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[Q. B. was nothing in the Highway Acts to prevent his the authorities upon it. The case of Lowen v. Kaye building on his own land within 15ft. of the centre (4 B. & C. 3) was decided upon 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, ss. of the highway, providing that he did not build 6 and 64, by which a person was liable to a penalty if upon the highway or boundaries thereof, and it he “shall encroach by making any hedge, ditch, or was also contended that as the walls were built on fence on any highway;" it was held that upon an the village green, and at the distance from the action for trespass against the surveyor for pulling metalled road above stated, but leaving no more down a fence which plaintiff had erected, so that than a width of 16ft. between wall and wall, and the road was only 24ft. wide, a proper question that as the part of the green on which the walls for the jury was whether the fence was erected on were built (though open ground) had never, as the the highway, or on the plaintiff's soil. By 5 & 6 appellant contended, been dedicated to the public Will. 4, c. 50 (The Highway Act 1835), s. 63," where, as a highway to any greater extent than the whole in this Act, any matter or thing is directed or forgreen had been dedicated, the walls were not built bidden to be done within a certain distance of the upon the highway or sides thereof, so as be an en- centre of a highway, that portion of ground shall be croachment within the meaning of the Acts, and deemed and taken to be the highway which has been therefore that the appellant ought not to have been maintained by the surveyor as highway and reconvicted.
paired with stones or other materials used in formThe justices, however, being of opinion that the ing highways for the six months immediately prewalls had been built upon the sides of the high- ceding." And by sect. 69 a penalty is imposed, if way, leaving only a width of 16ft. between wall
any person shall encroach by making or causing to and wall, and that the appellant had thereby en- be made any building, hedge, ditch, or other fence, croached on the said highway within the meaning on any carriage way or cartway within the distance of the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 101, s. 51; and being also of 13fi. from the centre thereof." Under this Act, of opinion that hy reason of such encroachment it was held that the erection of a building within the said highway had been reduced in width to 15ft. of the centre of a carriage way which has less than 30ft. between the fences on each side been repaired by the surveyor for the six months thereof, within the meaning of the said section, preceding, but not on any part of the highway gave their determination against the appellant in which has been lately used for passage, is not an the manner before stated.
encroachment of which justices can take sumThe question for the opinion of the court is, mary cognisance : (Chapman v. Robinson, 1 E. & whether, upon the facts above stated, the appellant | E. 25.) “ The encroachment,” Wightman J. said was justified in building the walls in question, only in his
in his judgment, “must be within
15ft. leaving a width of 16ft. between wall and wall
, or of the centre of the highway, and also was bound to leave a space or roadway of the upon that which is highway.” Another auwidth of 30ft.
thority upon this 69th section is that of Maule J., If the court should be of opinion that the appel- who summed up, in an action against a surveyor for lant was not justified in building the walls as pulling down a fence built by the plaintiff by which stated in this case, the conviction is to stand, but the highway was rendered only 22ft. wide : "In order if the court should be of opinion otherwise, the in- that a fence put up by a party should come formation is to be dismissed.
within the provisions of the statute that has been Field, Q. C. (with him Herschell) argued for the cited, two things must concur, the one, that it must appellant.—The section under which the appellant be within 15ft. of the centre of the road, the other, was convicted is the 51st of the Highway Act 1864 that it must be on the road. If an encroachment (27 & 28 Vict. c. 101.) “From and after the passing was made by putting up a fence at the edge of a of this Act, if any person shall encroach by making road as wide as Portland-place, that would not be or causing to be made any building or pit or hedge, within this enactment, because it would not be ditch or other fence, or by placing any dung, compost, within 15ft. of the centre of the road. So if the or other materials for dressing land, or any rubbish, road was under 30ft. wide, and the encroachment on the side or sides of any carriage way or• cart- was at the side of it, but not on the road, it would way, except for the purpose of improving the on that ground not be within the 69th section of road, and by order of the highway board, or where the Highway Act. Here we find that there is a there is no highway board, of the surveyor, he road running along this line, but that the two shall be subject on conviction for every such offence places inclosed never were parts of that road, as no to any sum not exceeding 40s., notwithstanding carriage ever did or could go along the steep that the whole space of 15ft. from the centre of bank at The Pound, or over the rough uneven such carriage way or cartway has not been main- ground at Nichols; and if these places at which tained with stones or other materials used in form- the fences were put up have never either of them ing highways: and it shall be lawful for the justices been used by the public as a part of the road, the assembled at petty sessions, upon proof to them surveyor had no right to pull down the fences, bemade upon oath, to levy the expenses of taking cause they were within 15ft. of the centre of the down such building, hedge, or fence, or filling up road : (Evans v. Oakley Car. & Kir. 125.) Now, such ditch or pit, and removing such dung, com- under the last Act of 1864, there is certainly a post, materials, or rubbish, as aforesaid, or restoring change in the language, but the question is the injury caused by the removal of such soil or whether the change is so extensive as to meet this turf, upon the person offending. Provided always There must be an encroachment, which, that where any carriage way or cartway is fenced according to Jacob's Law Dictionary, “Signifies on both sides, no encroachment as aforesaid shall an unlawful gaining upon the right or possession be allowed whereby such carriage way or cartway of another man." There must, therefore, be some shall be reduced in width to less than 30ft. be- injury to the rights of the public, which the buildtween the fences on each side.” To understand ing of these walls cannot be, unless this the effect of this provision, it is necessary to con- been dedicated to the public. According to the sider the previous legislation on the subject, and case there has been no such dedication. (BLACK
[Q. B. BURN, J.-Your argument is, that although sect. 51 to meet the case of a highway wider than the of the Act of 1864 was passed to overrule Chapman metalled road. And the true construction of the v. Robinson, it was not intended to overrule Evans statute is, not that it should include the case of v. Oakley ?] Yes.
building upon rough or waste land by the side of Manisty, Q.C. (with him Cave) for respondents.- the road, which could not possibly be used by the In some cases it may be difficult to decide what is public, but it is intended for the case of building the side of a road, but it is clear that in this sec- upon t' at part of a highway which is not metalled tion the side must mean something different from or gravelled, but which has been dedicated to the the carriage way or cartway itself. In Grove v. public. This is reasonable ; for the rough ground West (7 Taunt. 39), cited in the note to Evans v. by the side of the road might be such as could Oakley, Gibbs, C.J, said: “ Primâ facie the pre- never have been part of the highway, and it would sumption is, that a strip of land lying between a be a confiscation of the owner's property to hold highway and the adjoining close belongs to the that he could not build upon it. But it would be owner of the close, as the presumption also is that reasonable that, whatever was part of the highway, the highwav itself ad medium filum viæ does. But though not gravelled, should be protected and prethe presumption is to be confined to that extent ; served for the public, and this would be no interfor if the narrow strip be contiguous to, or com- ference with the rights of the owner, who has, municate with open commons or larger portions indeed, abandoned all his rights to the strips by of land, the presumption is either done away or the side of the road when he dedicated them to considerably narrowed; for the evidence of owner- the public. There could be no hardship or injusship, which applies to the larger portions, applies tice in this; and by putting such a construction on also to the narrow strip which communicates with the Act, the fair and proper objects of the Legisthem." It must be a question of fact in every lature would be attained, and all rights and intecase how far a strip by the road is the side rests would be reconciled and regarded. Applying of the road, and here in effect the jus- this principle to the present case, the land by the tices have found that the public had a side of the road, which formed no part of the right to use the land enclosed by the appel. highway, was not within the enactment, and therelant. [COCKBURN, C.J.—The words of the case do fore the magistrates were wrong in convicting not mean that the whole green is a highway, but the appellant for an unlawful encroachment on the they are express that the public have not exercised highway, if, as we understand the case, the pieces any greater or other right of passage over the of grass between the new walls and the metalled grass adjoining the metalled road than they have road had never been dedicated to the public. over the rest of the green. MELLOR, J.-The BLACKBURN, J.-I also think that the magistrates justices do not find that these strips were dedicated have here mistaken the meaning of this Act, but to the public.] They find that it was used by :he I consider that theirs is a very natural mistake to public. [MELLOR, J.-Yes; but they tell us the fall into. When a highway exists of which a part kind of user, in order that we may judge of its only is metalled road, it is generally a question of effect.] Taking the case as it is, clearly this is fact how much between the fences is included in not like Evans v. Oakley, where the strip by the the highway. Primâ facie, the whole of it is highside of the highway could not be used as a road. way, but this may be rebutted by evidence, and Lord Denman said, in Elwood v. Bullen (6Q.B. 409): the facts of this case seem to show that none “Where a highway passes through an inclosed but the metalled part of this green was highway. country, it is not the formed road merely (whether Now at common law encroachments on the highof pavement, gravel, or other material), but the way, whether it was gravelled or not, were unlawful whole space from fence to fence which is the high- and indictable. The early statutes, giving magis. way; and an obstruction in any part is equally the trates summary jurisdiction (13 Geo. 3, c. 78 and subject of an indictment. The extent of a highway, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50) were restricted to the metalled where it passes over a common, is frequently still or gravelled part. The two cases cited (Chapman more indefinite to the right and left of what may
v. Robinson and Evans v. Oakley) were clearly be the ordinary passage. Even if your Lordships right. The recent Act simply adopted the principal hold that the side of a carriage way, to be within of the common law, and related to the whole highthe Act must be dedicated to the public, I would way, gravelled or not. But it did not go beyond ask that the case should be sent back to the magis. the boundaries of the highway, and therefore the trates, in order that they may find the facts on that magistrates in this case were wrong. The Legispoint. [BLACKBURN, J.--I see nothing in the case lature had a right to take away people's rights to show us that the public had any right to go without compensation, but it was not to be over the grass upon which the walls are built.] presumed that they had done so without clear and
Cockburn, C.J.-In this case I am of opinion express words to that effect. To have taken any that the conviction was wrong, and that there was land which was no part of the highway wo ild have no encroachment on the appellant's part within had this effect, and that construction did not the meaning of the 51st section of the Act of 1864. appear to be required to carry out the object of the It is suggested by Mr. Field that this provision Act. The phrase, "on the side or sides of the was not intended in any way to interfere with or highway," therefore, was to be confined to those limit the ruling of Maule, J. in Evans v. Oakley, parts which belonged to the highway. The conand I think that its object certainly was rather to viction, therefore, will be quashed. meet the circumstances of Chapman v. Robinson, MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think and to set aside that decision so far as it was that it was not the intention of the Legislature to thereby held that this erection of a building by the take away any person's property. Therefore, if on side of a highway was not an encroachment, unless the sides of the carriage way there were any the place upon which it was built had been pieces of land not included in the highway, they lately used for passage. It seems to me that the were protected from the penalty of encroachment; recent enactment on the subject was merely meant but if they were pieces of land by the sides of the
GAINSBOROUGH Union (apps.) v. WELCH (resp.)
highway, and forming part of that which had been spent in each year in maintaining drainage works. dedicated to the public, the owner of the neigh. No portion of it is expended in constructing new bouring soil had no right to build upon them. works, or in paying back money borrowed in Here I agree that there is no evidence of dedica- former years, or in interest on such moneys. tion to the public, and I think the magistrates have Without such drainage rate the drainage works misinterpreted the Act.
by which the land occupied by the respondent is Judgment for appellant. drained could not be maintained. Attorneys: Pattison, Wigg, and Co.; and J. L. Without such drainage works as those just Tomlin, for J. R. Tomlin, Richmond, Yorkshire. mentioned, the land occupied by the respondent
would be under water at certain seasons of the GAINSBOROUGH UNION (apps.) v. Welch (resp.).
year, and could not be maintained in its present
state, and the annual value thereof would be conThe Parochial Assessment Act (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), siderably diminished.
8. 1-Eepenses necessary to command rent- In assessing the respondent to the above poor Drainage rate under Local Act—Taces payable by rate, no deduction or allowance whatever was made landlord.
for or in respect of the said drainage rate of 291. 58. By the Everton Drainage Act 1860 the owners and pro- in arriving at the net rateable value. In other reprietors of land in Nottinghamshire were charged spects the respondent admits that the assessment is with embankment and drainage works, without proper and just. But the respondent appealed which the annual value of the neighbouring lands against the rate to the justices in special sessions would be considerably diminished. The rutes so for the petty sessional division of East Retford charged were made payable by the occupiers, who on the ground that he was entitled to deduct the
were authorised to deduct the amount from their rent: said sum, and the said justices decided that he was Held, that the average annual cost of the works so entitled.
ought to be deducted from the occupier's rent, in The present appellants then appealed to the order to estimate the net annual value under the Court of Quarter Sessions, upon the ground that Parochial Assessment Act 1836.
no deduction whatever ought to be made for or in On appeal from the decision of justices in special respect of the said drainage rate, and the appeal sessions in the matter of a poor rate, the Court was heard at the adjourned Quarter Sessions for of Quarter Sessions confirmed the decision of the
the county of Nottingham, held at Newark, on the said justices, subject to the following case :
24th day_of Oct., 1870, before John Evelyn The respondent is a farmer and occupier of cer- Denison, Esq., chairman, and a bench of magistain lands in the parish of Misterton, in the poor trates. The said Court of Quarter Sessions, under law union of Gainsborough, and the Duke of Port- the circumstances above mentioned, thought that land is the owner and proprietor of the said lands. the expenses of maintaining such drainage works Under the provisions of a local Act (23 & 24
were expenses necessary to maintain the said land Vict. c. cliv.), called the Everton, &c., Drainage in a state to command the rent at which the said Act 1860, which is to be taken to form part of this land was assessed in the said rate, and gave judgcase, and which was “ An Act to Consolidate into ment for the respondent; but granted this case one Act and to Amend, Extend, and Enlarge the for the Court of Queen's Bench, and ordered that Powers and Provisions of the several Acts for the costs of the appeal and of this case should Embanking and Draining certain Low Lands and abide the event. Grounds in the Parishes or Townships of Everton, The question for the opinion of this court is, Scaftworth, Gringley-on-the-Hill, Misterton, and whether the said drainage rate of 291. 58. ought to be Walkeringham, in the county of Nottingham, and deducted from the gross estimated rental of the to make further and better Provision for such said lands. Embankment and Drainage,” the said lands in the If the court should be of opinion that the reparish of Misterton, so occupied by the respondent spondent is entitled to the said deduction, the order as aforesaid, became liable to be rated, and have of sessions to be confirmed. been rated, under the 58th section of the said Act, If the court should be of opinion that the rein each year since the passing of the said Act, for
spondent is not entitled to the said deduction, the the purposes for which the said Act was passed, in order of sessions to be quashed. the sum of 291. 58., and a similar rate will be Cave (with him Mellor) for respondent.—The required in future years.
question in this case arises under the Parochial The Duke of Portland, the owner and proprietor Assessment Act 1836 (6 & 7 Will 4, c. 96), s. 1, of the said lands as aforesaid, has duly paid the which enacts that “no rate for the relief of the said sum when required, and the same has not poor in England and Wales shall be allowed by been paid by the respondent at any time.
any justices, or be of any force, which shall not The respondent was rated in the poor rate be made upon an estimate of the net annual value appealed against, which was made in accordance of the several hereditaments rated thereunto; that is with the valuation list then in force for the parish to say, of the rent at which the same might reasonof Misterton, as under:
ably be expected to let from year to year, free of all usual tenant's rates and taxes, and tithe commutation rentcharge, if any, and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain them in a state to command
such rent.” By the 62nd section of the local Act, Brian S.
“The tenant or occupier of any lands and grounds Land 148 3 22 147 5 9 132 10 0 7 14 7 embanked and drained, or intended to be em.
banked and drained by virtue of this Act, is hereby The whole rate raised under the said Act is authorised and required to pay such sum and sums
A. R. P.
£ s. d. £ s. d.les.d.
KNARESBOROUGH UNION (apps.) v. PATELEY BRIDGE UNION (resps.)
of money, not exceeding half a year's accruing rent, expense, which is necessary to keep off water, is as shall be asse -sed, taxed, or charged upon the not ejusdem generis with insurance, which is necesowner or proprietor of any such lands or grounds sary to keep off fire. It is also said that repairs in his occupation, and to deduct the same out of and insurance are expenses which vary in each parhis rent then due or accruing due; and every ticular estate, and that this is an expense which tenant or occupier who shall make such payment applies in the same way to all the neighbouring shall be acquitted and discharged for so much farms, which are compelled to club together to money as the sum he shall so pay shall amount defray them in shares proportionate only to their unto, as if the same had been actually paid unto extent. The Legislature has imposed this rate the person to whom his rent was due and pay | primarily upon the occupiers, but for certainty able." This deduction is claimed by the respondent, in the distribution of the burden the owners are not as a tenant's rate, but under the last branch of liable. This is like the case of Rex v. Adames, and the above section of the Parochial Assessment Act, I do not see why these expenses should not be deas expenses necessary to maintain the land in a ducted from the assessment in the same way as state to command the rent. The case finds that, the sewers rate was deducted there. without these drainage works, the annual value of MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. The apthe land would be considerably diminished. pellant's argument is, that unless they are incurred [Stopped by the court.]
for tenant's rates or taxes, no expenses ought to be Lawrance and Horace Smith argued for the ap- deducted from the estimated rental. The last part pellants.-All expenses to be deducted from the of the section, however, must also be considered; estimate must be ejusdem generis with those which and we should deduct the other expenses upon the are expressly mentioned in the section. The dis- lands which are necessary to maintain them in a tinction between these drainage expenses, and re- state to command the rent. These drainage er. pairs or insurance, is that the latter are expenses penses are clearly necessary to command the rent, which a tenant would have to calculate upon and it is not material in my opinion whether they as the cost of his holding, additional to the rent, are paid by the tenant or the landlord. It seems whilst the former is a tax expressly imposed upon to me that these expenses are certainly in printhe landlord, and payable by him, whether his land ciple ejusdem generis with those expressly menis let or not, for the benefit, not of his own land tioned. only, but also for the whole district. The tenant's
Judgment for respondent. expenses, which are to be deducted from the esti- Attorneys for appellants, Thomas H. and A. R. mate, vary according to the nature of the tenement Oldman. and the land in each case, but the cost of drainage Attorneys for respondent, C. and J. Allen and to each proprietor depends only upon the quantity Son, for Newton and Jones, East Retford. of land which he owns. In the case of Reg. v. Vange (3 Q. B. 242), the appellant had received a grant of land in fee, subject to a liability to keep up an embankment which was necessary to main.
KNARESBOROUGH Union (apps.) v. PATELEY BRIDGE tain the lands in the neighbourhood in a state to
UNION (resps.) command the rent from a tenant, or to be capable Status of irremovability of a pauper-Breach of of occupation by the owner; it was held that the
residence-Legal right to return. appellant was rateable to the poor for the full In June 1868 a pauper sold off some of her furniannual value of his land, without deduction on ture, and removed the rest to a spare room in the account of the expense of the embankment. house of her brother-in-law, with whom she stayed [BLACKBURN, J.—The question there seems to have off and on until Jan. 1869. She then went array, been whether the whole expense of the embank- and stayed with other relations and at an infir ment ought to be deducted from the appellant's mary in other unions until after September of the assessment, and not whether he had a right to year, when she returned to the house of her brotherhave his proportion deducted.] Certain deductions in-law as before. In May 1870 she took a cottage were allowed in Reg. v. Hall Dare (5 B. & S. 785), in the same union as that of the house in which but the reasons given by the court for allowing she was staying, and put her furniture into it. In them do not apply to this case.
the following month she became chargeable to the here are analogous to the salary of a curate: (Reg. union. v. Sherford, L. Rep. 2 Q. B. 503.) The case of Rec. The quarter sessions found that the pauper had V. Adames (4 B. & Ad. 60) is distinguishable from no legal right to return to the house of her this, in that the sewers' rate there considered was brother-in-law after her departure in Jan. 1860; imposed only on some of the lands in the parish. and therefore held that she had not acquired a
BLACKBURN, J.-I think this annual cost of status of irremovability in that union. draining these lands is one of the “expenses reces- The court sent the case back, in order that the justices sary to maintain them in a state to command the might find as a fact whether or not her brother-inrent.” From the facts found in the case, it ap- law intended, when she went away, to receire her pears that this farm is part of a wet fen, in order again as before ; and intimated that their judgto cultivate which it is necessary to maintain these ment would depend upon that fact. drainage works. By the local Act the cost of the Upon appeal to the Epiphany Quarter Sessions for works is apportioned among the landlords of the the West Riding of Yorkshire, held at Wakefield. district, and the Duke of Portland pays his pro- on the 2nd Jan. 1871, against an order for the reportion for this estate. Why is not this an ex- moval of Alice Slinger, a pauper, from the Pateley pense necessary to maintain the land in a state to Bridge Union to the Knaresborough Union, the command the rent? It is contended that all such sessions confirmed the order, subject to the expenses must be ejusdem generis with those of opinion of the court on the following case :-which the annual costs are expressly deducted in At the trial of the appeal before the sessions it the section; but I am unable to perceive why this was proved that Alice Slinger, the pauper was
Gill (app.) v. Bright (resp.)
legally settled in the Knaresborough Union. The think they were, the order of sessions confirming appellants then relied on a ground of appeal, the order of removal is to stand. If otherwise, both which alleged that Alice Slinger had gained a orders are to be quashed. status of irremovability in the Pateley Bridge Maule, Q.C. and Waddy appeared for the responUnion by the requisite residence, actual or con- dents. These absences of the pauper from the structive, of one year.
respondents' union were sufficient to constitute a It appeared that the pauper, who had previously break of residence fatal to her status of irremov. resided in Leeds, gave up her house in that town ability in that union. In Reg. v. Glossop Union in June 1868, and sold off some of her furniture. (13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 672; L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 227), it On the 22nd of the same month she came to the was held that a pauper's intention to return was house of her brother-in-law, Mr. Hainsworth, who immaterial when she had no residence of her own is a farmer residing in Bishop Thornton, a township to return to. And in Reg. v. Stourbridge Union within the Pateley Bridge union. The remainder (34 L. J. 179, M. C. ; 12 L. T. Rep. N. Š. 542), a of her furniture was brought to his house, where pauper left a parish in which he had occupied it was stowed away in a spare room which the lodgings, intending to return as soon as his trade pauper did not occupy, and she lived there till became better; he did not retain his lodgings, Christmas 1868, except during several short but left some old clothes there in the hands of the periods, which she spent at the houses of her landlord, and in his absence his lodgings were not brother, Mr. Stead, also of Bishop Thornton, and occupied, and he could have had them at any time of Mr. Ellis, of Clint, a township adjoining Bishop on his return. After three months' absence he Thornton, and in the same union. As one of the returned. It was held that the pauper was not witnesses said, “she moved about among her constructively resident in the parish during the relations."
three months, and that the absence formed a break In Jan. 1869 the pauper left Mr. Stead's, where in the residence. [BLACKBURN, J.-The case finds she was then staying, and was absent from the that this pauper had no legal right to return, but union for six weeks, on a visit to a nephew, who it does not state whether her friends would receive resides at Knaresborough, in the appellant's union, her or not.] for the purpose of keeping house for him, in con- Campbell Foster appeared for the appellants, but sequence of his sister's temporary absence, but
was not heard. returned to Mr. Stead's, at Bishop Thornton, and remained in the union either with Mr. Hainsworth,
BLACKBURN, J.-It is not necessarily a legal or with Mr. Stead, or with Mr. Ellis, with
right to return which constitutes a constructive
residence sufficient to create a status of irremov. a short interval in which she paid a visit to a female relative at Harrogate, for the purpose of ability. It would be monstrous to say that an
absence of this kind would be a break of residence, nursing her in her confinement) till the end of September. Owing to an accident she was taken
if not only this pauper herself, but the relations to the infirmary at Leeds, without the union, where
whom she left, entertained an intention that she she remained five weeks, after which she stayed in
should come back. If, however, her relations had Leeds on a visit to her daughter for a fortnight.
at the time of her last departure in Jan. 1869 no Whilst with her daughter at Leeds she applied to
intention to receive her again to live with them as be admitted into the institution of the Sisters of
before, she would come within the rule of Reg. v. Mercy there, but did not succeed in her application,
Glossop Union and Reg. v. Stourbridge Union. and ultimately returned to the Pateley Bridge Union,
On this point the case ambiguous, and must go
back to be restated. With this intimation the going first for a night or two to Mr. Ellis, of Clint, because neither Mr. Hainsworth nor Mr. Stead
justices will probably be able to dispose of the
matter. could receive her just then, but afterwards living
MELLOR, J. concurred. partly at Hainsworth's, and partly at Stead's, until May 1, 1870, when she took a cottage in the same
Attorneys for appellants, Paterson, Snow, and
Burney, for Powells, Knaresborough. union, and removed her furniture to it. She had no agreement or legal title to live either at Mr.
Attorney for respondents, John Scott. Hainsworth's or Mr. Stead's, but it appeared that she was allowed to live with them as a poor relation out of charity. On the 20th June 1870, she became
Wednesday, Nov. 15. chargeable to the Pateley Bridge Union.
SECOND COURT. It was not contended, on behalf of the respondents, that the pauper had not actually lived
Gill (app.) v. Bright (resp.) sufficiently long in their union to give her a status Wine and Beerhouse Act Amendment Act 1870 of irremovability by construction, if she were, (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29), 8. 15-Seizure and sale of under the circumstances, capable of possessing liquors in suspected houses--Right of owner to be such an animus revertendi as would give rise to heard. a constructive residence during the periods of The Wine and Beerhouse Act Amendment Act 1870, absence above set forth. But it was argued that sect. 15, gives a justice power upon information to the pauper, not having before May 1870 had any grant a warrant to seize liquors in a suspected abode of her own, or place of residence in the house, and provides that "
any liquor seized in anion to which she had a right to return, had not pursuance of this section shall be sold in such resided there within the meaning of the Acts manner as two justices in petty sessions may creating and defining irremovability, and could direct.' Two justices refused to allow the owner not have such animus revertendi thither.
of some liquor, seized under this section, to be heard The sessions confirmed the order, subject to a in explanation, or to cross-examine the informer, case.
and ordered the liquor to be sold. The question for the opinion of the court is Held upon a case stated, that the words of the section whether they were right. If the court should implied that the owner should have an opportunity