Q. B.] GRAND JUNCTION CANAL Co. v. OVERSEERS OF HEMEL HEMPSTEAD AND KING'S LANGLEY. [Q. B. and a portion thereof, and the towing-path and lock-houses attached thereto, cover and occupy nineteen acres and one rood of land, and is of the length of two miles four furlongs, in the parish of Hemel Hempstead, in the county of Hertford, and no more, and which said lands were purchased by the said company, under and by virtue of the aforesaid private Acts, and for the purposes of the company. 7. Another portion of the said canal and the locks and buildings attached thereto cover and occupy eighteen acres and two roods, and is of the length of two miles and two furlongs, in the parish of King's Langley, in the county of Hertford, and no more, and which said last-mentioned lands were also purchased by the said company, under and by virtue of the aforesaid private statutes, and for the purposes of the said company. 8. In or about the year 1848 the said company adopted the provisions of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 42, and commenced business as carriers on their own account on the said canal, and have from that time exercised all the powers given by the first section of that statute for the purpose of carrying on the trade or business of carriers, and for such trade or business the company have a tariff of freights and charges different from the tolls chargeable by their private Act. 9. Lock-houses and toll-houses have been erected on the lands of the said company, which are occupied by them for the purposes of their business. 10. In or about the year 1836 an Act was obtained for making a railway from London to Birmingham, which railway runs parallel with the said canal through the said parishes at various distances from the said canal, not exceeding 300 yards at the farthest point, at one place crossing the canal, which railway is assessed to the poor-rates at 2000l. per mile. 11. Buildings have been erected on much of the land lying near to the said canal, and other portions of such lands have been converted into gardens for watercresses, and otherwise greatly improved in value. 12. On the 8th Jan. 1867 an assessment for the relief of the poor of the said parish of Hemel Hempstead was made, allowed, and published according to law; and in and by the said assessment the said company were rated upon the annual sum of 2001. in respect of the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments in the said parish, as the net rateable value thereof. 13. On the 17th Feb. 1867 an assessment for the relief of the poor of the said parish of King's Langley was duly made, allowed, and published; and in and by the said assessment the said company were rated upon the annual sum of 1967. in respect of the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments in the said parish, as the net rateable value thereof. 14. The said company, on or about the 6th July 1867, duly objected before the assessment committee of the Hemel Hempstead Union, in which both of the said parishes are included, pursuant to previous written notices duly served upon them and upon the overseers of the poor of the said parishes respectively, to the said valuation lists respectively, upon the grounds of unfairness and incorrectness, and that in particular the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments of the said company, in the said respective parishes of Hemel Hempstead and King's Langley, were not valued and assessed in and by the said valuation lists respectively, according to the provisions of the said private statutes hereinbefore referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, and that in respect of the said respective lands, tenements, and hereditaments of the said company in the said parishes respectively, the said company were over-assessed in the said valuation lists respectively, but the said company failed to obtain such relief in the matter as the said company deemed just. The questions for the opinion of the court were, first, whether the company is liable to be assessed to the poor-rates at the value of the lands, buildings, and premises as improved by reason of the business of carriers carried on by the appellants? Secondly, what is the legal construction of "lying near to the canal? Thirdly, whether, in estimating the value of the land over which the railway runs, the value of the site only is to be estimated, as being lands, grounds, and buildings, or is such site to be estimated at its improved value as a railway? Fourthly, are the lands lying near to the canal upon which buildings have been erected to be estimated at the value only of the sites of such buildings, or is the value of such buildings to be estimated? Fifthly, are the lands lying near to the canal, which have been improved by their conversion into gardens or otherwise, to be estimated at their improved value, or as agricultural land only? Sixthly, In estimating the value at which the premises of the appellants are to be assessed in proportion to the lands, grounds, and buildings lying near thereto, are all such lands, grounds, and buildings to be thrown into hotchpot, and the entire of the premises of the appellants to be assesed at the average rating value of the whole of such lands, grounds, and buildings, or is each portion of the appellants' premises to be assessed only in proportion to the rating value of so much of the lands, grounds, and buildings as is lying next to such portion of appellants' premises ? Seventhly, whether, in estimating the value at which the premises of the appellants are to be assessed the proportion which by sect. 19 such assessment is to bear to the lands, grounds, and buildings lying near to the canal is to be distributive, that is, whether the land of the appellants is to be assessed in the same proportion as the land lying near, and the buildings of the appellants as the buildings lying near, or whether all the premises of the appellants are to be assessed as a whole in proportion to the aggregate rating value of all the lands, grounds, and buildings lying near? Manisty, Q. C. (Bush Cooper with him) appeared for the appellants. With reference to the first question, the rateable value ought not to be increased on account of the company becoming carriers; the only effect of the operation of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 42 is that they carry for themselves as well as for the public generally. The other points are all determined by the cases of R. v. The Grand Junction Canal (1 B. & A. 289) and R. v. Grand Junction Canal (7 W. R. 597), Reg. v. The Proprietors of the Glamorganshire Canal Company (3 E. & E. 186; 29 L. J. 238, M. C.). Sir J. Karslake, Q.C. (Taylor with him), appeared for the respondents.-The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 42, has placed canal companies upon the footing of common carriers, and they can make use of their canals in any manner most beneficial to themselves. The case of Reg v. The Proprietors of the Glamor Q. B.] GRAND JUNCTION CANAL Co. v. OVERSEERS OF HEMEL HEMPSTEAD AND KING'S LANGLEY. [Q. B. ganshire Canal Company, 3 E. & E. 186, lays down the true principle of rating in this case. The COURT intimated their opinion that by the adoption of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 42, there was no repeal of the rating clauses in the 34 Geo. 3 c. xxiv; and that the land occupied by the canal lying near to the railway, ought not to be rated in proportion to the improved value of land with a railway upon it. Manisty, Q.C. was heard in reply. MELLOR, J.-We have disposed of several of the points raised by this case in the course of the argument, and there is now really but one I upon which it is necessary we should deliver our judgment. If this case had been governed by Reg. v. The Proprietors of the Glamorganshire Canal Company (3 E. & E. 186), so that we could not dismiss that case from our view, I should have felt myself compelled to follow the rule which is there laid down; but it appears to me that there is an essential distinction between that case and the present. As I understand that decision, it was confined to the meaning to be put upon the words "lands or grounds," the word buildings" not being mentioned. It appears also that a considerable portion of the lands had become covered with buildings, and it would have been impossible to have laid down any rule as to the rateable value of the canal without going through the process which the court felt itself at liberty to go through. confess that I think that the Lord Chief Justice in disapproving of the judgment in Reg. v. The Grand Junction Railway Company (7 W. R. 597) scarcely sufficiently considered what really was intended to be expressed by Lord Campbell, C. J. and Erle, J., as reported in the Weekly Reporter. If they really intended that the land of the company was to be rated simply as agricultural land, I should agree with the present Lord Chief Justice; but I rather incline to think that that was not the meaning intended to be conveyed by what fell from Lord Campbell, C. J. or Erle, J. In the present case, as was suggested by my brother Hannen, I think that the respondents are not to look at the agricultural value of the land lying near at the time the Act passed, but they are to look at the reflected value of the land as determined by the change of circumstances. If from various circumstances the land becomes of more value, as if by a new mode of cultivation being adopted, a different use, such as that of a market garden had been made of it, then the rateable value of the canal would be determined by what would be the rateable value of the lands lying near with that additional value arising from the change of circumstances. Now, in this case we find it stated in parapraph 3 that, by the 19th section of the amending statute it was enacted as follows, that is to say, "that the said company of proprietors shall from time to time be rated to all parliamentary and parochial taxes and assessments for and in respect of the lands and grounds already purchased or taken, or to be purchased or taken; and all warehouses or other buildings to be erected by the said company of proprietors in pursuance of the said recited Act and this Act in the same proportion as other lands, grounds, and buildings so purchased or taken and erected would be rateable in case the same were the property of individuals in their natural capacity." We therefore find that the word "buildings" appears expressly to regulate the rating of buildings, and "lands" the rating of lands; and I think that we cannot interpret the word "lands" to mean land covered with buildings. It appears to me that in assessing the rateable value of the canal lying near to this particular land, the respondents must not take into consideration the land appropriated to buildings, or building land in the proper sense of that term, because no tenant from year to year would give anything for building land qua building land, but it may be that persons would give a higher value for land because it was near to buildings. In that sense alone, as I think, can we interpret the words of the 19th section. What I say is this, that the reflected value of the land, varying from time to time according to circumstances, is to be the measure of the rating of the land and buildings of the appellants. That being so, I think that our judgment does not in any degree affect the decision of this court in Reg. v. The Proprietors of the Glamorganshire Navigation (3 E. & E. 186), in which the Lord Chief Justice delivered the judgment of the court. This case is entirely distinguishable on the ground that the word "buildings " is used. LUSH, J.—I am of the same opinion. The only question which remains for our opinion is whether the bed of the canal is to be rated as if it were land built over and covered with buildings, or whether it is to be rated as if it were open land? I think that it is only necessary to read the section to discover what it was that the Legislature meant. I think that the plain meaning of the language is, that, for the purpose of rating it is to be assumed always that the bed of the canal is open land, not land covered with buildings, but that whatever buildings are erected by the appellants on the land are to be rateable as buildings, and both are to be rated in proportion to the value of other lands and buildings in the neighbourhood or locality. The bed of the canal would no doubt be enhanced in value by reason of the growth of buildings in the neighbourhood, and the increased value is to be the value upon which the rate is to be made. It is not to be rated as land covered with buildings. I quite agree with my brother Mellor that the section which we have to interpret differs from the one upon which the court gave judgment in Reg. v. The Proprietors of the Glamorganshire Navigation. There the word "lands" was not used in conjunction with the word "buildings," but was evidently used to denote in its legal sense land of every description, whether covered with buildings or not. I also agree with what my brother Mellor has said as to the expression attributed to this court in Reg. v. The Grand Junction Canal Company, reported in the Weekly Reporter. If it was intended to lay down that the land which now comprises the bed of the canal was for all time to be treated as if it were purely agricultural land, I agree that that would not be the proper interpretation of the Act. But I do not think that the court intended to say So. I should dissent from the judgment of Lord Campbell and Erle, J., if they are to be read in the same way in which this court in Reg. v. The Proprietors of the Glamorganshire Navigation understood them. The land of the appellants is to be treated as land open and not covered with buildings, and which might be turned to uses more profitable than agricultural land. HANNEN, J., concurred. Judgment for the appellants. Attorneys: for the appellants, H. Day; for the respondents, Grover, Son, and Stocken. Thursday, Feb. 2, 1871. Game Killing on a Sunday-Joint information Whether an offence be single or several must depend upon the wording of the statute creating it, or its nature. Where the offence is in its nature single, there the penalty can only be single; but where it is in its nature several, each offender is liable. 66 By the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32 (Game Act), s. 3, it is enacted that if any person shall kill, &c., any game on a Sunday, such person shall on conviction forfeit for any such offence not exceeding 51.: Held, that under this section two persons who were jointly concerned in killing game on a Sunday might be informed against and tried jointly, and severally convicted in the full penalty. THESE were two cases stated by the quarter sessions for the county of Essex upon an appeal by each appellant against a separate conviction of each, for an offence under sect. 3 of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32 (Game Act), upon the hearing of which appeals the said convictions were affirmed, subject to a case reserved for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench, upon the second ground of appeal, namely, that if the said justices before whom the information was heard, did, in fact, convict the appellants of a joint offence, it was illegal to inflict such separate penalties upon each of them as they inflicted; and if the said justices did in fact convict each of them as of a separate offence, then it was illegal of them to do so upon a joint information, and a joint hearing after they had been requested and had refused to hear the charge against each separately. On the hearing of the appeal it appeared that in respect to what was relied on by the appellants under the second ground of appeal the facts were as follows:-On the 13th Oct. 1869, one George Littlechild, and one William Heslop, were informed against by John Boram, by an information, of which the following is a copy : Essex to wit.-Be it remembered that within three calendar months after the commission of the offence hereinafter mentioned, to wit, on the 13th Oct. 1869, at High Ongar, in the county of Essex, John Boram, of Kelvedon Hatch, in the said county of Essex, gamekeeper, in his proper person, cometh before the undersigned, one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace, in and for the said county, and now here giveth me, the said justice, to understand and be informed that George Littlechild, of the parish of Kelvedon Hatch, in the county of Essex, farmer, and William Heslop, of Romford, in the said county, carpenter, did within three calendar months now last past, to wit, on Sunday, the 10th Oct. 1869, at the parish of Kelvedon Hatch, in the said county, unlawfully use a certain engine, to wit a gun, for the purpose of killing game, to wit two pheasants, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, whereby and by force of the said statute they, the said George Littlechild and William Heslop, have severally forfeited a sum money not exceeding 5l., to be applied as the statutes in that behalf made and provided direct. And thereupon MAG. CAS.-VOL. VII. [Q. B. the said John Boram prays that the said George Littlechild and William Heslop may be duly caused to appear before one or more of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the said county, to answer to the said information, and to be further dealt with according to law. In obedience to the summonses duly issued against them, the said George Littlechild and also the said William Heslop attended before the petty sessions for the division of Ongar, in the said county of Essex, holden at Chipping Ongar in the said county, on the 23rd Oct. 1869, and the said information then and there came on to be heard. At the said petty sessions the said George Littlechild and the said William Heslop were defended by an attorney, who, on behalf of both, made application to the justices present that the cases might be heard separately, in order that on hearing the charge against the said George Littlechild, the said William Heslop might be called to give evidence, but the said justices refused to hear the said cases separately, and after hearing the evidence for the prosecution, convicted both the said defendants. 12. The two convictions returned to the quarter sessions were verbatim the same, except that the name of George Littlechild was used in the one, the name of William Heslop was used in the other. On the hearing of the first-mentioned appeal it was contended for the said appellant that the said proceedings at the said petty sessions were irregular and invalid, and that by reason thereof the said conviction of the said appellant was invalid and ought to be quashed on appeal. It was contended for the respondent that the said proceedings were not objectionable, and that the said conviction was valid. The court of quarter sessions decided in favour of the respondent, and on their proceeding to hear the case of the appellant in the said firstmentioned appeal, the said William Heslop was called, and gave evidence for and on behalf of the appellant George Littlechild. In the secondly above-mentioned appeal the appellant (William Heslop) was also convicted at the same time and place as the said George Littlechild, and all the facts above stated in reference to the appeal of the said George Littlechild as to the against him apply equally and respectively to the hearing before the petty sessions of the case said appeal by the said William Heslop or to the hearing before the petty sessions of the case against him, the said William Heslop. The question for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench is whether, by reason of the said proceedings at the petty sessions, the court of quarter sessions ought on the said appeals to have quashed the said convictions? If the said question be answered in the affirmative, the said convictions are to be quashed. If it be answered in the negative, the said convictions are to stand confirmed. By the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32 (Game Act), s. 3, it is enacted "That if any person whatsoever shall kill or take any game, or use any dog, gun, net, or other engine or instrument for the purpose of killing or taking any game on a Sunday or Christmas Day, such person shall, on conviction thereof before two justices of the peace, forfeit and pay for every such offence any sum of money not exceeding 51. as to the said justices shall seem meet, together with the costs of the conviction," &c. H. T. Atkinson appeared for the appellants. E Q. B.] REG. v. HESLOP. REG. v. LITTLECHILD. The conviction was bad, inasmuch as it was separate for what was a joint offence. The information was a joint one, and the hearing was joint; therefore the conviction should have been joint. There is only one penalty imposed by the 3rd section of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, of not exceeding 51., and yet in consequence of there being separate convictions each appellant is ordered to pay the penalty of 31. That it was a joint offence is clear from the fact that the two appellants, Littlechild and Heslop, used a gun, and killed two pheasants. The justices, therefore, could not have convicted each of using a gun and killing two pheasants. [MELLOR, J. Each has committed an offence, although jointly. The question is, can the justices upon a joint offence convict separately? The justices find that each has committed it. [MELLOR, J.-I find it stated in Paley on Convictions, p. 73: 'Where the act is such that several may join in it, all the offenders may be included in the same information and conviction. But where separate convictions were drawn up upon a joint information the court refused to order the justices to alter the conviction by making it a joint one:" (Re Clee and Asbourne, 21 L. J. 112, M. C.) The section says, "If any person shall kill," &c., so that each will be liable to a penalty, though from their being together it may be a joint offence. LUSH, J. Would it not be wrong under this section to impose a joint penalty? Each is liable to the entire penalty. The question asked is, whether by reason of the proceedings at the petty sessions the quarter sessions ought to have quashed the convictions ?] It is clear that only one killed the two pheasants, and only one gun was used; the appellants, therefore, could not have been guilty (Ex parte Sylvester, 9 B. & C. 61. per Bayley, J.) [Q. B. it. The same doctrine is laid down in Re Clack (Cowp. 610; Reg v. Hube, 5 T. R. 542). 66 MELLOR, J.-I am of opinion that the judgment of the quarter sessions was right. We must look in such cases as these at the wording of the statutes to ascertain what is meant. The principle is very clearly stated by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Clarke (Cowp. 612). He says, Where the offence is, in its nature single, and cannot be severed, there the penalty shall be only single, because, though several persons may join in committing it, it still constitutes but one offence. But where the offence is in its nature several, and where every person concerned may be separately guilty of it, there each offender is separately liable to the penalty, because the crime of each is distinct from the offence of the others, and each is punishable for his own crime." In the present case, when the information was laid it was treated as a joint offence, and at the hearing the defendants applied to be separately tried. That, however, was a matter entirely for the discretion of the justices, and neither could we nor the quarter sessions interfere. It is said this is a joint offence, and there should have been a joint penalty; but the words of the 3rd section of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, point to each person The as committing the offence. offence is one certainly that may be committed by many, but each of them commits the offence, and if, therefore, a joint penalty had been imposed it would have been erroneous. LUSH, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is obvious that two or more may assist in doing an act. That being so, the information was not objectionable for describing the act which many may commit as having been committed by the two defendants. If it was a separate offence the justices at petty sessions ought to have allowed each defendant to have been tried separately. Warton, for the respondents.-This was an offence committed by two, for which each is liable, and they were both properly tried together, just as two persons may be tried together upon an indictment for an offence committed together, for which each would be liable to the full penalty. It is merely a matter of discretion with the justices to allow a separate trial for each (Re Biggins, 5 L. T. Rep. 605). But, even supposing there was any error in this, the appeal was a fresh hearing, and then each case was tried separately, and each appellant was called for the other. The defendants had each committed an offence, though both joined in committing it, and therefore a separate penalty was properly imposed upon each. The distinction between what is a joint and what a separate offence, is well explained in Re Bleasdall and another, 4 T. R. 809, which was a conviction on the statute of 5 Anne c. 14, s. 4, for using a greyhound to destroy game without being qualified, for which the defendants were convicted in 57. each, which conviction the court said could not be supported, for that it was only one offence, and that the magistrates should only have convicted them in one penalty; that this question depended on the 5 Anne c. 14, s. 4, which enacts, "that if any person or persons not qualified, &c., shall keep or use any greyhound, &c., to kill and destroy game, and shall be thereof convicted, &c., the person or persons so convicted shall forfeit the sum of 51." There, there was only one for the using of the dog, however many may have been the persons using Being jointly charged, each one claimed a right to be tried separately. But when several are jointly charged, can each one claim as a right to be separately tried? I think not, and there is no authority to the contrary. It is said, however, that a separate conviction of each is wrong. But if each has been guilty of an offence which each may commit, each may be convicted, and can it be said that a separate conviction is wrong? I can see no objection, no injustice or injury is done in each being separately convicted. I think, therefore, that the convictions were good, and the quarter sessions correct in their judgment. HANNEN, J.-I am also of the same opinion. The first question which arises is, whether the defendants were entitled to be tried separately? Now that was an information for an offence of which two or more persons might be guilty. If so, they might be tried together, and it is only a matter of discretion with the justices to allow them to be separately tried. Then the second question is whether this was an offence for which the two defendants could be convicted separately? The rule upon the subject is clearly laid down in Paley on Convictions, p. 263. Now this is a case which falls within the first branch of this position. It was proper therefore to treat the offences as several. There is a case in 15 C. B., N. S., 550, of Mayhew (app.) v. Wardley (resp.), where two persons who were in a highway shot a partridge, and it was questioned whether the two offenders should have been convicted jointly; but it was held that they were rightly separately convicted, for it might well be inferred that the two were not QB.] HAMMERSMITH BRIDGE COMPANY v. CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF HAMMERSMITH. [Q. B. out for the common purpose of killing game, and that the unlawful act was the act of each. Attorney for the appellants, Rawlings, Romford. Attorney for the respondents, Preston, Brentwood. Wednesday, Feb. 22, 1871. THE HAMMERSMITH BRIDGE COMPANY (apps.) v. The CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF THE PARISH OF HAMMERSMITH (resps.) Sewers rate-Metropolitan district-Bridge and approaches-Rateability of bridge-General benefit from sewerage of district-The Metropolitan Sewers Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 112, s. 76)The Metropolitan Local Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. e. 126, s. 164). The Overseers made a sewer rate for a metropolitan district, under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, and assessed the company in respect of a “moiety of suspension bridge, appurtenances, and approaches," in one sum. The Company built this bridge over the Thames, with roads and approaches, and opened the same to the public, on payment of tolls, in 1827. The bridge drains directly into the river. The ap proaches drain into a sewer made in 1854; but before that date the surface water was carried from them into the river by a barrel drain, which still exists, and could again be used as formerly. The Company appealed against the above-mentioned assessment on the ground that the bridge was not rateable, as it derived no benefit from the sewers, and that, being therefore originally exempt, its exemption was preserved by the Metropolitan Sewers Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 112), s. 76, and the Metropolitan Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 164: Held, per Blackburn and Hannen, JJ. (Cockburn, C. J., dissentiente), on the authority of Soady v. Wilson (3 Ad. & E. 248) that a property such as the bridge and roads, although not deriving any immediate benefit from the sewers, does derive the general benefit and advantage of being accessible from the proper sewerage of the district; consequently that it would not have been exempt from sewers rates antecedent to 1848, and is therefore rateable. ON an appeal against a sewers rate made on the 16th March 1868, the following case was stated under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45: 1. The appellants were rated in the sum of 391. 118. 8d. in respect of a "moiety of suspension bridge, appurtenances, and approaches," at a gross estimated rental of 11061. and on a rateable value of 9561. 2. The appellants are the Hammersmith Bridge Company, constituted and incorporated by an Act of Parliament made in the 5 Geo. 4 (c. 112), for the purpose of building a bridge over the Thames from Hammersmith, in the county of Middlesex, to Barnes in the county of Surrey, and for making convenient roads and avenues to communicate with such bridge. The said Act was altered and amended by another Act passed in the 9 Geo. 4 (c. 52). 3. The above Acts hereinafter referred to as The Company's Acts may, if necessary be referred to as part of this case. 4. The respondents who are the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Parish of Hammersmith, made the rate under an order of the Board of Works for the Fulham district, constituted and incorporated by the Metropolitan Local Management Act 1855 (amended by the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 112, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), for the local management of the metropolis in respect of the sewerage and drainage, and the paving, and the cleansing, and improvements thereof. 5. The appellants, under the powers conferred upon them by the said Company's Acts, made and completed a bridge over the Thames, and the said bridge with the approaches thereto, were thrown open to the public for use upon payment of the prescribed tolls in the year 1827. The said bridge and approaches have from thence hitherto been continually maintained by the appellants for, and have been used by, the public. 6. The parish of Hammersmith is one of the two parishes that comprise the Fulham district. It extends on the south to the middle line of the river Thames. The said bridge so made by the appellants as aforesaid, and hereinafter called "the bridge," crosses the river from Hammersmith on the north side to Barnes on the south side, one half being in Hammersmith parish and the other half being in Barnes parish. 7. The bridge drains directly into the river, and no part of it drains into the sewers of the district board of works or into any sewer whatever. The approaches, "the roads," and other neighbouring public ways are drained partly by the Metropolitan Board of Works and partly by the district board of works. 8. The appellants under the powers of the above Acts also purchased land and formed roads on each side of the bridge as approaches thereto. These roads they are bound to keep, and have kept, in repair. These roads did not drain into any common sewer until 1854 (none having existed there previously), up to which time the surface water was carried off by a barrel drain into the river. This barrel drain was made and maintained by the appellants, and is still in existence, and might be used as before. In that year 1854 the then Commissioners of Sewers constructed a sewer, hereinafter called the New Sewer, under the appellants' land. This sewer goes from the high road at Hammersmith into the Thames, near Hammersmith-bridge, and the commissioners made gullies to conduct the surface water from the road to the new sewer. The appellants did not require this to be done, nor was it necessary for them that it should be done, inasmuch as up to the time of construction of the said new sewer the beforementioned barrel drain was amply sufficient to carry off the surface water from and efficiently drain the said roads. 9. The new sewer became vested in the Metropolitan Board of Works, by virtue of the Metropolitan Local Management Act 1855, s. 135, and schedule D, and since it was constructed always has been and still is in operation as above described. 10. The houses adjacent to the roads drain into the new sewer. The surface water diverted from the appellants' drain into the new sewer assists to carry down the soil in that sewer. 11. The owners and occupiers of the said adjacent houses pay the sewers rate in respect of them. No sewers rate was ever made upon, or paid in the parish till the year 1854, but in that year and from thence to 1861, rates were made upon and paid by the appellants. 12. In 1862, after the opinion pronounced by the |