless he was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Claiming, as both parties did, under Payne and Cook, the regularity and validity of the location of the mining claim is not in question. And when, in 1862, the plaintiff purchased from one of the owners of the claim an undivided interest therein, and went into possession with his grantor and with others deriving title from the original locators, expending large sums in prospecting and developing it (acts which the state statute declares shall constitute adverse possession), he became a tenant in common with those who were then the owners. He was such when the Union Gold and Silver Mining Company purchased the interest of other owners. By that purchase that Company succeeded to a tenancy in common with him, and so did the defendant when it became the purchaser. And though, after 1863, the plaintiff did no work personally upon the property, he did not thereby lose the possession he had after his purchase from Wood. The possession of his co-tenants was his possession. They held it for him until he was ousted. That this is a settled rule of law is not denied. And we find nothing in the statutes of Nevada to which we have been referred that is at variance with the rule, even when applicable to mining claims. That it does apply is expressly held in Van Valkenburg v. Huff. 1 Nev., 142. It follows that neither the defendant nor its grantor had any possession adverse to the plaintiff prior to the time when the ouster was made, and no ouster is found to have been made two years before the suit was brought. The finding that the defendants were in possession more than two years before suit was brought, is not a find ing of an adverse possession during all that period, such as to constitute a bar under the It is, however, useless to enlarge upon this, for the findings show clearly that the defendant has no protection under the Statutes of Limitation. The plaintiff was in possession with others who derived their title from the original locators, until the Union Gold and Silver Mining Company, a California corporation, acquired their title, in September, 1863. After that time the Statute could not run against him in favor of that corporation or its grantee, the defendant, also a foreign corporation. The Statutes of Limitations of Nevada are held by the Supreme Court of that State to except foreign corporations from their protection. Robinson v. Silver M. Co., 5 Nev., 44; Barstow v. Silver M. Co., 10 Nev., 386. Hence, those statutes cannot be set up by the defendant as a defense in this case; and as the circuit court found as a fact that the plaintiff had been ousted by the defendant from his property, no reason appears why he was not entitled to recover according to the interest which he held prior to the ouster. It is insisted, however, that, if entitled to recover at all, judgment should have been given for no more than two and a half undivided feet of the mining_claim. This position cannot be maintained. It is true the original locators claimed six hundred feet extending along the Comstock vein, but of more than three hundred feet they never had an undisputed title, and that three hundred feet lies next to the claim of the Ophir Company on the south. Indeed, the finding is express, that the Union claim begins at a point fifteen hundred feet north of the claim of the Ophir Company, and extends northward on the Comstock lode three hundred feet, including the ground in dispute. Of that claim Solomon Wood, the plaintiff's grantor, was the owner of at least fifty feet undivided; and he sold and conveyed to the plaintiff five undivided feet interest therein, describing the claim as consisting of three hundred feet, bounded on the south by the claim of the Ophir Company. There can be no doubt, therefore, what was intended to be conveyed. Plainly, it was five undivided feet of that three hundred, and, therefore, whether the whole claim in fact consisted of three hundred or six hundred feet can make no difference. Owning, as Wood did, fifty feet undivided, it was in his power to convey, as he did, an undivided interest of five feet in the southern three hundred. It is objected by the plaintiff in error that the special finding of the court was not sufficiently full and formal to justify any judgment; that it did not find the essential facts, but left presumptions of fact to be drawn; that it did not find how Solomon Wood became the owner, or set out in words the conveyances under which the parties claimed. Whether a special finding of facts by the court must have all the requisites of a special verdict, it is not necessary now to assert or deny, for all that is essential to such a verdict is an ascertainment of the ultimate facts. A jury is not to find evidence. We think the ultimate facts were sufficiently found in this case. The ownership of Wood in 1862 was an ultimate fact, and even if Taylor had no other The findings of fact by the Court of Claims were as follows: I. The claimants and the defendant entered into the various contracts and agreements set forth in the petition. right to the possession than that which he de- | any, for such loss and damage." Approved rived from Wood by conveyance, it was not June 23, 1874. necessary to set forth the chain of conveyances by which Wood became the owner. A transfer of possession is sufficient. They would have been but evidence of Wood's ownership. Be sides, a written conveyance is not necessary to the transfer of a mining claim. Table Mt. Tun. Co. v. Stranahan, 20 Cal., 198. But Wood was in possession when he sold to Taylor, and Taylor then went into joint possession within. That possession is enough to justify a recovery by him against a disseisor. The only other assignment of error is the first, and it needs no consideration. Apart from the fact that the defendant claims under Payne and Cook, and is, therefore, not at liberty to dis pute their title, it is impossible to discover how it could have been injured by the reception of Exhibits A and C. The instrument C was certainly sufficient to transfer an interest in the mining claim, and the mining rules, at worst, were only immaterial. The admission of immaterial or irrelevant evidence is no sufficient reason for reversing a judgment, when it is apparent, as in this case, that it cannot have affected the verdict or the finding injuriously to the plaintiff in error. The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Field did not sit in this case. II. The claimants, at various times between the 9th October, 1862, and the 24th October, 1864, delivered horse equipments and infantry accoutrements, under said contracts and agreements, to the defendant's officers at the United States Arsenal in St. Louis, to the amount of $494,972.66. III. There were one hundred and fifteen distinct deliveries of the above described goods made by the claimants, extending from the 9th October, 1862, to the 24th October, 1864, and the goods delivered were then, at the respective times of delivery, inspected and approved by the defendant's officers, and bills therefor were duly authenticated by the proper officers of the ordnance department, as provided by the contract, and no negligence or delay is attributable to the officers of the ordnance department in regard to the inspection of the goods or the issuing of the vouchers. The vouchers so received by the claimants were by them presented to the ord nance office in Washington, and were by the ordnance office transmitted to the Treasury, to be audited and paid, and no delay in so transmitting them is attributable to the ordnance office. After the vouchers reached the Treasury De partment, intervals of different length occurred before they were audited and drafts issued in ROBERT TILLSON ET AL., Partners, as payment thereof. The shortest interval between ROBERT TILLSON & CO., Appts., D. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 10 Otto, 43-47.) the receipt of a voucher by the Treasury Department and the issuing of the draft in payment was seven days, and the longest was one hundred and fourteen days; the average was thirtysix days. During the period of the fulfillment of their contracts and agreements before described, the claimants' business necessities compelled them to borrow money by hypothecating or selling their vouchers, and the rate of discount 2. In addition to the practice which has long pre-paid by them generally was ten per cent per an Interest, when allowed by Court of Claims. 1. Where an Act referring a claim for damages to the Court of Claims did not authorize it to allow interest, none can be allowed. num. vailed in the departments, of not allowing interest on claims presented, the statute under which the IV. A portion of the payments made to claimCourt of Claims is organized expressly declares ants on the vouchers before described were "That no interest shall be allowed on any claim, un- made, to the extent of twenty-five per cent thereless upon a contract expressly stipulating for inter-of, by certificates of indebtedness, issued under est." [No. 21.] Argued Oct. 28, 1879. Decided Nov. 10, 1879. APPEAL from the Court of Claims. This action was instituted pursuant to the following Act of Congress: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the claim of Robert Tillson & Company, of Quincy, Illinois, for loss and damage growing out of the failure of the Government of the United States to keep and perform the contract or contracts, as to time and manner of payment, under which certain horse equipments and infantry accoutrements were manufactured between the months of September, 1862, and July, 1864, by said Tillson & Company for said Government, be and the same is hereby referred to the Court of Claims, and such court is authorized and directed to investigate the same, and to ascertain, determine and adjudge the amount equitably due said firm, if | the Act 1st March, 1862 12 Stat. at L., 352. These certificates were sent by mail to the claimants, accompanied by ordinary treasury drafts for the remaining seventy-five per cent of the payments. The claimants neither solicited such certificates, nor objected to them. Being below par in the market, the claimants sold them at a discount of seven and a half per cent. The total amount of the certificates so issued to them was $77,000, and the discount or loss suffered by the claimants in disposing of them for cash, was $5,775. The court rendered judgment dismissing claimants' petition. Messrs. M. H. Carpenter, H. E. Paine and B. F. Grafton, for appellants. Mr. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-Gen., for ap pellee. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin ion of the court: We have no doubt it was the wish of those 3. This court will adopt and follow the decisions of the state courts in the construction of their own constitution and statutes. who procured the passage of the special statute 1. In Illinois, donations by counties or other muunder which the Court of Claims took jurisdic-nicipalities, to railroad companies were not prohibited by the new State Constitution of 1870, where tion of this suit, to obtain from Congress author- they had been authorized, by a prior statute and by ity for that court to give a judgment against the a vote of the people of the County or municipality United States at least for interest, in case it before the adoption of such Constitution. 2. Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, should be found that payments on the contracts 92 U. S., XXIII., 628, overruled. held by the claimants had been unreasonably delayed. But if Congress had desired to grant such authority, it would have been easy to have 4. This court will change its decision construing said so in express terms; and because it did not a State Constitution when no rights have been acsay so, we are led irresistibly to the conclusion quired under it, and when, before the decision was that it did not intend to give any such power. preted the constitution differently, and that intermade, the highest tribunal of the State had interBy the statute, the court was required to inves-pretation has within the State become a fixed rule tigate the claim, and Ascertain, determine of property. and adjudge the amount equitably due such firm, if any, for such loss or damage." There is now here any intimation that the investigation is to be conducted otherwise than judicially. The reference was made to the court as a court, and not to the Judges as arbitrators. The determination is to be made according to the fixed rules which govern that court in the adjudication of causes, and not at the discretion of the judges. The same principles of jurisprudence and the same statutory regulations as to practice are to be applied here that would be if the case had come into the court under its general jurisdiction. It is to be ascertained and determined what, if anything, is due the claimants from the Government, according to the rules of law applicable to the settlement in that court of controversies between the Government and its citizens. The special statute does not even provide that the adjustment shall be made upon principles applicable to suits between citizens. To our minds the word "equitably," as here used, means no more than that the rules of law applicable to the case shall be construed liberally in favor of the claimants. [No. 526.] Submitted Jan. 15, 1879. Decided Nov. 10, 1879. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United This action was instituted in the court below by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error upon certain coupons. Judgment was rendered for the County and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Cullom, Scholes & Mather, O. J. Bailey and J. H. Sedgwick, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. A. L. Knapp and Duff, Bowman & Wilson, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: The facts of this case, so far as they are needed to exhibit the question presented by the writ of error, are very few. The defendant, on and prior to Feb. 28, 1868, was a lawfully organized and existing County of the State of Illinois, through which was located the railroad of the Illinois Southeastern Railway Company, As between citizens, no allowance could be a company incorporated on the 25th of Feb., made for loss of profits consequent on the ad- 1867. The County was authorized by the Legvance in the price of materials while payments islature of the State to donate to the railroad were withheld, nor for the discount on the cer- company, as a bonus or inducement towards tificates of indebtedness sold in the market. the building of the railroad, any sum not exSuch damages are too remote. Interest, how-ceeding $100,000, and was authorized to order ever, would have been recoverable as against a citizen, if the payments were unreasonably delayed. But with the Government the rule is different, for in addition to the practice which has long prevailed in the departments of not allowing interest on claims presented, except it is in some way specially provided for, the statute under which the Court of Claims is organized expressly declares "That no interest shall be allowed on any claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment thereon in the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for interest." R. S., sec. 1091. This is conclusive. No interest was stipulated for in this contract, and the prohibition against its allowance has not been removed in favor of the claimants. Judgment affirmed. GEORGE B. FAIRFIELD, Plf. in Err., v. COUNTY OF GALLATIN. (See, S. C., 10 Otto, 47-55.) Donations to railroad companies-case overruled -state decisions-when conclusive. the clerk of the county court, or Board of Supervisors of the County, to issue county bonds to the amount donated, and deliver them to the company, provided that no donation exceeding $50,000 should be made until after the question of such larger donation should have been submitted to the legal voters of the County, at an election called and conducted in the usual manner. The statute further enacted, that if a majority of the ballots cast at such an election should be in favor of a donation, it should be the duty of the county court or Board of Supervisors to donate some amount, not less than $50,000 nor more than $100,000, to the company, and to order the issue of county bonds for the amount so donated. On the 28th of Feb., 1868, in pursuance of these statutory enactments, an election of the legal voters of the County was held to determine whether the County would donate $100,000 NOTE.-Jurisdiction of U. S. Supreme Court to declare state law void as in conflict with State Constitu tion; to revise decrees of state courts as to construction of state laws; power of state courts to construe their own statutes. See note to Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.), 280. It is for state courts to construe their own statutes; Supreme Court will not review their decisions except when specially authorized to by statute. See note to Com. Bk. v. Buckingham, 46 U. S. (5 How.), 317. The defense set up is, in substance, that in consequence of a provision in the New Constitution of the State, which came into force July 2, 1870, the authority to issue and deliver the bonds had ceased to exist before the issue was made. The section of the Constitution relied upon is in the following words: "No county, city, town, township or other municipality shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to, or loan its credit in aid of such corporation: Provided, however, That the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of any such municipality to make such subscriptions, where the same have been authorized under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipalities, prior to such adoption." The question presented, then, is, whether a donation to a railroad company, by a county empowered by the Legislature to make such a donation, when approved by a majority of the legal voters of the county at an election held for that purpose, is forbidden by this clause of the Constitution, if it was authorized under laws then existing by a vote of the people of the county prior to the adoption of the Constitution? What should be the answer to the question depends upon the construction that must be given to the section thus quoted. Are donations, thus authorized by a popular vote, within the prohibition, or are they excepted out of it by the proviso? of its bonds in aid of the said road, and the elec-| The language of the court is very positive. We tion resulted in authorizing their issue. The quote it at some length, as follows: "At the bonds were accordingly issued by the County time the section of the Constitution referred to Judge and county clerk, under the direction of was framed, large sums of money in different the county court, and they were delivered to parts of the State had been voted by municipalthe railroad company on the 6th or 8th of Oc-ities to be subscribed and donated to railroad tober, 1870, after the conditions precedent to companies, on condition that railroads then betheir delivery had been fulfilled. The plaintiff ing constructed should be completed within a is the holder of coupons belonging to said issue, given time; and the country, whether wisely having purchased them before due, in the usual and judiciously or not, seemed to demand that course of his business. in cases where the people in these municipalities had, under then existing legislation, voted to aid railroads by subscription or donation prior to the adoption of the Constitution, such subscription or donation should not be affected by the formation of the Constitution. And we have no doubt it was in view of this demand of a large portion of the State that the proviso was engrafted in the foregoing section.' "A reasonable construction of the whole section will embrace donations as well as subscriptions. In one sense of the term, a donation is a subscription to the capital stock of a company. We have no doubt, at the time this section was framed, there were then in the State quite as many donations voted as there were subscriptions to stock in any other manner, and if a necessity or reason existed to protect a subscription, there was also the same reason and demand to protect a donation; and we entertain no doubt it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, by adding the proviso to the section, to place subscriptions and donations on the same footing." This authoritative exposi tion of the meaning of the Constitution of the State by its highest court has repeatedly been recognized by that tribunal. Middleport v. Ins. Co., 82 Ill., 562; Lippincott v. Pana, decided Oct. 1, 1879 [92 Ill., 24], not yet reported. It has also been the understanding of the Legislature of the State that donations, as well as subscriptions, if authorized by a vote of the People before the adoption of the Constitution, are saved by the proviso. In 1874 an Act of the General Assembly was passed which declared that the liability of all counties, cities, townships, towns or precincts that had voted aid, donations or subscriptions to the capital stock of any railroad company, in conformity with the laws of the State, should cease and determine at the expiration of three years after July 1 of that year, and that after that time no bonds should be issued on account of or upon authority of such vote. This implied that up to July, 1877, donations voted before July 2, 1870, were lawful and might be completed by the issue of bonds. It was an expression of the legislative understanding that such donations were not forbidden by the Constitution. Act of March 17, 1874. A similar Act was passed on the 29th of May, 1877, extending the time for issuing bonds for donations upon the authority of a vote of the people until July 1, 1880. It thus appears to have become a rule of property in the State that municipal bonds, issued to railroad companies on account of donations voted by the people before the adoption of the Constitution, are valid, though not issued until after the adoption. Such was the earliest exposition of the Constitution, made by the court of last resort in the State, twice since recognized by it, and recognized also by repeated legislative action. There In Concord v. Bk., 92 U. S., 625 [XXIII., 628], we had occasion to construe this section of the State Constitution. We then held that donations by counties or other municipalities to railroad companies were prohibited by it, and that they could not lawfully be made after July 2, 1870, though they had been authorized by a prior statute and by a vote of the people of the county or municipality before the adop tion of the Constitution. We were fully aware that it is the peculiar province of the Supreme Court of a State to interpret its organic law, as well as its statutes, and that it is the duty as well as the pleasure of this court to follow and adopt that court's interpretation. But we were not informed, when the case was decided, that any judicial construction had been given to the constitutional provision. It now appears that the Supreme Court of Illinois had previously considered it, and decided that donations, equally with subscriptions, if sanctioned by a popular vote before the adoption of the Constitution, are not prohibited by it, and that they are excepted from the prohibition by the proviso. This was decided by that court in 1874, more than a year before Concord v. Bk. came before us; but the decision was not called to our notice, and it was not reported until 1877. It may now be found in R. R. Co. v. Pinckney, 74 Ill., 277. I |