Q. B.]

of money, not exceeding half a year's accruing rent, as shall be asse sed, taxed, or charged upon the owner or proprietor of any such lands or grounds in his occupation, and to deduct the same out of his rent then due or accruing due; and every tenant or occupier who shall make such payment shall be acquitted and discharged for so much money as the sum he shall so pay shall amount unto, as if the same had been actually paid unto the person to whom his rent was due and payable." This deduction is claimed by the respondent, not as a tenant's rate, but under the last branch of the above section of the Parochial Assessment Act, as expenses necessary to maintain the land in a state to command the rent. The case finds that, without these drainage works, the annual value of the land would be considerably diminished. [Stopped by the court.]

Lawrance and Horace Smith argued for the appellants. All expenses to be deducted from the estimate must be ejusdem generis with those which are expressly mentioned in the section. The distinction between these drainage expenses, and repairs or insurance, is that the latter are expenses which a tenant would have to calculate upon as the cost of his holding, additional to the rent, whilst the former is a tax expressly imposed upon the landlord, and payable by him, whether his land is let or not, for the benefit, not of his own land only, but also for the whole district. The tenant's expenses, which are to be deducted from the estimate, vary according to the nature of the tenement and the land in each case, but the cost of drainage to each proprietor depends only upon the quantity of land which he owns. In the case of Reg. v. Vange (3 Q. B. 242), the appellant had received a grant of land in fee, subject to a liability to keep up an embankment which was necessary to maintain the lands in the neighbourhood in a state to command the rent from a tenant, or to be capable of occupation by the owner; it was held that the appellant was rateable to the poor for the full annual value of his land, without deduction on account of the expense of the embankment. [BLACKBURN, J.-The question there seems to have been whether the whole expense of the embankment ought to be deducted from the appellant's assessment, and not whether he had a right to have his proportion deducted.] Certain deductions were allowed in Reg. v. Hall Dare (5 B. & S. 785), but the reasons given by the court for allowing them do not apply to this case. The expenses here are analogous to the salary of a curate: (Reg. v. Sherford, L. Rep. 2 Q. B. 503.) The case of Rec. v. Adames (4 B. & Ad. 60) is distinguishable from this, in that the sewers' rate there considered was imposed only on some of the lands in the parish.

BLACKBURN, J.-I think this annual cost of draining these lands is one of the "expenses reces sary to maintain them in a state to command the rent." From the facts found in the case, it appears that this farm is part of a wet fen, in order to cultivate which it is necessary to maintain these drainage works. By the local Act the cost of the works is apportioned among the landlords of the district, and the Duke of Portland pays his proportion for this estate. Why is not this an expense necessary to maintain the land in a state to command the rent? It is contended that all such expenses must be ejusdem generis with those of which the annual costs are expressly deducted in the section; but I am unable to perceive why this

[Q. B.

expense, which is necessary to keep off water, is not ejusdem generis with insurance, which is necessary to keep off fire. It is also said that repairs and insurance are expenses which vary in each particular estate, and that this is an expense which applies in the same way to all the neighbouring farms, which are compelled to club together to defray them in shares proportionate only to their extent. The Legislature has imposed this rate primarily upon the occupiers, but for certainty in the distribution of the burden the owners are liable. This is like the case of Rex v. Adames, and I do not see why these expenses should not be deducted from the assessment in the same way as the sewers rate was deducted there.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. The appellant's argument is, that unless they are incurred for tenant's rates or taxes, no expenses ought to be deducted from the estimated rental. The last part of the section, however, must also be considered; and we should deduct the other expenses upon the lands which are necessary to maintain them in a state to command the rent. These drainage expenses are clearly necessary to command the rent, and it is not material in my opinion whether they are paid by the tenant or the landlord. It seems to me that these expenses are certainly in principle ejusdem generis with those expressly mentioned. Judgment for respondent. Attorneys for appellants, Thomas H. and A. R. Oldman.

Attorneys for respondent, C. and J. Allen and Son, for Newton and Jones, East Retford.

KNARESBOROUGH UNION (apps.) v. PATELET BRIDGE UNION (resps.)

Status of irremovability of a pauper-Breach of residence-Legal right to return.

In June 1868 a pauper sold off some of her furni ture, and removed the rest to a spare room in the house of her brother-in-law, with whom she stayed off and on until Jan. 1869. She then went away, and stayed with other relations and at an infirmary in other unions until after September of that year, when she returned to the house of her brotherin-law as before. In May 1870 she took a cottage in the same union as that of the house in which she was staying, and put her furniture into it. In the following month she became chargeable to the

union.

The quarter sessions found that the pauper had no legal right to return to the house of her brother-in-law after her departure in Jan. 1869; and therefore held that she had not acquired a status of irremovability in that union.

The court sent the case back, in order that the justices might find as a fact whether or not her brother-inlaw intended, when she went away, to receive her again as before; and intimated that their judg‐ ment would depend upon that fact.

UPON appeal to the Epiphany Quarter Sessions for the West Riding of Yorkshire, held at Wakefield, on the 2nd Jan. 1871, against an order for the removal of Alice Slinger, a pauper, from the Pateley Bridge Union to the Knaresborough Union, the sessions confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of the court on the following case:--

At the trial of the appeal before the sessions it was proved that Alice Slinger, the pauper was

legally settled in the Knaresborough Union. The appellants then relied on a ground of appeal, which alleged that Alice Slinger had gained a status of irremovability in the Pateley Bridge Union by the requisite residence, actual or constructive, of one year.

It appeared that the pauper, who had previously resided in Leeds, gave up her house in that town in June 1868, and sold off some of her furniture. On the 22nd of the same month she came to the house of her brother-in-law, Mr. Hainsworth, who is a farmer residing in Bishop Thornton, a township within the Pateley Bridge union. The remainder of her furniture was brought to his house, where it was stowed away in a spare room which the pauper did not occupy, and she lived there till Christmas 1868, except during several short periods, which she spent at the houses of her brother, Mr. Stead, also of Bishop Thornton, and of Mr. Ellis, of Clint, a township adjoining Bishop Thornton, and in the same union. As one of the witnesses said, "she moved about among her relations."

In Jan. 1869 the pauper left Mr. Stead's, where she was then staying, and was absent from the union for six weeks, on a visit to a nephew, who resides at Knaresborough, in the appellant's union, for the purpose of keeping house for him, in consequence of his sister's temporary absence, but returned to Mr. Stead's, at Bishop Thornton, and remained in the union either with Mr. Hainsworth, or with Mr. Stead, or with Mr. Ellis, with a short interval (in which she paid a visit to a female relative at Harrogate, for the purpose of nursing her in her confinement) till the end of September. Owing to an accident she was taken to the infirmary at Leeds, without the union, where she remained five weeks, after which she stayed in Leeds on a visit to her daughter for a fortnight. Whilst with her daughter at Leeds she applied to be admitted into the institution of the Sisters of Mercy there, but did not succeed in her application, and ultimately returned to the Pateley Bridge Union, going first for a night or two to Mr. Ellis, of Clint, because neither Mr. Hainsworth nor Mr. Stead could receive her just then, but afterwards living partly at Hainsworth's, and partly at Stead's, until May 1, 1870, when she took a cottage in the same union, and removed her furniture to it. She had no agreement or legal title to live either at Mr. Hainsworth's or Mr. Stead's, but it appeared that she was allowed to live with them as a poor relation out of charity. On the 20th June 1870, she became chargeable to the Pateley Bridge Union.

It was not contended, on behalf of the respondents, that the pauper had not actually lived sufficiently long in their union to give her a status of irremovability by construction, if she were, under the circumstances, capable of possessing such an animus revertendi as would give rise to a constructive residence during the periods of absence above set forth. But it was argued that the pauper, not having before May 1870 had any abode of her own, or place of residence in the union to which she had a right to return, had not resided there within the meaning of the Acts creating and defining irremovability, and could not have such animus revertendi thither.

The sessions confirmed the order, subject to a

case.

The question for the opinion of the court is whether they were right. If the court should

think they were, the order of sessions confirming the order of removal is to stand. If otherwise, both orders are to be quashed.

Maule, Q.C. and Waddy appeared for the respondents. These absences of the pauper from the respondents' union were sufficient to constitute a break of residence fatal to her status of irremovability in that union. In Reg. v. Glossop Union (13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 672; L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 227), it was held that a pauper's intention to return was immaterial when she had no residence of her own

to return to. And in Reg. v. Stourbridge Union (34 L. J. 179, M. C.; 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 542), a pauper left a parish in which he had occupied lodgings, intending to return as soon as his trade became better; he did not retain his lodgings, but left some old clothes there in the hands of the landlord, and in his absence his lodgings were not occupied, and he could have had them at any time on his return. After three months' absence he returned. It was held that the pauper was not constructively resident in the parish during the three months, and that the absence formed a break in the residence. [BLACKBURN, J.-The case finds that this pauper had no legal right to return, but it does not state whether her friends would receive her or not.]

Campbell Foster appeared for the appellants, but was not heard.

BLACKBURN, J.-It is not necessarily a legal right to return which constitutes a constructive residence sufficient to create a status of irremovability. It would be monstrous to say that an absence of this kind would be a break of residence, if not only this pauper herself, but the relations whom she left, entertained an intention that she should come back. If, however, her relations had at the time of her last departure in Jan. 1869 no intention to receive her again to live with them as before, she would come within the rule of Reg. v. Glossop Union and Reg. v. Stourbridge Union. On this point the case is ambiguous, and must go back to be restated. With this intimation the justices will probably be able to dispose of the

Wednesday, Nov. 15.

SECOND COURT.

GILL (app.) v. Bright (resp.)

Wine and Beerhouse Act Amendment Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29), s. 15-Seizure and sale of liquors in suspected houses--Right of owner to be heard.

The Wine and Beerhouse Act Amendment Act 1870, sect. 15, gives a justice power upon information to grant a warrant to seize liquors in a suspected house, and provides that " any liquor seized in pursuance of this section shall be sold in such manner as two justices in petty sessions may direct." Two justices refused to allow the owner of some liquor, seized under this section, to be heard in explanation, or to cross-examine the informer, and ordered the liquor to be sold.

Held upon a case stated, that the words of the section implied that the owner should have an opportunity

of showing cause why his liquor should not be sold.

THIS was a case stated by two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the county of Devon, under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

On the 29th April 1871, Richard Bright, a police constable, deposed to an information which he laid before De Castro Fisher Lyne, Esq., a justice of the peace for the county of Devon, under the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 29, of which the following is a copy:

Devon to wit. The information and complaint of Richard Bright, of the parish of Stoke Gabriel, in the said county, police constable, taken this 29th April 1871, before the undersigned, one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the county of Devon, who saith that he he had reasonable ground to believe that certain fermented, distilled, or exciseable liquors or sweets are being unlawfully sold or kept for ale at certain premises in the occupation of one Thomas Gill, jun., at Churston Ferrers, in the said county, and he therefore prays that a warrant may be granted him to enter the said premises, and to search for and seize such liquors which there reasonable ground to suppose are in such premises or place for unlawful sale contrary to law. RICHARD BRIGHT. Taken and sworn before me on the day and year first above written, at Paington, in the said county.

DE CASTRO F. LYNE.

The said De Castro Fisher Lyne, Esq., as such justice of the peace, in the exercise of the discretion given to him by the said Act, thereupon issued his warrant to the said Richard Bright, authorising him to enter and search the premises of the said Thomas Gill the younger, and seize any exciseable liquors found thereupon. The said Richard Bright executed the warrant aforesaid on the 29th April last, and there found on the premises of the said Thomas Gill the younger, six pipes of cider, which he then seized and conveyed in safe custody.

On the 3rd May 1871, he, the said Richard Bright gave notice to the said Thomas Gill, the younger, under the hand and seal of Henry Studdy, Esq., one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county, that he the said Richard Bright would apply for an order for the sale of the said cider on Wednesday, the 10th May 1871, at the court room, Brixham, in the said county, when and where the said Thomas Gill the younger might attend and show cause why the said cider should not be sold, as the law directs.

On the said 10th May, two justices of the peace in petty sessions assembled at the court room at Brixham aforesaid, when the said Richard Bright, hereinafter called the respondent, for whom Mr. F. R. Carter, solicitor, of Torquay, appeared, and the said Thomas Gill the hereinafter younger, called the appellant, for whom Mr. Baker, solicitor, of Newton Abbot, appeared, were present; and the respondent gave the following evidence.

Richard Bright, having been duly sworn, saith: I am a police constable, living at Stoke Gabriel. I produce the information upon which I obtained the warrant against Thomas Gill the younger. I also produce the warrant. I went to Thomas Gill the younger on Saturday the 29th April 1871, at Churston Ferrers, the place indicated in the warrant. I saw Thomas Gill the younger there, and read the warrant to him. I went into the cellar and found five pipes of cider, which I believe were full. In a sixth pipe a tap was in, and so e gal. lons drawn. There were there also four empty pipes. I went and hired horses and trucks and took the cider to Churston Court, Mr. Rendle's farm, where it now is. I apply to the magistrates for an order for the sale of the oider so seized, and to direct how the proceeds of the sale may be applied.

[Q. B.

Whereupon the appellant's attorney proceeded to cross-examine the said respondent with a view to impeach the grounds on which the warrant had been granted, and also proposed to call witnesses for the appellant.

To this, objection was made by the respondent's attorney, and on referring to the Act under which they were proceeding, the justices allowed the objection of the respondent's attorney, and refused to permit the appellant's attorney to crossexamine the respondent, or to call his witnesses; and made the order directing a sale of the liquor seized pursuant to the Act, holding that the appellant by the statute had no locus standi in the court, and the summons or notice, served on him to appear and show cause why the cider so seized should not be sold, was unnecessary, and not contemplated or provided for by the Act.

Whereupon the appellant, being dissatisfied with this ruling as being erroneous in point of law applied to the justices pursuant to sect. 2 of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, to state and sign a case setting forth the facts, and the grounds of such determination as aforesaid for the opinion of this court.

The questions for the opinion of the court are, whether in point of law the said justices were right in refusing to allow the appellant, on the applica tion of the said respondent for an order to sell the cider so seized, to cross-examine the respondent on the facts on which the justice who granted the warrant had exercised his discretion, or for the alleged purpose of impeaching the proceedings taken by the justice who had granted the warrant aforesaid, or its execution; the justices considering that the cider having been seized under the warrant aforesaid, no further hearing of the case was contemplated by the Act, and that on the application by the respondent in petty sessions as aforesaid, they had no power delegated to them by the stat të beyond that of making an order for the sale of he cider.

Collins argued for the appellant.---By the Wine and Beerhouse Act Amendment Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29) s. 15, " Where an information on oath is made before any justice of the peace that there is reasonable ground for believing that any fermented, distilled, or exciseable liquors or sweets are being unlawfully sold or kept for sale at any premises or place for the retail whereat of fermented, distilled, or exciseable liquors or sweets no licence is in force, such justice may in his discretion grant a warrant under his hand to any superintendent, serjeant, or other officer or officers of police, by virtue whereof it shall be lawful for the officer or officers named in the warrant at any time or times within one month from the date thereof to enter, and, if need be, by force, the premises or place named in the warrant, and every part thereof, and to search for and seize any fermented, distilled, or exciseable liquors or sweets there found which there is reasonable ground to suppose are in such premises or place for the purpose of unlawful sale at such or any other premises or place; and if any person by himself, or by any other person acting by or with his direction, permission, or consent, refuse or neglect to admit to any part of any such premises or place any officer or person demanding admittance in pursuance of the provisions of this section, he shall be liable, upon summary conviction, to a penalty not exceeding 201. Any liquor seized in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall be sold in such manner as two justices in petty

sessions may direct, and the proceeds shall be applied in the same manner as penalties summarily imposed by the same justices for sale without a licence might be applied." Although this Act does not expressly say so, the last part of this section, the provision that liquor seized shall be sold, must be read as if words were interpolated to the effect "unless cause be shown to the contrary." Although silent on the subject, the Legislature could not have intended that in this matter the justices were to act contrary to the principles of natural justice. The object of the section seems to be to enable justices to seize liquors under suspicious circumstances, before the owner could conceal them; this object would be defeated if the owner had an opportunity to show cause before the warrant was issued. It cannot therefore be said that the proper time for the owner to be heard was at any other stage of the proceedings than that at which the justices here refused to hear the appellant. In Reg. v. Simpson (10 Mod. 250), Parker, C.J., said: It is more agreeable to the course of the common law that he (the defendant on a penal information) should be summoned." The cases of. Reg. v. Benn (6 T. Rep. 198), and Rex v. the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge (1 Str. 557), are to the same effect. There is also a more recent case, Cooper v. the Wandsworth Board of Works (8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 278; 32 L. J. 185, C. P.), where, under the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855, s. 76, a district board of works ordered a house to be demolished, in default of notice by the owner before he commenced building; it was held that the board could not legally do this without giving to the owner an opportunity of showing cause why the house should not be demolished. Willes, J., said: "Every tribunal invested with the power of affecting the property of her Majesty's subjects, is bound to give the parties against whom the powers are to be exercised an opportunity of being heard. This rule is universally applicable." [Stopped by the court.]

No one appeared for the respondent.

LUSH, J.-It is a clear and established rule of law and justice, that no one shall be subject to a penalty either upon his person or property, without an opportunity of being heard, and I think that rule applies to this case. The words of the section necessarily imply that the owner should have an opportunity of showing that the evidence upon which the warrant had been granted was not true, or of giving an explanation of the suspicious circumstances, before the justices make an order to sell.

HANNEN, J., concurred.

Judgment for appellant. Attorneys for appellants, Church, Son, and Clarke, for Francis and Baker, Newton Abbott.

CORE (app.) v. JAMES (resp.)

6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 8-- Conviction for using an adulterating ingredient in bread-Absence of guilty knowledge.

By 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 8, no baker or other person who shall make bread for sale, nor any journeyman or other servant of any such baker or other person shall use any mixture or ingredient as therein provided, upon pain that every such person shall pay a penalty, and it shall be lawful for

[Q. B.

the magistrates to cause the offender's name to be published in a newspaper. By sect. 9 a penalty is imposed upon any person who shall knowingly sell any such ingredient mixed with meal or flour. By sects. 12 and 13 a penalty is imposed upon a baker having such ingredients on his premises, and a remedy is given to a master against his servant, if the former be convicted in consequence of the fault of his servant.

Held, upon a case stated by magistrates, that a baker could not be convicted under sect. 8 of using an adulterating ingredient in making bread, unless he or his servant had guilty knowledge of such

use.

CASE stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

At a petty sessions holden at Bolton in and for the borough of Bolton in the county of Lancaster, on the 24th Dec. 1870, before three of Her Majesty's justices of the peace, acting in and for the said borough, James Core, the above-named appellant, was charged on an information laid by William James, the above-named respondent, being the inspector of nuisances and provisions to the local board of health for the borough of Bolton, "for that he the said appellant being a person making bread for sale beyond the limits mentioned and set forth in the Act of Parliament hereinafter mentioned, to wit, out of the city of London and the liberties thereof, and beyond the weekly Bills of Mortality, and ten miles of the Royal Exchange, did on the 16th Dec. instant in a certain shop in Newport-street, in Great Bolton aforesaid, use a certain mixture or ingredient, to wit, alum, in the making of certain bread for sale in such shop, such mixture or ingredient being other than and except such as are mentioned and enumerated in the second section of the statute made in the sixth and seventh years of the reign of his late Majesty King William the Fourth, chapter 37, intituled An Act to repeal the several Acts now in force relating to bread to be sold out of the city of London and the liberties thereof, and beyond the weekly Bills of Mortality, and ten miles of the Royal Exchange, and to provide other regulations for the making and sale of bread, and for preventing the adulteration of meal, flour, and bread beyond the limits aforesaid.'"

Evidence was given of the purchase of a loaf of bread in the shop of the appellant, and the appellant also admitted at the time that the loaf was his own making; the evidence in this respect being that when the loaf was bought on the 16th Dec., the witness who made the purchase said to appellant, "I want a two pound loaf of your own making." Further evidence was given that on analysis the said loaf contained 4097 grains of alum. The appellant also produced his baker, who, being duly sworn, deposed that the bread sold on the 16th Dec. was made by him from a sack of flour in appellant's shop; that he, the baker, did not put any alum in the flour, and that none could have got in without his knowledge; that he was the only person who made the bread; that he made it purely from the flour; and that no other person worked on the premises but himself.

In cross-examination of the analyst by the appellant's attorney, the following were the chief answers elicited by the attorney's questions:

"If the bread was pure and the flour impure, I should say the bread was not the production of that flour. The loaf in question came from impure

flour. The loaf might be impure from pure flour, as impurities might be added. I cannot say

whether the alum was in the flour before the bread was made. It might have been in the flour. I can give no opinion as to whether it was in the flour or the bread first."

The appellant's attorney contended that the Act of Parliament being highly penal, the utmost stringency should be exercised in the inquiry, and if the evidence was equally reconcileable with innocence as with guilt, the appellant ought not to be convicted, and, further, that beyond the simple finding of the alum in the loaf of bread in question there was no evidence whatever even of a prima facie character that the appellant had used the mixture, to wit, alum. And that the appellant was ready to give the name of the miller from whom he had, prior to the 16th Dec., the day of the alleged sale by him of the said loaf of bread, purchased wholesale ten sacks of flour, and produce a portion of the whole of what he had still on hand, so that the party really culpable might be reached, pursuant to the provisions of the 9th section of the Act of Parliament under which the appellant was sought to be convicted. The appellant's attorney further contended that the appellant was not a practical baker, and had only recently given up the trade of a tailor, and never took any part whatever in the making of bread.

The justices were of opinion that the appellant did use a certain mixture or ingredient, to wit, alum, in the making of the said bread for sale in such shop, and convicted the appellant in the sum of 51. and costs. The said appellant being dissatisfied with this decision, as being erroneous in point of law, made application in writing within three days to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and grounds of such determination for the opinion thereon of her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench at Westminster; and the said appellant having duly entered into the recognizances required by the said statute, the justices stated the following questions for the consideration of the Court of Queen's Bench :

1. Whether, supposing the said alum to have been mixed in the said flour previous to the purchase thereof by the appellant, the said appellant was entitled to his acquittal on the ground that he did not mix the said alum in the said flour. 2. Whether the fact of the said loaf of bread being upon the appellant's premises, admitted to be his own making that is to say, by the appellant admitting to the officer, Ratcliffe, that the bread was of his own making and containing alum mixed in the bread, was sufficient to ground a conviction "for using a certain mixture or ingredient, to wit, alum in the making of such bread."

The case had, at a previous hearing, been sent back to the justices in order that they should find as a fact whether the appellant knew that alum had been used in making this bread.

The justices amended the case as follows:"At the hearing of the case in question no evidence was adduced tending to prove the knowledge of the appellant that alum was used in the bread in question, and we did not find that appellant knew that alum was used in such bread.'

Baylis argued for the appellant.-The effect of the case and the amendment is that it must be assumed that neither the appellant nor his servant had any knowledge that alum was in this bread, and the question is whether the appellant can be

[Q. B.

convicted of using alum without this knowledge on the part of either of them. Sect. 8 of 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, enacts that "No baker or other person or persons who shall make bread for sale beyond the limits aforesaid, nor any journeyman or other servant of any such baker or other person, shall at any time or times, in the making of bread for sale beyond such limits, use any mixture or ingredient whatsoever, in the making of such bread, other than and except as hereinbefore mentioned, on any account, or under any colour or pretence whatsoever, upon pain that every such person, whether master or journeyman, servant or other person, who shall offend in the premises, and shall be convicted of any such offence by the oath, or in case of a quaker by affirmation, of one or more credible witness or witnesses, or by his, her, or their own confession, shall for every such offence, forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding 10., nor less than 51., or in default thereof shall, by warrant under the hands and seal of the magistrate or magistrates, justice or justices, before whom such offender shall be convicted, be apprehended and committed to the house of correction, or some prison of the city, county, borough, or place where the offence shall have been committed, or the offender or offenders shall be apprehended, there to remain for any time not exceeding six calendar months, with or without hard labour, from the time of such commitment, unless the penalty shall be sooner paid, as any such magistrate or magistrates, justice or justices, shall think fit and order; and it shall be lawful for the magistrate or magistrates, justice or justices, before whom any such offender or offenders shall be convicted, to cause the offender's name, place of abode and office, to be published in some newspaper which shall be printed or published in or near the city, county, borough, or place where the offence shall have been committed, and to defray the expense of publishing the same out of the money to be forfeited as last mentioned, in case any shall be so forfeited, paid, or recovered.". This publication is a punishment for something which the Legislature clearly intended to be considered as disgraceful, and although the word “knowingly” is not employed as in the 9th section with respect to selling, the word "use" must be taken to imply with intention. [LUSH, J.-Sect. 13 contemplates a master being punished for the act of his servant.] But it does not, therefore, follow that he should be liable for what was done in the ignorance of both of them. The baker may be liable under sects. 11 and 12 for having ingredients for adulteration on his premises without his knowledge, but the Legislature probably intended to distinguish such a proceeding from that of the innocent use of a mixture supplied to him by other people.

J. Edwards, for the respondent.-There is nothing in the words of the section to render proof of the baker's intention necessary to justify his being convicted for using adulterated flour. This and the other Acts concerning bakehouses and bread were passed to protect the public from imposition by that particular trade, and the Legislature has rendered it compulsory upon the bakers to exercise care in the use of their materials. It is for neglect of that duty the appellant has been convicted.

Baylis was not heard in reply.

LUSH, J.-I am of opinion that this conviction must be quashed. The question for our conside