and consequently extend no further than the observance of the written law, when this latter is good. This is as much as to say that we have only negative duties to perform toward other men, taken individually. For instance, the matter of property, an individual man being supposed one whom we shall consider simply in the quality of a
only be said that he is not under obligations
always in the same way to such fulfillment.-
Negative duty is more imperative than positive,
because it is more definite, and more necessary.
Positive duty is nobler than negative, because it
supposes a more generous nature, and because it
can not be enforced by law. In general, the per-
formance of a duty is more meritorious in propor-human being, making abstraction of the category
tion as the obligation to fulfill it is less strict, and
the sacrifice greater. But although there are
degrees of obligation and of merit, obligation is
always present. To content one's self by not
injuring others simply, without doing them any
good, is to degrade one's self voluntarily; for the
worth and dignity of each one of us are measured
by his service to mankind. On the other hand,
doing good to others and failing in the perform-
ance of negative duties is to be a bad man with
some virtues. The practice of virtue does not
excuse any one from the observance of probity;
probity without virtue suffices to make an honest
man before the law and in the eyes of the world,
but a useless man in the sight of God and of
conscience. It is a question with writers on
politics whether a constitution should simply
declare rights, or whether it should also prescribe
duty. No one can deny the existence of political
duties; but we can and ought to deny that human
law has for its object the prescribing of duties.
All human law is a declaration of the principles
of right and their application, and it can not be
any more than this without attacking liberty.
There are therefore, properly speaking, no politi-
cal duties which can be included in a constitution
or in a code. The right only, and the duty of
each one to respect the right, can be written there,
for this latter kind of duty is indissolubly con-
nected with right, and is always understood, both
as a sanction and as a consequence, to be part of
the formula of right.—But if human law can not
prescribe political duties, or if it only prescribes
them indirectly, the moral law, on the contrary,
enjoins upon us very directly and very impera-
tively political duties of the positive kind—We
owe duties to every man individually considered,
and special duties to the different categories of
persons into which the human species is divided
with respect to ourselves. These categories are
four in number: society, country, friends and
benefactors, and family. Besides, we must dis-
tinguish between the duties we owe to the entire
category, and those we owe to the individuals
who compose it. For instance, I have more
duties to perform to a fellow-countryman than
to a foreigner; but I have many more duties to
perform to my country than to the citizens taken
individually whose fatherland is mine. Of course
there are degrees in each category: country,
province, city; father, brother, and the most
distant relative. Morality is obliged to descend
to all these details; we shall give here only the
most universal rules.-The duties we owe each
person individually and solely, in his quality of
human being, are measured strictly by his rights,
to which he may belong-it is our duty not to rob
him, but not our duty to give him anything. He
has a right not to be injured in his property by
us; he has no right to demand any sacrifice of
ours. The duty to give exists only from the
standpoint of the categories, and consequently
creates no right to the advantage of an indi-
vidual, considered simply as such. Thus I am
obliged to give of my wealth to the poor, although
no poor man individually can assert any claim
whatever against my property. In order clearly
to understand the special duties, which are at the
same time positive duties, and which have rela-
tion to all four categories, we may picture them
to ourselves as four concentric circles, with man
in the centre of all: the largest circle represents
society, the smallest the family. Here is the
rule: our duties are both more numerous and less
imperious, as they approach the centre. The
words "less imperious" must not be left ambig-
uous; since every duty is imperious, the duty
which outweighs another, when we are com-
pelled to choose between duties, is considered
the more imperious. For instance, my country
can not exact from me so many sacrifices as my
family; but when the interests of my country and
my family conflict, and it is left to me to decide ·
between them, I should sacrifice my family to my
country. This is what is meant when it is said
that my duties to my family are the more numer-
ous, while those to my country are more imperi-
ous. If we take into consideration, not the en-
tire category, but the persons who compose it,
duties become both more numerous and more
imperious as we approach the centre.—This rule,
which suffices for all other categories of duties,
is less clear in the case of politics, and for this
reason: the constitution of other societies or cate-
gories is natural; that of political society is hu-
man. In other words, there is the country,
which is a natural society, and the government
of the country, which is factitious. Every gov-
ernment tries to prove that it is the natural or-
ganization of the country, and consequently the
legitimate one; and this pretension, if it were
proven, would elevate political law to the dignity
of natural law. But let us ask if any government
is legitimate simply just because it exists. This
is the same as asking whether right can be the
result of a fact-which is absurd. There are,
therefore, legitimate governments and others
which are not legitimate, and consequently it
may happen to be the duty of a citizen to disobey
his government in order to be true to his coun-
try. Can morality determine the duty of a citi-
zen who looks upon the government of his coun-