foreseen what I have, and am likely to experience, no consideration upon earth should have induced me to accept this command. A regiment or any subordinate department would have been accompanied with ten times the satisfaction, and perhaps the honor."1 Some officers enlisted, expecting promotion; some waited to see if promotion would be offered them; others first declined, and then solicited appointment. Colonial feeling was very strong. Washington wrote, "Connecticut wants no Massachusetts man in their corps; Massachusetts thinks there is no necessity for a Rhode Islander to be introduced amongst them; and New Hampshire says, it's very hard, that her valuable and experienced officers (who are willing to serve) should be discarded, because her own regiments, under the new establishment, cannot provide for them."2

It was necessary to arrange the officers first, for the privates would not come forward until they knew who were to command them. By the consolidation of small regiments, mainly from Massachusetts, many officers had been thrown out; and they were suspected of discouraging enlistments. The generals, therefore, issued an address to the men, appealing to their hopes and fears, and to their pride as New Englanders. They said that economy required the amalgamation of the regiments, and that the officers who were to remain had been chosen without partiality. Courage, integrity, and patriotism, they explained, could not make an officer; "a certain degree of bodily vigor, and activity of mind" were also necessary. The privates, they declared, were particularly fortunate: "Never were soldiers whose duty has been so light, never were soldiers whose pay and provision has been so abundant and ample. In fact, your interest and comfort have been so carefully consulted, even to the lowest article, by the Continental Congress, that there is some reason to dread that the enemies to New England's reputation may hereafter say, it was not principle that saved them, but that they were bribed into the preservation of their liberties." 3

1 Washington to Reed, November 28, 1775, Washington, Writings (Ford), iii, 246-247.

2 Washington to Reed, November 8, 1775, Ibid. 208.

8 November 24, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th series, iii. 1666–1667.

THE "CONTINENTAL" ARMY.

17

By such persuasions, and by promises of numerous furloughs, a force was at last recruited sufficient to continue the siege.

January 1, 1776, may be regarded as the birthday of the Continental army: from that time it was raised and governed by the direct authority of Congress; and, notwithstanding the devolving of many duties on the States later in the war, it remained a Continental force, distinct from the militia. Washington himself recognized the change, and announced in a general order of that day, "This day giving commencement to the new army, which in every point of view is entirely Continental; the general flatters himself, that a laudable spirit of emulation will now take place, and pervade the whole of it."1

1 Washington, Writings (Ford), iii. 311, note.

с

CHAPTER II.

CONGRESS AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

CONGRESS had now an army which they must officer and support. Much will be said in the following chapters of the failures and errors in their attempts to discharge this duty; but in justice to Congress it should be remembered that their position was one of extreme difficulty. The situation is vividly, but in the main accurately, described in a letter of John Adams to his wife: "The business I have had upon my mind has been as great and important as can be intrusted to man, and the difficulty and intricacy of it prodigious. When fifty or sixty men have a constitution to form for a great empire, at the same time that they have a country of fifteen hundred miles in extent to fortify, millions to arm and train, a naval power to begin, an extensive commerce to regulate, numerous tribes of Indians to negotiate with, a standing army of twenty-seven thousand men to raise, pay, victual, and officer, I really shall pity those fifty or sixty men."1

The task was one to tax the energies of a stronger government, and it overwhelmed the Congress. Until the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, their authority was undefined: any State, and even any individual who was not in the United States service, could refuse obedience to their commands, on the ground that they were unable to show any right to issue them. Congress themselves were very careful to avoid assertions of authority: they "advised" and "recommended," but were reluctant to command. In their relations with the people, they 1 July 24, 1775, C. F. Adams, Familiar Letters of John Adams and his Wife, 85.

POLITICAL SITUATION.

19

acted mainly through the State governments; and these, even when willing to help, were not always able to do so, for they in turn could exercise but a partial control over the counties and

towns.

and Ne

The country was suffering from a "nightmare of liberty"; the state had lost much of that "divinity" which under ordinary circumstances doth hedge, not kings alone, but all long-established governments. Executive power suffered most of all. Except in Connecticut and Rhode Island, the governors had been appointed by the king or the proprietor, and were regarded as the representatives of a distinct, if not of a hostile, interest. In the political struggles which preceded the war, nearly every governor had been a Tory leader. On the other hand, public meetings, committees of correspondence, and committees of safety, aided by the legislatures, had brought about the Revolution. Consequently, there was a strong tendency to regard executive authority as a foe to liberty, and to limit it as much as possible.

Congress shared the popular feeling; and this prejudice, a natural reluctance to part with power, and perhaps the private interests of some members, combined to prevent them from adopting measures which they had full authority to take, and which would have done much to insure an efficient management of army affairs. A War Department with extensive powers should have been promptly established; instead, Congress retained the military administration in their own hands, merely appointing committees for special purposes, and frequently giving them authority only to report, not to act.

Such a system made it impossible to avoid delay and confusion, and on January 24, 1776, a committee was appointed to consider the subject of establishing a War Office. Five months later Congress adopted a plan providing for a Board of War and Ordnance, to consist of five of their own members and a paid secretary. John Adams, Sherman, Harrison, Wilson, and Edward Rutledge were chosen members of the Board, and Richard Peters, secretary.1 Peters remained in connection with 1 1 Journals of Congress, ii. 37, 208-211, January 24, and June 12 and 13, 1776.

the Board, either as secretary or as member, during the five years of its existence; and his valuable and faithful service deserves a wider and more generous recognition from his country than it has yet received.

The Board was to take charge of all military stores, superintend the raising, equipping, and despatching of the land forces, keep a register of the officers, and so forth. In 1777 its place was taken by a new Board, consisting of persons who were not members of Congress. In 1781 Congress, having become convinced of the advantage of single-headed departments, abolished the Board and appointed General Lincoln Secretary at War.1

Congress also sent special committees to examine affairs at camp. Six different committees were despatched to Washington's army as occasion rose, one in 1775, two in 1776, and one in each of the years 1778, 1779, and 1780. They consisted sometimes of two, sometimes of three members. Although occasionally empowered to assist Washington, -as in issuing commissions, their duties were mainly to investigate on the spot and report to Congress. In 1780 the committee sent to camp was given unusual powers; and many members, jealous of a few men's exercising so much authority, tried to have the committee composed of a delegate from each State. There was a warm debate; but the centralizers pointed out that such a body would merely reproduce the dissensions and delays of Congress, and the proposal failed. This committee gave great dissatisfaction by considering matters which Congress thought belonged to themselves, and it was abruptly recalled.3

The later Congresses were far less able than the earlier ones. The position of member of Congress involved much labor and inconvenience and brought little honor or profit, while the reorganization of the State governments afforded special opportunities for usefulness and distinction at home. Hamilton and Washington wrote to their friends lamenting the degeneracy of Congress, and Gouverneur Morris declared that the members

1 Journals of Congress, vii. 216, October 30, 1781.

2 Luzerne to Vergennes, April 16, 1780, Durand, New Materials, 219–220. Journals of Congress, vi. 152-153, 160, August 2 and 11, 1780.