Ex.] THE SHEFFIELD WATERWORKS COMPANY v. BENNETT. house himself, or paid a premium; and no one would contend that, in any such cases, the actual rent paid would be the criterion. It would not be the criterion in any case in which it does not form a means of comparison with other houses, as regards their worth. In general the rent paid is what the house is worth, and is the real criterion of value, as distinguished from estimates. It makes a fact the test, which is certain, and excludes partiality. Having arrived at the conclusion that the actual rent is not necessarily the "rent " referred to in the 79th section of the Sheffield Water Works Act of 1853, but the proper rent for the houses which would, in general, correspond with the actual rent of small houses let at weekly rents, it follows, as we think, that the proper rent must be ascertained by some regular and fixed standard, and not by a standard depending upon whether the house is let or occupied by the owner, or let for more or less than three months, or for a greater or less value than a particular sum, or upon the application of certain Acts of Parliament to the property, or upon the particular arrangement made between the landlord and his tenants. Now, upon the proper construction of the 79th section, standing by itself, supposing no subsequent Act of Parliament on the subject of rating to be applied to the premises, the rent paid by an ordinary tenant, who himself paid all the rates and charges properly borne by occupiers, would clearly satisfy the word "rent." It may appear that this would be so only as regards houses above the annual value of 107., because, as regards houses below that value, by the 72nd section of the general Act the owners of such houses are liable to the water rate instead of the occupier, so as to make the water rate necessarily, as regards such houses, part of the rent, but this is an apparent objection only. It would be an objection if the word "rent" in the clause in question must signify the rent which the tenant pays; whereas the more reasonable meaning is what rent the premises are worth as "rent" under ordinary conditions. The word "rent" may, we think, be read to mean what the landlord gets as "rent," under the usual conditions, though technically this is not its meaning; and, if the landlord is obliged to pay the water rate, all that he gets as rent, and all that he ought to have taxed as rent, is the whole payment after deducting what he is so obliged to pay. The same reason applies with equal force to the payment of poor rates and district rates. We thus hold the word "rent" in the 79th section of the Act in question to mean the proper rent to a tenant paying the rates and charges regularly paid by the tenant, of which the actual rent, where the tenant does pay those rates and charges is, in general, the proper criterion; and this is the same thing as the yearly worth or annual value. And by so holding, we escape from the inconsistency of rating the premises upon a different standard, according as the value of the premises makes the actual payment of the rates fall upon the tenant or the landlord. The words "rent and "annual value are often used indiscriminately, and we think that they are done so in the 68th section of the general Act, and the 79th section of the special Act. As another instance, although it is not allowed to refer to the marginal reference in construing the clause in an Act of Parliament, yet we may do so in considering the general sense in which words are used. The 72nd section of The [Ex. Waterworks Clauses Act 1847, makes the rate payable by the landlord when the annual value of the premises does not exceed 107.; and the marginal note is "owners of houses not exceeding 101. rent to be liable to the rates." We have referred to the various authorities cited in the course of the argument. We do not think that the settlement cases have any real bearing upon a case like the present, where we are considering a system of rating houses. But it may be noticed that it would appear that the case of Rex v. The Inha bitants of St. Paul's, Deptford, in 13 East, 320, was decided because the court felt bound by a previous decision in the case of Reg. v. Inhabitants of Framlingham (Burrow's Settlement Cases, p. 748); and, as regards the case of Rex. v. The Inhabitants of Thurmaston (1 B. & Ad. 731), the words of the Act of Parliament therein referred to were, as to one of them, that the houses must be boná fide hired for 10l. by the year, and the rent paid for one year, and as to the other of them, that the house must be rented at 101. a year, and the rent actually paid for that term; so that the payment by the tenant of the rent of 101. for one year is the criterion of settlement, a reason which does not apply to the present case at all. The case of Elstone v. Rose (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 280; 38 L. J. 6, Q. B.; L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 4) raised a question as to the jurisdiction of the County Court judge, and the grounds of decision there do not at all assist the decision in the pre-ent case. In Reg v. The Overseers of Bilston (L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 18; 35 L. J. 73, M. C.), a poor rate case, it was held that a payment made by the landlord as a water rent ought not, in ascertaining the rateable value of the premises, to be deducted from the amount, 91. 28., found as a fact by the sessions to be the gross rental, on the ground that it did not come within any of the deductions allowable under the Parochial Assessment Act (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 1. In that case there was nothing in the nature of a water rate, but the water was supplied at the option of the inhabitants, and the agreed rent paid by the landlord or tenant as arranged between them. The court held it to be clear, and could not do otherwise, that the so-called water rent was not a tenant's rate or tax, and that it did not come within the other head of deductions, as an expense necessary to maintain the premises in a state to command the rent, any more than the supplying by agreement of gas instead of candles, or of meat, or any other necessary of life, would have done so. That case, therefore, has no bearing upon the question in the present case, which is, how the compulsory water rate is to be imposed. In the present case, all the deductions claimed are in respect of charges which are the subject of rates, and compulsory so far as the property is concerned. But the case mainly relied on by the plaintiffs was that of Rook (app.) v. The Mayor, &c., of Liverpool (resp.) (7 C. B., N. S., 240). According to the marginal note that case would be a strong authority in their favonr; and, if the question raised in that case and decided had not been complicated by an agreement between the parties, which was relied on in the judgments, and in fact formed the foundation of them, we should have felt bound by the decision upon a question of such a general nature as rating, and have decided accordingly. In that case the water rate was to be upon the annual value of the premises, and there was a power to compound Ex.] PRESTON V. THE CORPORATION OF GREAT YARMOUTH. where the yearly rent or value did not amount to 101. There had been a composition paper by which the appellant agreed to compound for the water rates, and in a schedule the rental of the two sets of premises was stated to be 4s. 6d. per week and 38. 6d. per week, respectively; and there was a proviso that, in case the rentals were not correctly stated, the corporation might insert the correct rentals and recover the water rates accordingly. It appeared that, in fact, the rentals were sixpence a week more in respect of both sets of premises, the landlord claiming to deduct the sixpence for The court held that in the rates paid by him. that case the appellant must be rated to the full amount; but not, it is submitted, because that would be the correct mode of rating independently of the terms of the composition, but because the appellant had agreed to make the actual rental the criterion, or rather the corporation had a right to act upon his having so Erle, C.J., in the course of the arguagreed. "You ment says (at p. 257 of 7 C. B., N. S.): say the written contract between the parties is on the rental and with a view to that alone; and that, for aught that appears, the council would not have entered into it upon any other footing." And the whole of his judgment afterThe concluwards given is to the same effect. sion of it is as follows: "My judgment is founded upon the terms of the composition paper which Mr. Justice Willes says: is before us." seems to us to have been agreed on both sides that the rent should be taken to represent the value." So that no judgment whatever is given upon the general question of annual value, but only upon the proper construction of the composition paper. There is no such question as that before us now, and therefore that decision does not in any way conflict with the reasons which we have given for the conclusion arrived at in the present case. It For the reasons above given we think that in determining the class to which the houses belong, the actual rent paid by the tenant is not to be taken, but the sum which comes into the landlord's pocket as rent, after the deductions for water rates, poor rates, and district rates, Our judgment therewhenever he pays them. tore will be for the defendant. The same question arises in the case of Bennett v. The Sheffield Waterworks Company, stated by the magistrate. And according to our judgment already given, the decision in that case will be reversed. Judgment for the defendant. Attorneys for the plaintiffs, Pitman and Lane, 27, Nicholas-lane, Lombard-street, E.C., agents for Blakelock Smith, Sheffield. Attorneys for the defendant, Pattison, Wigg, and Co., 50, Lombard-street, E.C., agents for Broomhead, Wightman and Moore, Sheffield. 603 [CHAN. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Wednesday, June 19, 1872. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) PRESTON V. THE CORPORATION OF GREAT YARMOUTH. Corporation-Mortgage of rates-Local Act-Provision for repayment by ballot-Right of mortgagee to repayment of principal-Account-Receiver. The corporation of a borough were, by Act of Parliament, authorised to raise a certain sum of money for local improvements by mortgage of the general district rates. In the form of mortgage prescribed by the Act, no time was specified for the repayment of the money, and the only mode of repayment mentioned in the Act was that the Corporation should yearly and every year pay off 1001., at the least, of the moneys borrowed under the Act, and it was provided that the mortgagees to be paid off should be ascertained by ballot. On a bill by one of the mortgagees for payment of the principal moneys owing to him, and for the appointment of a receiver: Held (affirming the decision of Bacon, V.C.), that THIS was an appeal from a decision of Bacon, V.C. The Vice-Chancellor having dismissed the plaintiff's bill with costs, the plaintiff appealed. Eddis, Q.C. and W. Pearson, for the appellant, contended that he was entitled under the Act to have his mortgage paid off after six months' notice, and as the corporation had, after such notice, failed to repay him his principal, he was entitled to have a receiver appointed of the rates: (Hopkins v. The Worcester and Birmingham Canal Proprietors, If the contention of the L. Rep. 6 Eq. 437.) corporation that they were only bound to pay off 1007. in each year were correct, it would take them 200 years to pay off the 20,000l. which they had borrowed; and the rights of the mortgagees could not be prejudiced in this way for the benefit of the ratepayers. They also cited Lord Crewe v. Edelstone, 1 De G. & J. 93; De Winton v. The Mayor and Corporation of Brecon, 33 L. T. Rep. 296; 26 Beav. 533; Postlethwaite v. The Maryport Harbour Trustees, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 138; Fripp v. The Chard Railway Company, 11 Hare, Ames v. The Trustees of the Birkenhead Docks, 20 Public Health Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63), ss. 113, 114; Local Government Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict c. 98), ss. 10, 57. Without calling upon Kay, Q.C. and Lindley, Q.C., who appeared for the corporation, or Rodwell, who appeared for a bondholder representing the mortgagees who did not wish to be paid, Lord Justice JAMES said:-This litigation, in which the plaintiffs, not satisfied with the case being argued and decided in the court below, have occupied the time of this court for some hours, is only explicable by the fact that one of the plaintiffs appears to be a solicitor. A more idle contention appears to me never to have been raised than whether a person who has lent money to the Corporation of Great Yarmouth, on the security of the rates, is entitled to get his money back by having a receiver appointed of the rates and tolls of the borough of Great Yarmouth, when he might sell his bonds in the market for a price which would no doubt be within a few pounds of their nominal value. The plaintiffs, as representing the other bondholders, raise a great many nice points about this matter, which involves only a few pounds at the utmost, and institute an expensive litigation, the costs of which they may find that they will have to pay personally. In my opinion the litigation is as idle in point of legal contention as it is in substance. I cannot bring myself to doubt at all as to what the meaning of this Act of Parliament is, looking at the whole context of it, and the proper construction to be put upon its provisions with regard to these mortgages. The Commissioners of Great Yarmouth, who are only public functionaries, were authorised to raise money on the rates of the borough for certain public purposes, and were authorised to take the money, not as a loan to themselves, for they were not the debtors, or as money advanced on their own property, for they had no property, but as money lent on the security of tolls to be raised under the Act. The Act having provided that they should take the money in the shape of annuities on lives, or by means of the credit of the Act of Parliament, it contained an express provision how the principal was to be paid off. The provision is this. It was supposed it would take a long time to pay the money off, and the provision was that they were at all events to apply 1001. in each year, and if they had more than 100l., they were to apply at least 1001. every year in payment of the creditors by ballot. There was a particular machinery provided for the ballot, and notice was to be given to the creditors whose names were drawn, and that was the sole provision made by the Act for the repayment of the principal. This provision is, to my mind, plainly inconsistent with the idea that a creditor whose name was not drawn at the ballot would be entitled immediately to go and demand the whole of his money, which is the contention here. The contention raised by the plaintiffs would amount to this, that although the Corporation were to begin to pay off the money in the way I have mentioned, any of the creditors had power to call on them to repay their principal at once, and in default to come to this court for a receiver. I am of opinion that there has been no default. The interest has been paid regularly. There is no default as to the principal, for the Corporation have continued to pay (at least there is no allegation to the contrary) 1001. a year in discharge of the principal. They have done all that the Act of Parlia ment intended them to do, and there being no default in payment of principal or interest, it appears to me that this court has no jurisdiction or power to interfere with the application of these moneys by the person whom the Act of Parliament has appointed to apply them, namely, the treasurer of the Commissioners of the borough of Great Yarmouth. I am of opinion that the decision of the Vice-Chancellor is perfectly correct, and that it ought to be affirmed with costs. Lord Justice MELLISH:-I am of the same opinion. Appeal dismissed with costs. [ROLLS. Solicitors: Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard and Co., agents for J. and C. A. Preston, Great Yarmouth; Andrew Storey, agent for Charles Driver, Great Yarmouth; and F. T. Dubois. ROLLS COURT. Reported by G. WELBY KING, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Monday, June 10, 1872. CHAMBERLAYNE v. BROCKETT. Will-Charitable legacy-Legacy to be applied to such charitable purpose as legatee should think fit -Death of legateee in lifetime of testatrix-Lapse Bequest for building almshouses when site should be given-Perpetuity. A testatrix bequeathed legacies to several persons, to be applied by each of them to such charitable purposes as each might deem most advisable: Held, that such legacies lapsed by the death of the legatees in the lifetime of the testatrix. Testatrix directed that a number of almshouses in different parishes should be erected at the expense of her residuary personal estate, when and as soon as land should at any time after her death be given for that purpose: Held, void on the ground of remoteness. SARAH CHAMBERLAYNE, by her will, dated the 13th Jan. 1838, bequeathed to several persons, some of whom died in the lifetime of the testatrix, the sum of 1001. each, to be applied by each of them to such charitable purposes as each might deem most advisable, and she directed that out of the residue of her personal estate, when and as soon as land should at any time thereafter be given for the purpose, as thereinafter mentioned, that an almshouse, or almshouses, consisting of ten rooms, with suitable appendages for ten poor persons, should be built in the parish of Southam, in the county of Warwick; also an almshouse, or almshouses, consisting of five rooms, with suitable appendages for five poor persons, in the parish of Long Itchington, in the county of Warwick; also an almshouse, or almshouses, consisting of five rooms, with suitable appendages for five poor persons, in the parish of Okeley, in the county of Essex; and also an almshouse, or almshouses, consisting of six rooms, with suitable appendages for six poor persons, in the hamlet of Bushend, in the parish of Hatfield Broad Oak, in the county of Essex, all to be built in a plain substantial manner, without any expensive ornament whatever. The questions raised were first whether the legacies of 1001. each to such of the legatees as died in the lifetime of the testatrix lapsed; and, secondly, whether the direction for the erection of almshouses failed on the ground of remoteness. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Speed for the plaintiffs. The legacies to such of the persons as died in the lifetime of the testatrix must be treated as having lapsed. Although the gift for the erection of almshouses is not invalid under the Mortmain Act, yet it is void for remoteness, as no land has been given, and the court will not hold the fund for an indefinite time to see whether land will be given: (Sinnett v. Herbert, L. Rep. 7 Ch. App. 232; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 7.) They also cited: Philpotts v. St. George's Hospital, 6 H. L. Cas. 338; Re Watmough's Trusts, L. Rep. 8 Eq. 272; Q. B.] REG. v. THE REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. Fry, Q.C. and Cadman Jones for the defendants in the same interest. Hemming, for the Attorney-General. The legacies to such of the persons as have died in the lifetime of the testatrix ought to be applied cy près to charitable purposes, on the ground of the general charitable intent; and as regards the bequest for the erection of almshouses, it is not void under the Mortmain Act; and the objection on the ground of remoteness does not apply to a charity. There ought to be an inquiry whether lands will be given for the purpose. Lord ROMILLY held that the legacies to those persons who had died in the lifetime of the testatrix lapsed, and that the gift for building almshouses was void, not as being within the statute of Mortmain, but because the gift being to a charity to be ascertained, not immediately, nor within any given time, but when and as soon as land should at any time be given for the purpose of almshouses being erected in the parishes mentioned, the testatrix had transgressed the rule against perpetuities, for an indefinite time might elapse before the gift could take effect as a charitable gift. Solicitors, Taylor, Hoare, and Taylor; Raven and Bradley. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by J. SHORTT and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. May 30 and June 6, 1872. SECOND COURT. REG. v. THE REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. Trade union-Disruption of society-Mandamus to register-Trade Union Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31). The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners was a trade union which had deposited its rules under sect. 44 of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, with the Registrar of Friendly Societies, before the passing of the Trades Union Act 1871. A disruption of the society took place in May 1871, and the society was divided into two sections, one of which consisted of the executive council and some of the members, whilst the other represented the larger number of members and a larger part of the funds; the former continued its place of business in London, the latter set up at Manchester. Applications were made by both sections to be registered in the name of the society under sect. 6 of The Trade Union Act 1871; but the registrar refused to register either of the sections, on the authority of a regulation made by the Secretary of State under sect. 13, forbidding the registration of a trade union under a name identical with that of any other existing trade union, whether registered or not registered. The London section obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus to compel the registrar to register them, contending that this regulation was beyond the powers conferred by the Act, and invalid; and that having complied with the provisions with respect to registry, they were entitled to registration. Held, that the dispute between the members of this society was one which ought to be decided by the Court of Chancery, and that this court would not enter into the merits upon a rule for mandamus. Mac Donald had obtained, on the 29th April, a [Q. B. rule nisi calling upon the Registrar of Friendly Societies in England, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, directed to him, commanding him to register the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, meeting at East Temple Chambers, Whitefriars, London, as a trade union, upon the application, dated the 15th April 1872, of T. T. Matthews and others, according to the provisions of the Trade Union Act 1871. Notice of the rule was directed to be given to J. Thompson and others, the representatives of the Manchester portion of what was the same society, a disruption having taken place amongst the members. The registrar had refused applications made by both sections to be registered in the name which had been used by the society when united, for reasons which he stated in writing, as hereinafter appears. By The Trade Union Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31) s. 6: Any seven or more members of a trade union may, by subscribing their names to the rules of the union, and otherwise complying with the provisions of this Act with respect to registry, register such trade union under this Act, provided that if any one of the purposes of such trade union be unlawful, such registration shall be void. By sect. 13: With respect to the registry, under this Act, of a trade union, and of the rules thereof, the following provisions shall have effect. 1. An application to register the trade union, and printed copies of the rules, together with a list of the titles and names of the officers, shall be sent to the Registrar under this Act. 2. The Registrar, upon being satisfied that the trade union has complied with the regulations respecting registry in force under this Act, shall register such trade union and such rules. 3. No trade union shall be registered under a name identical with that by which any other existing trade union has been registered, or so nearly resembling such name as to be likely to deceive the members or the public. 4. Where a trade union applying to be registered has been in operation more than a year before the date of such application, there shall be delivered to the registrar before the registry thereof a general statement of the receipts, funds, effects, and expenditure of such trade union in the same form, and showing the same particulars as if it were the annual general statement required as hereinafter mentioned to be transmitted annually to the registrar. 5 The registrar upon registering such trade union shall issue a certificate of registry, which certificate, unless proved to have been withdrawn or cancelled, shall be conclusive evidence that the regulations of this Act with respect to registry have been complied with. 6. One of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State may from time to time make regulations respecting registry under this Act, and respecting the seal (if any) to be used for the purpose of such registry, and the forms to be used for such registry, and the inspection of documents kept by the registrar under this Act, and respecting the fees, if any, to be paid on registry, not exceeding the fees specified in the second schedule to this Act, and generally for carrying this Act into effect. By sect. 17, The registrars of the friendly societies in England, Scotland, and Ireland shall be the registrars under this Act. Under clause 6 of sect. 13, regulations were made as follows: Trade Union Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31). In pursuance of the powers vested in me by the above-mentioned Act, I, the Right Hon. Henry Austin Bruce, one of Her Majesty's principal secretaries of State, make the following regulations : 1. The registrar shall not register a trade union under a name identical with that of any other existing trade union known to him, whether registered or not registered, or so nearly resembling such name as to be likely to deceive the members or the public. Q. B.] REG. v. THE REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. In the matter of the applications to register the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners as a trade union. An application is before me dated 23rd Dec. 1871, requiring me to register the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners as meeting at East Temple Chambers, Whitefriars-street, Fleet-street, London. This application (hereinafter called "the London application") is signed by H. P. Colliver and others, who state they are authorised to make it by a resolution passed by the executive council of the above-named society. Another application is before me dated 30th Dec. 1871, requiring me to register the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners as meeting at 53, Grosvenorstreet, Chorlton-on-Medlock, Manchester. This applica tion (hereinafter called "the Manchester application ") is signed by John Thompson and six others, who state that they are authorised to make it by a vote of the whole of the members of the society, taken at meetings summoned for the purpose in the month of Sept. 1871, when 3821 votes were recorded in favour of registering the society, 125 members only voting against the proposal to register. As both applications are to register a trade union under the same name, if one had been complied with the other must have been refused: (34 & 35 Vict. c. 13, s. 13, sub.-sect. 3.) It appeared from the balance sheets accompanying the respective applications, that both related to one and the same society, whose, rules, as the rules of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, had been deposited with me under sect. 44 of the Friendly Societies Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 63), previous to the passing of the Trade Union Act 1871. I therefore served notice on both applicants that on the 15th Jan. 1872, I should be prepared to hear evidence for or against their respective applications. Though I am authorised, by regulation 2 of the Secretary of States Regulation of 8th Dec. 1871, to require from the applicants such evidence as may seem to me necessary, no power is given me by the Trade Union Act 1871 to administer an oath, or to compel the production of any evidence; but I was willing and desirous to hear anything that either of the applicants for registration might be disposed voluntarily to lay before me, with the view of ascertaining whether I could satisfy myself as to the right of either party to obtain registration to the exclusion of the other, without requiring that right to be established by litigation; or of ascertaining whether by mutual consent their differences could be arranged, or whether the applicants could be registered under different names. The London applicants were represented before me by Mr. MacDonald, barrister, instructed by Mr. Howard; the Manchester applicants by Mr. Shaen of the firm of Shaen, Roscoe, and Massey. Both parties stated that they could not consent to take my decision, if adverse, as binding, and would reserve their rights to compel me, by mandamus or otherwise, to register upon their application, if I should refuse to do so. Mr. Macdonald delivered to me a protest in writing in the following terms: "Trade Union Act 1871. "The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. Take notice, that on behalf of this trade union, I protest [Q. B. against the proceedings to hear evidence for and against its application to be registered under the Trade Union Act 1871, and that the said hearing is attended by the said union, subject to all the rights reserved by this protest. And further take notice that on behalf of the said union, I hereby intimate that it is advised the regula tions of Mr. Secretary Bruce, dated the 8th Dec. 1871, are illegal, and in contravention of the said Act, and that it reserves to itself the right and power, by mandamus or otherwise, to compel its registration in terms of the said Act. "And further take notice that this protest will be used in any legal steps the said union may be advised to take. "Dated this 15th Jan. 1872. (Signed) A. HOWARD, "37, Queen-street, Cheapside, Solicitor for the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. "To A. K. Stephenson, Esq., Registrar of Friendly Societies." Subject to this statement and protest, each party tendered evidence which satisfied me that differences had occurred in the society, as it existed under the rules deposited with me, previous to the passing of the Trade Union Act, which differences had led, on the 18th May, 1871, to a division of the society into two sections, which were represented by the applicants before me. It also appeared that the funds of the society in the possession of its various branches, as returned by the applicants in their respective balance sheets, amounted on the 31st Dec. 1870, to £17,568 19s. 4d. It also appeared that the books of the society, whose rules were, as above stated, deposited with me as registrar of friendly societies, were, and still are, in possession of the London appli cants; but it was contended by the Manchester appli cants that such possession was illegal. It appeared, therefore, that the questions at issue were mixed questions of fact and law, depending on the application of the legal construction of the rules as deposited, to disputed facts; and that such questions involve very large interests. I am of opinion, that under the Trades Union Act 1871, the duties of the registrar are ministerial, not judicial; that no power is either expressly or impliedly given to him by the Act to call for evidence either oral or documentary, or to administer sa oath; and that the regulations made by the Secretary of State cannot confer on the registrar any power which the Act does not give him. Though the applicants have voluntarily given me imformation, they have declined to give me any authority beyond what the Act gives to the registrar. I express no opinion on the merits of the case of either party; but decline to register the trade union under either application, unless directed by mandamus so to do, or until the decision of a competent court determining the legal status of the applicants to my satisfaction has been obtained by one or other of them. To facilitate the determination of the question, I hereby refuse to register the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, upon the application of John Thompson and others, dated 30th Dec. 1871. (Signed) A. K. STEPHENSON, London, 19th Jan. 1872. Registrar. From the time of this refusal, the Manchester section took no further steps for the purpose of obtaining registration; but on the 15th April 1872, a further application for the registration of the society was made on behalf of T. T. Matthews and others, representatives of the London section. This application, concerning which the rule nisi was obtained, produced the following: Notice of Refusal to Register. Friendly Societies' Registration Office 28, Abingdon-street, S.W., London, 16th April, 1872 Trades Union Act, 1871. The accompanying documents are returned unregistered, for the following reasons: They are a renewal of the application to register made to me on the 23rd Dec. 1871, which I refused, in writing, on the 19th Jan. 1872, until the decision of a competent court, determining the legal status of the applicants to my satisfaction, had been obtained, either by them or by the other applicants for registering the same trade union. |