case.

[His Lordship read paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.] From the statement it appears that the electors knew, and must have known by reason of the very nature of the case that this undue influence was practised before the election by the respondent. This is a case very special indeed in its circumstances. The candidate entered into a combination-not a secret one, but open and avowed to obtain his return by bringing undue influence to bear upon the body of the electors. That was carried out publicly for months before the election. Its success depended upon its universality, upon its being brought to operate upon and to control the volition of the electors. I cannot therefore doubt, upon these findings, that every elector must be held to have known, as a matter of fact, that the respondent was guilty of practising undue influence and intimidation upon the electors. Therefore, the only question, as it appears to me, is whether, knowing all these facts, the electors must be taken also to have known the legal consequence that the commission of these offences created a disqualification in the respondent to be a candidate, or to be elected as a member of Parliament. Now, in order to arrive at a sound conclusion upon this question, it is absolutely necessary to consider what, in point of law, is the character of the acts done by the respondent and his agents, to the electors' knowledge. I emphatically say that they were criminal acts. I am not at liberty, sitting here as a judge, to gloss over these acts-to say that they were the results of indiscreet zeal or mere breaches of decorum. I feel myself bound, even at the peril of giving offence, to designate them by their name-crimes; and to pronounce those, whether lay or clerical, engaged in them criminally engaged in an unlawful combination. In Reg. v. Conway (7 C. L. Rep. 519), which was a prosecution against the Rev. Peter Conway for offences like the present, at the Mayo election, Perrin, J.—a judge whose authority will not be controverted-says: "One of the charges is for using what is called spiritual intimidation, and calling down and using imprecations of a very shocking nature, to prevent persons from the due exercise of the elective franchise. The charges laid in the information are grave and serious offences-offences which require suppression, and, if necessary, punishment." When it appears then that this system of intimidation was carried on throughout the country, publicly and openly by the candidate himself, seen and known by the electors-when denunciations were ringing from the altars, am I, sitting here as a judge, at liberty to presume that the electors who saw these offences committed did not know that they were offences, and that their commission created a disqualification? I cannot lay down any such principle. I hold that every man must be presumed to know the criminal law, and to be aware when he sees or knows an offence to have been committed that it is an offence, and that it entails penal consequences upon the offenders." I do not think that Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury at all applies to a case like the present. There the disqualification was that the candidate was mayor and returning-officer, and as such was disqualified for being a candidate, according to the decision of the Queen's Bench in Reg. v. Owens. Blackburn, J. says: "It is, therefore, necessary to decide whether the mere knowledge of the fact that Blizard was the mayor and the returning-officer must be taken to involve MAG. CAS.-VOL. VII.

knowledge of his being disqualified for election. Every elector in the borough must have known that Blizard was the mayor, and every elector who saw him presiding at the election must have known as a fact that he was the returning-officer, and every elector who was a lawyer, and had read the case of Reg. v. Owens, would know that he was disqualified. From the knowledge of the fact that Blizard was mayor and returning-officer, was every elector bound to know as a matter of law that he was disqualified? I think that when a voter is informed that a certain circumstance in point of law disqualifies a candidate, even although he may hold a different opinion, yet if he afterwards vote for that candidate his vote is thrown away." That has a very important bearing upon the argument that an elector is not bound to notice the disqualification unless it has been the subject of adjudication. He proceeds to ask, "In the present election, a voter may possibly have been told by the one party that Blizard, being returning-officer, could not be elected, by the other party that he could be; if this could be shown, the vote would be thrown away; but the case merely shows as a fact that Blizard was returning-officer, from which a lawyer would be aware he was disqualified; and, in my opinion, the knowledge that Blizard was returning-officer does not, in law, necessarily involve the knowledge that he was disqualified." Now, does that apply to the present case? Can any elector be assumed to be ignorant that a candidate, openly practising intimidation and undue influence, was not by law disqualified to be elected? I think not. It is quite true that a man cannot be presumed to know legal technicalities, or, as Maule, J. says in a case there cited: "It would be too much to hold that ordinary people are bound to know in what particular court such and such a practice does or does not prevail." In Cooper v. Phibbs (L. Rep. 2 H. L. Cas. 170) Lord Westbury says:-"It is said 'ignorantia juris haud excusat,' but in that maxim the word jus is used in the sense of denoting general law,, the ordinary law of the country. That I believe to be the true distinction. In Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, Lush, J. says: "For the reasons given by my brother Blackburn, I am of opinion that it is not enough to show that the voter knew the fact only, but that it is necessary to show sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that he knew the fact amounted to a disqualification. It cannot be said, in all cases, that the mere knowledge of a fact, which in law disqualifies a candidate, must be taken to be knowledge of all the accompanying circumstances." Now, taking the rule to be as thus laid down, I am clearly of opinion that it is not only a reasonable but a legal inference from the facts stated which I am bound to draw, that the electors who knew of the exercise of these acts of undue influence-spiritual intimidation-knew that those acts disqualified the candidate. But the case does not rest upon the general notoriety and publicity of this intimidation. It was provided that, on the day of nomination, two days before the polling, a notice was posted at and in the immediate vicinity of the place of nomination. That notice is signed by a responsible person, the conducting agent for the petitioner. It is very accurately prepared, and substantially informed the electors that the respondent was disqualified by acts of treating and undue influence, and that votes given for him would be thrown away. That notice was also published R R

in the local newspapers, and extensively posted at the different polling places in the county. The case further states that the petitioner had persons stationed at each of the polling places and booths in order to serve the electors previous to their coming to the poll. It states that these notices were served at each of the polling places, except one, on some of the electors previous to their voting the number of such services varying considerably in different polling places, but not amounting in the aggregate of personal services to more than a few hundreds-and that attempts were made to serve numbers of such notices on the voters as they came to the poll, who either refused to receive them or were prevented from receiving them by the confusion of the booths, sometimes by the agents of the respondent, and frequently by the members of the Roman Catholic clergy who were engaged in conducting the electors to the poll. It appears that in the excepted booth, the person employed to serve the notices did not do so until after the electors had polled, having been told by an agent of the petitioner's that was the proper time to do so. And it is further stated that these notices were scattered about on the floors and tables of the polling booths; that they were all in English, and that many of the electors could not speak English. Upon these facts it is clear that notice was not served personally upon all the electors; but I think that the petitioner did all that could be reasonably done in order to apprise the electors of the disqualification by posting, publishing, and serving these notices. The question is, were they fixed with knowledge? Notice is only one mode of bringing home knowledge, and, taking the facts as stated regarding these notices with the facts of previous knowledge on the part of the electors stated in the case, I cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that sufficient knowledge of the respondent's disqualification is brought home to the electors who constituted the majority of the respondent. It is said that no case has occurred since the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, in which a candidate in a minority has been seated. The point does not appear to have arisen. It could not arise unless the disqualification existed before the election, and was brought home to the knowledge of the electors. In the case of the Norwich election petition, before Martin, B., the bribery relied on in order to disqualify the candidate did not take place until three o'clock on the day of polling, and the candidate was not personally implicated, therefore the question could not have arisen. The case, however, now arises and calls for a decision. I decide it upon its own special facts-facts which I hope are of rare occurrence. I find existing, as reported in this case, a system of spiritual intimidation, organized by the candidate, and successfully carried out through the county for months before the election. It is found that large numbers of the electors who had previously declared their intention to vote for the petitioner had been compelled to vote for the respondent, or to refrain from voting for the petitioner, and had avowed that they were compelled to do so by such intimidation and undue influence. How jealously the law regards the exercise of spiritual influence in the various transactions of life every lawyer knows. Just in proportion as it is powerful and all-prevading so are the safeguards which the law interposes for the protection of those

on whom it is exercised. Not only does the law of the land condemn its undue exercise, it is contrary to the moral law, and the best interests of our nature revolt against it. It is an application to base purposes of an influence accorded for a pure and holy purpose. If it is inhibited when exercised in the private affairs of men, what judg ment should the law pronounce when a minister of religion, robed in the sacred vestments of his order, surrounded by the most sacred mysteries of his creed, claiming the power to bind and to loose, misuses that position to denounce and expose to public odium those who dare to exercise their civil rights and franchises in a way that he disapproves, and to threaten them with temporal injury and spiritual punishment? When such words fall from the lips that should only utter the message of love and mercy to sinners, the words of the great Catholic epistle of St. James recur to my mind"Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing. These things ought not so to be. Does a fountain send forth at the same place sweet water and bitter?" We have been told in the argument of the constitutional rights of the electors. Their rights are to be protected, so far as we by our deci sions can protect them, against undue influences. The qualified candidate also, against whom such influences have been exerted, has a right to be protected against them as far as the rules of law will admit. I believe that the conclusion at which I have arrived, after careful consideration, is in strict conformity with the rules of the common law, in harmony with the principles of our free constitu tion, and calculated to promote that which, in the preamble of the Act we are administering, is declared to be expedient-the freedom of elections; for a candidate may henceforth hesitate to invoke to his aid spiritual influence and altar denunciations, if it be decided that the effect of introducing into a contest such tremendous weapons will be, not merely to cause the ultimate defeat of the person who resorts to them, but further, to render probable the success of the candidate against whom they have been employed. For these reasons I am of opinion that both the questions reserved should be answered in the affirmative.

MORRIS, J.-In this case the judgment pronounced so well and ably by my brother Lawson upon the questions reserved for the determination of the court obviously leaves to me nothing to add, nor is there anything to alter. In fact, I have but to express my concurrence.

MONAHAN, Č.J.-I regret that I feel obliged to differ from my learned brethren, but in my opinion an oppo site reply should be returned to the question submitted in the present case for our determination. For my part, I should be disposed to answer in effect that the petitioner should not be seated. The case is one of serious difficulty, and as it has required so it has received our calm and careful consideration. I shall refer to the facts in so far as they appear to me to be material. Making allowance for deaths and for double entries on the registry, the number of electors found competent to vote at the election was 4686. Of these, 2823 voted for the respondent and 655 for the petitioner, leaving 1205 voters unpolled, and giving a majority of 2165 votes in favour of the respondent. To me it appears that these figures have a very material bearing upon the question to be resolved. According to the statement next presented-and let me observe that I do not desire to question any

statement of fact reported in the case-it appears that the respondent by himself, his agents, and by persons for whose acts as detailed he had rendered himself responsible, was guilty of that which the law defines as undue influence, which was practised upon the electors and carried out in pursuance of some arrangements made previous to the election, and especially during the months of November, December, and January preceding the election; and therefore, that he ought not to have been elected. Accepting the accuracy of that statement, I have no doubt whatever that, so far as the respondent is concerned, the consequent decision by which he is declared to have been disqualified to be elected was a correct and right decision. But there remains the question, whether the facts were such as to justify us in replying upon the case reserved in the manner stated by my brother Lawson, and upon that question I entertain an opposite opinion. The case affirms that certain prelates, their numbers undisclosed, and that certain other members of the Catholic priesthood, how many not specified, had combined or entered into an arrangement with the respondent, in consequence of which undue influence was exercised, and that the respondent being responsible could not properly have been returned. And accordingly, as properly stated by the case, the respondent was disqualified. But that which appears to me the most material is the statement that the knowledge of such acts and especially of such intimidation and undue in fluence had become generally known to and among the great body of the electors throughout the county, and especially amongst those who afterwards voted for the respondent. Now what is found by the case is the fact that undue influence existed, and was known to have existed; but not so that the electors had become aware that, as the consequence of its exercise, the candidate was disqualified. [His Lordship read paragraphs 8 and 9 of the case.] What number of electors were compelled to vote for the respondent, or voted for him, having promised their suffrages to the petitioner, what proportion or how many of them became aware of the acts which disqualified the respondent, we find unspecified. [His Lordship read paragraphs 10 and 11 of the case.] We find that the notice relied upon was not duly served at all the polling booths; there was one exception, for, owing to a mistake of an agent of the petitioner, it appears that at one of the booths the notice was not served until after the votes had been recorded, and that is of no avail. However, it is found that, with this exception, copies of the notice were served at each booth, so far as was allowed, upon some of the electors previous to their voting, such personal services not amounting in the aggregate to more than a few hundreds-whether two, three, or five hundred is not specified, nor can I determine. How many services were attempted but frustrated, even an approximate number, is not specified, neither have we any means of ascertaining. In conclusion, the learned judge who tried the petition correctly states the questions arising. [His Lordship read paragraphs 14 and 15.] It has been contended, on the part of the respondent, that, notwithstanding that he was found disqualified the votes recorded for him were not thrown away in the sense of the reservation. Now, were the electors fixed with notice of the respondent's disqualification? From the case, as presented,

I infer that the learned judge who heard the petition has not, as a fact, found, nor has he stated to us that the existence of the respondent's disqualification was brought home to the actual knowledge of any number of electors. We have it that a few hundreds were served with a certain notice; we are told that there was a general knowledge throughout the county amongst the electors of acts that would constitute a disqualification; but it is not found as a fact that those whom now it is intended to disfranchise for the purpose of the late election had actual knowledge of the existence, as a matter of fact, of such disqualification. There being no finding that the fact of disqualification was known to the body of the electors, are we to draw an inference that in point of fact it was known to them? I should have some hesitation in saying that it ever was intended that, presiding and dealing with this case under the Elections Petitions' Act, we could draw inferences of fact. That which we are to determine is-what is the law that should govern a given state of facts. Were this case being tried with the assistance of a jury, it would be one question whether there was evidence enough to go to them of knowledge, on the part of the great body of the electors, that the respondent was de facto disqualified so as to reduce the respondent's large majority of 2165, and to seat the petitioner. We are placed here instead of a jury, and assuming, as I do, that we are bound to reply as best we can, the question is this: Upon the state of facts given should we come to the conclusion that a number of votes were disqualified sufficient to reduce the respondent's majority so far as to justify us in declaring the petitioner entitled to be elected? Let us then consider the facts so found. It is found in fact that, through the county, the commission of the acts which amount to undue influence was known to the general body of the electors; it is not found in fact how many of the electors knew of the commission of those acts, or that they amounted to a disqualification. In my opinion, in order to justify us in reducing the respondent's majority, it should be found how many voters knew both the fact of the commission of undue influence and its consequence as a disqualification. Did the course taken at the trial admit of a scrutiny, it would be necessary, in order that the votes should be struck off the poll, to prove that notice was given to a certain number of the voters. In some of the recent cases, in which the question arose before committees of the House of Common, the course pursued was, if objection were taken to a particnlar voter, his name was struck off the poll on proof of service of the notice upon him; a similar ruling was applied to others; and so the votes were reduced until the petitioner was left in a clear majority. But here, there was no attempt at any thing of that description; and there is no finding to enable us now to strike off any one or any number of the respondent's votes, so as to leave his opponent in the majority. Even supposing for a moment that knowledge of the facts could be established as against a number of those electors by reason of their having seen the notices in the halls of the polling places, nay, even were they aware that the clergymen acted as has been alleged in this case, would it be possible fairly to infer as a matter of fact, and not as a mere legal presumption, that these country people knew that the respondent's status was destroyed, and that he

was disqualified for election? Anyone who knows the class of voters in those country districts must be aware that a great many are illiterate, that a great many, as found by the case itself, speak only the Irish tongue. They know that the Catholic priest exercises considerable influence, and that it is not illegal to exercise that influence; for the Catholic priest has as much as any elector in the community, a constitutional right to exercise his legitimate influence. If, indeed, clergymen will act as by the findings in this case they are stated to have acted, the same law applies to them as to others, and such acts would amount to the offence of using undue influence, for the purpose of procuring the return of the candidate whom they supported. But it is a wholly different thing to ascribe to the electors a knowledge of the illegality of the acts exercised, and of their effect to vitiate the election. To all it is a very difficult matter to know with anything like certainty where fair influence ends, and where undue influence begins; and though I am satisfied that as a matter of fact, a great number of the electors were aware of the influence practised by the priesthood, I do not believe, and cannot persuade my own mind that, as a matter of fact, they knew that influence was such as to be illegal and to vitiate the election. As to the question of legal presumption, I do not think that the maxim, ignorantia juris haud excusat, applies exactly as it has been laid down by my brother Lawson. If a person is accused of a crime, he cannot himself be excused by his ignorance of the law which rendered the particular act illegal; but I am unaware that it has ever been decided that a third person, no party to the illegal act, is to be presumed to know that the act is illegal, or that being so it would involve the effect sought to be attached to the commission of the offence here in question. Now, by sect. 26 of the statute we are administering, we are directed to have regard to the law as laid down in decisions pronounced by committees of the House of Commons, and, should that course prove inadequate, we are then to resort to the law as dispensed in analogous cases by the ordinary tribunals. It happens that the cases before committees, which in respect of time and circumstance invite attention, are but few in number. The second Horsham and second Cheltenham cases appear to have been decided contemporaneously. In the former it was proved that the elected candidate had been guilty of treating; notice had been given to each elector; and the committee, holding that the election was at his peril, seated his adversary. But in the latter the committee refused to act upon the supposition of knowledge of guilt, and there, although notice had been given and the candidate was declared disqualified, they ordered a new election. In the Tavistock case subsequently it had been publicly intimated that the candidate had not the necessary qualification; he came forward and made a solemn declaration that he possessed the necessary qualification; yet, although no actual personal service of notice that he was disqualified had been proved, his opponent was seated. I confess that I cannot understand the propriety of that decision. Later occurred the Clitheroe case. It there appearing that the successful candidate had been guilty of bribery at a former election, the question arose whether that fact and notice of it given should vitiate his present election and entitle his antagonist to be

seated. The committee unanimously held that the defeated candidate should not be seated, and they merely held the election void. On that petition it was resolved-"That from the proceedings before the committee they think it right to draw the attention of the House to the unsatisfactory state of the law with regard to the effect of a notice to electors, in the case of a candidate who is returned by a majority of votes. By the com mon law the principle seems to be firmly established, that when a candidate is in point of fact disqualified at the time of an election, all votes given for him, with knowledge of the fact upon which such disqualification is founded, must be thrown away. This knowledge may be established either by distinct notice or by notoriety, and it will in all cases be inferred that when the voter is aware of the facts he is aware of the legal deduction from those facts, however intricate and doubtful such deduction may be. It is obvious that on these princi ples it may be contended that in all cases without exception, where notice of disqualification is served on a sufficient number of voters of the majority, and where the fact of such disqualification existing at the time of the election is subsequently established, the candidate who was in a minority on the poll is entitled to the seat, and some cases before election committees appear to have been decided on principles which lead directly to this conclusion. On the other hand, other cases point to the conclusion that to give effect to the notice the disqualification must be founded on some specific and definite fact existing and established at the time of polling, so as to lead to the fair inference of wilful perverseness on the part of the electors voting for the disqualified persons." And here I may be permitted to express that, as the Act under which we sit will expire at the end of the present Parliament unless renewed by the Legislature, I do sincerely hope that the report of the committee in the Clitheroe case will be taken into consideration, and that some enactment may be passed declaring a rule fixed and definite to be administered in cases of this description. The Clitheroe is the last case in which the question arose, but it certainly is not conclusive. Yet it is a circumstance not unworthy of consideration that, from the period of that report up to the time of the passing of the statute under which we are now proceeding, there is not a single instance to be found in which a committee of the House of Commons in cases of treating, bribery, or undue influence, have done more than unseat the sitting member-in none have they seated the unsuccessful candidate. But failing to discover any settled principle or assured rule in the conflicting decisions of the Parliamentary committees, I am bound as best I can to ascertain and apply the rule of the common law adapted to this case. But in the common law again changes from day to day are brought to pass by the adjudications of competent tribunals, and neither does it supply a sufficing substitute for a determinate statutory enactment. Nevertheless, if I too am to adopt the common law, I confess that for my part I am unable in principle to distinguish this case from that of Reg. v. The Mayor of Tewkesbury,which was decided so recently as 1868, a case which has never been questioned. There Blizard, one of the candidates for the office of town councillor in a borough, was elected, notwithstanding that, inas much as he was mayor and acted as returning

officer, he was incapable of being elected. Thə question arose whether another candidate should be declared elected. It appears that on the morning of the election notices stating that Blizard was so disqualified, and that votes for him would be thrown away, were served upon the deputy mayor and his assessors, and posted on the town hall, public market-place, and in other conspicuous places. Others were carried on boards through the public streets, or distributed at various shops and houses throughout the borough. Blackburn, J., says: "There were five candidates, and four vacancies in the office of town councillor. Amongst the candidates were one Blizard, who was the mayor, and Moore. Blizard, as mayor of the borough, was the returning officer, and, as such, presided at the election. It is quite clear, on the authority of Reg. v. Owens, that a returning officer cannot return himself, and consequently Blizard was disqualified, and therefore could not be elected, although he had an actual majority of votes; and in Reg. v. Blizard we granted a quo warranto to oust him. The question now is whether Moore, who had the smallest number of votes, has been elected. The candidate for the office of town councillor is duly elected if he has an actual majority of valid votes. This was decided in Rex v. Hawkins, and it was also decided that if an elector, having notice of the disqualification of a candidate, chooses to vote for that candidate, it is the same thing as if he did not vote at all. From the illustrations in the cases it is plain that, if an elector knows as a fact that the candidate for whom he is about to vote is disqualified and yet persists in voting for him, the elector's vote is as utterly thrown away as if he had voted for a dead person or for the Man in the Moon. Does it appear in this case that those who voted for Blizard without knowing of his disqualification were a smaller number than those who voted for Moore ? it does, Moore is entitled to be declared duly elected; if it does not, then the election is void. It is, therefore, necessary to decide whether the mere knowledge of the fact that Blizard was the mayor and returning officer must be taken to involve knowledge of his being disqualified for election. Every elector in the borough must have known that Blizard was the mayor, and every elector who saw him presiding at the election must have known as a fact that he was the returning officer, and every elector who was a lawyer and had read the case of Reg.v. Owens, would know that he was disqualified. From the knowledge of the fact that Blizard was mayor and returning officer, was every elector bound to know, as matter of law, that he was disqualified? 1 agree that ignorance of the law does not excuse. But I think that in Martindale v. Falkner, Maule, J., correctly explains the rule of law. He says:"There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so." In Jones v. Randall, Dunning, arguendo, says :-"The laws of this country are clear, evident, and certain; all the judges know the laws, and, knowing them, administer justice with uprightness and integrity." But Lord Mansfield, in delivering the judgment of the court, says: "As to the certainty of law mentioned by Mr. Dunning, it would be very hard upon the Profession if the law was so certain that everybody knew it; the misfortune is, that it is so uncertain that it costs much money to know what

If

it is even in the last resort." It was a necessary ground of decision, in that case, that a party may be ignorant of the law. The rule is, that ignorance of the law shall not excuse a man, or relieve him from the consequence, or from liability upon a contract. There are many cases where the giving up a doubtful point of law has been held to be a good consideration for a promise to pay money. Numerous other instances might be cited to show that there may be such a thing as a doubtful point of law. If there were not, there would be no need of courts of appeal, the existence of which shows that judges may be ignorant of the law. That being so, it would be too much to hold that ordinary people are bound to know in what particular court such and such a practice does or does not prevail. I take this to be the rule of law applicable to this case. And, accordingly, it was in that case held that, although the electors had knowledge of the facts which created the disqualification, there was no inference of law that they knew that these facts amounted to a disqualification. I regret very much that in this case my opinion differs from that of the other members of the court, and it may be that I have come to a wrong conclusion; but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that, as a matter of fact, the respondent's majority did not know, at the time they were voting, that they were voting for a disqualified candidate. I am of opinion that there was not sufficient evidence that the notice was known to a majority of the electors who polled for there is no mode of taking any distinction between the entire number and the number who voted for the respondent. The case, if it does anything, disqualifies every man who gave his vote, to the number of 2823. I cannot come to the conclusion that all these voters, many of whom-I do not know how many-did not speak English, and several of whom, I am satisfied-but there is no finding on the matter-were not at all in the town of Galway during the election proceedings, were aware of the legal disqualification of the candidate for whom the majority voted. And I may add that it is stated in the case that there were eight polling places; and the county is a very extensive one. It seems to me it would be going a long way in this case, the first of its kind, to make a precedent such as will be made by the present decision, upon the idea that the legal disqualification was generally known, without a finding and without any means of ascertaining to how many it was known. That conclusion strikes off the poll the 2823 who voted for the respondent. In the propriety of that conclusion I cannot concur, and neither, upon the facts stated, can I declare that the petitioner is entitled to be seated. I am decidedly of opinion that he is not. That the respondent was properly unseated, I entertain no doubt upon the facts reported; but my opinion is that the electors had not sufficient notice of his disqualification. The judgment of the court, however, will be that the electors who constituted the majority of the respondent were fixed with suthcient knowledge of the respondent's disqualification; and, there being no disqualification on his part, that the petitioner is entitled to be elected for the county.

KEOGH, J.-It now becomes my duty to express my opinion on this case the first time I have done so since the questions involved came before me. I gave no opinion upon the matter in the court at Galway, though there the questions