Q. B.]

ceeded ex parte, and have convicted. But that they did not do, but they acted upon the plea of guilty without hearing the evidence. It is most likely that the defendant being very ill, and not able to go to Hastings, wished his father to go for him, and the father accordingly went down and did as he thought the best for him. The evidence, however, seems to show that the son gave the father no authority either to employ an attorney or to plead guilty.

MELLOR, J.-There is no doubt that the justices convicted upon the plea of guilty, and that there was no authority from the son for pleading in that way. The first idea of so pleading emanated from the attorney; the son himself denied that he did the act complained of maliciously. It would be very strange, under these circumstances, to infer that he really intended to plead guilty.

HANNEN, J.-I quite concur with the rest of the Convictions quashed.

court.

Attorneys for the defendant, Stocken and Jupp.

SECOND COURT.
Wednesday, Jan. 25, 1871.

(Before MELLOR and LUSH, JJ.) LEWIS (app.) v. ARTHUR AND ANOTHER (resps.). Salmon Fishery Act 1865, 88. 33, 36-Licensed persons having the assistance of persons who are not licensed.

Under the provisions of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, a licence may be granted to a person for the use of a net for catching salmon, and a penalty is imposed upon any person for using a net without such licence.

A. and B. had each a licence for the use of a net, and on a certain day they and the two respondents were together using two coracle nets, each of which required the assistance of two persons. A. and B. were using one net, and the two respondents, who had no licence, were using another. The justices (upon an information against the two respondents) found that no fraud was intended, and as one of the licencees would have conferred the right to the assistance of one of the respondents, and the two licences therefore would have protected all four of the parties, they dismissed the information: Held, that they were right.

THIS was a case stated under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, upon a dismissal by justices at petty sessions of an information for an offence under the Salmon Fishery Act 1865, as follows:

At a petty sessions of Her Majesty's justices of the peace of the county of Carmarthen, in and for the Carmarthen petty sessional division in the said county, the 30th July 1870, Henry Arthur and Evan Harris, fishermen, the respondents, were charged upon information laid by Thomas Lewis, water-bailiff, the appellant before us, the undersigned, four of Her Majesty's said justices, for having, on the 19th July 1870, at or near Cynastanog, in the parish of Llangunnor, in the said county of Carmarthen, unlawfully used a coracle net for catching salmon in the river Towy, within the Carmarthen Bay fishery district, without then and there having a proper licence for the same, contrary to sect. 36 of the Salmon Fishery Act 1865.

The respondents used together, it is admitted, a

[Q. B.

coracle net, which is a net that can only be used by or between two persons at the same time in coracles, and a licence of the value of 11. 10s. is required to so use a coracle net in the said district. It appeared that there were fishing at the same time and place as respondents two other men, named Lewis and Evans, who each held a licence in his own name of the value of 11. 10s. Thus Lewis and Evans had two licences, while the respondents had none, at least not in their own names at the time, but it was also proved that Evans's licence was obtained and paid for by Arthur, with whom he had been accustomed to fish, and it was admitted that had Arthur been fishing with him or Lewis, or had Harris been fishing with Evans or Lewis, that no offence had been committed contrary to the penal enactment in the section referred to, as the licences granted in the names of Lewis and Evans to use each a coracle net with a partner or assistant, would have respectively protected the partner or assistant from incurring any penalty.

Considering, therefore, that if Evans's licence had been granted to Arthur who obtained it, it would have exonerated Harris; that there were but two nets used; that there were two licences with two of the fishermen authorizing the use of coracle nets, and that there was in fact no fraud by the use of an extra net or otherwise, we dismissed the information against the respondents, who we held were legally assisting two licensed persons to use two coracle nets. Whereupon the said appellant being dissatisfied with our determination erroneous in point of law, has duly applied to us in writing to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and grounds of such determination for the opinion thereon of Her Majesty's Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench, which we hereby state and sign accordingly.

as

Given under our hands this 6th day of August 1870, at the Shire Hall, Carmarthen.

JAMES JOHN HAMILTON, Bart.
ISAAC HORTON.

ROBERT BARRETT.

E. M. DAVIES.

By the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, the Salmon Fishery Act 1865, sect. 33, a licence is to be granted in fishery districts to the person named therein in respect of all fishing weirs, fishing mill-dams, putts, putchers, nets, or other instruments or devices, except rods and lines, whereby salmon are caught; and by the 36th section a penalty not exceeding 201. is imposed upon any person for a violation of such section.

The

McIntyre appeared for the appellant. licence is a personal one, and the name of the party is inserted in it. [LUSH, J.-He may have an assistant.] That is so, as it is necessary that there should be two persons in order to use the net. But although a licensed person may have the assistance of a non-licensed person to assist him with the net, he cannot authorise an unlicensed person to use a net. There must always be a licensed person with the net. [MELLOR, J.-There were four persons fishing with two nets, two of the persons having licences. The justices may have thought that there was a sufficient number of licences.] But it is not clear that they were all acting in concert. [LUSH, J.-The finding of the justices must be taken to establish that they so acting. Certainly we cannot say that

were

The using of a net which is of itself bonâ fide not an instrument used peculiarly for catching salmon, and which is not fixed for the purpose, but which is fixed to the soil in tidal waters within the limits of a salmon fishery district, does not come within the penalty of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, s. 11. Lyne v. Leonard, L. Rep. 3 Q. B.156; 18 L. T. Rep, N. S. 55; 16 W. R. 562, distinguished. THIS was a case stated under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, upon a refusal by justices to convict. The case stated that at a petty sessions holden at Wareham, in the county of Dorset, an information preferred by Charles Dawswell Watts, of Holme Bridge, in the county of Dorset, water bailiff of the river Frome salmon fishery district (hereinafter called the appellant), against William Lucas, of Stoborough, in the county of Dorset, labourer (hereinafter called the respondent), under sect. 11 of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, intituled An Act to amend the Laws relating to Fisheries of Salmon in England, charging "for that he, the said William Lucas, on the 25th July last, at the parish of Arne in the said county, was then the owner of certain fixed engines, to wit, two nets, which were then unlawfully placed for catching salmon and fish in certain water there, called the estuary of the river Frome, and the same engines were so placed for several hours, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided," was heard and determined by us, the said justices, the said parties respectively being then present, and upon such hearing we dismissed the information.

Upon the hearing of the information it was admitted by the respondent that he fixed into the mud with poles two nets, one four feet deep and forty-six feet long, the other two feet deep and thirty-six feet long, with meshes of about one and a half and one inch, one net being placed higher up the stream than the other, and that the place was within the tidal waters, as stated in the information. But it was alleged by the respondent that the nets were so placed for the purpose of catching mullet and other fish not of the genus salmon; and no evidence of a contrary character was tendered by the appellant. It was contended by the attorney for the appellant, that the mere fixing of any description of net in a fishing dis

[Q. B.

trict was of itself illegal, and that the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, s. 39, enacting, "fixed engines shall in this Act and the Salmon Fishery Act 1861 include any net or other implement for taking fish fixed to the soil," was made to amend the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, by using the word “fish” instead of salmon, and the case of Lyne v. Leonard, (16 W. R. 562; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 55), was quoted. The magistrates decided that if the instrument used had been one of those named in the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, s. 36, as requiring a licence, as a putt, putcher net, or other instrument or device for catching salmon, it would have been clearly illegal to use it without a licence, though there may be no further proof of intention to catch a salmon; but that if the fixed engine be bona fide not an instrument peculiarly meant for catching salmon, in order to bring its use within the operation of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, there must be some sort of evidence that the fixed engine (such as the net now in question) was placed for the purpose of catching salmon.

The question of law upon the above facts is, whether the using of a net, which is of itself bonâ fide not an instrument used peculiarly for catching salmon, and which is not fixed for that purpose, but which is fixed to the soil in tidal waters within the limits of a salmon fishery district, comes within the operation of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, s. 11.

By the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, s. 11, it is enacted

that

No fixed engine of any description shall be placed or used for catching salmon in any inland or tidal waters; and any engine placed or used in contravention of this section may be taken possession of or destroyed; and any engine so placed or used, and any salmon taken by such engine shall be forfeited, and in addition thereto the owner of any engine placed or used in contravention of this section shall for each day of so placing or using the same incur a penalty not exceeding 101.; and for the purposes of this section a net that is secured by anchors or otherwise temporarily fixed to the soil shall be deemed to be a fixed engine; but this section shall not affect any ancient right or mode of fishing as practised at the time of the passing of this Act by any person by virtue of any grant or charter or immemorial usage: Provided always, that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed to apply to fishing weirs or fishing mill dams.

By the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, s. 36, it is enacted that

From and after a time to be appointed as aforesaid, in a fishery district, any person using within that district any fishing weir, fishing mill dam, putt, putcher, net, or other instrument or device, not being a rod and line, for catching salmon, without having a proper licence for the same, shall be liable to a penalty of not less than double the amount to be paid for the requisite licence, and not exceeding 201.

The 39th section enacts that

Fixed engine shall in this Act and the Salmon Fishery Act 1861, include any net or other implement for taking fish fixed to the soil, or made stationary in any other way, not being a fishing weir or fishing mill dam.

Pinder appeared for the appellant. The justices were wrong in declining to convict, for the respondent came within the meaning of the 11th section of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109 and sect. 39 of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, as using a net, which is a fixed engine. [LUSH, J.-You must take the whole of the interpretation in the 11th section of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, "no fixed engine of any description shall be placed or used for catching salmon." This net was not used for that purpose.] The 36th section of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121 is general in its application, and the 39th section

makes a net a "fixed engine." [MELLOR, J.That only defines what is a "fixed engine.” LUSH, J.-The offence consists in the purpose for which the net is used.] The decision in Lyne v. Leonard (L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 156; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 55; 16 W. R. 562) is in point. There it was held that the bare use of instruments and devices for catching salmon, enumerated in sect. 36, is sufficient to render an unlicensed person using them liable to the penalty, without evidence that they were used for the purpose of taking salmon. [MELLOR, J.-We must take it from the finding of the justices, that the net was not intended to catch salmon.] Then it must be taken not to be within the 11th section. [Mellor, J.--We must not read it as prohibiting the use of all nets, but merely those which are intended to catch salmon. The 39th section of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, does not enlarge the offence, but the articles whereby it may be committed.] The net was capable of catching salmon, and is within the mischief of the statute.

No counsel appeared for the respondent. MELLOR, J.-Although I have entertained some doubt upon the case, upon the whole I have come to the conclusion that upon the facts the justices came to the right conclusion. The offence is created by the 11th section of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, which enacts that no fixed engine of any description shall be placed or used for catching salmon. Then we have the 36th section of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, which enacts that from and after a time to be appointed any person using within a fishing district any net, &c., for catching salmon, without having a licence is to be liable to a penalty; and then the 39th section further defines the meaning of a ‘fixed engine.” Now I do not think that this latter enactment was intended to alter the character of the offence, but only to put an end to any doubt as to what was to be considered to be a "fixed engine." We must, I think, regard the words "for catching salmon." This case is distinguishable from the one cited, for there the instrument was really calculated to catch salmon, though made to act otherwise. The case is somewhat imperfectly stated, but I think the justices were right.

LUSH, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that the case of Lyne v. Leonard is distinguishable from the present one. The 33rd section of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121 provides for the granting of licences; then the 36th section provides the penalty for using a net without a licence. In the case cited, the defendant put down seventy putts, but alleged they were for shrimps and flat fish only. He alleged that he had placed some circles of wire in them to prevent salmon from passing into them, and which he could put in at any moment. The justices in that case refused to convict, because they thought that he did not intend to catch salmon. This court, however, said that such evidence was not necessary. I take it that in the present case the justices have found that the net in question was not such a net as is within the 39th section--that it is not such a one as requires a licence. This, not being a net for the purpose, but capable of taking salmon, the question is, were the justices right? That brings us to the 36th section of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121. The offence there consists in the purpose for which the net is used. Now I think we must read this section with the 39th. The offence itself is left as

it was before. If the Legislature had intended to have excluded all nets which might be capable of catching salmon, they would so have expressed themselves. I think, therefore, that, according to their finding of the facts, the justices were right in their decision. Judgment for the respondent. Attorneys for the appellant, Sole, Turner, and Turner.

Saturday, Jan. 28, 1871.

THE WEST LONDON EXTENSION RAILWAY COMPANY (apps.) v. THE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE OF THE FULHAM UNION AND THE OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF THE PARISH OF FULHAM (resps.)

Order of reference-12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 13 (Baines's Act)-Award-Costs.

An appeal against a poor rate having been entered and respited, the sessions ordered, with the consent of the parties, that "the matter in dispute" should be referred to the Queen's Counsel named to inquire into and arbitrate thereon.

Pending the award, the “hearing and determining the appeal" was formally adjourned from sessions to sessions. The arbitrator awarded that 'the appeal be dismissed and that the appellants do pay to the respondents their costs of the said appeal." The Court of Queen's Bench on a motion of the appellants granted a rule directing the arbitrator to strike out the part of his award relating to costs, on the ground that the order of reference conferred no power upon him to give them. An application to the sessions to order the payment of the respondents' costs was refused, and a rule having been obtained for a mandamus commanding the sessions to give such costs as they might think fit:

Held, that the reference was in fact ordered under Baines's Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 13), that the sessions, having parted with their jurisdiction to the arbitrator, had no power to add to or alter his award, but that their judicial functions were at an end, and they had merely the ministerial duty to perform of entering the amended award as their judyment.

Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 380, followed. AN appeal, entered at the Middlesex Quarter Sessions, by the West London Extension Railway Company, against a rate for the relief of the poor of the parish of Fulham, was respited from time to time until the 20th Feb. 1869, when the sessions made an order, the material part of which was as follows:

It is . . . . ordered that the hearing and determining the matter of an appeal between the appellants, and respondents, touching a certain rate or assessment made on the 1st May 1868 . do stand further adjourned until the next general quarter sessions of the peace, to be holden ... on Monday the 5th April next. And it is further ordered by and with the consent of counsel on both sides, that the matter in dispute between the appellants and respondents herein shall be referred to John Gray, Esq., one of Her Majesty's counsel learned in the law, to inquire into and arbitrate thereon, the said several parties agreeing and consenting to abide the report of such his arbitration. And it is further ordered that notice in the mean time be given unto the assessment committee of the Fulham Union and the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Fulham, that they, and all persons concerned do attend the court at the Guildhall, Westminster, on Friday. the 30th April next, at the hour of ten in the forenoon of

the same day, to hear and abide the judgment and determination of the said court touching the said appeal.

The "hearing and determining the matter of the appeal" was adjourned from sessions to sessions by successive formal orders, and on the 28th Jan. 1870, the arbitrator made his award, which contained the usual recitals and concluded thus: "Now I do make my award of and concerning the premises as follows:-I do award and order that the said appeal be dismissed, and that the appellants do pay to the respondents their costs of the said appeal, to be taxed by the proper officer of the court of quarter sessions in the usual manner. In witness," &c.

This award was sent back to the arbitrator by the Court of Queen's Bench, to be amended, on the ground that the sessions had not given him authority to award costs in their order of reference: (The West London Extension Railway Company v. The Assessment Commitee of the Fulham Union, &c., 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 523; L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 361.) The amendment was made accordingly by striking out so much of the award as gave costs. After further regular adjournments of the appeal, an application was made on the 14th May by the respondents to the sessions, to adopt the award, and that as the appellants had entirely failed in their appeal the court would, in accordance with its invariable rule and practice, order the payment of the respondents' costs of the said appeal to be made by the appellants. The question as to costs having been argued by counsel on both sides, the sessions, after another adjournment, decided that their remaining duty was ministerial only, ordered that the award should be enrolled as the judgment of the court, and refused the application on the part of the respondents as to the costs of the appeal.

A rule was afterwards obtained calling on the justices to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to enter continuances upon the said appeal, and at the next general quarter sessions to proceed to consider, award, and order such costs, as by the justices in their discretion should be thought reasonable, to be paid by the appellants to the respondents.

Against this rule,

Field, Q.C., Poland with him, showed cause.— The case was undoubtedly referred under Baines's Act: (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45 (a.) Before that enactment there was no power to refer: (Thorp v. Cole (a) Sect. 13. It shall be lawful for any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace before which any appeal, with certain exceptions, shall be brought to order, with the consent of the parties or their attorneys, that the matter or matters of such appeal be referred to arbitration to such person or persons, and in such manner and on such terms as the said court shall think reasonable and proper; and such order shall be made a rule of the Court of Queen's Bench on the application of either party; and the award of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or umpireage of the umpire, may, on motion by either party, at the sessions next or next but one after such award or umpireage shall have been finally made and published, or after the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, on any motion for setting aside the same, be entered as the judgment of the court of general or quarter sessions in the appeal, and shall be as binding and effectual to all intents as if given by the said court: Provided always, that the Court of Queen's Bench may, if it thinks fit, on application within the term next after the making and publication of such award or umpireage, either refer the case back again to the same arbitrator, arbitrators, or umpire, or wholly set aside the award or umpireage already made, and may in the latter event order the court of general or quarter sessions to enter continuances and hear the appeal.

2 C. M. & R. 367.) It was deemed to be a reference under Baines's Act when the former rule was argued in this court: (The West London Extension Railway Company v. The Assessment Committee of the Fulham Union (sup.) It is, however, now suggested by the respondents, that the award of the arbitrator was but a report. Yet they applied to the sessions to enrol "the award." Moreover the appellants made the order of sessions a rule of court under sect. 13 of the above Act, and no objection was made. Next a rule nisi was obtained to strike out such part of the award as related to costs, and this court made the rule absolute, on the ground that power had not been given to the arbitrator to award them. The court then called on

66

a

Huddleston, Q. C., and Castle, in support of the rule. There were successive adjournments, the quarter sessions continuing seised of the appeal. If this had been a reference under sect. 13 of Baines's Act alone there would have been no necessity to adjourn, for it has been held that from the time when a reference under that section is ordered the court of quarter sessions has only a ministerial duty to enter the judgment: (Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 380; 6 B. & S. 531.) When the matter was referred to Mr. Gray, it might have been referred under the old system. [BLACKBURN, J.— But you cannot construe this order as a conventional agreement such as you allude to.] In Rex v. Harding (2 Salk. 477), the court held that judge of Nisi Prius, by consent of parties, may make a rule to refer a cause, but the sessions cannot do so though by consent. They may refer a thing to another to examine, and make report to them for their determination, but cannot refer a thing to be determined by the other," and the same proposition is laid down in Nolan's Poor Law (4th edit., vol. 2, p. 547). Now here they adjourned the appeal, and referred "the matter in dispute," the parties agreeing to "abide the report," the very words used in Ree v. Harding (sup.). [BLACKBURN, J.-If the question referred had been one of figures only they might have referred it to an accountant, but they refer it as a matter of law to "John Gray, Esq. . . . one of Her Majesty's counsel learned in the law."] It may be that the sessions thought it convenient that a legal arbitrator should apply the law to the facts, and report thereon, but kept their jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the appeal. [MELLOR, J. But the arbitrator orders the appeal "to be dismissed."] There may have been an omission of the sessions to insert a power as to costs in the order; but they can now remedy the hardship resulting therefrom by giving costs. They had a power to deal with the report when it came back to them. The award was made by the arbitrator, then at the next sessions counsel for the appellants applied to the court to "adopt the report,' and the court "further adjourned the appeal to the next quarter sessions, and ordered that the parties should attend to hear and abide by the judgment and determination of the said court touching the said appeal." In Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (sup.), Cockburn, C.J., says: "I do not agree with the respondents' counsel that the court of quarter sessions may respite the appeal from sessions to sessions, and then take into consideration the matters already referred to arbitration, and affirm and annul such part as they think right. There is no provision of that sort; the

Q. B.]

[C. P.

award or umpirage having been made at the next sessions, or next but one, the court is to be moved not to make any order respecting it, but to enter it as the judgment of the court of quarter sessions before whom the appeal came on to be determined." Where the sessions retain their jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter, as they have done in this instance, they have power when the report comes back to deal with it. pose they had said in express terms, "We do not intend this to be a reference under Baines's Act ?" If they have not reserved jurisdiction over the appeal, they have reserved it over the question of costs by respiting from time to time. In Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (sup.), "the appeal was referred; but here only "the matter in dispute," and there is a distinction. Nor in this case are the sessions asked to exercise any discretion or to do more than to make the usual order according to their practice, that the costs shall follow the event.

BLACKBURN, J. —I think it is quite clear that this rule must be discharged. The moment it is understood what the order of quarter sessions really was, the case is plain. Now before Baines' Act the quarter sessions had no power to refer a matter at all. They might, by agreement, say that some question of fact, or even of law, might be referred to an individual who should report to them, and whose judgment they would take as their own, they making their award accordingly. But they could make no reference, and therefore the arbitrator could not be brought before this court for what he did. The whole matter must have been done privately. Then Baines' Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45) by sect. 13 enacts, that the court of quarter sessions may make an order with the consent of the parties that the matter of an appeal "be referred to" any arbitrator, and the award of the arbitrator may on motion

by either party at the sessions next or next, but one after such award shall have been finally made and published, or after the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench on any motion for setting aside the same be entered as the judgment of the court of general or quarter sessions in the appeal, and shall be as binding and effectual to all intents as if given by the said court." Nothing can be clearer when one reads that section, even without reference to cases, although Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (sup.), and the former decision of the court in the present appeal, are both express authorities on the point, that where there is a reference of this kind it may be brought before the Queen's Bench but after it has been altered all the quarter sessions have to do is to enter it, and they cannot vary it. Taking it that the quarter sessions did make the order whereby they said they adjourned this matter to a future day-that might have been necessary, but would do no hurt and then they proceed, and it is further ordered " that the matter in dispute . . . shall be referred to John Gray, Esq.. to inquire into and arbitrate thereon, the said several parties agreeing and consenting to abide the report of such his arbitration." That one word "report" formed the basis of an argument which Mr. Huddleston endeavoured to urge upon us. It seems to me that is not sufficient, and that the quarter sessions intended to refer the whole matter to Mr. Gray, and thereby parted with their jurisdiction.

LUSH, J.-No one can doubt the intention of the parties that this should be a reference under Baines's Act; indeed, if it were not so, the court would have had no power to do what they did when the case was before them. It was conceded on both sides that it was a reference under the Act. That being so, I am clearly of opinion that the quarter sessions had no power to add to or alter the award; so soon as they made the order of reference under the Act their judicial functions were at an end, and the duty only remained of entering the award when made. The case of Reg. v. The Justices of West Riding of Yorkshire (sup.) is directly against the respondents' argument. There the quarter sessions had referred a question of law in a rating case to this court, the parties agreeing that on our judgment being given the question of fact should be referred to an arbitrator; therefore, the judgment on the law was that of the quarter sessions. The arbitrator on the facts had made his award, and the court of quarter sessions confirmed his award, with costs to the respondents. On taxation of costs the clerk of the peace refused to allow so much of the costs as related to the reference, on the grounds that the sessions had no power to give them; and the Court of Queen's Bench held that he was right in so doing. That was the only point decided and is expressly against this application.

Rule discharged.

Attorney for the appellants, W. Haggerty, Attorney for the respondents, J. Alley Jones.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by M. W. MCKELLAR, and H. H. HOCKING, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Thursday, Jan. 26, 1871.

SIMPSON (app.) v. SMITH (resp.) Metropolis Local Management Acts Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 75-General line of buildings-Line fixed by architect-Powers of magistrate.

Under sect. 75 of the Metropolis Local Management Acts Amendment Act 1862, it is a necessary preliminary to the jurisdiction of the magistrate that the superintending architect of the Metropolitan Board of Works for the time being should have fixed the general line of buildings for the street in which the person against whom proceedings are taken under the section is alleged to have built beyond the general line; but the magistrate, before