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PRIV. Co.]

SMALLBONES (app.) v. EDNEY AND LUNN (resps.)

assessed to the rate in respect of such rentcharge, and therefore that the rate was bad: Held (reversing the judgment of the Court of Arches), that M. P., as the owner of a tithe rentcharge in the parish was liable to be assessed to the rates made for the repayment of the money, borrowed under the provisions of the above statute; such owner being the occupier of property in the parish, in respect of which he was entitled to vote upon the question whether money should be borrowed under the Act, and receiving as much benefit from the money being borrowed as the owners of other perty in the parish. There is a distinction between rates under the above Act and church rates, and though there are strong reasons for holding that every person liable to be assessed to a church rate is also liable to be assessed to a rate under the Act, yet it does not follow that every person, who is exempted from liability to a church rate, is also to be exempted from liability to pay a rate under the Act, unless the reason for his exemption is equally applicable.

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THIS was an appeal from a judgment of Sir Robert Phillimore, pronounced in the Court of Arches on 31st July 1869, in a suit for subtraction of church rates, promoted by the respondents, the churchwardens of the parish church of Whitchurch, near Southampton, against the appellant. The facts are stated in the judgment, post, and in the report of the case in the court below (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 506.)

By the judgment appealed from the respondent was ordered to pay his assessment to the church rate, and was condemned in the costs of the suit.

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Sir Travers Twiss, Q. C. (for the appellant.)— The important question in the case is on what principle the rate ought to be levied. The money borrowed from the commissioners might be expended in repairs of the chancel, for “church" includes chancel" (Rippin v. Bastin, 20 L. T. Rep N. S. 622; L. Rep. 2 A. & E. 386.) This rate is nowhere in the Act called a "church rate." It is the consent of the major part of the inhabitants and occupiers assessed to the poor rate that is required before application for the loan can be made to the commissioners. Assessment to the relief of the poor has no legal connection with church rates. [JAMES, L. J.-The church rate making body and the poor rate making body are quite distinct; the former existed centuries before the latter. MELLISH, L. J.-At the date of 5 Geo. 4, I think the liabilities of stockin-trade to church rate and poor rate were on the same footing.] Miller v. Bloomfield (1 Adams 499) decided that stock-in-trade was liable to church rate. [MELLISH, L.J.-Are there any cases to show that tithes were exempted entirely from church rates, and not merely from church rates for the purposes of the body of the church ?] Tithes were exempted entirely. Re Batkin (25 L. J., N. S., 126, M. C.), it was held that the jurisdiction of justices to enforce payment of a rate made for the repayment of money borrowed under 5 Geo. 4 c. 36, was the same as with respect to a church rate, was a decision in the express words words of sect. 2, prescribing the mode in which these rates are to be recovered, and throws no light on their nature or quality. Compare the wording of this Act with that of the 59 Geo. 3 c, 134, for building additional churches in populous parishes. There (sect. 14) the churchwardens, with the consent of the vestry and of

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the bishop and incumbent are empowered to borrow "upon the credit of the church rates," &c. Here the overseers of the poor are joined with the churchwardens, and there is no mention of church rates. [MELLISH, L. J.-We must either say that those liable to church rates are liable to this rate, or that those liable to poor rate are liable to this rate, or we must invent some new rate to satisfy the statute.] In the Act for the Abolition of Compulsory Church Rates (31 & 32 Vict. c. 109). sect. 3, which relates to money due in any parish on church rates, or rates in the nature of church rates, and to money "in the name of church rates," ordered to be raised by any Act of Parliament, contains the proviso "that the accounts of the churchwardens of such parish in reference to the receipt and expenditure of the moneys levied under such Acts shall be audited annually," &c. The case of overseers of the poor being joined with the churchwardens is not contemplated. [MELLISH, L. J.-The boundaries of poor law parishes and ecclesiastical parishes are often independent, but the statute cannot have intended to rate persons not within the church parish, and who would not have the benefit of the expenditure.]

Dr. Swabey followed, and cited:

Prideaux's Churchwarden's Guide, p. 157;
Reg v. Basker, 6 Ad. & El. p. 388.

A tithe-owner is by the words of the statute entitled to be present and vote in the vestry on the question whether the money should borrowed.

Dr. Tristam for the respondents.-A vicar and the occupier of church lands are entitled to vote for a church rate, although not liable to pay it. Ransom v. Campkie, 2 Robertson, 370. Sir Travers Twiss, Q. C., replied.

Cur. adv. vult.

Judgment was delivered by Sir JAMES W. COLVILE. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Arches in a suit brought by the churchwardens of the parish church of Whitchurch, for subtraction of an alleged rate made under the 5 Geo. 4, c. 36, s. 1, against James Smallbones, the appellant, by which the appellant was ordered to pay his assessment to the rate and the costs of suit. It appeared that, in 1867, the sum of 2000l. was borrowed from the commissioners authorised to make advances for public works, under the provisions of the Act for the purpose of repairing and enlarging the parish church of Whitchurch, and that on the 7th Feb. 1868 the churchwardens and overseers of the parish of Whitchurch made a rate of 6d. in the pound upon the inhabitants and parishioners of the parish of Whitchurch for the purpose of paying the annual instalment, and the interest of the said sum of 2000l., which became due to the commissioners on the 18th March. The appellant occupied a house in the parish, and was rated at the sum of 58. 6d. The defence to the suit was, that Melville Portal Esq., the owner of a tithe rentcharge of the rateable value of 11897. arising out of lands in the parish, was not assessed to the rate in respect of such tithe rentcharge, and it was admitted that if he ought to have been so assessed the rate was bad, and that the appellant would be entitled to succeed. The question therefore is, whether according to the true construction of the 5 Geo. 4, c. 36, the owner of a tithe rentcharge in a parish is liable to be assessed to the rates made for the repayment of money borrowed under

PRIV. Co.]

SMALLBONES (app.) v. EDNEY AND LUNN (resps.)

the provisions of the Act? The first and second sections of the Act are as follows: By the 5 Geo. 4, c. 36, s. 1, it is enacted that

From and after the passing of this Act, it shall and may be lawful for the churchwardens or chapelwardens and overseers of the poor of any parish in England or Wales, with the consent of the major part of the inhabitants and occupiers assessed to the relief of the poor, in vestry assembled, and with the consent of the bishop of the diocese, and the incumbent of such parish, to make application to the commissioners authorised and empowered to make advances for public works under the provisions of the said recited Acts, for any loan or advance under the powers, authorities, provisions, and regulations of the said Acts, and this Act, for such sum or sums in Exchequer bills or money, as shall be necessary for defraying the expense, or any part of the expense, of rebuilding, repairing, enlarging, or otherwise extending the accommodation in any church or chapel of any such parish. And if such commissioners shall think fit to entertain such application, and shall be satisfied that such consent as required by this Act has been given and obtained, it shall and may be lawful for such commissioners, and they are hereby authorised and empowered to make and grant any such loan or advance for the purposes aforesaid, in such manner as such commissioners are empowered to make any loan or advance under the authority of the said recited Acts or any of them; and it shall be lawful for such churchwardens or chapelwardens, together with the overseers of the poor, of or for any such parish with respect to which such application shall be made and granted, to receive the sum or sums so advanced, and to apply the same for the purposes mentioned in such application; and from and after the grant of any such loan or advance, it shall be lawful for the churchwardens or chapel wardens, and overseers of the poor of the parish in respect of which such loan or loans shall be advanced as aforesaid, and their successors fro. time to time for the time being, and they are hereby authorised and required to make such annual or half-yearly rates for the repayment of the sums so advanced, in such proportions and at such times as shall be directed and appointed by the said commissioners on that behalf, and to assign the rates so to be made as aforesaid as a security for repayment of the sums so advanced, in such manner and form as the said commissioners shall direct and appoint, and so as to secure the repayment of all sums so advanced, with interest thereon, at and after the rate of 41. per cent. per annum, by annual or half-yearly instalments, on the amount of the principal money advanced, within the period of twenty years at the farthest from the advancing of any such sums respectively. And by sect. 2 of the said Act it is enacted:

That it shall be lawful for any churchwarden or chapelwarden, or overseer in auy parish in which any rates shall be made under the provisions of this Act, to collect, demand, and receive, sue for, levy, and recover all such rates, by all such ways and means as any church rates may by law be collected, demanded, received, sued for, levied, and recovered, as fully and effectually as if all power, authorities, provisions, penalties, and forfeitures relating to the collecting, demanding, suing for, levying, receiving, and recovering of any church rates, or relating to any refusal to pay any like rates were specially repeated and enacted in this Act, any law, statute, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.

The learned judge in the court below has held that though the Act does not specify the property on which the rate is to be levied, yet it is to be implied, that it is only to be levied on those on whom a church rate is to be levied, and that as the owner of a tithe rentcharge was not liable to be rated to an ordinary church rate, he was not liable to be rated to a rate made under the Act. The Act, however, nowhere describes the rates as church rates. On the contrary, it expressly distinguishes between the råtes made under the provisions of the Act and church rates, and, although their Lordships agree, there are strong reasons for holding that every person liable to be assessed to a church rate is also liable to be assessed to

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a rate under the Act, because every such person is benefited by money being borrowed for the repair or building of the church, yet it does not follow that every person who is exempted from liability to a church rate is also to be exempted from a liability to pay a rate under the Act, unless the reason for his exemption is equally applicable. Now a tithe owner is exempted from an ordinary church rate for the repair of the body of a church, because he is under a particular liability to repair the chancel. He is not less liable, but more liable than the owners of other property in the parish to repair the church, being under a personal liability to repair a particular part of it. He is therefore not less benefited, but more benefited than the owners of other property in the parish by money being borrowed under the Act for the repairing, rebuilding, or enlarging the whole church including the chancel, and in this very case it is admitted that the money borrowed was expended in rebuilding the chancel as well as the rest of the church. Moreover, the owner of a tithe rentcharge, being an occupier of property assessed to the relief of the poor, is by the express words of the statute entitled to be present and to vote in the vestry on the question whether the money should be borrowed; and it would be strange if a person who, in respect of particular property, is entitled to vote on the question whether the money should be borrowed, and being in fact one of the borrowers, should not also be liable to be rated in respect of the same property to the rates made for the repayment of the money. It is indeed true that, in the case of an ordinary church rate also, a tithe owner is entitled to be present and vote in the vestry which imposes the rate, and, nevertheless, is not assessed to it; but, then, the money raised by an ordinary church rate cannot be expended in the repair of the chancel, and the tithe owner by the ancient custom of the realm is to be considered as having compounded for his liability to contribute to the church rate by having taken upon himself the exclusive liability to repair the chancel. On the whole their Lordships are of opinion that the owner of a tithe rentcharge being the occupier of property in the parish in respect of which he is entitled to vote upon the question whether money should be borrowed under the Act, and receiving as much or more benefit from the money being borrowed as the owners of other property in the parish, ought to be held liable to be rated to the rates made under the Act; and they will accordingly advise Her Majesty that the judgment of the Court of Arches ought to be reversed, and that judgment should be entered for the present appellant with costs in the court below, and the costs of this appeal.

Judgment reversed. Proctors for the appellant, Fielder and Sumner. Proctor for the respondent, G. C. Ring.

Q. B.]

REG. v. STANGER.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by T. W. SAUNDERS, and J. SHORTT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-law.

Tuesday, Jan. 31, 1871.

REG. v. STANGER.

Criminal information-Evidence of publication of libel—Affidavits.

Where a libel appeared in a newspaper, and a rule nisi calling for a criminal information against J. S., for printing and publishing the libel, was obtained upon affidavits in which one deponent said only that copies of the newspaper had been purchased by him at the publishing office of the paper; and another, that by a foot note at the end of the said newspapers, J. S. was stated to be the printer and publisher of them; and that the deponent believed that the said J. S. was the printer and publisher of the papers:

Held, that there was not sufficient legal evidence to show that the defendant was the person who published the libel, and that therefore the rule must be discharged.

Quare, whether the prosecutor might supplement his defective affidavits by having recourse to those used on the part of the defendant.

RULE calling upon the defendant to show cause why an information should not be exhibited against him for a misdemeanor in printing and publishing a false and scandalous libel.

In the Newcastle Daily Chronicle of the 23rd May 1870 was an article censuring the conduct of the prosecutor as a justice of the peace, and a similar article also appeared in the same newspaper of the 30th May 1870. These articles contained the libel complained of.

The following were the affidavits used to connect the defendant with the libellous articles :

[Q. B. not be had to the defendant's affidavits in answer,

to supply the defect. They cited

Cole on Criminal Informations, 52, 55, 62;

Rex v. Willett, 6 T. R. 294;

Corner's Crown Pract. 172;
Reg. v. Baldwin, 8 Ad. & E. 168;
Ex parte Williams, 5 Jur. 1133;
Rex v. Mein, 3 T. R. 596;

Reg. v. Woolmer, 12 Ad. & E. 422.

Sir J. Coleridge, Q.C. (Solicitor-General), (with him Beresford), in support of the rule, contended that the two affidavits were sufficient; that the cases cited contra were decided when a statutory means of proof was available which was now taken away by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24; that then absolute proof was required by the courts from a party who did not choose to adopt the statutory means, but that now common law prima facie proof of publication was all that was necessary, or even in many cases possible; and that there was no denial in the defendant's affidavits that the newspaper was printed and published by him.

BLACKBURN, J.-We are agreed that the rule must be discharged, on the ground that there is not evidence to show that the person against whom the rule for a criminal information was moved, viz., John Stanger, is the publisher of the statement said to be libellous. There is no further evidence than that at the bottom of the newspaper John Stanger is described as the printer and publisher. And one of the persons who makes affidavits in support of the rule, says he believes Stanger is the publisher. That amounts to information and belief only, and anyone could depose to that. Then comes the question, is that sufficient legal evidence to show that Stanger was the person who published the libel? I think it is not. Facts might have been easily proved, which would have shown that Stanger was cognisant of or present at the printing or issuing of the paper, and then his own statement that it was printed and

First. Affidavit of W. H. D. Longstaffe, saying, published by him would be sufficient.

1. That on the 30th May last past I attended at the publishing office of the newspaper called the Newcastle Daily Chronicle, situated in Westgate-street, in the borough and county of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and purchased and paid for a copy of Number 3839 of the said Newcastle Daily Chronicle, dated the 30th May 1870, which then and there I received from William Gray, a clerk or salesman in the said office, and which said newspaper is now produced and shown to me, and marked with the letter A.

2. That on the 31st May last past I attended at the publishing office of the said Newcastle Daily Chronicle, situate as aforesaid, and purchased and paid for a copy of number 3839 of the said newspaper, dated the 23rd May 1870, which I then and there received from the said William Gray, and which said last-mentioned newspaper is now produced and shown to me, and marked with the letter B. Secondly, affidavit of W. Crossman, saying:

1. That I have referred to the newspapers mentioned in the affidavit of W. D. Longstaffe, and verified by him, and which said newspapers are respectively marked A. and B., and I say that by a foot-note printed at the end of the said respective newspapers, John Stanger is stated to be the printer and publisher of the said newspaper respectively, and I say that the said John Stanger is, as I believe, the printer and publisher of the said

papers.

Digby Seymour, Q. C. and Udall showed cause, arguing that the affidavits were insufficient; that they should afford such legal evidence as would justify a grand jury in finding a true bill of indictment; that the affidavits must be complete in the first instance; that there should be proof of publication by the defendant distinctly given, which was wanting here; and that recourse could

That

information and belief only is not enough, was decided in Rec v. Willett (6 T. R. 294), where it was held that an affidavit by A., stating that B. had brought him a challenge from C., and that B. had refused to make an affidavit that C. sent him with it, is not evidence on which this court will grant a rule nisi for a criminal informa tion against C. for sending the challenge. The court, after pointing out that the affidavit was but mere hearsay evidence, explained that "if they were to grant a rule calling on the defendant to show cause why an information should not be filed against him, it would be calling on him either to give evidence, on the showing cause, against himself, or leaving the rule to be made absolute on this affidavit alone, which was not legal evidence." So that the ratio decidendi in that case, determined eighty years ago, was that the "information and belief" of a person was not sufficient to call on the other party to make an answer thereto : (Rex v. Willett) was acted on subsequently in the case Ex parte Williams (sup.) Then comes the second question. Although the material fact did not appear in the affidavits upon which the rule was obtained, yet as other affidavits have now been used, it is said by the Solicitor-General that we should look at those. It is not necessary to decide whether we should do so or not. In Rex v. Mein (sup.) Lord Kenyon, C. J. states that if the matter had rested on the relator's affidavit alone he should have been clearly of opinion that the information

Q. B.]

RAWNSLEY V. HUTCHINSON AND OTHERS.

could not go; but that upon conference with the other judges, he found that it was not unusual to have recourse to the affidavits against the rule, in order to come, if possible, at the whole truth of the transaction. Mr. Cole, in his book upon Criminal Informations, remarks on that and says that the difference between Reg. v. Baldwin (sup.) and Rex v. Mein was that the former was a criminal matter and the latter a civil. I do not think that distinction is a sound one at all. Whether the application made to the court is for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, or for libel, seems to me the same. I think the rule in Rex v. Mein was sounder and more consistent with good sense. If it were necessary to consider which rulethat one, or the one in Reg. v. Baldwin-we should follow, I should require a good deal of consideration. But the affidavit of the defendant solely amounts to this-viz., that having made an affidavit, he does not therein answer so as to negative the belief that he was the publisher, and I think for the reasons in Rex v. Willett (sup.) he was not bound to answer, and on that ground the rule should be discharged.

MELLOR and HANNEN, JJ. concurred.

Attorneys for prosecutor, Shum and Crossman, for Watson, Durham.

Attorneys for defendant, E. Flux and Leadbitter, for Laws and Glynn, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

Wednesday, Feb. 1, 1871.

(Before KEATING (a), LUSH, and HANNEN, JJ.) RAWNSLEY v. HUTCHINSON AND OTHERS. Quarter sessions-Adjournment of Appeal missed with costs-Costs taxed and inserted in the order at the adjourned sessions.

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An adjourned quarter sessions is a continuation of the original quarter sessions. Where, therefore, an appeal under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 27, which requires that "the court at such sessions shall hear and determine the matter of such appeal," was dismissed with costs, which costs were not taxed until the adjourned sessions, when they were ascertained and inserted in the order of sessions: Held, that such adjourned sessions were a continuation of the original quarter sessions, and that the taxation was warranted, and the order good. THIS was a rule to quash an order of quarter sessions dismissing an appeal, and ordering the appellant to pay the sum of 271. 118. 8d. for costs. It appeared that at the general licensing meeting at Halifax in August last, the appellant applied for a wine and beer licence; but, being opposed, it was refused. The justices having adjourned over three weeks, he again applied at the adjournment day, when the justices refused to hear such second application. He then appealed to the Michaelmas Quarter Sessions, held at Leeds, when the court dismissed his appeal with costs, and the quarter sessions were then adjourned, and at such adjourned sessions at Sheffield they were taxed (under protest from the appellant) at the sum of 271. 118. 8d., and the amount was inserted in the order. Not having been paid, the order of sessions was removed into this court and made a rule of court, under the provisions of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 18, for the purpose of being enforced, whereupon the present rule was obtained. The

(a) Keating, J. sat under the provisions of the Judges Jurisdiction Act 1870, sect. 2.

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present rule was moved upon the ground that it was not competent to the adjourned sessions to make the order in question.

By sect. 8 of the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27 (the Wine and Beerhouse Act 1869), all the provisions of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, as to appeals from any act of any justice shall, so far as may be, have effect with regard to grants of certificates under this Act; and by sect. 27 of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, a right of appeal is given to a party applying for a licence to the quarter sessions; "and in case of the dismissal of such appeal, or of the affirmance of the judgment on which such act was done, and which was appealed against, the said court shall adjudge and order the said judgment to be carried into execution and costs awarded to be paid, and shall, if necessary, issue process for enforcing such order."

Philbrick appeared in support of the order.-It is said on the other side that, although the quarter sessions could have taxed the costs, no taxation could take place at an adjourned sessions. But an adjournment of the sessions is only a continuation of the original sessions, and in principle it matters not whether the sessions are adjourned from day to day or over a week or a month, provided no subsequent quarter sessions should intervene. It is often impossible, from the pressure of business, that the clerk of the peace can tax at the original sessions. The other side will rely upon Reg. v. Belton (11 Q. B. 379), but that was not a question of the adjournment of the sessions, but of the adjournment of the appeal, which was held to be bad, inasmuch as the words of the 27th section of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, are that "the court at such sessions shall hear and determine the matter of such appeal." [LUSH, J.-That was not an adjournment of the sessions, but an adjournment of the case. It is really difficult to see what difference there is between an adjournment from one day to the next, and an adjournment for a week.]

Hannay, contra.-There is an important distinction between an original quarter sessions and an adjournment; the same justices may not be present at both and seldom are, and the granting of costs is a judicial act, which should be performed by the justices who decide the appeal; the order is incomplete until the amount of costs is filled in, and this should be the act of the sessions at which the costs are granted: (Selwood v. Mount, 1 Q. B. 726; Reg. v. Clark, 5 Q. B. 887.) [LUSH, J.-Suppose the court were to adjourn from the Thursday before Good Friday to the Saturday, will a taxation on the Saturday be good? and if so, why not equally so if the adjournment be for a week or a month ?] Where the adjournment is merely temporary it may be otherwise, but here the regular business was at an end, and the sessions were only adjourned for certain specific business. The 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 27, ties the justices down to decide the whole matter at the original sessions, and Reg. v. Belton (11 Q. B. 379) is an authority. The appeal was either adjourned or not; if not adjourned then there was no order for costs; if adjourned, then it is within Reg. v. Belton, and this order cannot be sustained.

KEATING, J.-This is the case of an appeal which was heard at the Michaelmas quarter sessions, and was then dismissed with costs, but the costs were not then ascertained; the sessions, however, were afterwards held by adjournment, and the costs which had been directed at the former sessions were at these adjourned sessions taxed and allowed; and the question now is this-being an appeal under

Q. B.] GRAND JUNCTION CANAL Co. v. OVERSEERS OF HEMEL HEMPSTEAD AND KING'S LANGLEY. [Q. B.

the provisions of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 27, can the costs be ascertained at an adjournment of the sessions? Now, although Mr. Hannay has endeayoured to throw much difficulty into the subject, it seems to me to be a very plain case, for it comes simply to this-whether an adjourned sessions is in law the same as an original sessions? If an adjourned sessions is another and a different sessions, then this order for costs is wrong. The 27th section of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, says that "the court at such sessions shall hear and determine the matter of such appeal," and therefore no other court can deal with the appeal, and in support of his argument Mr. Hannay relies upon Reg. v. Belton, which, however, seems to me not to further his argument, for in that case it was the appeal which was adjourned; whilst here it was not so. I am of opinion, therefore, that the proceeding was perfectly regular.

LUSH, J.-I am of the same opinion. An adjournment of the court is an adjournment of the same sessions. This was pending business, and at the adjournment day it came before the court again. I can see nothing in the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 27, which requires the court to determine an appeal upon one day. What the statute requires is that the appeal shall be heard and determined at the then next quarter sessions; there is nothing, however, which prevents the court from adjourning these sessions if convenience requires, and if adjourned it is merely a continuance of the original sessions. HANNEN, J.-I am of the same opinion.

Rule discharged. Attorneys for the appellant, Bower and Cotton. Attorneys for the respondents, Edwards, Layton, and Jaques.

Saturday, Nov. 19, 1870.

THE GRAND JUNCTION CANAL COMPANY (apps.) v. THE CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF HEMEL HEMPSTEAD AND KING'S LANGLEY (resps.). Poor-rate Canal--Grand Junction Canal Company-Land and buildings of company adjoining the canal-Principle of rating.

By the 19th section of the 34 Geo. 3 c. xxiv., the Grand Junction Canal Company were to be rated to all parliamentary and parochial taxes and assessments, for and in respect of the lands and grounds already purchased or taken, or to be purchased or taken, and all warehouses or other buildings to be erected by the company of proprietors in the same proportion as other lands, grounds, and buildings lying near the same are or shall be rated; and as the same lands, grounds, and buildings so purchased or taken, or to be purchased or taken, and erected, would be rateable, in case the same were the property of individuals, in their natural capacity. The company purchased land; and buildings thereon adjoining the canal, were erected by them, which became much enhanced in value, and, subsequently, they adopted the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 42, and became carriers upon the canal upon their own accouut.

Held, in assessing the canal to the poor-rate, that first, the rateable value of the land occupied by the canal should not be estimated as being increased by the fact that the company had become carriers; secondly, that the buildings should be rated in the same proportion as other buildings near, and that

the lands and other premises of the company should be rated in the same proportion as other lands and premises near.

THIS was a case stated by an arbitrator for the opinion of this court, pursuant to the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45, upon an appeal by the appellants against two poor rates, as follows:

1. By a certain private Act of Parliament, passed in the 33 Geo. 3, c. lxxx., intituled "An Act for making and maintaining a navigable Canal from the Oxford Canal Navigation at Brainstone in the county of Northampton to join the River Thames at or near Brentford in the County of Middlesex, and also certain collateral Cuts from the said intended Canal," certain persons therein named were formed and incorporated into a joint-stock company for the purpose aforesaid by the name and style of "The Company of Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal," and by that name to sue and be sued.

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2. By a certain private Act of Parliament passed in the 34th year of King George 3, c. xxiv., entitled An Act for making certain navigable Cuts from the Towns of Buckingham, Aylesbury, and Wendover, in the county of Buckingham, to communicate with the Grand Junction Navigation authorised to be made by an Act of the last Session of Parliament, and for amending the said Act," after reciting the said first herein before-mentioned statute, the said company were empowered to make and maintain the said cuts in the title of the said amending statutes referred to.

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3. By the 19th section of the said amending statute it was enacted as follows, that is to say: That the said company of proprietors shall from time to time be rated to all parliamentary and parochial taxes and assessments for and in respect of the lands and grounds already purchased or taken, or to be purchased or taken, and all warehouses or other buildings to be erected by the said company of proprietors, in pursuance of the said recited Act and this Act, in the same proportion as other lands, grounds, and buildings lying near the same are or shall be rated, and as the same lands, grounds, and buildings so purchased or taken, or to be purchased or taken and erected, would be rateable, in case the same were the property of individuals in their natural capacity.

4. By the 7th section of a certain other private Act of Parliament, passed in the 36th year of King George 3, c. xxv., intituled, "An Act to enable the Company of Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal to finish and complete the same, and the several cuts and other works authorised to be made and done by them by virtue of several Acts of Parliament," it was enacted by sect. 7: “All parochial rates and assessments which shall or may at any time be laid, assessed, or imposed upon the lands and personal estate of the said company proprietors, shall be in each parish, township, hamlet, or place respectively, in proportion to the length of the said canal and cuts respectively, in such respective parish, township, hamlet, or place, and not otherwise."

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5. By the aforesaid private Acts all necessary powers were given to the said company to take, hold and use lands, and erect buildings for the purposes of the said company, and to make and maintain the said canal and cuts, and which have been duly exercised by the said company.

6. The aforesaid canal has long since been made,

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