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Galway COUNTY ELECTION PETITION.
Southampton, ib. 500; Hey. E. C. 535 ;
tioner, a duly qualified candidate, was entitled to Southwark, Hey. E. C. 544 ; Cliff. 1;
be seated. Before I approach the special facts of Radnorshire, 1 Peck. 496, 498; Cor. & D. 22 ; Leominster, Cor. & D. 21; Hey. E. C. 551;
the case, it is absolutely necessary to consider Penrhyn, Cor. & D. 55 ;
what the rule of law is which is applicable to cases Beverley, 1 Wol. & D. 219, 221;
of this kind. We are directed by the 26th section Abingdon, 1 Doug. E. C. 419 ;1 Peck. 499;
of the Act to pursue, as far as may be, the prin. Eversham, Fal. & Fitz. 504;
ciples, practice, and rules on which committees of 2nd Cheltenham, 1 P. R. & D. 225, 233;
the House of Commons have heretofore acted in 1st Horsham, ib. 107; 2nd Horsham, ib. 240 ;
dealing with election petitions. So far as these Tavistock, 2 ib. 5, 11;
principles fail to guide us we are, according to the 1st Clitheroe, ib. 30;
second section, to have the same powers as we 2nd Clitheroe, ib. 276, 280-5; Wol. on Elec. 125 ;
would possess if the petition were an ordinary 1st Norwich, Wol. & Bris. 145 ; Cliff. 1 ; 2nd Norwich, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 615, 619; O'M. & H.
cause within our jurisdiction, and we must then be 8; Par. El. Cas. 1, 123;
governed by the principles of the common law. I Westminster, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 17, 22 ; Par. E. Cas. have, therefore, approached the consideration of 2, 269 :
this case as if it were a new trial motion or a case Norfolk, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 426 ; Par. E. C. 2; reserved from Nisi Prius, endeavouring to ascer. Drogheda, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 402; Par. E. C. 2,
tain, in a manner to us somewhat novel, what are 321-2 ; York, O'M. & H. 213; Par. E. C. 2, 303;
the principles of law which govern this case, and 4 Coke Inst 47 ;
then to apply them to the facts. In the first place L. & Le Mar. E. L. 64;
then, it is necessary to ascertain whether there are Wol. Par. L. 124-5-8;
any principles to be deduced from the decisions of 1 Glad. 147 ;
committees of the House of Commons, upon the May Par. Pr. 58-9; Rogers El. L. 212, 248;
question whether a duly qualified candidate is en. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, ss. 12, 16, 26, 46 ;
titled, although in a minority, to be seated, should 25 & 26 Vict. c. 62, s. 4;
the other candidate be proved to have been dis17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, ss. 5, 36;
qualified at the time of the election, and should the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 68;
electors have been duly apprised of such disquali49 Geo. 3, c. 118; 2 Geo. 3, c. 24;
fication. The research and assiduity of counsel 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 4;
have referred us to nearly all the cases upon the 7 G. R., 1868.
point, from the earliest time before committees of
Cur. adv. vult. the House of Commons. I need not travel Lawson, J.-In this case two questions have through them in detail, but the result is thisbeen submitted by my brother Keogh to the court that in very many cases the candidate in the for its determination, arising out of the Galway minority has been seated, upon proof of his oppoCounty Election Petition, in pursuance of the nent's disqualification to the knowledge of the 12th section of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125. [His Lordship electors, while in many other cases, upon a state of read same.] The questions so reserved for our facts apparently similar, the committees hare consideration are as follows: First. Were the simply unseated the disqualified candidate, and electors who constituted the majority of said re declared the election void. Two remarkable inspondent fixed with sufficient knowledge of the stances of apparently contradictory decisions are disqualification of the said respondent, and should the Cheltenham and Horsham cases, decided about they have acted upon such disqualification and the same time. In the Horsham case, the com. refrained from voting for such respondent ? mittee seated the other candidate; in the Cheliei. Second. Was the petitioner, there being no dis ham case they declined to do so; in both there was a qualification on his part, entitled to be elected for divided opinion among the members of the com. said county? It was contended by Mr. Mac mittees. The result of the decisions therefore donogh in his argument that the first of these appears to be that the jurisdiction to seat the questions was one of fact, not of law, and that candidate in the minority was undoubtedly pos• the court could therefore return to it no answer. sessed by committees; that they frequently exer: It is, however, very clear to my mind that it in cised, and in many other instances refused to volves a serious and important question of law, exercise that jurisdiction. Failing in this chaos of namely, whether the facts as found in the case decisions to discover any settled principle which are sufficient, in point of law, to affect the electors should absolutely govern us, we must have recourse with sufficient knowledge of the disqualification to our common law for rules and analogies to guide of the respondent, and whether votes recorded our judgment, an alternative to which, for my part, for him after such notice are thrown away; Mr. I turn with pleasure, because there we shall find, MacDermot, in arguing on the same side, ad though often intermixed and obscured by much mitted that a difficult question of law was saved that is technical, or that perhaps may be deemed by the case. His logical intellect recognised that narrow, principles of the soundest sense, the truest question, and upon it he addressed to the court wisdom, and, above all, a power of expansiveness an argument distinguished by singular ability and adaptation, which when properly applied is and acumen. Now, the propositions contended adequate to the solution of the novel questions for before us, on behalf of the petitioner, who that, in the complex relations grown out of an adseeks the seat, were—first, that the respondent vanced civilisation, are continually coming to the was disqualified for being elected for the county, surface. That power of expansion is well stated and that the disqualification was complete before by Coleridge, J., in Gosling v. Veley (4 H. L. Cas. the election took place; secondly, that, before a 768), and in the language of Eyre, Č.J., in Ilderto# single vote was recorded at the election, suffi v. Ilderton (2 H. Bl.), where he says that when one cient knowledge of such disqualification was mode of trial is obsolete or inapplicable the com. brought home to the electors who constituted the mon law, “out of its own inexhaustible fountain majority of the respondent; third, that the peti of justice,” will devise another. The first case then
GALWAY COUNTY ELECTION PETITION.
to which I shall refer is Rex v. Hawkins on which this rule as to corporate and other elec(10 East, 211). That is a case of the very highest tions appears to have been established, and then, authority. The judgment of the Court of Queen's after stating the facts which these pleadings disBench is delivered by Lord Ellenborough, and the close, with regard to the proceedings now in case was carried to the House of Lords,
where the question, to see whether it is properly applicable decision was affirmed (2 Dow. P. C. 124). The to those facts, so as to be the groundwork of our question there discussed was, whether the notice decision. First, the cases in which the rule has of the other candidate's incapacity was given too been either stated or applied in regard to corporate late, not having been given until after two persons elections are very numerous. It may be sufficient had voted. At page 217, Lord Ellenborough says, to refer to four of the most important, either "The general proposition that votes given for a for the arguments or the judgments-Oldknow candidate after notice of his being ineligible are v. Wainwright, Rex v. Monday, Rex v. Hawto be considered the same as if the persons had kins, and Rex v. Parry. The result of the decinot voted at all is supported by the cases of the sions appears to be this—when the majority of Queen v. Boscawen (East, 13 Anne); Rex v. electors vote for a disqualified person, in ignorance Withers (East. 8 G. II.); Taylorv. Mayor of Bath (M. of the fact of disqualification, the election may be void 15 G. II.), all of which are cited in Cowper 537, in or voidable, or in the latter case, may be capable of Rex v. Monday. In the first, Boscawen and being made good, according to the nature of the Roberts, the two candidates, had an equal number disqualification; the objection may require ulof votes, but because Boscawen was incapable the terior proceedings to be taken before some compevotes given for him were considered as thrown tent tribunal, in order to be made available, or it away, and the other duly elected. In the second may be such as to place the elected candidate on case, Withers had five votes out of eleven, and the the same footing as if he never had existed, and the other six refusing to vote at all, the court held votes for him were a nullity. But in no such Withers duly elected, and that the six who refused case are the electors who vote for him deprived of to vote were virtually consenting to the election their votes, if the fact becomes known and is deof Withers. In the third case, Taylor, Bigg, and clared while the election is still incomplete. They Kingston were candidates. Bigg was objected to may instantly proceed to another nomination, and as a disqualified person, notwithstanding which vote for another candidate. If it be disclosed Bigg had fourteen votes, Taylor thirteen, and afterwards, the party elected may be declared Kingston only one. There Lee, C.J., at Nisi ousted, and the election declared void ; but the Prius, directed the jury that, if they were satisfied candidate in the minority will not be deemed ipso that the electors had notice of Bigg's want of facto elected. But where an elector before voting qualification, they should find for Taylor, because receives due notice that a particular candidate is Bigg not being qualified, should be considered as disqualified, and yet will do nothing but tender a person not in esse, and the voting for him a mere his vote for him, he must be taken voluntarily to nullity. The jury found for Taylor, and the court abstain from exercising his franchise, and thereon motion for a new trial agreed with the law as fore, however strongly he may in fact dissent and laid down by Lee, C.J., and refused a new trial. in however strong terms he may disclose his disAnd in Rex v. Monday and Rex v. Coe sent, he must be taken in law to assent to the this doctrine was not denied, although the cases election of the opposing and qualified candidate, then before the court went off on other points." for he will not take the only course by which it Lord Eldon, in giving the judgment of the House can be resisted, that is, the belping to the election ol Lords, puts it upon the ground that “the ma- of some other person. He is present as an elector; jority knowingly voted for this dead man.” It is his presence counts as such to make up the requite true that, as has been stated in the argu- quisite number of electors, where a certain number ment, the candidate in that case admitted his own is necessary; but he attends only as an elector, to incapacity, but in later cases it will be found that that perform the duty which is cast on him by the circumstance is immaterial, and that if the elector franchise he enjoys as an elector; he can only votes after he knows of the disqualification, he speak in a particular language; he can do only does so at the peril of losing bis vote. Again, in certain acts; any other language means nothing,
Parry (14 East, 549), this rule is recog; any other act is merely null; his duty is to assist nised. And in Gosling v. Veley (7 Q. B. 406), Lord in making an election. If he dissents from the Denman, a great constitutional lawyer, expresssly choice of A. who is qualified, he must say so by lays down the rule as applicable to elections to the voting for some other also qualified; he has no House of Commons. At p. 436 he says—“ Upon the right to employ his franchise merely in preventing argument of this case the counsel for the defendant an election, and so defeating the object for which did not shrink from meeting his opponent on the he is empowered and bound to attend. And this principle. Majority he truly asserted to be legal is a wise and just rule in the law. It is necessary majority, and he contended that though there that an election should be duly made, and at the might be numerically more vestrymen present lawful time; the electoral meeting is held for that who were in intention adverse to the rate, than purpose only, and but for this rule the interest those who voted for it, yet the majority of votes of the public and the purpose of the meeting might legally expressed was in its favour. This position both be defeated by the perverseness or the corhe sought to establish by showing that the ruption of electors, who may seek some unfair vestrymen who were so adverse had thrown away advantage by postponement. If then the elector their votes, and he likened this case to those will not oppose the election of A. in the only legal which have been decided in regard to corporate way, he throws away his vote, by directing it assemblies for corporate elections, or the meetings where it has no legal force, and in so doing he of freeholders or burgesses in the elections to the voluntarily leaves A. unopposed, i.e., assents to the House of Commons. It may be convenient, there- voices of the other electors. When the disqualifore, in the first place, to examine into the principle fication depends upon a fact which may be known
GALWAY COUNTY ELECTION PETITION.
to the elector, he is entitled to notice, for without statutes before the passing of the Corrupt Practices that the inference of assent could not be fairly Prevention Act (1854) created such disqualification, drawn, nor would the consequence as to the vote upon the commission of one of these offences, but be just. But if the disqualification be of a sort that the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act rewhereof notice is to be presumed, none need ex pealed all those earlier Acts, and creates no dis. pressly be given; no one can doubt that if an qualification except that contained in sect. 36. elector would nominate and vote only for a woman (His Lordship read the section.] This constructo fill the office of mayor or burgess in Parliament, tion of the Act would lead to some very startling his vote would be thrown away; there the fact consequences. If the earlier sections, two, four, would be notorious, and every man would be pre and five, defining the offences of bribery, treating, sumed to know the law upon that fact.” This and undue influence, and making them misdemea. decision was reversed in the House of Lords upon nours, do not destroy the status of the candidate a collateral point, but the principles laid down by who is guilty of them, upon what ground is a Lord Denman have never been questioned. The judge to unseat him ? He cannot be unseated, last proposition of Lord Denman, that a person because he has committed a misdemeanour; and having notice of the facts is presumed to know it' would seem, therefore, to follow in strictness the law has been qualified by a recent decision in from this argument that the judge could not unseat the Court of Queen's Bench in England, which him unless he had been already found guilty. has been much relied on in argument on both This is an absurd consequence, and I think that sides. I refer to Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury the true construction of the statute is, that the (L Rep. 3 Q. B. 634; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. commission of any one of these offences ipso facto 851), which decides that notice of the facts disqualifies the candidate from being elected, or, to creating the disqualification is not
use the language of Martin, B., in the Norwich sarily notice of the disqualification. The case, annihilates his status as a candidate. Sect. general rule, however, is there thus laid down 36, then, imposes an additional disqualification by Blackburn, J.-" The candidate for the office of by rendering the candidate, once reported guilty, town councillor is duly elected if he has an actual incapable of being elected for the same conmajority of valid votes. This was decided in Rex stituency during the then existing Parliament, v. Hawkins, and it was also decided that if an and in such case the mere production of the report elector, having notice of the disqualification of a is sufficient, without going into the facts, so to discandidate, chooses to vote for that candidate, it is qualify him. This was obviously intended in order the same thing as if he did not vote at all. From to prevent what might otherwise happen, that if the illustrations in the cases it is plain that if an a candidate were unseated and a new election elector knows as a fact that the candidate for ordered he might renew his candidature for the whom he is about to vote is disqualified, and yet same constituency. Therefore, were sect. 36 10persists in voting for him, the elector's vote is as enacted, I should hold that the commission of any utterly thrown away as if he had voted for a dead of such offences specially disqualified the candidate person or for the Man in the Moon.
In the case from the moment of its commission. I do not of Reg.v. Coaks, Lord Campbell, C.J., says— Blake think that sect. 36 which imposes this disability was in fact a candidate, but he was an alderman, can be held, as was argued, by implication to alter and therefore ineligible, and that fact was known the rule of law to which I have referred, and to to the electors. Now it is the law, both the com. enact that no previous disqualification of a candimon law and the Parliamentary law, and it seems date, unless evidenced by a report of a judge, shall to me also common sense, that if an elector will have the effect, no matter how clear it may be, of vote for a man who he knows is ineligible, it is as destroying his status, so that votes given for bin if he did not vote at all, or voted for a non-existent after notice of the disqualification to the electors person, as has been said, as if he gave his vote would be thrown away. The Legislature has not for the Man in the Moon.'' Here we have Lord said so, and the result, were we to accede to this Campbell, another great master of the common argument, would be that a candidate might appear law, laying down this rule as explicit. Such being upon the nomination day publicly with a bag of the undoubted rule of the common law, appli- sovereigns, and in the presence of every elector cable to Parliamentary as well as to other elec promise a certain sum to every one who voted for tions, let us see what are the special facts him; and yet he could be merely unseated, and stated in this
(out of which I shall although the electors had personal knowledge of not travel), in order to ascertain whether his disqualification, the seat could not be trans that rule is applicable to them, so as to form the ferred to the qualified candidate next him on the groundwork of decision. First, then, was there a poll. Nay, according to this doctrine, it is mani. disqualification of the respondent before the elec fest that the process might be repeated from time tion took place ? It appears by the case that he to time, and a series of disqualified candidates was personally guilty of acts of intimidation and brought forward one after another, and no matter undue influence, before the election; that he how open notorious and palpable were the corrup entered into a combination to procure his own practices used by them, they could only be unreturn by undue influence, long before the election seated, and the candidate seeking the seat by fair took place. [His Lordship read paragraphs 2 and 4 means and a free election would be placed in of case.] These are the findings on which the position which the law never contemplated. I fact of disqualification depends. The question is, think, therefore, in this case, that the disqualificado these acts amount to a disqualification ? Mr. tion of the respondent before the day of nomiMacDermot argued with great ingenuity that such nation was complete. The next question and acts do not amount to a disqualification unless the important one is, whether such knowledge they had been adjudicated upon by a committee or of that disqualification
was brought home to the by the repori of a judge; that there was no such electors so as to let in the
application of the rule of disqualification at common law; that the several law to which I have adverted. I turn again to the
Galway COUNTY ELECTION PETITION.
case. (His Lordship read paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, knowledge of his being disqualified for election. and 13.] From the statement it appears that the Every elector in the borough must have known electors knew, and must have known by reason of that Blizard was the mayor, and every elector who the very nature of the case that this undue in. | saw him presiding at the election must have known fluence was practised before the election by the as a fact that he was the returning-officer, and respondent. This is a case very special indeed in every elector who was a lawyer, and had read the its circumstances. The candidate entered into a case of Reg. v. Owens, would know that he was combination-not a secret one, but open and disqualified. From the knowledge of the fact that avowed-to obtain his return by bringing undue Blizard was mayor and returning-officer, was every influence to bear upon the body of the electors. elector bound to know as a matter of law that he was That was carried out publicly for months before the disqualified ? I think that when a voter is informed election. Its success depended upon its univer that a certain circumstance in point of law dissality, upon its being brought to operate upon and qualifies a candidate, even although he may hold to control the volition of the electors. I cannot a different opinion, yet if he afterwards vote for therefore doubt, upon these findings, that every that candidate his vote is thrown away.” That has elector must be held to have known,
as a matter of a very important bearing upon the argument that fact, that the respondent was guilty of practising an elector is not bound to notice the disqualificaundue influence and intimidation upon the electors. tion unless it has been the subject of adjudication. Therefore, the only question, as it appears to me, He proceeds to ask, “In the present election, a is whether, knowing all these facts, the electors voter may possibly have been told by the one party must be taken also to have known the legal con- that Blizard, being returning-officer, could not be sequence—that the commission of these offences elected, by the other party that he could be ; if this created a disqualification in the respondent to be a could be shown, the vote would be thrown away ; candidate, or to be elected as a member of Parlia- but the case merely shows as a fact that Blizard ment. Now, in order to arrive at a sound con- was returning officer, from which a lawyer would clusion upon this question, it is absolutely neces- be aware he was disqualified; and, in my opinion, sary to consider what, in point of law, is the the knowledge that Blizard was returning-officer character of the acts done by the respondent and does not, in law, necessarily involve the knowledge his agents, to the electors' knowledge. I emphati- that he was disqualified.” Now, does that apply cally say that they were criminal acts. I am not to the present case? Can any elector be assumed at liberty, sitting here as a judge, to gloss over to be ignorant that a candidate, openly practising these acts—to say that they were the results of intimidation and undue influence, was not by law indiscreet zeal or mere breaches of decorum. I disqualified to be elected ? I think not. It is feel myself bound, even at the peril of giving quite true that a man cannot be presumed to know offence, to designate them by their name-crimes; legal technicalities, or, as Maule, J. says in a case and to pronounce those, whether lay or clerical, there cited : “It would be too much to hold that engaged in them criminally engaged in an unlawful ordinary people are bound to know in what parcombination. In Reg. v. Conway (7 C. L. Rep. 519), ticular court such and such a practice does or does which was a prosecution against the Rev. Peter not prevail. In Cooper v. Phibbs (L. Rep. 2 H. Conway for offences like the present, at the Mayo L. Cas. 170) Lord Westbury says :-" It is said election, Perrin, J.-a judge whose authority will 'ignorantia juris haud excusat,' but in that maxim not be controverted-says: “One of the charges the word jus is used in the sense of denoting is for using what is called spiritual intimidation, general law,, the ordinary law of the country. and calling down and using imprecations of a very That I believe to be the true distinction. In Reg. shocking nature, to prevent persons from the due v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, Lush, J. says :-“For exercise of the elective franchise. The charges the reasons given by my brother Blackburn, I laid in the information are grave and serious am of opinion that it is not enough to show that offences-offences which require suppression, and, the voter knew the fact only, but that it is necesif necessary, punishment.” When it appears then sary to show sufficient to raise a reasonable inferthat this system of intimidation was carried on ence that he knew the fact amounted to a disqualithroughout the country, publicly and openly by fication. It cannot be said, in all cases, that the the candidate himself, seen and known by the mere knowledge of a fact, which in law disqualifies electors—when denunciations were ringing from a candidate, must be taken to be knowledge of all the altars, am I, sitting here as a judge, at liberty the accompanying circumstances.” Now, taking to presume that the electors who saw these offences the rule to be as thus laid down, I am clearly of committed did not know that they were offences, opinion that it is not only a reasonable but a legal and that their commission created a disqualifica- inference from the facts stated which I am bound tion? I cannot lay down any such principle. I hold to draw, that the electors who knew of the exerthat every man must be presumed to know the cise of these acts of undue influence-spiritual criminal law, and to be aware when he sees or intimidation-knew that those acts disqualified knows an offence to have been committed that it the candidate. But the case does not rest upon is an offence, and that it entails penal consequences the general notoriety and publicity of this intimiupon the offenders.” I do not think that Reg. v. dation. It was provided that, on the day of nomiMayor of Tewkesbury at all applies to a case like nation, two days before the polling, a notice was the present. There the disqualification was that posted at and in the immediate vicinity of the the candidate was mayor and returning-officer, and place of nomination. That notice is signed by a as such was disqualified for being a candidate, responsible person, the conducting agent for the according to the decision of the Queen's Bench in petitioner. It is very aocurately prepared, and Reg. v. Owens. Blackhurn, J. says: “It is, there- substantially informed the electors that the responfore, necessary to decide whether the mere know- dent was disqualified by acts of treating and undue ledge of the fact that Blizard was the mayor and influence, and that votes given for him would be the returning officer must be taken to involve thrown away. That notice was also published MAG. Cas.-VOL. VII.
GALWAY COUNTY ELECTION PETITION.
in the local newspapers, and extensively posted on whom it is exercised. Not only does the law of at the different polling places in the county: the land condemn its undue exercise, it is contrary The case further states that the petitioner had to the moral law, and the best interests of our persons stationed at each of the polling places and nature revolt against it. It is an application to booths in order to serve the electors previous to base purposes of an influence accorded for a pure their coming to the poll. It states that these and holy purpose. If it is inhibited when er notices were served at each of the polling places, ercised in the private affairs of men, what judg. except one, on some of the electors previous to ment should the law pronounce when a minister of their voting—the number of such services varying religion, robed in the sacred vestments of his order, considerably in different polling places, but not surrounded by the most sacred mysteries of his amounting in the aggregate of personal services to creed, claiming the power to bind and to loose, more than a few hundreds—and that attempts misuses that position to denounce and expose to were made to serve numbers of such notices on public odium those who dare to exercise their civil the voters as they came to the poll, who either re- rights and franchises in a way that he disapproves, fused to receive them or were prevented from re- and to threaten them with temporal injury and ceiving them by the confusion of the booths, spiritual punishment ? When such words fall from sometimes by the agents of the respondent, and the lips that should only utter the message of love frequently by the members of the Roman Catholic and mercy, to sinners, the words of the great clergy who were engaged in conducting the elec- Catholic epistle of St. James recur to my mindtors to the poll. It appears that in the excepted “Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and booth, the person employed to serve the notices cursing. These things ought not so to be. Does did not do so until after the electors had polled, a fountain send forth at the same place sweet water having been told by an agent of the petitioner's that and bitter P" We have been told in the argument was the proper time to do so. And it is further of the constitutional rights of the electors. Their stated that these notices were scattered about on rights are to be protected, so far as we by our deci. the floors and tables of the polling booths; that sions can protect them, against undue influences. they were all in English, and that many of the The qualified candidate also, against whom such electors could not speak English. Upon these influences have been exerted, has a right to be profacts it is clear that notice was not served per- tected against them as far as the rules of law will sonally upon all the electors ; but I think that the admit. I believe that the conclusion at which I petitioner did all that could be reasonably done in have arrived, after careful consideration, is in strict order to apprise the electors of the disqualifica- conformity with the rules of the common law, in tion by posting, publishing, and serving these harmony with the principles of our free constitunotices. The question is, were they fixed with tion, and calculated to promote that which, in the knowledge ? Notice is only one mode of bring- preamble of the Act we are administering, is de ing home knowledge, and, taking the facts as clared to be expedient—the freedom of elections ; stated regarding these notices with the facts of for a candidate may henceforth hesitate to invoke previous knowledge on the part of the electors to his aid spiritual influence and altar denunciastated in the case, I cannot avoid drawing the con- tions, if it be decided that the effect of introducing clusion that sufficient knowledge of the respond into a contest such tremendous weapons will be
, ent's disqualification is brought home to the not merely to cause the ultimate defeat of the electors who constituted the majority of the re- person who resorts to them, but further, to render spondent. It is said that no case has occurred probable the success of the candidate against whom since the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, in they have been employed. For these reasons I am which a candidate in a minority has been seated. of opinion that both the questions reserved should The point does not appear to have arisen. It be answered in the affirmative. could not arise unless the disqualification existed MORRIS, J.-In this case the judgment probefore the election, and was brought home to the nounced so well and ably by my brother Lawson knowledge of the electors. In the case of the upon the questions reserved for the determination Norwich election petition, before Martin, B., the of the court obviously leaves to me nothing to add, bribery relied on in order to disqualify the candi- nor is there anything to alter. In fact, I have but date did not take place until three o'clock on the to express my concurrence. day of polling, and the candidate was not person- MONAHAN, Č.J.-I regret that I feel obliged to differ ally implicated, therefore the question could not from my leamed brethren, but in myopinion anoppohave arisen. The case, however, now arises and site reply should be returned to the question subcalls for a decision. I decide it upon its own special mitted in the present case for our determination. facts-facts which I hope are of rare occurrence. For my part, I should be disposed to answer in I find existing, as reported in this case, a system effect that the petitioner should not be seated. of spiritual intimidation, organized by the candi- The case is one of serious difficulty, and as it has date, and successfully carried out through the required so it has received our calm and careful county for months before the election. It is found consideration. I shall refer to the facts in so far that large numbers of the electors who had pre- as they appear to me to be material. Making viously declared their intention to vote for the allowance for deaths and for double entries on the petitioner had been compelled to vote for the re- registry, the number of electors found competent spondent, or to refrain from voting for the peti- to vote at the election was 4686. Of these, 2823 tioner, and had avowed that they were compelled voted for the respondent and 655 for the petitioner, to do so by such intimidation and undue influence. leaving 1205 voters unpolled, and giving a majoHow jealously, the law regards the exercise of rity of 2165 votes in favour of the respondent. To spiritual influence in the various transactions of me it appears that these figures have a very matelife every lawyer knows. Just in proportion as it rial bearing upon the question to be resolved is powerful and all-prevading so are the safeguards According
to the statement next presented-and which the law interposes for the protection of those let me observe that I do not desire to question any