tive action operating upon the contract, forbidding its enforcement or transfer, or otherwise restricting its use, the owner is as much deprived of his property without due process of law as if the contract were impounded, or the value it represents were in terms wholly or partially confiscated. establish was not thought by them to be com-owner; and if that be effected by direct legislapatible with legislation of an opposite tendency." 8 Wall., 623 [75 U. S., XIX., 526.]. Similar views are found expressed in the opinions of other Judges of this court. In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Justice Chase said, that there were acts which the Federal and State Legislatures could not do without exceeding their authority, and among them he men- In the case at bar, the contract with the Centioned a law which punished a citizen for an tral Pacific is, as I have said, changed in esseninnocent act; a law that destroyed or impaired tial particulars. The Company is compelled to the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law accept it in its changed form, and by legislative that made a man judge in his own case; and a decree, without the intervention of the courts, law that took the property from A and gave it that is, without due process of law, to pay out to B. "It is against all reason and justice," he of its earnings each year to its contractors, the added, "for a people to intrust a Legislature United States, or deposit with them, a sum that with such powers, and therefore it cannot be may amount to $1,200,000, and this, twenty presumed that they have done it. They may years before the debt to which it is to be applied command what is right and prohibit what is becomes due and payable by the Company. If wrong; but they cannot change innocence into this taking of the earnings of the Company and guilt, or punish innocence as a crime or violate keeping them from its use during these twenty the right of an antecedent lawful private con-years to come is not depriving the Company of tract, or the right of private property. To maintain that a Federal or State Legislature possesses such powers if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opinion, be a political heresy altogether inadmissible in all free republican governments." 3 Dall., 388. In Ogden v. Saunders, which was before this court in 1827, Mr. Justice Thompson, referring to the clauses of the Constitution prohibiting the State from passing a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, said: "Neither provision can strictly be considered as introducing any new principle, but only for greater security and safety to incorporate into this charter provisions admitted by all to be among the first principles of our government. No state court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law, if no such prohibition was contained in the Constitution of the United States; so, neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced. Such laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles upon which every just system of laws is founded." In The Federalist, Mr. Madison declared that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation; and in the Dartmouth Coll. Case Mr. Webster contended that Acts, which were there held to impair the obligation of contracts, were not the exercise of a power properly legislative, as their object and effect was to take away vested rights. "To justify the taking away of vested rights," he said, "there must be a forfeiture, to adjudge upon and declare which is the proper province of the judiciary." Surely the Constitution would have failed to establish justice had it allowed the exercise of such a dangerous power to the Congress of the United States. In the second place, legislation impairing the obligation of contracts impinges upon the provision of the Constitution which declares that no one shall be derived of his property without due process of law; and that means by law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice. Contracts are property, and a large portion of the wealth of the country exists in that form. Whatever impairs their value diminishes, therefore, the property of the its property, it would be difficult to give any meaning to the provision of the Constitution. It will only be necessary hereafter to give to the seizure of another's property or earnings a new name, to call it the creation of a sinking fund or the providing against the possible wastefulness or improvidence of the owner, to get rid of the constitutional restraint. To my mind the evasion of that clause, the frittering away of all sense and meaning to it, are insuperable objections to the legislation of Congress. Where contracts are impaired, or when operating against the government are sought to be evaded and avoided by legislation, a blow is given to the security of all property. If the government will not keep its faith, little better can be ex pected from the citizen. If contracts are not observed, no property will in the end be respected; and all history shows that rights of persons are unsafe where property is insecure. Protection to one goes with protection to the other; and there can be neither prosperity nor prog ress where this foundation of all just government is unsettled. "The moment," said the elder Adams, "the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence." I am aware of the opinion which prevails generally that the Pacific railroad corporations have, by their accumulation of wealth, and the numbers in their employ, become so powerful as to be disturbing and dangerous influences in the legislation of the country; and that they should, therefore, be brought by stringent measures into subjection to the State. This may be true; I do not say that it is not; but if it is, it furnishes no justification for the repudiation or evasion of the contracts made with them by the government. The law that protects the wealth of the most powerful, protects also the earnings of the most humble; and the law which would confiscate the property of the one would in the end take the earnings of the other. There are many other objections to the Act of Congress besides those I have mentioned, each to my mind convincing; but why add to what has already been said? If the reasons given will not convince, neither would any others which could be presented. I will, therefore, refer only to the interference of the law with the rights of the State of California. UNITED STATES, Piff. in Err., v. decision of the majority goes a great way-further, it appears to me, than any heretofore made by the court-to weaken the authority of the The Central Pacific being a state Corporation, States, in this respect, as against the will of the law creating it is, by the Constitution of Congress. According to my understanding of California, subject to alteration, amendment its scope and reach, the United States have onand repeal by its Legislature at any time; a powly to make a contract with a state corporation, er which the Legislature can neither abdicate and a loan to it, to oust the jurisdiction of the nor transfer. In its assent given to the Company State, and place the corporation under their dito extend its road into the territory of the Unit-rection. It would seem plain that if legislation ed States, the General Government having au- taking institutions of the State from its control, thorized the extension, the Legislature reserved can be sustained by this court, the government the same control which it possesses over other will drift from the limited and well guarded railroad and telegraph companies created by it. system established by our fathers into a cenThat control under the new Constitution goes, as tralized and consolidated government. is claimed, to the extent of regulating the fares and freights of the Company, thus limiting its income or earnings; and of supervising all its business, even to the keeping of its accounts, making disobedience of its directors to the regulations established for its management punishable by fine and imprisonment; and the Legislature may impose the additional penalty of a forfeiture of the franchises and privileges of the Company. The law in existence when the Corporation was created, and still in force, requires the creation of a sinking fund by the Company to meet its bonds, and under it large sums have been accumulated for that purpose, and still further sums must be raised. In a word, the law of the State undertakes to control and manage the Corporation, in all particulars required for the service, convenience and protection of the public; and can there be a doubt in the mind of anyone that over its own creations the State has, within its own territory, as against the United States, the superior authority? Yet the power asserted by the General Government in the passage of the Act of 1878 would justify legislation affecting all the affairs of the Company, both in the State and in the JAMES H. MORGAN ET AL. Secretary of the Treasury-extra compensation the Treasury containing an allowance made by him 4. A point, which does not appear by the bill of IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. The United States brought suit in the court below, upon the bond of Morgan as Collector of Internal Revenue, for an alleged failure to pay over moneys due. The defense was: 1. A general denial of indebtedness. 2. A special plea, setting forth certain items disallowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury, and claiming the allowance thereof. Upon the trial, defendants gave evidence against plaintiff's objection, by one Curtis and by Morgan himself, to show that the Secretary of the Treasury, by a letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, agreed to allow the defendant seven per cent. commission on the first $100,000 and five per cent on all over that amount collected and accounted for by him for the term commencing June 30, 1864, and ending Feb. 28, 1865. Territories of the United States. It could treb le the amount of the sum to be annually deposited in the sinking fund; it could command the immediate deposit of the entire amount of the ultimate indebtedness; it could change the order of the liens held by the government and the first-mortgage bondholders; it could extend the lien of the government beyond the property to the entire income of the Company, and, in fact, does so by the Act in question (sec. 9); it could require the transportation for the govern ment to be made without compensation; and it could subject the Company to burdens which, if anticipated at the time, would have prevented the construction of the road. A power thus vast, once admitted to exist, might be exerted to control the entire affairs of the Company, in direct conflict with the legislation of the State; its exercise would be a mere matter of legislative discretion in Congress. Yet it is clear that both governments cannot control and manage the Company in the same territory, subjecting its directors to fine and imprisonment for disobeying their regulations. Under the Constitution the management of local affairs is left chiefly to the States, and it never entered into the conception of its framers that under it the creations of the States could be taken from their control. CerMr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opintain it is that over no subject is it more impor-ion of the court: tant for their interests that they should retain We find no error in this record. The objecthe management and direction than over cor- tion to the admissibility of the testimony of Čurporations brought into existence by them. Thetis and the defendant Morgan, was not because There was verdict and judgment for the defendants; whereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is further stated by the court. Messrs. Charles Devens, Atty-Gen., Edwin B. Smith, Asst. Atty-Gen., for plaintiff in error. Mr. William W. Morrow, for defendants in error. Submitted Apr. 21, 1879. Decided May 5, 1879. it was insufficient to prove an arrangement be- covered, might as easily have been found at the time tween the Secretary of the Treasury and Mor- of the controversy, as now. gan, by which Morgan was to be allowed his [No. 87.] extra compensation, but because the Secretary of the Treasury might make the allowance at any time, and as the adjusted account showed the exact amount finally allowed, this account was conclusive evidence on that question. As the case stands upon the record, it is to be presumed there was evidence tending to prove that the letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. Upon the objection as made, we think the ruling of the court was right. There is nothing in the Act of Congress which precludes the Secretary of the Treasury from fixing the rate of extra compensation to be allowed in advance of the service rendered, and if he does, it becomes binding on the Government and may be enforced in the settlement of accounts there after. The allowance of a commission upon the sum of $13,619.85, as part of the compensation of the Collector for the year ending June 30, 1864, was also right. The money was all collected before the expiration of that year, and $10,000 was actually paid into the Treasury. As to the allowance of commissions for this there can be no doubt. It is a matter of no consequence that advices of the payment did not reach the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, so as to be entered on the books there, until after the year expired. No unnecessary delay occurred in paying over the remainder. It was actually collected in a distant part of the collection district, and did not in the ordinary course of transmission reach the Collector so that it could be paid into the Treasury before June 30. The Collector was accountable for it when it was collected, and since he paid it over as soon as he could, we think he was entitled to his compensation as for services rendered during the year. The objection to the claim for express charges paid was not made below and cannot be considered by us. We hear the case upon the rulings contained in the bill of exceptions, and not upon the evidence. The same is true as to the claim now made, that compensation has been given by the jury in their verdict in excess of the maximum limit fixed by the statute for the year. It does not appear from the bill of exceptions that this point was taken below. No error is assigned upon that part of the charge of the court which related to the payment of the bills of the assistant assessors. The judgment is affirmed. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa. Petition for leave to file bill of review. The bill in this case was filed in the court below, for the cancellation of a certain land certificate, and the establishment of title in the complainant. The court below dismissed the bill, and the decree was affirmed by this court. The appellant now brings his petition for leave to file a bill of review, on the ground that he had discovered new and important evidence, since the decision of the court below, which evidence would enable him to prove the invalidity of the defense and establish his claim. That the evidence consisted of a certain Treaty between the United States and the Sacs and Foxes and other Indian Tribes, made July 15, 1880, and ratified Feb. 24, 1831. 7 Stat. at L., 328. That he had been guilty of no negligence or laches in not sooner discovering said evidence, but that he and his counsel had been very diligent in endeavoring to obtain full knowledge of all the evidence as to the title in controversy. Messrs. Charles A. Clark and James Grant, for appellant: The new matter goes directly to the issue. It is not merely cumulative, but is a new fact, decisive of the central issue in the case. As such, it warrants a bill of review. Story, Eq. Pl., secs. 415, 416 and notes; Partridge v. Osborn, 5 Russ., 195; Massie v. Graham, 3 McLean, 42; see, also. 2 Daniells, Ch. Pl. (Perkins, 3d Am. ed.), 1640, 1641 and notes. Messrs. C. C. Nourse and N. M. Hubbard, for appellees: The evidence with reasonable diligence might have been discovered sooner. Besides it is not so much a revelation of new facts, as a discovery of new theories. As to diligence, see Livingston v. Hubbs, 3 Johns. Ch., 124; Pendleton v. Fay, 3 Paige, 203; Massie's Heirs v. Graham, 3 McLean, 41; Story, Eq. Pl., sec. 414. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This application is denied. The petitioners have not shown such diligence as will entitle them to reopen a litigation that has been carried on with so much pertinacity for a great number of years. The new matter relied upon consists principally of record evidence drawn from the archives of the government, which might as easily have been found at the time the controversy arose, as now. The Treaty was a part of the law of the land, and the maps and official reports have been on file in the proper government office where they were discovered, for a quarter of a century. We are all of opinion that if a bill of review should be filed containing all the averments that are in the present petition, it ought not to be sustained. Clearly, then, leave ought not to be granted for a continuance of the litigation. 99 U. S. |