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Winch v. CONSERVATORS OF THE THAMES.
some of the objects for which the defendants were gation, and to purchase land for that pupose. And thereby incorporated as mentioned in the pream- by the last Act of 1866 the present defendants are ble were, “ The preservation and improvement of authorised to take the tolls, and by sect. 88 are the streams, bed and banks of the upper part of bound to apply their funds, first, in defraying the the Thames as a matter of great local and public expenses of the repair and maintenance of the importance.” The Act recites that the locks and works vested in, acquired, or constructed by them works under the previous control of the com- under that Act, and secondly, in carrying into missioners were in a very bad and dangerous execution the purposes of that Act which, as it condition, and that their income had long been incorporates, necessarily includes, the purposes insufficient to defray the necessary expenses of the of the former Acts. Those purposes, as stated in repair and maintenance of the locks and works, and the preamble of the last Act, as well as in the that considerable debts had been incurred by the former Acts, are the preservation, repair, mainformer commissioners. By sections 25, 26 and 30 tenance and improvement of the navigation, and the powers, authorities, rights and interests, which would we think include the banks and duties and obligations of the former commissioners towing paths. The defendants in pursuance of were transferred to the defendants. As to certain the powers vested in them, made arrangements locks, dams and weirs existing on the navigation in 1866 to secure the use of the towing path at the before the passing of the Act of 1866, the owners place in question for the purpose of the navigaof them were entitled to take toll and were bound tion, and it was agreed on the argument that to repair them, but by this Act the traffic was the defendants under that arrangement now pay relieved from the tolls payable to these private an annual rent per rod to the owner of the soil owners, the property in these locks, dams and weirs of the towing path and take an aggregate toll was transferred to and vested in the defendants, in one sum at Teddington Lock for the use of the and the obligation to maintain and repair them was entire navigation and towing paths, and it is to be by express words imposed upon the defendants. | taken as a fact that the defendants have under the By sect. 55 the defendants were authorised to take provisions of the statute acquired and have the use tolls and charges for the navigation, and under of the whole of the towing paths along the river, sect. 70 to borrow money on the security of the and the right to take toll in respect of the use of tolls, and their funds were to be applied by the them as well as for the use of the navigation defendants under sect. 88 (1) inter alia in defraying generally. Somewhat similar Acts of Parliament the expenses of the repair and maintenance of the were under consideration in the case of Badger F. works vested in, or acquired, or constructed by The South Yorkshire and River Dunn Company them by or under that Act, and (6) in carrying into (1 El. & El. 349), and the Navigation Company execution the purposes of that Act. There are no there, as in this case, appeared to have paid an words directly imposing the obligation to repair annual sum to the owner of the towing path in the banks and towing paths upon the defendants, order to secure the use of it for the public. It was as is the case with respect to the locks, dams and considered by the Court of Exchequer that the weirs by the 43rd section, but then the towing paths company had thereby acquired the soil in the topand the right to take tolls for passing along them ing path, but this decision was afterwards reversed are not absolutely transferred to the defendants in by the Exchequer Chamber, and that court decided the same manner as the locks, dams and weirs, that the company had acquired only an easement so that there was no necessity for any such ex- over the towing path such as was necessary for press enactment with respect to the towing paths, the purposes of the undertaking, and that the and the powers, rights, duties, obligation and arrangement for the payment of an annual sum liability of the defendants with respect to the was a purchase within the meaning of the statutes. towing paths and banks must be ascertained by The Court of Exchequer Chamber also laid down reference to the provisions of the former Acts as that generally speaking in the absence of express well as to the general scope and language of this words the courts were not inclined to infer that Act. It appears from the earlier Acts already men. statutes of this kind gave more than such an use tioned that originally there were owners and by i of the soil as was necessary for the purposes of the subsequent Acts tenants or occupiers of towing navigation, and a similar view was taken by the paths who took toll for horses passing along them, Court of Exchequer in the case of Stracey y. Nelson and that such persons were bound to keep the towing (12 M. & W.) with respect to commissioners of paths in repair, and by those statutes the com
It is quite true that the arrangement in missioners had extensive powers of supervision the present case between the commissioners and and control over the towing paths, and power to the owner of the towing path was by parol only, make orders respecting them, and to regulate the but the owner of the land letting the right to use toll to be taken by the persons entitled to take it. the towing path and receiving a rent for it must They subsequently acquired power to purchase be taken to know the powers of the conservators and take lands compulsorily, and to execute works and to have assented that they might do that for the purposes of the navigation, and by the Act which was necessary to enable the public to have of the 28 Ġeo. 3, c. 51, sect. 6, were authorised and enjoy the use of the towing paths, including themselves to take tolls for (amongst other things) the power to repair them, upon the same principle the towing paths purchased or hired by them, and that when the use of a thing is granted every there are similar expressions in the next section thing is granted by which the grantee may have as to towing paths purchased or hired by the and enjoy such use (Pomfret v. Ricroft 1 Wms commissioners. By the later Act of the 35 Geo. 3, Saund. 322), and with respect to a question which c. 106, sects. 18 and 23, they obtained power to was raised as to what is to be deemed the towing execute any works or repairs that they thought path, it seems to us that it is impossible to confine needful or proper, and to pay for them out of the it to the mere beaten track which is described to rates and tolls, and also to make and establish a have been made principally by single horses continued horse towing path throughout the navi- towing down stream, for in towing up stream the
WINCH v. CONSERVATORS OF THE THAMES.
horses cannot always be in a direct line, and there decision in the earlier case of The Mayor of Lyme must be space for them as well as for the driver and Regis v. Henley in the House of Lords (reported in for the proper use of the tow line, and we think 1 Bing. N. C. 222 & 2 Cl. & Fin. 331), and was the towing path must be taken to include so much confirmed by the case of Parnaby v. The Lancaster of the bank as is necessary and proper for the Canal Company (11 Ad. & El. 230) and the decision purposes of towing barges, and is reasonably and of the House of Lords in the Mersey Dock case. properly used as such, and which in this case Upon the true construction of the statutes in this would include that part of the bank which gave case, construed according to the rule laid down in way. The defendants having acquired the towing the cases cited, we are of opinion that the defenpath in the manner before mentioned for the use dants had power to maintain and repair the towof the public subject to the payment by the public ing paths; they had provided that towing path of the toll to them, they invited the public to use under the Acts of Parliament for the use of the the towing paths and to pay them the tolls. They public; they invited the public to use it; and they have also employed their superintendent and their took a toll as they are authorised to do for the use engineer from time to time to inspect and report of it, and it appears to us therefore that they were on the banks and towing paths, and it was proved bound to take reasonable care that the towing to be part of the duties of the engineer to see if path was in a reasonably fit condition to be used the banks were being washed away. The plaintiff as a towing path, and that the present case does in this case was lawfully using the towing path fall within the principle of the decision in The with his horses in towing a barge for which the Mersey Docks v. Gibbs and the other cases to proper toll had been paid to the defendants and for which we have referred, and must be governed by the purpose of the navigation. It was alleged by them. It is also to be observed that after having the plaintiff that the towing path was in an un- acquired the right to use the towing path from safe and dangerous state and that in consequence the owner of the soil, and having the power themhis horses fell into the river and were drowned ; selves to repair and maintain it, it would be very whilst the defendants alleged that the bank was strange if they were at liberty to make orders in a safe and proper condition and that the acci- upon the owners to do the repairs whilst they dent arose from the sole fault of the driver of the received the toll from the public. It was conhorses or of the man who had charge of the barge. tended for the defendants that there was no public No question was raised (indeed upon the evidence right of towing on the banks of the river, and the there was no ground for contending) that if the case of Bell v. Herbert (2 T. R. 253) was relied upon bank was in a dangerous state and it was the by the defendants in support of this view, but that defendants' duty 'to maintain it, they had been case only decided that there was no such right guilty of negligence in that respect. The case merely at common law, and the decision in fact having been left to the jury, they found that the affirmed that there may be and in fact is, on most towing path and banks were not in a proper con- navigable rivers such a public right by custom, dition relatively to the purpose and proper use of and that slight evidence of usage would generally them as a towing path; that this was the cause of be sufficient to support it on the ground of the the accident to the plaintiff's horses; and that public convenience. We see no objection to a there was no neglect in the navigation of the dedication of a way to the public for such a limited barge or in the management of the horses. The purpose and in Rex v. The Severn and Wye verdict was thereupon entered for the plaintiff for Navigation (2 B. & A. 648) Holroyd and Bayley, 1001., the value of the horses, subject to the point, JJ. both laid it down, and we think correctly, which was reserved, as to the liability of the defen- that a towing path may be a highway to be used dants in point of law, and this question was to be only for the purpose of towing barges or vessels. raised without reference to the particular form of It was further contended that if a public right of the pleadings. A rule was accordingly obtained by way existed for the purpose of towing, that the the defendants to enter the verdict in their favour, parish alone had the power, and were liable to the and upon the argument the plaintiff contended duty of repairing it, but we can find no sufficient that the case fell within the principle which was grounds in fact or law under the circumstances of established by the case of the Mersey Docks v. this case, and upon the proper construction of Gibbs (L. Rep. 1 Eng. & Ir. App. 93). In that case it these statutes, for supporting that contention; was laid down that the general rule of construc- nor is this case like some which were suggested, tion of statutes like the present was that, in the such as that of a road washed away by the sea, absence of something to show a contrary intention, where no person or body may be liable to repair the Legislature intends that the body created by or restore it. The authorities to which we have the statutes shall have the same duties, and that already referred seem effectually to dispose of this its funds shall be subject to the same liabilities, as point. It was further contended that if there was the general law would impose upon a private a public right of towing upon the river banks, and person having and exercising the same rights, and the defendants were bound to repair them, the that the trustees in that case were bound to take only remedy for breach of that duty was by indictreasonable care that their works were in such a ment, and that no action could be maintained by state that the public might use them without an individual; but if the duty of keeping the towdanger. In the case of Nicholl v. Allen (1 B. & S. ing paths and banks' in repair be imposed upon 916 and in error 934) it was held that a person the defendants, and they have neglected that duty, being authorised to make a bridge and to take toll we are at a loss to understand upon what principle upon it was liable to repair it, upon the principle it can be said that a person who has sustained a that taking the benefit of the tolls he must bear particular injury from such neglect, and which is the burthen of the repairs, and it was considered not common to the public at large, is precluded that the statutes in that case contemplated that from maintaining an action to recover damages both the tolls and the liability to repair should go for the injury which he has thus individually sustogether. This was also in accordance with the tained. T'he cases before referred to are direct Mag. Cas.-VOL. VII.
POWER v. WIGMORE.
authorities in favour of the plaintiff upon this point other fees as may from time to time be directed by also. It was further contended that the defen- the Metropolitan Board of Works, but one fee dants did not collect the tolls for their own advan- only shall be chargeable with respect to any such tage, but merely as trustees for the benefit of the works done in, to, or upon any building as are inpublic; but in the Mersey Dock case that circum- cluded in one notice. The second schedule, as far stance was held not to make any difference in as is material, is as follows : “ Fees for addiprinciple with respect to the liability in such cases, tions or alterations. For inspecting the arches or and all the grounds upon which it was sought to stone floors over or under public ways, 10s." distinguish the case from the previous cases have The 106th section provides that for every case, exo in our judgment entirely failed. Some questions cept in reepect of fees of a district surveyor in were raised as to the sufficiency of the declaration, which jurisdiction is hereinbefore given to a jueand which are material only for the purpose of the tice of the peace, if either party is dissatisfied demurrers, but as the defendants denied their with the determination of the justice so convict
. liability altogether under any form of declaration ing, such party may appeal to any of the Superior it was arranged that the plaintiff should be at Courts of Common Law at Westminster. liberty to make any such amendments as he The appellant having received notice from the remight be advised consistently with the facts of spondent of his intention to build fifty-two arches, the case and the finding of the jury, and which inspected and measured them on several occasions. he is still at liberty to make if he thinks fit. The arches were built on a vacant space of ground Our decision upon the main point in the case is under what was and is a public highway, and in favour of the plaintiff, and the rule obtained were built on the four sides of a parallelogram. by the defendants to enter the verdict for them The appellant claimed 261., being 10s. per arck, under the leave reserved at the trial will there- while the respondent refused to pay more than 108. fore be discharged, and judgment will be entered altogether. for the plaintiff on the demurrers, upon the Upon appeal to the alderman, he was of opinion present or the amended form of the declaration, that 10s. was all that the appellant was entitled at the option of the plaintiff. The remaining to, but stated a case for the opinion of the Court of point argued before us was that the verdict was Common Pleas. against the weight of the evidence, and that there It was objected on the part of the respondent that ought to be a new trial on that ground. Upon the alderman had no power to state a case, which reading the notes of the evidence we have not was taken away by the 106th section of the been able to satisfy ourselves that the verdict is Metropolitan Building Act : so clearly against the weight of evidence that it Held, that the appellant was entitled to a fee of 108. ought to be set aside, but at the same time the for every building; and that the alderman must Lord Chief Justice before whom the case was say
howo many buildings there were : tried has certified to us that he is dissatisfied Held, also, that the power of the alderman to state a with the verdict, and under any other circum- case under 208-21 Vict. c. 43, was not taken arcay stances than those which have occurred we should by the 106th section of the Metropolitan Building almost certainly have thought it right in defer- Act. ence to such an opinion, that the case should CASE stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. undergo further investigation before another jury. 1. Upon hearing of a summons obtained by the But it must be remembered that this was a second appellant against the respondent under sects. 25, verdict obtained by the plaintiff, and after the 31, 49, 51, and schedule 2 of the Metropolitan first verdict in his favour had been set aside; the Building Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122), whereby the questions left to the jury were peculiarly matters respondent was summoned for that on the 26th within their province, the evidence upon them July 1870, certain arches under the public way, was contradictory, and two special juries having, situate in Newgate Market and within the limits after the summing up of the presiding judge, of the Metropolitan Building Act 1855, and within found their verdict upon all the points submit- the district of the southern division of the City of ted to them in favor of the plaintiff, and as we London, of which the appellant was district sursee little or no probability that another jury veyor under the said Act, were completed, and would be likely to come to a different conclusion that at the expiration of fourteen days after such upon a third trial, we think we ought not to completion on the 10th Aug. 1870, the appellant send the case down for trial again, and that the became entitled to receive from the respondent, as rule so far as it relates to a new trial should also the builder employed in erecting such arches, the be discharged.
amount of fees due to him, specified in the second
Rule discharged. schedule of the Act, to wit, 251. 108., and that on Attorneys for plaintiff, Wilkinson and Howlett. the 29th Aug. 1870, the appellants caused a proper Attorney for defendants, Hall for Freer and Co. bill specifying the amount of such fees to be sent
to the respondent in a registered letter, but the respondent had, contrary to the form of the statute,
refused to pay the same. The respondent was Tuesday, June 4, 1872.
ordered to pay to the appellant the sum of 108. and POWER v. WIGMORE.
2. The following facts were proved and admitted Metropolitan Building Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122)— by both parties.
Surveyor's fees-Inspecting arches or stone floors 3. (1.) The appellant was and still is the Dis-Power for justice to state case,
trict Surveyor for the Southern Division of the The Metropolitan Building Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, city of London, and his district includes the old
8. 49) enacts there shall be paid to the district | Newgate Market. surveyors in respect of the several matters in the (2.) On 8th June 1870 he received a notice from second schedule the fees therein specified, or such the respondent that he intended to build fifty-two
POWER v. WIGMORE.
arches under a public highway in old Newgate arches. He is entitled to a fee of 10s. for Market.
inspecting the arches or stone floors over (3) The appellant went to the place described under any public way, but the Act says that one on 12th June, and measured and surveyed the fee only shall be chargeable with respect to place where these arches were intended to be built. any such works done in, to, or upon any build
(4) About ten or twelve days afterwards he ing, as are in pursuance of the provisions infound one or two of the arches completed.
cluded in one notice. This clearly means that he (5) By 26th July fifty-one of the arches were is entitled to one fee of 108. for inspecting each completed, and in the time between 12th July and arch, or else in an extreme case the surveyor 26th July he was obliged to go, and went fifteen, or might be entitled to only one fee of 108. for inspectsixteen times to inspect them while they were in ing all the arches in London. The Act does not progress.
define the word building. Secondly, the magis(6) In the discharge of his duties under the trate is not prevented by the 106th section from above mentioned statutes he was obliged to mea- stating a case for the opinion of the court. sure the said arches from time to time to see that Under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, the 106th section only the walls were of a proper thickness, and that the refers to the powers of appeal of the parties them. arches were of a proper
width and span,
selves. structed in accordance with the statute.
Grove Chapman for the respondent.—The sche(7) The arches varied in size, and he was there- dule clearly states the sum to be paid to the fore obliged to measure and examine every one of surveyor for inspecting the arches or stone them separately.
floors over or under public ways in 10s. It is as (8) They were not arches attached to houses, easy to inspect several arches as one, and in the but were built on a vacant piece of ground, under case of some hundreds of contiguous arches the what was, and is a public highway. The arches costs would be very heavy if 108. was to be paid were built on the four sides of a parallelogram. for each arch. The decision of the alderman was
(9) Each arch or vault was separated by a pier conclusive in this case, and the case having been in brickwork and open in front, and there was no settled by him there is an end of it. The 106th internal communication or mode of access what- section enacts that in every case, except in respect ever from one vault to another.
of fees of a district surveyor, in which jurisdiction 4. On the part of the appellant it was contended is hereinbefore given to a justice of the peace, if that each arch was a separate structure, and that either party to any such case is dissatisfied with he was entitled to a fee of 108. for each, amount- the determination of the justice so convicting in ing in the whole to a sum of 251. 108.
respect of any point of law, or of the admission or 5. On the part of the respondent it was con- rejection of any evidence, such party may, upon tended that the words in the schedule “for in- giving notice within seven days to the other party specting the arches or stone floors over or under of his intention to appeal, appeal therefrom to any public ways, 108.," meant that the appellant was of the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westonly entitled to one sum of 108. for inspecting any minster, subject to this restriction, that no such number of arches under or over any public way, appeal shall be made by any district surveyor, and that no greater fee could be demanded. It except with the consent of the justice before was also contended on the part of respondent that whom the case is tried, and that no such appeal under the 106th section of the Act the decision of shall be made by any other party to the case exthe justices is final, and that no appeal can be cept upon giving such undertaking as the justice made.
thinks fit. 6. The magistrate being of opinion that the con- Geary in reply. tention of the respondent was correct, and that WILLES J.-'I'his case was reserved for our the appellant was only entitled to a sum of 108., opinion by the alderman under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. gave his determination against the larger claim of 43. The appeal was by his leave under this the appellant. The question of law upon which section; for it is not the sort of appeal which the this case is stated for the opinion of the court is, parties are allowed under the 106th section of the first, whether the justices have any power under Metropolitan Building Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122). the 106th section to state a case when the subject That section explicitly gives jurisdiction to the matter of dispute is in respect of district surveyor's justices, and justices alone in respect of the fees fees; and secondly, whether, under the circum- payable to the district surveyor, where such jurisstances above stated, the appellant is entitled to diction has been given by a former section of the any and what larger fee than the fee of 10s. Act; but the fact is that the alderman has power
8. If the court should be of opinion that an ap- to allow the parties to appeal, by his stating a case peal can be made, and that the appellant is only | under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, and the two are conentitled to the fee of 108., then our determination sistent, for the Metropolitan Building Act does is to stand.
not take away the power the alderman possesses 9. If the court should be of opinion that the under that Act. This appeal, therefore, as far as appellant is entitled to a larger sum, the case to it relates to a point of law, comes before this court be remitted to the justices with the opinion of the for our decision, and the point of law may be court thereon, or to make such other order as to stated thus: whether, if a number of arches are made the court shall seem fit.
under a public highway, of some miles in length, Geary, for the appellant.-The Metropolitan or surrounding a square, whatever be the number Building Act renders it compulsory on the district of arches built, as long as the arches are in one surveyor to inspect all buildings within his dis- continuous way, is the surveyor to be satisfied trict, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the with 10s.? Under the second schedule to the dimensions and requirements of the Act have Act, Part I., but one fee is given. It is obvious been carried out. The 25th section enacts that the alderman has decided the point of law what are to be the span and thickness of the against the appellant, for he has adopted the
Cory v. THE CHURCHWARDENS OF GREENWICH.
rule in favour of the respondent, that the sur- The derrick was moored by two single fluke anchors, veyor is entitled to 108., and that no greater fee and two heavy stones, which were simply dropped can be demanded; the facts are not found spe- into the bed of the river, and not fastened to the cially, and as the case has been sent up in so bare
soil in any way. a manner, this is all we have to decide, viz., whe- Held, that the derrick was enjoying a mere easement ther under any state of circumstances, the sur- in her occupation of the bed of the river. veyor is only entitled to one fee. The 49th sec- Held also that there was no occupation of the soil, tion contains the whole thing; it says there shall and that therefore the occupier was not rateable
. be paid to the district surveyor, in respect of the SPECIAL case stated for the opinion of the court. several matters specified in the first part of the The appellant was summoned before the Greensecond schedule hereto, the fees therein specified, or wich police magistrate for that he being possessed other such fees not exceeding the amounts therein of property within the parish of Greenwich, in the specified as may from time to time be directed by county of Kent, rateable to the relief of the poor the Metropolitan Board of Works, but one fee only ain the said parish, and duly charged, rated, and shall be chargeable with respect to any such aassessed in respect of the houses, buildings, land, works done in, to, or upon, any building as are in tenements, or hereditaments, or other property, pursuance of the provisions hereinbefore con- by law rateable to the relief of the poor, had tained, included in one notice. On construction neglected or refused to pay the same to the colof this section it would appear that 10s. is all that lector of the rates, notwithstanding that the same is to be paid for inspecting arches; but, on re- had been duly and respectively demanded. The ferring to sects. 24 and 25, each arch is referred to appellant having duly appeared before a magistrate, separately, and the section is seen to distinguish contended that he was not possessed of property, arches from works. If a builder constructed one and did not occupy or possess houses, lands, or arch under and one arch over the same highway, tenements chargeable or rateable to the relief of and the surveyor inspected the two, could it be the poor within the said parish, as alleged in the said that entitled him only to 108., or would not said summons, and the magistrate having duly the more reasonable conclusion to draw be, considered the appellants' objection gave his that the schedule is dealing with a genus, decision against them, and in support of the said and that the 10s. deals with each individual class ? I think 10s. per arch would be the reasonable in- 1. The following are the facts of the case, and terpretation of such a case. The 49th section the question for the opinion of the court is as to deals with the payment to be made in respect of the rateability of the appellants to the poor rate one heavy building, but even then the surveyor may for the parish of Greenwich. charge 108. for arches under that building by 2. In the rate made under the local Acts relating virtue of that section. It is necessary to inquire to Greenwich, viz., the 4 Geo. 4, c. lxx, and the 9 whether these are arches belonging to one build- Geo. 4, c. xliii
, the appellants are rated, and the ing or to several ? If they are in a direct line following is a copy of the appellant's rating in the joining one another, they may be one building, but said rate-book, so far as is material: if houses which stand upon them are in a square, then they would be several buildings. These illustrations show what we mean. It is for the alderman to determine how many buildings there ought to be. He has jurisdiction alone over the question of fact, and the case must be remitted to the alderman for him to say whether in his opinion
Derrick £600. there was one or several buildings. If there are several buildings, then the decision of the alderman was wrong. KEATING, J., concurred. Case to be remitted to the alderman to say how
3. The coal derrick mentioned in the list is many buildings there were; if more than similar to a very large coal barge, and is about one, judgment for the appellant.
250ft. long and 90ft. wide. It is fitted up with the Attorneys for the appellant, Chapman, Clarke,
necessary machinery for the purpose of unloadand Turner.
ing coal from the colliers and reloading into Attorney for the respondent, Charles Thomas.
vessels and barges brought alongside. No coals are deposited or stored in the derrick.
4. The derrick is the property of the appellant,
and rides afloat on the river Thames within the Friday, June 7, 1872.
boundary of the parish of Greenwich. It has been CORY v. THE CHURCHWARDENS OF GREENWICH.
anchored at the same place for some years, but
daily changes its position slightly with the ebb Poor rate-Occupation-Rateability of moorings- and flow of the tide.
Easement-Bed of river-Floating derrick. 5. The derrick is retained at the spot where she The Conservators of the Thames, who are the owners floats in the following way, i.e., by two single
of the soil and bed of the river, gave permission to fluke anchors on the side nearest the shore, by two one C. to lay down moorings in the river for the stones on the channel side and by two stream purpose of mooring a derrick coal hulk, it was ex- anchors, one at the head and the other at the pressly agreed between them that if at any time it stern ; the anchors and stones were merely dropped should be found inexpedient to permit the moor- into the river, no force being used for the purpose ings for the derrick to remain in that position of fastening either anchors or stones. Before assigned to it or in any other, that it should at dropping the stones a small quantity of ballast once be removed.
was removed in the bed of the river, so that the
Land and coal