C. CAS. R.] 66 REG. v. ALLEN. sister. The same point as is now raised being taken on behalf of the prisoner, Lord Denman overruled the objection. "I am of opinion," said his Lordship, that the validity of the second marriage does not affect the question. It is the appearing to contract a second marriage, and the going through the ceremony, which constitutes the crime of bigamy, or otherwise it could never exist in the ordinary cases, as a previous marriage always renders null and void a marriage that is celebrated afterwards by either of the parties during the lifetime of the other. Whether, therefore, the marriage of the two prisoners (the male prisoner had been included in the indictment as an accessory), was or was not in itself prohibited, and therefore null and void, does not signify, for the woman having a husband then alive has committed the crime of bigamy by doing all that in her lay by entering into a marriage with another man." In the earlier and analogous case of Reg. v. Penson (5 Car. & P. 412), a similar objection had been taken on the ground that the second marriage was invalid by reason that the woman whom the prisoner was charged with having married while his first wife was alive, had, for the purpose of concealing her identity, been described as Eliza Thick, her true name being Eliza Brown. But Gurney, B., who tried the case, overruled the objection, being of opinion "that parties could not be allowed to evade the punishment for such an offence by concertedly contracting an invalid marriage." We should have acted without hesitation on these authorities, had it not been for the case already referred to, of Reg v. Fanning, decided in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Ireland, a case which, if not on all fours with the present, is still closely analogous to it, and which, from the high authority of the court by which it was decided, was entitled to our most attentive consideration. We therefore took time to consider our judgment. The facts in Reg v. Fanning were shortly these. The prisoner being a Protestant, and having within twelve months been a professing Protestant, was married, having a wife then living, to another woman who was a Roman Catholic, the marriage being solemnized by a Roman Catholic priest. Independently of the second marriage being bad as bigamous, it would have been void under the unrepealed statute of the 19 Geo. 2, c. 13, which prohibits the solemnization of marriage by a Roman Catholic priest where either of the parties is a Protestant, and declares such a marriage so solemnized null and void to all intents and purposes. On an indictment against the prisoner for bigamy, the invalidity of the second marriage was insisted on as fatal to the prosecution. The point having been reserved, seven Judges against four in the Court of Criminal Appeal held the objection to be fatal, and quashed the conviction. After giving our best consideration to the reasoning of the learned Judges who constituted the majority of that court, we find ourselves unable to concur with them, being unanimously of opinion that the view taken by the four dissentient judges was the right one. The reasoning of the majority of the court in Reg. v. Fanning is founded mainly on the verbal criticism of the language of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57; and the words being that, if any person "being married" shall marry any other person, it was insisted that whatever sense is to be given to the term "being married," in the first part the same must be given to the term "marry" in [C. CAS. R. the subsequent part of the sentence; and that consequently, it being admitted that the term "being married" implies a perfect and binding marriage, the second marriage must also be one which, but for the prohibition of the statute, would be, whether as regards the capacity to contract marriage, or the manner in which the marriage is solemnized, binding on the parties. Two authorities were relied on in support of this reading of the statute: First, the language of Tindal, C.J., in delivering the opinion of the judges in the House of Lords, in the well-known case of Rex v. Millis (10 Cl. & Fin. 669), and the decision of the Judge Ordinary of the Divorce Court in the case of Burt v. Burt (2 Sw. & Tr. 88). In the first of these cases, Tindal, C.J., undoubtedly says that "the words in the first clause, and the words 'marry any other person' in the second, must of necessity point at and denote marriage of the same kind and obligation." But it must be borne in mind that the question before the House of Lords was, whether the first marriage-not the second-was valid. The validity of the second marriage was not in question at all. In order to show that what had passed between the parties on the first marriage had not amounted to a valid marriage, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas urges that a similar proceeding between the parties would have amounted to no more than a contract per verba de præsenti, and would not, therefore, have sufficed to constitute bigamy, had it happened in the second instance instead of in the first. The case put by the Chief Justice was not the point to be decided; it was only used for the purpose of argument and illustration. The question how far the incapacity of the parties to the second marriage to contract a binding marriage, independently of the bigamy, would take the case out of the statute, was not present to his mind, or involved in the decision of the case before the House. And the Chief Justice expressly states that though the conclusion he had arrived at was concurred in by the rest of the judges, the reasoning was entirely his own. language of the learned Chief Justice must, therefore, be taken as extrajudicial, and cannot bind us in expounding the statute now under consideration. The case of Burt v. Burt in like manner falls altogether short of the question we have now to decide. It was a suit for divorce instituted by a married woman against her husband on the ground of bigamy, adultery, and desertion. To establish the bigamy, evidence was given that the husband had married a woman in Australia according to the form of the Kirk of Scotland, but there was no proof that the form in question was recognised as legal by the local law. Upon this latter ground the Judge Ordinary held that a second marriage was not proved so as to make good the allegation of bigamy. All, therefore, that this case shows is that a second marriage by a form not recognised by law, will not amount to bigamy under the Divorce Act. Admitting, as we are disposed to do, that the construction of the two statutes should be the same, the decision in Burt v. Burt will not, as will presently appear, be found to conflict with oar judgment in the present case the second marriage in the present instance having been celebrated according to a form fully recognised by the law. We may, therefore, proceed to consider what is the proper construction of the statutory enactment in question, unfettered by The these authorities. Before doing so, it should, however, be observed that there is this difference between the case of Reg. v. Fanning and the present, that the form of marriage there resorted to was one which, independently of the bigamous character of the marriage, was, by reason of the statutory prohibition, inapplicable to the special circumstances of the parties, and ineffectual to create a valid marriage. Whereas, in the case before us, independently of the incapacity, the form would have been good and binding in law. This distinction is expressly adverted to by Christian, J., in his judgment, as distinguishing the case before the Irish judges from that of Rex v. Brawn, and it may be doubted whether, but for this distinction, that learned judge would not have come to a different conclusion. The other judges constituting the majority do not, however, rest their judgment on this distinction, but plainly go the length of overruling the decision of Lord Denman in Reg v. Brawn. Their judgments proceed on the broad intelligible ground that to come within the statutes against bigamy the second marriage must be such as that but for its bigamous character it would have been in all respects, both as to the capacity of the parties and the ceremonial adopted, as binding as the first. Differing altogether from this view, and being prepared to hold that so long as a form of marriage has been used which the law recognises as binding, whether applicable to the particular parties or not, and further than this it is not necessary to go, the offence of bigamy is committed, we have only adverted to the distinction referred to in order to point out that our decision in no degree turns upon it, but rests on the broader ground taken by the dissentient judges in the Irish court. When it is said, in construing the statute in question, the same effect must be given to the term "marry" in both parts of the sentence, and that, consequently, as the first marriage must necessarily be a perfect and binding one, the second must be of equal efficacy in order to constitute bigamy, it is at once self-evident that the proposition, as there stated, cannot possibly hold good, for if the first marriage be good, the second, entered into while the first is subsisting, must of necessity be bad. It becomes necessary, therefore, to engraft a qualification on the proposition just stated, and to read the words "shall marry," in the latter part of the sentence, as meaning shall marry under such circumstances as that the second marriage would be good but for the existence of the first. But it is plain that those who so read the statute are introducing into it words which are not to be found in it, and are obviously departing from the sense in which the term "being married" must be construed in the earlier part of the sentence. when once it becomes necessary to seek the meaning of a term occurring in a statute, the true rule of construction appears to us to be not to limit the latitude of departure so as to adhere to the nearest possible approximation to the ordinary meaning of the term, or to the sense in which it may have been used before, but to look to the purpose of the enactment, the mischief to be prevented, and the remedy which the Legislature intended to apply. Now we cannot agree with Fitzgerald, B. in his judgment in Reg. v. Fanning that the purpose of the statutes against bigamy was simply to make polygamous marriages penal, and that consequently it was only intended to constitute the But [C. CAS. R. offence of bigamy where the second marriage would, but for the existence of the first, be a valid one. Neither can we agree with those judges who, in Reg. v. Fanning, found their judgments on the assumption that, in applying the statute against bigamy, the second marriage must be one which, but for the first, would be binding. Polygamy, in the sense of having two wives or two husbands at one and the same time for the purpose of cohabitation is a thing altogether foreign to our ideas, and which may be said to be practically unknown, while bigamy in the modern acceptation of the term, namely, that of a second marriage consequent on an aban donment of the first while the latter still subsists, is unfortunately of too frequent occurrence. It takes place, as we all know, more frequently where one of the married parties has deserted the other, sometimes where both have voluntarily separated. It is always resorted to by one of the parties in fraud of the law, sometimes by both, in order to give the colour and pretence of marriage where the reality does not exist. Too often it is resorted to for the purpose of villanous fraud. The ground on which such a marriage is very properly made penal, is that it involves an outrage on public decency and morals, and creates a public scandal by the prostitution of a solemn ceremony which the law allows only to be applied to a legitimate union to a marriage at best but colourable and fictitious, and which may be made, and too often is made, the means of the most cruel and wicked deception. It is obvious that the outrage and the scandal involved in such a proceeding will not be the less, because the parties to the second marriage may be under some special incapacity to contract marriage. The deception will not be the less atrocious, because the one party may have induced the other to go through a form of marriage known to be generally binding, but inapplicable to their particular case. Is the scandal or the villany the less because the man having represented to the woman who is his dupe, and to the priest that he is a Roman Catholic, turns out afterwards to be a Protestant? Such instances as these we have referred to, thus involving public scandal or deception, being plainly within the mischief which we may reasonably assume it must have been the purpose of the Legis lature to prevent, we are of opinion that we ought not to frustrate the operation of a very salutary statute by putting so narrow a construction on it as would exclude such a case as the present, if the words are legitimately capable of such a construction as would embrace it. Now, the words "shall marry another person," may well be taken to mean shall "go through the form and ceremony of marriage with another person.' The words are fully capable of being so construed without being forced or strained, and as a narrower construction would have the effect of leaving a portion of the mischief untouched, which it must have been the intention of the Legislature to provide against, and thereby, as is fully admitted by those who contend for it, of bringing a grave reproach on the law, we think we are warranted in inferring that the words were used in the sense we have referred to, and that we shall best give effect to the Legislative intention by holding such a case as the present to be within their meaning. To assume that the words must have such a construction as would exclude it because the second marriage must be one which but for the bigamy would have been C. CAS. R.] REG. v. THOMPSON AND OTHERS-TEMPLE v. FLOWER. as binding as the first, appears to us to be begging the entire question, and to be running directly counter to the wholesome canon of construction, which prescribes that, where the language will admit of it, a statutory enactment shall be so construed as to make the remedy coextensive with the mischief it is intended to prevent. In thus holding, it is not at all necessary to say that forms of marriage unknown to the law, as was the case in Burt v. Burt, would suffice to bring a case within the operation of the statute. We must not be understood to mean that every fantastic form of marriage to which parties might think proper to resort, or that a marriage ceremony performed by an unauthorised person, or in an unauthorised place, would be a marrying within sect. 57 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 101. It will be time enough to deal with a case of this description when it arises. It is sufficient for the present purpose to hold, as we do, that where a person already bound by an existing marriage goes through a form of marriage known to and recognized by the law as capable of producing a valid marriage, for the purpose of a pretended and fictitious marriage, the case is not the less within the statute by reason of any special circumstances which, independently of the bigamous character of the marriage, may constitute a legal disability in the particular parties, or make the form of marriage resorted to specially inapplicable to their individual case. After giving the case of Reg. v. Fanning our best consideration, we are unanimous in holding that the conviction in the case before us was right, and that the verdict must stand good. Conviction affirmed. Saturday, June. 1, 1872. (Before BOVILL, C. J, BRAMWELL B., BYLES BLACKBURN AND MELLOR, JJ.) REG v. THOMPSON AND OTHERS. Evidence-Husband and wife-Admissibility of wife as witness for a joint prisoner. The wife of a prisoner jointly indicted and given in charge to the jury with other prisoners, cannot be called as a witness by one of the other prisoners for him whilst the husband is so in charge. CASE reserved for the opinion of this Court, at the Easter Quarter Sessions for the county of Essex. This was a joint indictment against Thompson and Danzey for stealing 56lb. of onions, the property of their master, and against Hide for receiv ing the same, knowing them to be stolen. The charge was that the two first, being sent with two carts of vegetables to Covent Garden, stopped on the road at Hide's house, and there disposed to him of this bag of onions stolen by the two conjointly from one of the carts. The prisoners did not ask to be tried separately but the two first retained one counsel, and Hide retained another. The case depended mainly on what had been done and said at the door of Hide's house, and in his kitchen, by Thompson, Danzey, Hide, and his wife Elizabeth, and a maid servant Eliza, sister of the prisoner Thompson. After the speech of the counsel for Thompson and Danzey, he tendered as a witness for his client, Elizabeth, the wife of the prisoner Hide. [V.C. B. This was objected to by the counsel for the prosecution on the ground that her evidence must directly affect the case against her husband, inasmuch as the aquittal of the two would necessarily entail the acquittal of Hide, and moreover that anything tending to strengthen or weaken the evidence against them, must have a similar effect on the evidence as regarded Hide. The following cases were referred to: Reg. v. Payne, 41 L. J. 65, M. C; 12. Cox C. C. 118; Under these circumstances, and considering the general policy of the law, as rejecting the evidence of a wife for or against her husband in criminal cases, we refused to admit the evidence of the wife, subject to a case to be submitted to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. Thompson and Danzey were convicted and Hide was acquitted, and we passed on each of the two former a sentence of four months' imprisonment, and (no application being made to admit them to bail) execution was respited and they were committed to prison to await the decision of the court. (Signed) T. C. CHISENHALE MARSH, Chairman. No counsel appeared to argue on either side. The Judges retired to consider their decision, and upon their return into court, BOVILL, C. J., said: We have considered the point reserved in this case and are all of opinion that the wife of one of the prisoners stands in the same position, as regards the admissibility of her evidence at the trial, as her husband. The three prisoners were jointly charged upon the same indictment at the trial, and were all in the charge of the jury upon it, when the wife was tendered as a witness. The case is therefore not distinguishable in principle from Reg v. Payne, and the conviction will be affirmed. Conviction affirmed. V.C. BACON'S COURT. Reported by the Hon. ROBERT BUTLER and T. H. CARSON, Esq., Barristers-at-Law. April 19, 20, and 23, 1872. Railway company-Public highway-Right to stop up-Special injury-Superfluous lands-Parties. A railway company were empowered to stop up certain streets and passages, including L. C. Place, and to appropriate and use such streets and passages, or parts thereof, so stopped up, for the purposes of their railways and works. By another Act they were also empowered to stop up and appropriate any passage, place, &c., on any part of their railway and works if and when they should have purchased all the land and houses to which it formed an access, and through which any public right of way to any place beyond the same lands and houses did not exist. They were also empowered to grant building leases of any superfluous lands. The company took the whole of L. C. Place, and pulled down the houses thereon, and on the northern part thereof built a station, and at the southern side erected a hoarding, and the super fluous land thereby enclosed they leased to F., who commenced to build thereon in such a way as to stop up the southern end of L. C. Place, and deprive T. and the public of all access over the old roadway. T., whose premises were immediately opposite the southern entrance to L. C. Place, had, since 1850, made use of the facilities thereby afforded to bring in and out of his premises long building materials, and this right he claimed as a part of and incident to the right which, in common with the rest of the public, he had of using L. C. Place as a public highway." 66 Upon a motion for an injunction to restrain F. from building so as to stop up that portion of L. C. Place not actually used for the purposes of the railway: Held, that the whole of L. C. Place had by the exercise of the powers conferred by their Acts become vested in the company, and that L. C. Place ceased to be a highway by the construction of the railway and the erection of the hoarding, and the motion was refused. 66 Held also that L. C. Place was not an access to T's premises within the meaning of the Act. Semble, that the railway company should have been parties to the suit, and that the court would not make a final decree in their absence. THIS was a motion for an injunction to restrain the defendants, who were the lessees of the Metropolitan Railway Company, from building their premises in such a manner as to interfere with plaintiff's access to, and right of user over part of the land. The plaintiffs were builders, carrying on business in premises situated on the south side of Conduit-place, Paddington, which had been erected in 1850, and which were immediately opposite the southern end of Little Conduit-place. Conduitplace was only 18ft. 7in. wide, and the plaintiffs alleged that they and their predecessors in title had, since 1850, availed themselves of the facility afforded by the opening into Little Conduit-place for the purpose of turning their waggons and bringing in and out of their premises ladders and poles, and other long materials used in their business, and they claimed this right as a part of and incident to the right, which in common with the rest of the public, the plaintiffs had of using Little Conduit-place as a public way." The bill also charged that if the defendants were allowed to stop up Little Conduit-place as they threatened to do, the plaintiffs would sustain special injury and damage beyond that which would be occasioned to the public at large, as they would thereby be prevented from carrying on the business as theretofore, or would at least be subject to great loss and inconvenience in so doing. 66 The Metropolitan Railway Company were incorporated in 1854, and, by their Act of 1860, in which was incorporated the Lands and Railways Clauses Consolidation Acts 1845, the company were empowered (sect. 7) to purchase and take for the providing of stations and works certain lands delineated in the deposited plans, and described in the Book of Reference lying on the east and west of Little Conduit-place, but not including any part of Little Conduit-place, which was, however, within the limits of deviation, as shown on the deposited plans. By a subsequent Act, passed in 1861, the company were empowered (sect. 8) to stop up any of [V.C. B. the streets or passages shown within the limits of the deposited plans and named in the Act, including Little Conduit-place, and to appropriate and use such streets and passages, or parts thereof so stopped up for the purposes of their railways and works. By an Act passed in 1862 (sect. 14), after reciting that the company had, in the construction of their railway, been compelled to purchase and pull down various houses and buildings, and that the sites thereof had not been wholly used or would not be required for the purposes of the railway, and that, inasmuch as the railway was wholly within the metropolis, it was expedient that the company should be at liberty to grant building leases of lands which they had purchased but not used for the purposes of their railway, but without prejudice to the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, requiring within the prescribed period the sale of the superfluous lands, it was enacted that the company might grant leases of any superfluous lands for such terms of years, at such rents, and subject to such covenants and conditions, as the company should deem expedient, but every such lease should be granted within the period prescribed by the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, for the sale of superfluous lands, and any lands comprised in such lease should (subject to such lease) be sold within the period prescribed, and in default of sale should vest as provided by the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act with reference to superfluous lands. By an Act passed in 1865 (sect. 31), after reciting that the company were the owners of certain lands adjacent to the railway, and houses and buildings erected over the railway, or imme diately adjoining thereto, or otherwise connected with the structure of the railway, and that other lands and houses, and buildings similarly placed, might thereafter belong to the company, and that it was expedient to reserve to the company the power and control over such lands, houses, and buildings, it was enacted that any lands on, or immediately adjoining to, or houses, buildings, or tenements then or thereafter acquired, erected, or built over, or immediately adjoining to the railway or works of company, or any part thereof, in any way connected with the structure of the railway or works, and the site thereof, and any yards, gardens, or premises attached thereto, should not be deemed superfluous lands within the meaning of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and it should be lawful for the company to hold and let any such lands, houses, or buildings, and to grant leases of the same for any term or number of years as they might think proper. By another Act passed in 1866 (sect. 11), the company were, in addition to the powers conferred on them by any previous Acts, empowered to stop up and appropriate any court, alley, square, way, passage, or place on any part of the railway and works, if, and when they should have purchased all the lands and houses to which it formed an access, and through which any public right of way to any place beyond the same land and houses did not exist. In 1867 the company used the northern portion of Little Conduit-place for the purposes of their station and works, thereby stopping up that end of the street, and they inclosed the land on the north of Conduit-place, including the site of Little Conduit-place, with a hoarding, in which at the south end of Little Conduit-place they put a gate; but the plaintiffs allege that the company did not thereby attempt to exclude them from using the street as theretofore, as the gate was always left unlocked, and they were in the habit of opening it whenever they required so to do in the exercise of their rights. The plaintiff further charged that the Southern portion of the street, and the lands adjoining thereto were not, and never had been, required or used for the purposes of the company's works, and therefore that the company never acquired the power to stop up the southern portion of the street, and that the rights of the public over the same as a street, including the aforesaid right of the plaintiffs, remained undisturbed. By an agreement, dated the 13th Feb. 1872, the company agreed to grant to the defendants, who were brewers at Stratford-on-Avon, a building lease of the land on the north side of Conduitplace, including the site of Little. Conduit-place. The agreement contained a proviso that the company should be at liberty at any time to retake the land if it should be required for the purposes of their works. The defendants shortly after commenced erecting warehouses on the said piece of land. The plaintiffs objected to the defendants building in such a way as to interfere with their alleged rights. The defendants, in a correspondence that ensued, offered, upon payment to them by the plaintiffs of a nominal rent, to alter a gateway in their premises so as to allow to the plaintiffs the same access to their premises which they had previously enjoyed. The plaintiffs, however, refused the offer, and instituted the present suit to restrain the defendants from interfering with their alleged right. Neither the railway company nor the AttorneyGeneral were made parties to the suit. Amphlett, Q. C. and Bagshawe, for the plaintiffs.The railway company have only a right to stop up Little Conduit-place so far as it is required for their works. Compulsory powers enabling them so to do are not to be created or extended by doubtful implication: (Lamb v. The North London Railway Company, L. Rep. 4 Ch. 522, 526; 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 98.) Although by building their station the company stopped up one end of Little Conduit-place, it did not thereby cease to be a highway, although in reality a mere cul-de-sac: (Gwyn 7. Hardwicke, 25 L. J. 97, M. C.; 27 L. T. Rep. 72.) The company never purchased or acquired any right in the soil of the street. Beckett v. The Corporation of Leeds, 26 L. T. Rep. Kay, Q. C. and Osler, for the defendants.-The soil of the street was acquired by the company when they took the houses on either side of it. Doe d. Pring v. Pearsey, 7 B. & C. 304; Holmes v. Bellingham, 7 C. B., N. S., 329; Marquis of Salisbury v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 5 C. B., N. S., 174; 32 L. T. Rep. 175. In Beckett v. The Corporation of Leeds (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 375), there was evidence to rebut the presumption of law that the owners of the houses were entitled to the soil of the street, but here there is no such evidence. In the 8th section of the Act of 1861, the word "appropriate" is contrasted with the word "use." The company by taking, appropriates the land, and it is not necessary that they should use it. Whatever lands their engineers may consider [V.C. B. necessary, the company may acquire, either to be used for their own purposes, or to be disposed of as superfluous lands: Stockton and Darlington Railway Company v. Brown, The City of Glasgow Union Railway Company v. The company have complied with all the requirements of the several Acts, and have acted strictly within the powers thereby conferred on them. Amphlett, Q. C., in reply, referred to Flower v. The London, Brighton, and South Coast The VICE-CHANCELLOR said :-This case depends wholly upon the Acts of Parliament. The plaintiff's claim is that he is entitled to use a highway; it is that and nothing else; that there exists a highway to which, with the rest of the Queen's subjects, he is entitled to have access, to make such use of it as the public can make of a highway; and that the company or the defendants on this record, are seeking to interfere with his right in that respect. That there was a highway once is beyond all question. Whether that has ceased to exist is the question which is raised upon this application. Now I think that the railway company ought to be parties to this suit. I said the other day, when we were considering it, that for the purpose of this injunction I would not raise such an objection. The defendants do not raise any such objection as appears by the correspondence which is set out in the bill, and for the present purpose the case may be disposed of upon the materials as they now exist, but it seems to me to be impossible that a decree can be made in this cause until the railway company are here. That I observe now, not for the purpose of postponing the decision which I have to pronounce, or of putting any impediment in the way of the parties. Now at the time when the first of the Acts of Parliament which have been mentioned was passed, the railway company were contemplating the making of a railway across the lands in question, and the other lands which are described in the Act of Parliament and book of reference, and which consist of a sort of parallelogram closely covered with buildings, bounded on the north by what was then called Conduit-street East, on the west by Spring-street, on the east by London-street, and on the south by Conduit-place, and through that parallelogram there ran what was unquestionably a highway called Little Conduit-place. The plaintiff's house, or the entrance to the house, is directly opposite the mouth of that Little Conduit-place. The Act of Parliament clearly does give, and meant to give, the railway company the power to acquire the whole of the land contained in that parallelogram, including of course Little Conduit-place. That is described in the deposited plan, and the books of reference, and the owners of the soil of Little Conduit-place are therein described as being the Metropolitan Board of Works, and the vestry of Paddington. Houses were built on either side of Little Conduit-place. The company, in the exercise of their powers under the Act of Parliament, have purchased and acquired the whole of the land comprised within the parallelogram. They have, as the Act of Parliament authorised them to do, taken and appropriated it for the purposes of their railway and works. That right is not at all confined by the |