excitable or nervous horses may be seriously affected and injured in getting enured to the effects of the engine. In addition to this, the defendant has made the window of the stable, which used to admit light and air, useless as to air, and also considerably interfered with as to light. The defendant says in excuse for this, first, that this window is not required for the stable, because the stable has a window on the other side, and also a door, and that there is plenty of air and ventilation in the stable. Now I am of opinion that that is not a matter to be gone into, or a question which I have to determine, and that a person has no right to shut up another person's window and then say it is not required. The next question which has been argued is, that the window was shut up by the sanction and concurrence of the agent of the plaintiffs; but, in my opinion, the evidence fails in proving this. The only person mentioned as the agent is Mr. Brealey, who, unfortunately, died before the suit came to a hearing. That he did act as the agent of the plaintiffs in various matters is unquestionably true. He was originally a clerk of Mr. Crusoe, and has since acted as the plaintiffs' agent in various matters. I do not think that there is any evidence to prove that he did sanction the closing of the window; but of this I am quite clear, that, if he did so sanction it, it was not within the scope of his authority, and that he had no authority from the plaintiff's to perform that office. It is also clear from the defendant's evidence that the boarding up of this window was essential, in his own view of the case, for the exclusion of the noise and heat of the engine from the stable of the plaintiffs. In that state of things, I am of opinion that they are entitled to some relief in respect of the stable. It is true five years and a half have elapsed since the engine was erected, but it is positively sworn by the plaintiffs, and I believe correctly, that they were ignorant of this fact relating to the stable until it was brought to their attention in 1870. Whether this was by reason of the increased nuisance, or by the complaint of the visitor whose horse suffered, or from their accidentally observing it, I do not know, and cannot ascertain from the course of the evidence; but putting it in a way leastfavourable to the plaintiffs, I am of opinion they are not barred by time, and that they are entitled to relief in respect of that. It is true that the time would prevent them from having an interlocutory injunction, and accordingly that view was taken in the previous stage of the case; but in other respects I am of opinion that they are entitled to apply to the court for relief. Before I proceed to the case of the dwelling house, which I take separately, I have to consider (and I have considered very carefully), what sort of relief the plaintiffs would be entitled to, if the case of the stable stood alone. In this case, so considering it, I am of opinion that I must have regard to these facts. The defendant's capita! has been engaged in this business for a great number of years, and was engaged in it for five years and a half without any complaint being made, and an injunction stopping the engine would, I think, upon the evidence, destroy the business of the defendant and put an end to it in that place. I think that if the case stood in the stable alone, a fit case would arise for the application of the provisions contained in the 2nd section of the Act of the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, which section I will read. It is very rarely I have had occasion either to con [ROLLS. sider it or to deal with it. The section is this: "In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an injunc tion against a breach of any covenant, contract, or agreement" (this is not any one of those), "or against the commission or continuance of any wrongful act" (which this is), "or for the specific performance of any covenant, contract, or agreement, it shall be lawful for the same court if it shall think fit, to award damages to the party injured, either in addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction or specific performance, and such damages may be assessed in such manner as the court shall direct." I think if the stable stood alone, this would be a case for damages; and I am of opinion that the injury occasioned by stopping the business of the defendant is, in the ordinary sense in which this court treats such a thing, irre parable, but that the evil produced by putting an end to the stable is not irreparable, at least as far as I can understand it. Another stable further off still exists, and, assuming that they must have a stable to supply the place of this, I am by no means clear that that might not be enlarged and increased without injury, and that it might easily be ascer tained what the damage was. Therefore, I should in that case think fit to say that the amount of damages should be ascertained in this court, and I would not enforce specific and irreparable injury upon the defendant. In considering that, of course I must consider the purpose for which the Act was passed. After the Act passed a person was not entitled, by obtaining an injunction, to inflict an irreparable injury upon a defendant, even though the defendant occasioned the nuisance himself, when in fact the plaintiff could be paid for any damage which he had sustained. Having so considered it, I now consider the question of the house. The house raises a new question, because the question is this with respect to the house," Is the house made uninhabitable, or is it so seriously inconvenienced as to render it such that an ordinary person would naturally quit the house and reside somewhere else?" because, if so, that I consider is an irreparable injury. If the question were a question between the abandonment of the house and the abandonment of the factory for carrying on the business, I should consider both injuries irreparable, but I should not hesitate between them, because the injury would have been created by the defendant, and, therefore, the injury to the house would be a case for an injunction. I have stated this in order to explain, if the case goes further, the principles which actuate me in the course I am about to take in the matter. Therefore the question is whether the abandonment of the house or the abandonment of the factory, is a necessary consequence which follows from the working of this engine. Upon this part of the case the evidence is very material, because the evidence here, as in the case of the stable, is very contradictory; indeed, more contradictory in the case of the house than in the case of the stable. In addition to that there are some marks of exaggeration, which there always are in these cases, and naturally enough, because persons who go there to give evidence give it, in a great measure, as partisans. But then the question of time becomes of very material importance indeed, because this is certain, that for five years and a half the plaintiffs have not complained. That is a very strong observation to show that if the nuisance has been the same, ROLLS.] METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS v. MARQUIS OF SALISBURY. they did not conceive it to be very serious for five years and a half, and therefore it could not be of such a nature as to drive them out of the house, if it was so. For that purpose I have looked very carefully at the evidence of what took place during the period of that five years and a half, and the evidence, I think, conclusively shows that the engine has been kept exactly the same for five years and a half. It is a very small engine, but I am of opinion that it is quite large enough to produce the injury I have mentioned in the stable; I am now talking, however, of the house. During that time not only has this engine been worked exactly in the same way, and by the same man, but I have got the bill for coals in which I do not conceive that they have concealed anything from me. I am bound to assume they tell the truth; and from that it appears that the same amount of coals has been used for five years, and that the same man has worked it. This is certain, that according to whether the engine is kept clean or not, it makes a greater or less noise; and that if it is kept carefully oiled, it works more easily and with less tumult. In addition to that, the state of the wind may produce considerable effect, and for aught I know the state of the atmosphere may have a good deal of effect upon it. But I believe, in reality, that the effect on the house is very slight. That there is some noise is quite clear to my mind. One gentleman says, he never perceived any, and that he endeavoured in vain to perceive it; but on the evidence of the others, there must have been some, which an impartial person would have perceived. Unquestionably it is very small under the particular circumstances I have mentioned, that is, when the wind is blowing in a contrary direction, and the engine is kept in a perfect state so as to work as easily as possible. Then I come to the evidence respecting the tremor. One gentleman has taken the course usually adopted, I believe, by astronomers, of making an horizon of quicksilver, and ascertained in that way the amount of the tremor. It is notorious that, with respect to astronomers, the very slightest tremor disturbs their observations. Still, no doubt, there is something susceptible, because, I think, the evidence upon that subject is quite distinct; although I doubt whether that would have been sufficient to have induced this court to have interferred, if it had rested upon that alone. I am disposed to think it would not, and if it stood there alone, I should have allowed the matter to stand for the plaintiffs to bring such action as they might be advised in a court of law, and I should have reserved the costs till I had ascertained whether substantial damages had been given in the action or not. That is what I should have done under the old system. I have quite made up my mind that it is proper to give a direction as to the stable, and therefore, although I do not think it right to grant an injunction upon that, it is quite fit to include the house in that direction, and to direct an inquiry as to what is proper to be allowed for damages for such injury as is inflicted upon the plaintiffs by the steam engine with regard to the stable, and also with regard to the house. I think the injury has been occasioned by the defendant, and he must pay costs of the suit up to and including the hearing; any further costs I shall reserve, and consider what I shall do with them. I shall direct that inquiry to be taken in chambers, and it will be dealt with in chambers subject to any appeal to me. ¡ the [V.C. W. Of course this does not interfere with the right which the plaintiffs may have, if they think fit, of carrying this case to a superior court for the purpose of obtaining a positive injunction, but I think the injury inflicted on the defendant would be greater than, under the circumstances, the plaintiffs are entitled to inflict, and that it could only be used, as is sometimes done, for the purpose of extorting larger damages than I think they would be entitled to receive; whereas, if I take the other course, I shall, according to my view of the case, subject to correction by a superior court, be able to give such damages as I think adequate compensation for the injury done. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Gregory and Co., for R. Stevenson, Hanley. Solicitors for the defendant, Milne, Riddle, and Mellor, for Hacker and Allen, Loek. V. C. WICKENS' COURT. Reported by EDWARD WINSLOW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Thursday, March 14, 1872. METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS v. MARQUIS OF SALISBURY. Thames Embankment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 93), 8. 62-Suit in equity-Award-CompensationAction at law-Injunction to restrain. Where, after an award had been made compensating the plaintiff for injury done to his property by the defendants, the plaintiff, considering that certain rights had not been included in the award, instituted a suit to enforce them, and at the same time commenced an action at law to recover the amount of compensation awarded, The court, at the instance of the defendants, granted an interim injunction to restrain the action until the hearing of the cause. THIS was a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs in the above suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from prosecuting an action at law for the sum of 10,645l. 18. 11d. The facts were these: By the 62nd section of the Thames Embankment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 93), "full and free rights of communication and access and egress at all times to and from the land reclaimed and inclosed" under the Act were reserved to the Marquis of Salisbury, "his heirs, sequels in right, or assigns," with respect to Cecil street and Salisbury-street, and the Board of Works were to "provide and construct such convenient means of communication therewith as might be necessary for giving to the Marquis, his heirs and assigns, and his, and their lessees and tenants, such access accordingly." Under subsequent Acts the embankment was laid out as a garden, and a claim was made by the marquis, under his reserved rights, to a carriage road to the embankment road from Cecil and Salisbury-streets. Matters in dispute relating to the question of damage and compensation for injury done to the marquis's inheritance, were referred to an arbitrator, who, in May 1871, awarded him the sum of 88751. for the injury to the inheritance, and 1770l. 1s. 11d. for interest thereon, making together the 10,645l. 1s. 11d. in question. The marquis considered that the award did not include his claim to the carriage-way, and V.C. W.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. MAYOR, &C., OF THE BOROUGH OF BATLEY. instituted a suit to enforce his right. The defendants, however, insisted that the 10,6451. 18. 11d. would not have been awarded, but on the consideration by the arbitrator that it covered the right of way. Pending the suit to enforce the grant of the carriage-way, the marquis brought an action at law to recover the sum awarded. The plaintiffs now moved as above. The question on the motion substantially was, whether the arbitrator had present to his mind when he made his award the 62nd section of the Act of 1862. Greene, Q.C. and Charles Hall, contended that the marquis must elect whether he would sue in this court for the carriage way, or at law for the compensation awarded. He could not continue proceedings in both courts. If he succeeded both at law and in equity, he would be compensated for that which he had never lost, and, in fact, would be paid twice over for the same thing. The whole of the question, under the 62nd section of the Act, was before the arbitrator, and there was no doubt that the sum awarded was intended as compensation for the want of carriage access. If a mistake had been made by the arbitrator, the court had jurisdiction to rectify it, especially as such mistake must have arisen through the misrepresentations of the marquis himself. The Board of Works were perfectly willing to allow the whole matter to be referred back to the arbitrator, but at all events they were entitled to ask that all proceedings in the action should be stayed until the result of the suit had been determined. They cited Penny v. Penny, L. Rep. 5 Eq. 227; 18 L. T. Rep. Duke of Buccleugh v. The Metropolitan Board of Re Dare Valley Railway Company, L. R. 6 Eq. 429; Eddis, Q.C. and W. W. Karslake, for the Marquis of Salisbury, argued that the court had no jurisdiction. It could not alter the award, except on the ground of mistake or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. There was nothing of that kind here. The award was made with full knowledge by the arbitrator of the provisions of the 62nd section, and without reference to the Marquis's right of access under it. The Marquis, therefore, had two distinct claims against the Board of Works, and was perfectly justified in the course he had pursued to establish them. If the Marquis succeeded in his action, the money was perfectly safe in his hands, and no injury would arise if it should be eventually decided that he was not entitled to it. The plaintiffs had altogether failed to establish a case for an interim injunction. They cited Read v. Victoria Station and Pimlico Railway Company, 32 L. J. 167, Ex. ; Mills v. The Master, Wardens, and Society of Bowyers, 3 K. & J. 66, 72; Brandon v. Brandon, 1 B. & P. 394. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I consider that the arbitrator's award includes compensation to the Marquis for the want of access to his property. The Metropolitan Board of Works say that according to the true construction of the 62nd section of the Thames Embankment Act the Marquis has no right to carriage access; the Marquis maintains that he has, and with the view of establishing his right has filed a bill in Chancery. He has also brought an action at law for the full amount awarded by the arbitrator. If he succeeds both in the suit and the action, he will be compensated for [V.C. W. what he has not lost. I consider that this court has jurisdiction to prevent the injustice of double compensation being recovered; and although perhaps it cannot set aside the award, still it will find some means of doing justice. I will therefore grant an injunction to restrain the action until the hearing of the cause, or further order, and the Board of Works must pay the money awarded into court. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, William Wyke Smith. Solicitors for the defendant, Nicholson and Herbert. Monday, March 18, 1872. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF THE BOROUGH OF BATLEY. Municipal Corporation Act (5 & 6 Will. 4, c 76), 8. 92-Borough fund-Purchase of chain for mayor out of-Injunction. The purchase of a gold chain for the mayor of a borough out of the borough fund is illegal. THIS was a motion on behalf of the Attorney General and the relators in the above suit, for an interim injunction to restrain the defendants, their council, treasurer, officers, and agents from purchasing, or otherwise providing out of the borough or district rates, or out of any other rates levied or to be levied for public purposes within the borough of Batley, a chain and badge, or any similar or other decoration for the personal use or adornment of the mayor for the time being of the borough. The facts were these : In Nov. 1871 the general purposes committee of the borough of Batley passed a resolution sug gesting to the town council the necessity of providing a gold chain for the mayor of the borough, and recommending that one should be purchased at a cost not exceeding 2001. Designs were afterwards submitted and approved, and at a meeting held on the 23rd Dec. a design for a chain and badge was selected. The chain was to be 48in. in length, to weigh 30oz., and to cost 2001. The emblems on the chain were to be a bale of wool, or shoddy, in the centre; a sheaf of wheat on the right, and a fleece on the left. It was also determined that the names of the past and present mayors, with their years of office, and the future mayors as they served the office, should be engraved on the chain. As soon as the resolution became publicly known in the borough several of the ratepayers objected to the purchase being made out of the borough rates, and a meeting was held, at which the proposal was condemned. Subsequently the question was formally put in the town council, and the result was that eleven voted in favour of the purchase, and eight against it. Thereupon the dis sentients instituted this suit to restrain the purchase as a misapplication of the rates. They now moved as above. The arguments principally turned upon the interpretation of the Municipal Corporation Act (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76), the 92nd section of which, after providing that all corporate property shall be brought within the borough fund, and applied, first to payment of debts contracted previously to the passing of the Act, then to the payment of the salaries of the borough officials, the costs of prosecutions, the main enance of the borough gaol, and the payment of constables, enacts that "all other expenses not herein otherwise provided for, which shall be ecessarily incurred in carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, and in case the borough fund hall be more than sufficient for the purposes aforesid, the surplus thereof shall be applied under the irection of the council, for the public benefit of the inhabitants, and improvement of the borough." Greene Q.C. and W. Barber, in support of the Potion, contended that the defendants had no power under the Act to expend the funds of the orough in the manner contemplated by the resolu: on. The defendants stood in the position of rustees with regard to the fund. They cited Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Lichfield, 11 Attorney-General v. The Mayor of Plymouth, 1 Attorney-General v. Mayor of Wigan, Kay 268; Karslake, Q.C. and Ince, for the defendants, after contending that the plaintiff's remedy, if ny, was by writ of certiorari in the Court of Queen's Bench, argued, on the construction of the Act, that the defendants were fully justified in charging the expense of the chain and badge upon the borough rates. They referred to, Reg. v. The Mayor of Warwick, 8 Ad. & E. 926 ; Attorney-General v. The Mayor of Wigan, 28 L. J. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I am of opinion that the borough fund is a trust fund held by the Corporation upon a public trust, which is not a charitable one. The Legislature has provided that in certain cases where there has been abuse in dealing with the fund the remedy shall be by writ of certiorari, and it has therefore been contended that the Court of Queen's Bench is the proper tribunal for dealing with the question in dispute. I consider, however, that this court has ample power, and is fully as competent to deal with a case like the present as a court of law, and that being so I shall certainly not send it to be tried over again before another tribunal. Then comes the question whether the proposed expenditure upon the chain and badge is within the terms of the Municipal Corporation Act. Giving the most liberal interpretation to the statute, and construing it so as to allow the Corporation, acting as trustees, every possible charge and every reasonable and justifiable latitude in reference to the due discharge of their duties, and allowing them everything which could be " reasonably" included in their costs, charges and expenses under the Act, I still find it impossible to hold that the expenditure in question is authorised by, or can be brought within the Act. It is said that the sum in dispute is so small as to be beneath the attention of the court; but it would be a matter of considerable regret if that were so. The money will have to be raised by a number of small payments, contributed by a number of persons of various positions in the social scale, and varying also in their pecuniary means; and it becomes the duty of the court to see that money so contributed is not wantonly spent or wasted. Forms and ceremonies, no doubt, have their uses, and some persons may be, and are, perhaps, more impressed by them than others. But to suppose that any reasonable human being [Q. B. would pay more respect to a mayor because he wears a gold chain, a chain bought for him out of the rates, a chain for which he has not paid himself, and which is not even, therefore, a proof of his own personal solvency, is a supposition beyond the possibility of belief. I have, in fact, throughout the argument, found great difficulty in regarding the case as a serious one; but as I have been asked to adjudicate upon it, and as-as I have already said the amount in dispute, though small, is no objection to the interference of the court, I shall grant an injunction in the terms asked, restraining the corporation from applying the borough funds in the manner proposed. Solicitors: Ridsdale, Craddock, and Ridsdale, for Chadwick and Son, Dewsbury; Edward Layton and Jaques. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by J. SHORTT and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barriste s-at-Law. Saturday, April 20, 1872. SECOND COURT. REG. v. ST. IVES UNION. Order of removal-Status of irremovability— The pauper, an old woman of seventy, had lived twenty-eight years in the parish from which she was ordered to be removed; during the last four years she was at intervals in the workhouse, and had no other place of residence. Upon leaving the workhouse in 1870, she was for six weeks in domestic service in the parish; after which, finding herself too old for such service she left, saying that she wished at any rate first to have a holiday. She stayed six days out of the parish with a son and a friend, both of whom were too poor to continue to entertain her. She then returned to the work house of the parish, from which she was afterwards removed to her place of legal settlement. Held, that this was not such a breach of residence as to destroy the pauper's status of irremovability in the removing parish, although she had no place of residence in that parish to which she could return, during her absence. Reg. v. Glossop Union (L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 227) discussed and qualified. THIS was an appeal against an order of removal, which was heard at the quarter sessions, held in and for the county of Middlesex on the 29th April 1871. The court confirmed the order, subject to the following case: The only question raised was, whether the pauper, Mary Parnell, was or was not removable from the parish of St. Matthew, Bethnall-green. The facts were that the pauper was about 70 years old, and was the widow of William Parnell; that she and her husband lived in St. Matthew for about twenty-four years, continuously, until March 1866; that owing to the illness of her husband she then went into the workhouse in that parish, into which also the husband was received a few months afterwards; that both were, from time to time, discharged and received again until the 23rd Dec. 1868, when the husband was removed to York Lunatic Asylum, where he died in Jan. 1869. Until that time both remained continuously in the parish of St. Matthew, and after the removal of the husband to the asylum, the wife remained in the workhouse of St. Matthew until the 24th Oct. 1870. She then went as a domestic servant into the service of the chaplain of the workhouse, who lived out of the workhouse, but in the same parish of St. Matthew. Before she went into his service she was supplied with a stock of clothes by the officials of the workhouse; she was hired as a yearly servant in the ordinary way. She continued in his service in the same parish for about six weeks, when being too old for service, she left the chaplain, saying that she wished at any rate first to have a holiday. Upon the day of leaving the chaplain, she took all she possessed, consisting of her clothes only, with her, and went to visit her son, who was living out of the parish, and stayed with him for three days. The son was a married man, had only one room, was very poor, and both he and his mother proved that she only went on a visit, with no intention of staying. Upon leaving the son she went on a visit in the same way to Mary Clarke, who also lived out of the parish, and there she stayed for three days. She then went for one day to a friend living in the parish of St. Matthew, and on the next went into the workhouse of that parish, where she remained until the making of the order. Whilst out of the parish of St. Matthew, Bethnal-green, she endeavoured to get employment, and if she had succeeded in getting employment out of the parish she would not have returned to that parish. When the pauper left Mrs. Clarke she asked Mrs. Clarke to let her, the pauper, know if she should hear of any work to suit her, and said she was going back into the workhouse. The respondents contended that a break in the residence was established by her absence from the parish during these two periods of three days each, inasmuch as it could not be said that she was constructively resident in St. Matthew, Bethnalgreen; she having no house or residence in that parish during such absence to which she could return. The appellants contended that there was no break, inasmuch as she did not leave with the intention of residing out of the parish, but simply to visit friends temporarily. The question for the court is: Was there a break in the residence or not? If there was a break, the order to be confirmed. If not, the order of sessions and the original order to be quashed. Poland, for the respondents, relied upon the case of The Queen v. Glossop (L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 227), in which Blackburn, J., said, "There must be both a place which he has a right to return to and an intention to return, to constitute a constructive residence; and where a man has gone away and left no residence, though he means to return at a future time, the animus revertendi is immaterial." This was in accordance with the previous cases of Hartfield v. Rotherfield (17 Q. B. 746), and Reg. v. The Stourbridge Union (34 L. J. 179, M. C.); and contained a clear and definite principle which would be more useful for the guidance of quarter sessions than the various considerations required by the case of The Guildford Union v. St. Olave's Union (25 L. T. Rep. 803). Metcalfe appeared for the appellants. BLACKBURN, J.-We need not trouble Mr. Metcalfe. The question is whether this pauper was constructively residing for a year before she became chargeable in the respondent parish. She was not bodily present in the parish during six days out [Q. B. of the year. I think myself that when a person is clearly shown to have been residing in a parish, the onus of proof is upon those who wish to establish that a break of the residence has occurred. Prima facie, no doubt, the fact of departure is evidence of a break of residence; this, however, may be rebutted by proof of an intention to return When an actual residence is abandoned, as, for instance, when a house, which has been occupied. is given up altogether, the presumption is strong that there is no intention to return. In the same way, when a house is retained, there is strong ground for assuming that the occupier intends to return. But neither of these things is of itself absolute proof of intention. The real test of a break of residence is whether the person going out of the parish entertains an intention to remai! away permanently or for some indefinite time. I think in the case of Reg. v. Glossop the woman's intention was to come back to the place of her residence only in case she should be discharged from her service; and the fair inference was that she intended to stay away indefinitely. If, as in this case, a person leaves a parish with no object but to pay a short visit, I think we may infer that there was no intention to stay away indefinitely. There must always be a difficulty in deciding a matter of more or less, but it would be monstrous to hold that a definite intention of being absent for a few days only should create a break of residence merely because there is no particular house to which the absent person has a right to return. Mr. Poland properly pressed upon us the language which I am reported to have used in Reg. v. Glossop; but whatever words I actually used in that case, I was conscious at the time, and I am clear now, that those contained in the report are not the law; all that I meant to say was that the fact of having a residence or no residence to return to should be a strong element in determining the intention to return. A complete break of resi dence would be established if the person departing had begun to reside elsewhere, or even if he had gone away with a clear intention to reside out of the parish in which he had been stationed. A dwelling-house to which he might return must be an important element in determining what was his intention, but is not essential for either conclusion. Here, I think, there was no break of residence, and the order must be quashed. HANNEN, J.-I am of the same opinion. It appears that the pauper intended to have a few days of holiday before going back to the workhouse of her parish. This is what I understand from the case, and I do not think she meant to continue her absence long enough to constitute a break of residence. QUAIN, J.-I also am of the same opinion. Each case must depend upon its particular circumstances. Here the old woman had lived continuously in the parish of St. Matthew without relief for twenty-four years; for six years afterwards she remained in the parish, and was at intervals in the workhouse. Being unable to carry out some employment which she had found in the parish, she said that before she returned to the workhouse she would have a holiday at any rate; and if she could find work to suit her, she seems to have meant to take it. But she found no work, and after six days' absence she returned, as she intended, to the workhouse. It would, in my opinion, be a very sad thing if we were bound to |