new state of things, and therein resume a condition, under which it may be conducted with due profits to all concerned. One of the heaviest burdens upon agriculture, the poor-rates, is diminishing in every part of the kingdom; in many parts a half, and in all a fourth. The continuance of peace, and the proceeding improvement of our finances, added to the zeal and sincerity with which ministers are making retrenchments, will gradually relieve the landlord and farmer, whilst the advancing state of manufactures will both increase the demand for agricultural produce, and assist in the further reduction of the poor-rates. If the rent of land and the price of its produce, have diminished with the cessation of the war, so likewise have the price and stock of manufacturers and merchants. It is notorious, that the accumulated stocks of our merchants and manufacturers have diminished at least thirty per cent.; and that a capitalist, who, ten years since, was worth twenty thousand pounds, in the value of his stock on hand, is now not worth fourteen; or to adopt the popular term, has suffered the extinction of a third part of his fortune. These are the incidents of the two periods of war and peace, and are common to all classes, as well as to the landlord and farmer. The main and sole question is, whether the fund of growth and profit be safe and unimpaired? Is there the same proportion between the seed and the harvest? Must the article continue in demand, or is the demand gone altogether? If it must be had, it must be paid for. To say all in a word, and to conclude this part of our subject, it is totally impossible that the ordinary and general price of food should not command the price of the land which rises it, of the laborer who sows and reaps it, and of the farmer who affords the capital and current expense of its cultivation from day to day. For a single year, or even for three successive years, a large surplus, beyond the demand of consumption, will not only be so much not wanted in itself, and, therefore, in itself, of little price in the market, but will necessarily affect the price of the whole quantity. But when waste, or what always accompanies the low price of food, a more plentiful use, shall have consumed the surplus quantity; or when the quantity grown shall have adapted itself to the supply, if the quantity actually grown be too much, all these incidental irregularities will pass away, and farmers and landlords will obtain the prices to which they are entitled.

As regards the general state of our debt and the means of redeeming it, it will appear by the accounts of the year now closing, that ministers will have proceeded with all practicable expedition to accomplish the recommendation of the finance committee of 1819. By the effect of a most zealous retrenchment, and by the proceeding improvement of our national resources, they would

have attained in 1822 a surplus of five millions, to be employed as a permanent sinking fund upon the national debt, if the agricultural horse tax of half a million had not been repealed. If Mr. Pitt, in the year 1786, regarded a sinking fund of one million to be adequate to the redemption of a debt of two hundred and forty millions, it is manifest that a sinking fund of five millions would operate with nearly a twofold proportion upon a debt of eight hundred millions. It would have the air of a paradox to assert, that a speedier redemption of the debt would not be desirable. But it may assuredly be stated, that in the actual condition of the country a larger sinking fund can in no degree be afforded. The immediate conclusion of a long war is not the most favorable period for the redemption of a national debt. If, together with the success of the ministers in creating this sinking fund, it be borne in mind, that they have within the same period paid a debt to the Bank of ten millions, and have not only themselves foregone any facility from a paper-currency in administering the powers of government, but have urged and enabled the Bank to resume cash-payments, it will be admitted, that, under the difficulties of the times, and the conclusion of so long a war, they have accomplished as much as could reasonably be expected. It may now be confidently asserted, that the system of loans and new taxes has reached its termination; that we are now living upon our income, and are in a condition of redeeming yearly some part of a mortgage which undoubtedly presses heavily upon the industry of the people. Under the system of loans we should every year have borrowed upon less favorable terms; and what is equally worthy of consideration, we should have anticipated in peace the resources of war. We should have gone to any new war under a most extreme difficulty; or, like France, under the administration of Fleury, we should have lost our due consideration in Europe, by seeking peace at more than its due value. By the application of the old sinking fund to the expenditure of the country, but still leaving a surplus of between four and five millions above our expenditure to operate upon the debt, we secure a great present relief, and leave untouched the means of future defence.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Without going into a detail of the new system upon which Europe was settled at the period of the treaties, it may be sufficient to state, that the European commonwealth was reconstructed at this period chiefly upon three principles.

The first was, that there should be such a distribution of power

among the several principal states, as might render each sufficient in itself to maintain its independence, and to withstand any possible incursion of France, till the general confederacy of Europe could move up in defence of the common tranquillity.

Secondly, but always subservient to the first principle, the restoration of ancient powers to their former stateof possession. Thirdly, where such restoration was manifestly impossible, or where it seemed expedient to forego it, in pursuit of the more valuable object of rendering each state sufficient to its own defence, in such case to indemnify the suffering power for its lost territories from the common fund of conquest.

The system of Europe was accordingly settled upon these principles. Under the first of them, the kingdom of the Netherlands was erected, and was rendered compact and self-sufficient, by its annexation to the United Provinces. And, as the Netherlands were thus interposed as a barrier between France and Germany, Sardinia, by the annexation of Genoa, was rendered a more adequate barrier between France and Italy. Under the second principle, the Swiss Republics and Italian states were restored as nearly as possible to their ancient condition. Under the third, Austria received an indemnity in Italy; whilst Prussia, who was in some degree affected by the new changes, and who lost her ancient influence in Holland, received a portion of Saxony. This last modification was indeed further recommended by the new state of things in Germany, and by the extinction, during the wars of the French revolution, of the German Empire. Under these circumstances, there was no longer any power in Germany sufficiently compact and united to oppose an adequate defensive force against a sudden invasion. Experience had proved that Prussia in her actual state was no equal opponent to France, and that the exposed condition of the smaller principalities, and their compulsory submission to an invading army, necessarily threw them as increments into the hands of the invader. Nor is it necessary to conceal, that it had become expedient, upon many other considerations, to bestow this increase of territory upon Prussia, and to take it from Saxony. If the one had suffered more than any other power Europe, under the long and unsparing oppression of France, the other, to use no harsher term, was surely but little entitled to escape the penalty of a war, in which her prince had borne so prominent a part.

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As such is the new system upon which Europe is now settled, our duties, under our foreign relations, consist in little more than in a faithful observance of the spirit of the treaties upon which this system is grounded. The leading principle and object of these treaties, and of the condition which they constitute, are the main

tenance of the general peace of Europe by the personal amity of the sovereigns, and by a system of mediation, which should, on the one side, recognize the perfect independence of the several states in their own internal concerns; and, upon the other, should hold forth their common interest, and therein their common obligation, to consult the general policy of Europe in all questions affecting the safety of the whole.

It is a malicious and most unjust representation of the character of this system to assert, that the allied powers, and England amongst them, are bound by these treaties to control the internal concerns of other states, or even to act the arbitrator in dissensions between state and state upon interests belonging only to themselves. As regards England, the obligations of the treaties are expressed in the treaties, and our contract is known to the letter. If the ministers of some of the allied powers appear to have pressed the assertion of this right of friendly mediation into that of authoritative control, the excess belongs only to them, and no portion of it attaches to us. They find nothing of this principle in the general treaties; and accordingly the king and government of England do not admit that they are comprehended in the obligation. If the assertion of these pretensions exist at all, it is totally a separate concern of the powers that make them. But it is not perhaps too much to say, that the Holy Alliance of the present time, like the treaty of Pilnitz in the French revolution, has no other existence, at least in the degree asserted, than in the factious writings of the day.

A very few words will explain intelligibly our different relations, and the good faith with which we adhere to the spirit of the peace. If we follow them geographically, our first relation is with Portugal, an ancient ally of the British crown, and one the most immediately indebted to us in the late war for deliverance and safety.

Under the ancient system of Europe, the object of our alliance with Portugal was to counterpoise the power of the House of Bourbon. Under the former close union of the two crowns of France and Spain, the common object of jealousy to Portugul and England was necessarily France and Spain; and the natural support of Portugal, a secondary state confiding upon a powerful neighbour, was England. In the vicissitude of human affairs, the original reasons for this alliance have passed away; but in the opening of the Brazils to British commerce, a new state of things has arisen, which may render it very doubtful, and till lately much more so, whether our close connection with Portugal be not our best policy. There can be no doubt that a commercial connection with France would be more lucrative, as to a pecuniary result, than with Portugal; and, if commerce were the only question, it would be an erroneous policy to adopt a minor state in preference

to a principal. But as the maintenance of the political relations of Europe and Great Britain is an end of greater value and importance, it is a rule of sound prudence to consult the more valuable object, though with some sacrifice of the secondary one. Recent events, indeed, may render this relation of more problematical value. These events have not, however, as yet assumed a shape sufficiently determinate to justify further remarks. As regards the present question it is sufficient to observe, that the actual state of Portugal at the present period is another proof of the good faith and moderation of the British government. It can scarcely be doubted, that a monarch in the situation of the king of Portugal should not have made some friendly representation of the difficulties of his condition to the king and government of Great Britain. It is scarcely possible, that the king of England and the other allied sovereigns can have regarded without some feeling the recent proceeding amongst the Portuguese populace. It is equally impossible for the people of England not to feel some indignation at the unworthy levity, to use no other term, with which Portugal has forgotten the blood and treasure of England lavished in her defence. But, under all these circumstances, Portugal is still left to the administration of her own concerns. She is still left to work her way through her own anarchy. There is still encouragement to hope that the fire may burn out without reaching the walls of her neighbours. It remains to be seen, how far the event may justify this expectation; but in the mean time her actual condition may be assumed as no less a proof of the moderation of England, than of the true spirit of the treaties. For, under such a state of circumstances, what becomes of the alleged secret article, that all the kings of Europe should guarantee to each other the actual state of the monarchical power of each over his own subjects? Will it admit a doubt, that, under the projected constitutions of Spain and Portugal, the kings of those countries will possess a much less degree of sovereign power, and a much more arduous administration of their duties as heads of their states, than the former Stadtholder of Holland or the President of America. ?

Our next foreign relation, following the same local order, is with Spain. Here our moderation has been equally tried, both as regards our own peculiar gain, and as bears upon the alleged principle of defending kings at all events. In the contest between Spain and her colonies, we have held forth a different example from the former conduct of that crown between ourselves and America. It will not be denied that a strong temptation urged us. The emancipation of so large a customer could not but be most advantageous to so large a dealer as Great Britain. The free commerce with South America is nothing to other kingdoms in