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D'Auterieve v. U. S.,

869

50. One in possession of public lands, under a cer-
tificate of the register that he had paid for the same,
without a patent, can successfully defend against
an action of ejectment to recover the possession by
the holder of a patent issued upon a subsequent
purchase of the land as part of the public domain.
Simmons v. Wagner,

910
51. The title of the Des Moines Navigation and
Railroad Company to the lands donated to Iowa for
the improvement of Des Moines River, by the Act
of Aug. 8, 1846, is good as against the State and
Railroad Companies under the railroad grant of
1856, and as against preemptors after 1855 under
the Act of 1841.

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54. The adjustment of 1866 between the United
States and Iowa settled no rights as between any
other parties than the State and the United States.
Idem,
915

55. The Governor had the right to convey to the
Des Moines Company, under the Joint Resolution
of March 22, 1858, all the lands which had before
that time been approved and certified to the State
under the river grant, excepting such as had been
sold or agreed to be sold by the officers of the State
prior to Dec. 23, 1853, "under said grant."

Idem,

915
56. Where the question is one of fact, as to wheth-
er one, when he demanded his patent certificate as
against other contesting claimants, had conformed
to the requirements of the Donation Act, and this
was determined by the land department, after a
contest in which the contending parties appeared,
and full opportunity was given to be heard, such
determination in the absence of fraud, is conclusive
on all questions of fact.

Vance v. Burbank,

929

57. Fraud in respect to which relief may be granted
in this class of cases,must be such as has been prac-
ticed on the unsuccessful party, and prevented him
from exhibiting his case fully to the department.
False testimony or forged documents, even, are not
enough.
Idem.
929

58. The wife, or her heirs, get nothing before the
husband, or some one for him, proves up the claim
under the Act. Whatever would bar her will neces-
sarily bar her heirs.
Idem,

59. Where two titles to the same land depend ex-
clusively for their validity upon the action of Con-
gress, he who first obtains the title and not he who
first applied for it, has the better right.
1021

Trenier v. Stewart,

60. If the title of the original donee was complete
when the province was ceded to the United States,
it is the superior title and is protected by the Treaty
of Cession.
Idem,
1021

61. Where Congress has confirmed the concession
to the donee, as one derived from a former Sov-
ereign of the province, its genuineness and authen-
ticity are established.
Idem
1021

62. In an action to try title to land, the plaintiff
cannot avail himself of a title acquired, or which
did not subsist in him until, after he commenced
suit. The title at the beginning of the action is the
question to be tried.
1028

Hollingsworth v. Flint,

63. Where a remainder is dependent upon a life
estate in the land, it does not take effect as an estate
in possession until the life estate is determined.
Until then it is a mere expectancy.
Wright v. Blakeslee,

1048

64. No one taking a quitclaim deed can stand in
the relation of bona fide purchaser.
Baker v. Humphrey,
1065

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8. A sale of property by one having only a sub-
sequent lien will not supersede nor displace a prior
lien held by another; and a sale in equity under a
prior lien will not impair any rights which belong
to the holder of the subsequent lien, if the latter
duly asserts his rights in proper season.
Idem

LIMITATIONS.

SEE BANKRUPTCY, 17.
DUTIES, 3.

PLEADINGS, 4.

TAXES AND TAX SALES, 39.

1081

1. As the right of an assignee in bankruptcy to
sue for property is barred by the two years' Statute
of Limitations, Rev. Stat., sec. 5057, so the rights of
the purchaser from him is barred by the operation
of the same statute.

Gifford v. Helms,

57
2. The California Statute of Limitations did not
begin to run against a Mexican title until July 1, 1864.
Palmer v. Low,
60
3. The concealment of a cause of action ex con-
tractu does not, in courts of law, interrupt or delay
the running of the Statute of Limitations as a bar
to the action.
158

Andreae v. Redfield,

4. No person can bring suit for lands under the
Act of Congress of June 22, 1860 who, by himself or
by those under whom he claims, has not been out
of possession over twenty years.
164

Scull v. U. S.,

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929

9. The Iowa Statute of Limitation of ten years, ap-
plies equally to bonds and their coupons, although

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Leavenworth v. Kinney,

333
336

667

5. A mandamus does not lie to control judicial dis-
cretion, except when that discretion has been
abused. But it may be used to restrain inferior
courts and keep them within proper bounds.
Ex Parte Commonwealth of Virginia,
6. This court has power by mandamus, to enforce
prompt compliance with its mandates, but it will
not, in that summary mode, revise the action of
inferior courts, as to any matters about which they
must or may exercise judicial discretion.
Ex Parte Railway Co.,
872

MARRIED WOMEN.

SEE HUSBAND AND WIFE, passim.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
SEE OFFICERS, 8, 9.

1. A corporation is liable for the acts of its
servants while engaged in the business of their em-
ployment to the same extent that individuals are
liable under like circumstances.

Orleans v. Platt,

404

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6. A judgment establishing the lien against the MORTGAGES.
railroad company is conclusive of the formality of
the prior proceedings in a subsequent action to
foreclose a mortgage on the same property.

Idem,

1057
7. The entire road is subject to a lien for work
done on one part of it, although the road was built
in sections.

Idem,

1057

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4. The cutting and washing away of a ditch, in or-
der that a claim might be worked and the water
used as before, was not an injury for which damages
could be recovered.

Idem.

240
5. Under the Acts of July 26, 1866, and May 10, 1872,
the location of a mining claim upon a lode or vein
of ore, should be made along the same lengthwise
of the course of its apex, at or near the surface.

Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 253
6. Each locator is entitled to follow the dip of the
lode or vein to an indefinite depth, though it car-
ries him beyond the side lines of the location, and
it is bounded at each end by the end lines of the lo-
cation crossing the lode or vein, and extending per-
pendicularly downwards, and indefinitely in their
own direction.

Idem,

253

7. A location laid crosswise of a lode or vein, so
that its greatest length crosses the same instead
of following the course thereof, will secure only so
much of the vein as it actually crosses at the sur-
face, and its side lines will become its end lines, for
the purpose of defining the rights of the owners.
Idem.

253

8. A locator working subterraneously into the dip
of the vein belonging to another, who is in posses-
sion of his location, is a trespasser and liable to an
action for taking ore therefrom.

Idem,

253

9. The 5th section of the Act entitled "An Act to
Promote the Development of the Mining Resources
of the United States:" approved May 10, 1872, 17
Stat. at L., 91, gives no greater effect to the record of
mining claims than is given to the records kept pur-
suant to the registration laws of the respective
States and does not exclude, as prima facie evidence
of title proof, of actual possession and of its extent.
Campbell v. Rankin,

435

10. A written conveyance is not necessary to the
transfer of a mining claim.

Union Consolidated Mining Co.v. Taylor, 541
11. Rights of miners and the rights of persons
who had constructed canals and ditches to be used
in mining operations and irrigation, are rights
which the government had, by its conduct, recog-
nized and was bound to protect, before the passage
790

of the Act of 1866.

Brooder v. Water Co.,

12. Congress, in making donation grants to the
Pacific Railroad Companies cannot be supposed to
have exercised its liberality at the expense of pre-
existing rights of miners which,although imperfect,
were still meritorious, and had just claims to legis-
lative protection.

Idem,

790

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EVIDENCE, 23.

INSURANCE, 9-11.

LANDS, 2.

MECHANICS' LIENS, 1, 5.
RAILROADS. 31.

TAXES AND TAX SALES, 23.

1. Where lands have been mortgaged, and par-
cels thereof subsequently sold at different times to
different purchasers, the rule as to the order in
which such parcels shall be subjected to the satis-
faction of the mortgage, as established by the
statute or the decisions of the State where the lands
lie, is a rule of property binding on the courts of the
United States sitting in that State.

Orvis v. Powell.

238
2. In Illinois, the rule has been established that
the parcels first sold should be last subjected to the
satisfaction of the mortgage.

Idem.

238

3. A decree of the Circuit Court of the United
States sitting in Illinois, in a suit to foreclose a mort-
gage of lands in that State, must give effect to the
equity of redemption after sale, provided by the
statues of that State.
Idem,

238

road company on time, and the title of the cars was
4. Where cars were sold and delivered to a rail-
to remain in the vendor until they were paid
for, the contract was valid and the cars are not

subject to a prior mortgage given on the pres-
ent and future acquired property of the company,
and the seller may reclaim them.
Fosdick v. Schall.
Fosdick v. Car Co.,

Huidekoper v. Locomotive Works,

339

344

344

dition when returned is only a general debt of the
5. The amount due for their use and injured con-
company, with no special equities in its favor, and
is not entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the
sale on a prior mortgage as against the claims of
the bondholders.

Huidekoper v. Locomotive Works,

344

6. Where such cars were sold as part of the rail-
road on the foreclosure of such prior mortgage, an
order to pay from the fund in court arising from
such sale the price of said cars to the seller there-
of, was proper.

Fosdick v. Car Company,

344

7. If the seizure and sale of mortgaged property in
Louisiana does not result in full satisfaction of the
debt, suit may be brought on the primary security
in order to recover the balance.
383

Gordon v. Gilfoil,

8. Setting aside the sale for irregularity does not
affect the order of seizure and sale, but a new writ
may issue upon it.
Idem.
383
9. Proceedings on an order of seizure and sale
interrupt the prescription of the personal action
for the same debt.
Idem,

383

10. Although proceedings in the order of seizure
and sale were pending in the State Court, the debt
could be prosecuted in the Circuit Court of the
United States.

Idem,

383

11. Where a mortgage of a railroad contained a
covenant that the trustee named therein, should
at the request of a majority of the bondholders,
purchase the premises at a sale thereunder, for
the benefit of the bondholders, and organize a
new company, it was not error to decree on a
should be authorized and directed to bid at the
foreclosure of the mortgage, that the trustee
sale, as trustee, for the first-mortgage bondhold-
of the first-mortgage bonds.
ers at least the amount of the principal and interest

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The Abbotsford v. Johnson,

892

168

593

1046

Liability of owner of animals for injury by them
to persons

Congress & Emp. Spring Co. v. Edgar,

NOTICE.

SEE ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS. 6.

487

NUISANCE.

1. That which the law authorizes cannot be a nuisance such as to give a common law right of action.

Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago,

OFFICERS.

SEE BANKS, 8.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 35-40.

CORPORATIONS, 12.

EVIDENCE, 5.

INJUNCTIONS.

PAYMENTS, 4. SALARIES, 1, 2. STATUTES, 7. WAR, 2.

336

1. A deputy Collector of Internal Revenue who performs the duties of the office of the collector, during the latter's suspension from office, is entitled to receive the compensation of a collector. U. S. v. Farden,

267 2. A surgeon in the Continental Army, who did not continue in service until the end of the war, is not entitled to five years' pay, under the Resolutions of Congress of Oct. 21, 1780 and March 22, 1783. Williams v. U. S.,

309 3. The acts of the United States Marshal, as an officer de facto are valid.

Hussey v. Smith,

314 4. The law presumes that persons acting in a public office have been duly appointed and are acting with authority, until the contrary is shown.

Keely v. Sanders,

327

5. A surgeon appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions to examine pensioners and applicants for pensions is not an officer of the United States.

U. S. v. Germaine,

482

6. An officer whose duty is mainly judicial, is no more liable, personally, for a mistaken construction of an Act of Congress than he would be for mistaking the common law or a state statute.

Williams v. Weaver,

708 7. Pursuant to orders, the colonel of a regiment reported, July 25, 1863, to the headquarters of a department, there to "await further orders." While awaiting them, he was not furnished fuel or quarters. Held, that he is entitled to recover their commuted value.

U.S. v. Lippitt,

747

8. The Secretary may put an employé of a department on furlough without pay at any time, if the exigencies of the service require it.

U.S. v. Murray.

756

9. The Joint Resolution of Congress of June 23, 1874, gave extra pay only when discharges occurred in consequence of a reduction of clerical force, made necessary by the legislation of that Session of Congress. Idem.

756

10. The acts of the Assistant Surgeon-General, appointed under the Act of Congress and located at St. Louis, are the acts of the Surgeon-General, and have the same validity until countermanded or revoked.

Parish v. U.S.,

763 11. In a suit against a Collector of Internal Revenue on his bond for taxes charged to him under sec. 3218. Rev. Stat., he is entitled to a credit for all uncollected taxes transferred by him to his successor in office, if he proves that due diligence was used by him for their collection.

U.S. v. Kimball,

835 12. The certificate of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is a condition precedent to a credit by the First Comptroller of the Treasury before suit, but not to a defense upon the facts if a suit is brought.

Idem,

OVERRULED CASES.

835

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Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 tions.
U. S., 625, XXIII., 628, overruled.
Fairfield v. Co. of Gallatin,

PARTIES.

See CORPORATIONS, 17.

544

77

8. The last clause of section 53 of the Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. at L.. 205; Rev. Stat., sec. 4916, relates merely to the evidence to which the Commissioner of Patents may resort, but does not increase his be granted.

1. An objection as to parties, not taken in the power as to the invention for which a re-issue may court below, cannot be taken here.

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Idem,

77

9. Where the only question in a suit is, whether the plaintiff or defendant is the original and first inventor of a patented invention, and there is nothing to rebut the presumption arising from plaintiff's patent, a decree in his favor will be affirmed. Garratt v. Seibert, 84

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