COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

(IRELAND).

(Collated by F. O. CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.)

GALWAY COUNTY ELECTION PETITION. June 6, 7, and 11, 1872.

(Before MONAHAN, C. J., KEOGH, MORRIS and LAWSON, JJ.)

TRENCH V. NOLAN.

Election petition-Spiritual intimidation-Disqualification of candidate-Status-Notice to electors-Claim of candidate in minority to the seat-31 & 32 Vict. c. 125 8. 12.

N. and T. were candidates for G. county. N. before the nomination day had been adopted as the candidate of the Roman Catholic clergy, who individually and collectively, by threats of spiritual chastisement and temporal injury, coerced the electors to promise their votes for N. A petition was presented against the return of N., and the election judge found that the exercise of such intimidation and undue influence had become publicly known amongst the electors previous to the day of nomination; that on the day of nomination T., the petitioner, had caused a notice to be posted at and in the immediate vicinity of the place of nomination for the said county, and to be advertised in several of the newspapers published in the county, and to be extensively posted in the different polling places for such county, cautioning the electors that N. was disqualified from being elected; that notices were served at each of the polling places (with one exception) on some of the electors previous to their voting, the aggregate of such personal services not amounting to more than a few hundreds; and that numbers of the notices were scattered about the floors of the polling booths, but were all in the English language, whilst many of the electors could not speak English.

Held (Monahan, C.J., dissentiente), that the status

of N. was destroyed the moment that he or his agents were guilty of undue influence, and that sufficient notice of his disqualification had been conveyed to the electors to cause all the votes given for him to be thrown away.

Held further (Monahan, C.J., dissentiente), that T., who obtained 658 votes only, and was in a minority of 2165, was entitled to the seat. THE following case was stated by Keogh, J., under the Parliamentary Elections Act 1868 for the determination of the court:

1. I hereby certify that the above petition, to which I refer, came on for trial before me at Galway on the 1st April last, and that, said trial having been continued from day to day, at the conclusion thereof, on the 27th May inst., it appeared to me requisite that, before finally determining as to that portion of the petition which prayed that the said petitioner might be declared duly elected, and that he should have been returned, I should, under the 12th section of said Act, reserve certain questions of law for the consideration of the Court of Common Pleas, and that I should accordingly postpone the granting the certificate directed by the said Act, until the determination of such questions by the said court.

2. I came to the conclusion, as a matter of fact, that the said respondent had, previously to the said election, by himself and his agents, committed

the offence of undue influence upon the electors in order to induce and compel such electors to give their votes for him or to refrain from voting against him at said election, contrary to law, and against the provisions of the statutes against such practices made and provided, and especially against the provisions of the statute 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 5.

3. It was proved before me that the number of electors on the registry for such county was 5346; but that, making allowance for double entries and deaths, the real number of electors available to vote at the time of such election, which took place on 6th Feb. in this year, did not exceed 4686. Of them 2823 voted for respondent, and 658 for the petitioner. The respondent was declared by the sheriff duly elected.

4. It was further proved before me that such undue influence had been practised upon the electors of the connty, and had been carried out in pursuance of arrangements made by the said respondent and his agents previous to such election, and especially during the months of November and December of the last year, and the month of January of the present year.

5. It was also proved that certain of the prelates of the Roman Catholic Church had, by letters written to and read at public meetings, and by resolutions adopted at meetings and con ferences of the Roman Catholic clergy, at which they presided, and which resolutions were printed, published, and made known throughout the county by the respondent and his agents, aided and assisted in the exercise of such undue influence. It was also proved that many of the Roman Catholic clergy, discharging ecclesiastical duties in such county, by their speeches at public meetings, held in various parts of the county, commencing on 19th Dec. of last year, and continued through the month of January in the present year, and by denunciations and threats of temporal injury and spiritual punishment, uttered during and after divine service, and in the preseuce of their congregations, had intimidated and unduly influenced the electors of such county; and that the said respondent had made himself liable for their acts.

6. It was also admitted upon both sides, on such trial, that at least nine-tenths of the electors were members of the Roman Catholic Church.

7. I was satisfied that, by reason of the foregoing and other acts of intimidation proved against the respondent and his agents, the status of the said respondent as a candidate qualified to be elected was destroyed, and that he was disqualified to be elected for the said county by such acts, committed by him and his agents, as hereinbefore described, and that such disqualification existed previous to the day of nomination for such election; and that the knowledge of such acts, and especially of such intimidation and undue influence, had become generally known through and amongst the great body of the electors throughout the county, and especially amongst those who afterwards voted for the said respondent.

8. It was further proved before me that large numbers of the electors, who had previously declared their intention to vote for said petitioner, had been compelled to vote for said respondent, or to refrain from voting for the said petitioner, and had avowed that they were so compelled by such intimidation and undue influence.

9. It was proved that the exercise of such intimidation and undue influence had become publicly known amongst the electors of such county, previous to the day of nomination.

10. It was further proved before me that, on Feb. 3, being the day of nomination, the said petitioner caused a notice to be posted at, and in the immediate vicinity of the place of nomination for said county, and to be advertised in several of the newspapers published in the county, and to be extensively posted in the different polling places for such county, cautioning the electors that said respondent was disqualified from being elected for the said county, as set forth in the petition.

11. It was further proved that, at each of the different polling places, and of the respective polling booths, the said petitioner had persons stationed with copies of such notice, with the view of serving them on the electors previous to their recording their votes at the poll.

12. It was further proved that these notices were served at each of the polling places (with one exception), on some of the electors previous to their voting, the numbers of such services varying considerably in different polling places, but not amounting in the aggregate of personal services to more than a few hundreds; and furthermore, it was proved that attempts were made to serve numbers of such notices on the voters as they came to the poll, who either refused to receive them or were prevented receiving them by the confusion in the booths, sometimes by the agents of the respondent, and frequently by the members of the Roman Catholic clergy, who were engaged conducting the electors to the poll. In the excepted booth to which I have referred, the person placed to serve the notices did not do so until after the electors had polled, having been told by one of the agents of the petitioner that was the proper time to do so.

13. It was further proved that numbers of these notices were scattered about on the floors and tables of the polling booths. They were all in the English language, and it was proved that many of the electors could not speak English.

14. It was, on the foregoing facts, contended before me on behalf of the petitioner, that, the status of the said respondent being destroyed thereby, the petitioner was the only candidate before the constituency eligible to receive their votes and be declared elected; and that I should, accordingly, declare him duly elected.

15. It was, however, contended on the part of the respondent, that, notwithstanding the said respondent being found ineligible, yet the votes given to him were not thrown away, as the electors were not bound to act upon his ineligibility, even though made known to them by sufficient notice, until so declared by some competent legal tribunal; and, furthermore, that, even if they were bound to act upon such ineligibility, though not so previously bound, knowledge thereof was not sufficiently brought home to a sufficient number of electors to displace the majority of the said respondent, and to justify me in declaring said petitioner duly elected.

16. I, therefore, request the opinion and determination of the Court of Common Pleas upon the following questions: First, were the electors who constituted the majority of said respondent fixed with sufficient knowledge of the disqualification of the said respondent, and should they have acted

upon such disqualification and refrained from voting for said respondent? secondly, was the petitioner (there being no disqualification on his part) entitled to be declared elected for said county ?

Armstrong, Serjt. (with him Murphy, Q.C., and Persse), on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the disqualification was complete before the election took place; the notice of that disqualification given was such as reason demanded, and the nature of the case allowed; and that notice had been brought home to the electors who constituted the respondent's majority, before a single vote had been recorded: consequently, votes then given in wilful perverseness against the law were as absolute nullities as if given for a dead man, and the only candidate existing in the eye of the law should be returned.

Macdonogh, Q.C. (MacDermot with him), contra. -We contend that the case does not show that the 2165 voters constituting the respondent's majority had knowledge of his being disqualified at the time they voted; that, even if they had notice of acts which a judge would hold amounted to the statutable offence of undue influence, previous to the passing of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854, such notice would not cause the votes to be thrown away in the sense of the reservation, and that, since that Act, there must be a declaration by a committee or a report by a judge before a candidate is disqualified in the sense mentioned. The notice stated not a proved or specific fact, but a mere general assertion. Actual knowledge of undue influence is not brought home, and it cannot be held that the electors had even constructive knowledge of the disqualification or of agency. Notoriety and notice are only evidence of knowledge, and knowledge has not been found as a fact by the judge. There should have been a direct finding; and if found, it should have been on the allegations in the petition, but those allegations are either unproved or disproved, and there is no power to draw an inference of notoriety not suggested by the petition. The incapacity rests upon the statute law, and by a provision of the Corrupt Practices Act, introduced in consequence of the report in the Clitheroe case, an express declaration of disqualification, or a report by a judge is necessary as a condition precedent to notice of disqualification; while here, the judge's report is still incomplete. There is no case since the passing of that Act in which the election was declared otherwise than void; and void this election should be held.

The following cases were cited:

Doe d. Taylor v. Crisp, 8 Ad. & E. 779, 787;
R. v. Hiorns, 7 ib. 960;

R. v. Hawkins, 10 East, 211, 218;
Kenrick v. Beauclerk, 11 ib. 657;
Claridge v. Evelyn, 2 B. & Ald. 81;
King v. Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76;
R. v. Monday, 2 Cowp. 530;
Malloon v. Fitzgerald, 3 Mod. 29;

Gosling v. Veley, 7 Q. B. 406, 436; 12 ib. 387; 4 H. of
L. Cas. 679, 801, 814;

Reg. v. Blizard, L. Rep. 2 Q. B. 55; 15 L. T. Rep. N. S.
242;

Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 629,
631, et seq.; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 851;
Nicholson v. Tanham, 4 Ir. C. L. Rep. 185;
Bewdly, Mitchell, 1 Lud. 65;

Southampton, ib. 500; Hey. E. C. 535; Southwark, Hey. E. C. 544; Cliff. 1; Radnorshire, 1 Peck. 496, 498; Cor. & D. 22; Leominster, Cor. & D. 21; Hey. E. C. 551 ; Penrhyn, Cor. & D. 55;

Beverley, 1 Wol. & D. 219, 221;

Abingdon, 1 Doug. E. C. 419;1 Peck. 499;
Eversham, Fal. & Fitz. 504;

2nd Cheltenham, 1 P. R. & D. 225, 233;
1st Horsham, ib. 107;
2nd Horsham, ib. 240;
Tavistock, 2 ib. 5, 11;

1st Clitheroe, ib. 30;

2nd Clitheroe, ib. 276, 280-5; Wol. on Elec. 125; 1st Norwich, Wol. & Bris. 145; Cliff. 1;

2nd Norwich, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 615, 619; O'M. & H. 8; Par. El. Cas. 1, 123;

Westminster, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 17, 22; Par. E. Cas. 2, 269:

Norfolk, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 426; Par. E. C. 2; Drogheda, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 402; Par. E. C. 2, 321-2;

York, O'M. & H. 213; Par. E. C. 2, 303;

4 Coke Inst 47;

L. & Le Mar. E. L. 64;

Wol. Par. L. 124-5-8;

1 Glad. 147;

May Par. Pr. 58-9;

Rogers El. L. 212, 248;

31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, ss. 12, 16, 26, 46; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 62, s. 4;

17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, ss. 5, 36;

13 & 14 Vict. c. 68;

49 Geo. 3, c. 118;

2 Geo. 3, c. 24;

7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 4; 7 G. R., 1868.

Cur. adv. vult. LAWSON, J.-In this case two questions have been submitted by my brother Keogh to the court for its determination, arising out of the Galway County Election Petition, in pursuance of the 12th section of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125. [His Lordship read same.] The questions so reserved for our consideration are as follows: First. Were the electors who constituted the majority of said respondent fixed with sufficient knowledge of the disqualification of the said respondent, and should they have acted upon such disqualification and refrained from voting for such respondent? Second. Was the petitioner, there being no disqualification on his part, entitled to be elected for said county? It was contended by Mr. Macdonogh in his argument that the first of these questions was one of fact, not of law, and that the court could therefore return to it no answer. It is, however, very clear to my mind that it involves a serious and important question of law, namely, whether the facts as found in the case are sufficient, in point of law, to affect the electors with sufficient knowledge of the disqualification of the respondent, and whether votes recorded for him after such notice are thrown away. Mr. MacDermot, in arguing on the same side, admitted that a difficult question of law was saved by the case. His logical intellect recognised that question, and upon it he addressed to the court an argument distinguished by singular ability and acumen. Now, the propositions contended for before us, on behalf of the petitioner, who seeks the seat, were-first, that the respondent was disqualified for being elected for the county, and that the disqualification was complete before the election took place; secondly, that, before a single vote was recorded at the election, sufficient knowledge of such disqualification was brought home to the electors who constituted the majority of the respondent; third, that the peti

tioner, a duly qualified candidate, was entitled to be seated. Before I approach the special facts of the case, it is absolutely necessary to consider what the rule of law is which is applicable to cases of this kind. We are directed by the 26th section of the Act to pursue, as far as may be, the prin ciples, practice, and rules on which committees of the House of Commons have heretofore acted in dealing with election petitions. So far as these principles fail to guide us we are, according to the second section, to have the same powers as we would possess if the petition were an ordinary cause within our jurisdiction, and we must then be governed by the principles of the common law. I have, therefore, approached the consideration of this case as if it were a new trial motion or a case reserved from Nisi Prius, endeavouring to ascer tain, in a manner to us somewhat novel, what are the principles of law which govern this case, and then to apply them to the facts. In the first place then, it is necessary to ascertain whether there are any principles to be deduced from the decisions of committees of the House of Commons, upon the question whether a duly qualified candidate is entitled, although in a minority, to be seated, should the other candidate be proved to have been disqualified at the time of the election, and should the electors have been duly apprised of such disqualification. The research and assiduity of counsel have referred us to nearly all the cases upon the point, from the earliest time before committees of the House of Commons. I need not travel through them in detail, but the result is thisthat in very many cases the candidate in the minority has been seated, upon proof of his opponent's disqualification to the knowledge of the electors, while in many other cases, upon a state of facts apparently similar, the committees have simply unseated the disqualified candidate, and declared the election void. Two remarkable instances of apparently contradictory decisions are the Cheltenham and Horsham cases, decided about the same time. In the Horsham case, the com mittee seated the other candidate; in the Chelten ham case they declined to do so; in both there was a divided opinion among the members of the committees. The result of the decisions therefore appears to be that the jurisdiction to seat the candidate in the minority was undoubtedly possessed by committees; that they frequently exercised, and in many other instances refused to exercise that jurisdiction. Failing in this chaos of decisions to discover any settled principle which should absolutely govern us, we must have recourse to our common law for rules and analogies to guide our judgment, an alternative to which, for my part, I turn with pleasure, because there we shall find, though often intermixed and obscured by much that is technical, or that perhaps may be deemed narrow, principles of the soundest sense, the truest wisdom, and, above all, a power of expansiveness and adaptation, which when properly applied is adequate to the solution of the novel questions that, in the complex relations grown out of an advanced civilisation, are continually coming to the surface. That power of expansion is well stated by Coleridge, J., in Gosling v. Veley (4 H. L. Cas. 768), and in the language of Eyre, Č.J., in Ilderton v. Ilderton (2 H. Bl.), where he says that when one mode of trial is obsolete or inapplicable the common law, "out of its own inexhaustible fountain of justice," will devise another. The first case then

to which I shall refer is Rex v. Hawkins (10 East, 211). That is a case of the very highest authority. The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench is delivered by Lord Ellenborough, and the case was carried to the House of Lords, where the decision was affirmed (2 Dow. P. C. 124). The question there discussed was, whether the notice of the other candidate's incapacity was given too late, not having been given until after two persons had voted. At page 217, Lord Ellenborough says, "The general proposition that votes given for a candidate after notice of his being ineligible are to be considered the same as if the persons had not voted at all is supported by the cases of the Queen v. Boscawen (East, 13 Anne); Rex v. Withers (East. 8 G. II.); Taylor v. Mayor of Bath (M. 15 G. II.), all of which are cited in Cowper 537, in Rex v. Monday. In the first, Boscawen and Roberts, the two candidates, had an equal number of votes, but because Boscawen was incapable the votes given for him were considered as thrown away, and the other duly elected. In the second case, Withers had five votes out of eleven, and the other six refusing to vote at all, the court held Withers duly elected, and that the six who refused to vote were virtually consenting to the election of Withers. In the third case, Taylor, Bigg, and Kingston were candidates. Bigg was objected to as a disqualified person, notwithstanding which Bigg had fourteen votes, Taylor thirteen, and Kingston only one. There Lee, C.J., at Nisi Prius, directed the jury that, if they were satisfied that the electors had notice of Bigg's want of qualification, they should find for Taylor, because Bigg not being qualified, should be considered as a person not in esse, and the voting for him a mere nullity. The jury found for Taylor, and the court on motion for a new trial agreed with the law as laid down by Lee, C.J., and refused a new trial. And in Rex v. Monday and Rex V. Coe this doctrine was not denied, although the cases then before the court went off on other points." Lord Eldon, in giving the judgment of the House ol Lords, puts it upon the ground that "the majority knowingly voted for this dead man." It is quite true that, as has been stated in the argument, the candidate in that case admitted his own incapacity, but in later cases it will be found that that circumstance is immaterial, and that if the elector votes after he knows of the disqualification, he does so at the peril of losing his vote. Again, in Rex. v. Parry (14 East, 549), this rule is recognised. And in Gosling v. Veley (7 Q. B. 406), Lord Denman, a great constitutional lawyer, expresssly lays down the rule as applicable to elections to the House of Commons. At p. 436 he says-" Upon the argument of this case the counsel for the defendant did not shrink from meeting his opponent on the principle. Majority he truly asserted to be legal majority, and he contended that though there might be numerically more vestrymen present who were in intention adverse to the rate, than those who voted for it, yet the majority of votes legally expressed was in its favour. This position he sought to establish by showing that the vestrymen who were so adverse had thrown away their votes, and he likened this case to those which have been decided in regard to corporate assemblies for corporate elections, or the meetings of freeholders or burgesses in the elections to the House of Commons. It may be convenient, therefore, in the first place, to examine into the principle

on which this rule as to corporate and other elections appears to have been established, and then, after stating the facts which these pleadings disclose, with regard to the proceedings now in question, to see whether it is properly applicable to those facts, so as to be the groundwork of our decision. First, the cases in which the rule has been either stated or applied in regard to corporate elections are very numerous. It may be sufficient to refer to four of the most important, either for the arguments or the judgments-Oldknow v. Wainwright, Rex v. Monday, Rex v. Hawkins, and Rex v. Parry. The result of the decisions appears to be this-when the majority of electors vote for a disqualified person, in ignorance of the fact of disqualification, the election may be void or voidable, or in the latter case, may be capable of being made good, according to the nature of the disqualification; the objection may require ulterior proceedings to be taken before some competent tribunal, in order to be made available, or it may be such as to place the elected candidate on the same footing as if he never had existed, and the votes for him were a nullity. But in no such case are the electors who vote for him deprived of their votes, if the fact becomes known and is declared while the election is still incomplete. They may instantly proceed to another nomination, and vote for another candidate. If it be disclosed afterwards, the party elected may be declared ousted, and the election declared void; but the candidate in the minority will not be deemed ipso facto elected. But where an elector before voting receives due notice that a particular candidate is disqualified, and yet will do nothing but tender his vote for him, he must be taken voluntarily to abstain from exercising his franchise, and therefore, however strongly he may in fact dissent and in however strong terms he may disclose his dissent, he must be taken in law to assent to the election of the opposing and qualified candidate, for he will not take the only course by which it can be resisted, that is, the helping to the election of some other person. He is present as an elector; his presence counts as such to make up the requisite number of electors, where a certain number is necessary; but he attends only as an elector, to perform the duty which is cast on him by the franchise he enjoys as an elector; he can only speak in a particular language; he can do only certain acts; any other language means nothing, any other act is merely null; his duty is to assist in making an election. If he dissents from the choice of A. who is qualified, he must say so by voting for some other also qualified; he has no right to employ his franchise merely in preventing an election, and so defeating the object for which he is empowered and bound to attend. And this is a wise and just rule in the law. It is necessary that an election should be duly made, and at the lawful time; the electoral meeting is held for that purpose only, and but for this rule the interest of the public and the purpose of the meeting might both be defeated by the perverseness or the corruption of electors, who may seek some unfair advantage by postponement. If then the elector will not oppose the election of A. in the only legal way, he throws away his vote, by directing it where it has nó legal force, and in so doing he voluntarily leaves A. unopposed, i.e., assents to the voices of the other electors. When the disqualification depends upon a fact which may be known

to the elector, he is entitled to notice, for without that the inference of assent could not be fairly drawn, nor would the consequence as to the vote be just. But if the disqualification be of a sort whereof notice is to be presumed, none need expressly be given; no one can doubt that if an elector would nominate and vote only for a woman to fill the office of mayor or burgess in Parliament, his vote would be thrown away; there the fact would be notorious, and every man would be presumed to know the law upon that fact." This decision was reversed in the House of Lords upon a collateral point, but the principles laid down by Lord Denman have never been questioned. The last proposition of Lord Denman, that a person having notice of the facts is presumed to know the law has been qualified by a recent decision in the Court of Queen's Bench in England, which has been much relied on in argument on both sides. I refer to Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury (L Rep. 3 Q. B. 634; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 851), which decides that notice of the facts creating the disqualification not neces

999

sarily notice of the disqualification. The general rule, however, is there thus laid down by Blackburn, J.-" The candidate for the office of town councillor is duly elected if he has an actual majority of valid votes. This was decided in Rex v. Hawkins, and it was also decided that if an elector, having notice of the disqualification of a candidate, chooses to vote for that candidate, it is the same thing as if he did not vote at all. From the illustrations in the cases it is plain that if an elector knows as a fact that the candidate for whom he is about to vote is disqualified, and yet persists in voting for him, the elector's vote is as utterly thrown away as if he had voted for a dead person or for the Man in the Moon. In the case of Reg. v. Coaks, Lord Campbell, C.J., says Blake was in fact a candidate, but he was an alderman, and therefore ineligible, and that fact was known to the electors. Now it is the law, both the common law and the Parliamentary law, and it seems to me also common sense, that if an elector will vote for a man who he knows is ineligible, it is as if he did not vote at all, or voted for a non-existent person, as it has been said, as if he gave his vote for the Man in the Moon.' Here we have Lord Campbell, another great master of the common law, laying down this rule as explicit. Such being the undoubted rule of the common law, applicable to Parliamentary as well as to other elections, let us see what are the special facts stated in this case (out of which I shall not travel), in order to ascertain whether that rule is applicable to them, so as to form the groundwork of decision. First, then, was there a disqualification of the respondent before the election took place? It appears by the case that he was personally guilty of acts of intimidation and undue influence, before the election; that he entered into a combination to procure his own return by undue influence, long before the election took place. [His Lordship read paragraphs 2 and 4 of case.] These are the findings on which the fact of disqualification depends. The question is, do these acts amount to a disqualification? Mr. MacDermot argued with great ingenuity that such acts do not amount to a disqualification unless they had been adjudicated upon by a committee or by the report of a judge; that there was no such disqualification at common law; that the several

statutes before the passing of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act (1854) created such disqualification, upon the commission of one of these offences, but that the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act repealed all those earlier Acts, and creates no dis qualification except that contained in sect. 36. [His Lordship read the section.] This construc tion of the Act would lead to some very startling consequences. If the earlier sections, two, four, and five, defining the offences of bribery, treating, and undue influence, and making them misdemeanours, do not destroy the status of the candidate who is guilty of them, upon what ground is a judge to unseat him? He cannot be unseated, because he has committed a misdemeanour; and it would seem, therefore, to follow in strictness from this argument that the judge could not unseat him unless he had been already found guilty. This is an absurd consequence, and I think that the true construction of the statute is, that the commission of any one of these offences ipso facto disqualifies the candidate from being elected, or, to use the language of Martin, B., in the Norwich case, annihilates his status as a candidate. Sect. 36, then, imposes an additional disqualification by rendering the candidate, once reported guilty, incapable of being elected for the same con stituency during the then existing Parliament, and in such case the mere production of the report is sufficient, without going into the facts, so to dis qualify him. This was obviously intended in order to prevent what might otherwise happen, that if a candidate were unseated and a new election ordered he might renew his candidature for the same constituency. Therefore, were sect. 36 unenacted, I should hold that the commission of any of such offences specially disqualified the candidate from the moment of its commission. I do not think that sect. 36 which imposes this disability can be held, as was argued, by implication to alter the rule of law to which I have referred, and to enact that no previous disqualification of a candi date, unless evidenced by a report of a judge, shall have the effect, no matter how clear it may be, of destroying his status, so that votes given for him after notice of the disqualification to the electors would be thrown away. The Legislature has not said so, and the result, were we to accede to this argument, would be that a candidate might appear upon the nomination day publicly with a bag of sovereigns, and in the presence of every elector promise a certain sum to every one who voted for him; and yet he could be merely unseated, and although the electors had personal knowledge of his disqualification, the seat could not be trans ferred to the qualified candidate next him on the poll. Nay, according to this doctrine, it is mani fest that the process might be repeated from time to time, and a series of disqualified candidates brought forward one after another, and no matter how open notorious and palpable were the corrupt practices used by them, they could only be unseated, and the candidate seeking the seat by fair means and a free election would be placed in a position which the law never contemplated. I think, therefore, in this case, that the disqualifica tion of the respondent before the day of nomination was complete. The next question and the important one is, whether such knowledge of that disqualification was brought home to the electors so as to let in the application of the rule of law to which I have adverted. I turn again to the