Q. B.] were to be quashed; if otherwise, they were to be confirmed. But if the court should be of opinion that on the facts and the present summonses the magistrate ought to have made an order for the payment by the said Mr. Pound of part of the said amount assessed upon him, upon the ground that a portion only of the said highway is a new street, then the further question for the opinion of the court was, what part? and the order was to be amended so as to include such part only of the said amount; and the same as to the amount assessed upon Lord Northbrook. POUND AND LORD NORTHBROOK v. BOARD OF WORKS FOR PLUMSTEAD DISTRICT. Willis argued for the appellant, Mr. Pound.These claims by the respondents are based upon the provision in sect. 105 of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, for paving a new street. According to the interpretation clause, sect. 112, of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, this place cannot be a new street within the meaning of the Legislature, because the road upon which the houses front had previously been a highway repairable by the parish. According to the case of Reg. v. The United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Company (31 L. J. 166, Mag. Cas.), not only this eighteen feet of hard metal road, but the whole space between the hedges also formed part of the highway, and therefore no part of this Burnt Ash-lane could be a new street. This is not only the necessary interpretation of the words defining a new street, but it also appears to have been the intention of the Legislature so to limit the expression, from the provision at the end of the 98th section of the same Act, concerning "any road, passage, or way hereafter to be formed or laid out." This provision would be superfluous if it were not for the subsequent definition of a new street. This, too, is consistent with the case of Sawyer v. Paddington (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 662; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 164), where a part of Harrow-road, having been laid out for sewerage after 1862, was held to be a new street. There are analogous provisions under the Public Health Acts, and if this road were subject to a local board of health instead of the Metropolitan Board of Works, the appellants clearly, under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 69, would not be liable for this claim: Wallington v. White, 10 C. B., N. S., 128; Hirst v. Halifax Local Board, L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 181. [MELLOR, J.-The question is whether an old road cannot become a new street.] Even assuming this to be a new street, the board have no right to adopt the course they have taken. They are asking now for an amount, some of which was expended thirteen years before these summonses, and a part of which has already been contributed out of the rates paid by the whole of the ratepayers of the parish. Whitchurch v. Fulham Board of Works (L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 233). is an authority that the board can make only one apportionment on all the owners along an entire road, and the case finds that they claim for what has been long completed, and also for what they have now determined to do. Tayler, for the appellant, Lord Northbrook, relied upon the points argued for the other appellant, and further contended that Lord Northbrook was not an "owner" within the meaning of the 18 & 19 Vict.c. 120 s. 250. By that section the word "owner" shall mean the person for the time being receiving the rack rent of the lands or premises in connection with which the said word is used, whether on his own account, or as agent or trustee [Q. B. for any other person, or who would so receive the same, if such land or premises were let at a rack rent. These are merely private roads, which it would be impossible to let at a rack rent, and which can be only a source of expense to the owner. Brown, Q. C. (with him Barrow) for the respondents. [COCKBURN, C.J.-We will not trouble you on the first point; in our opinion this was clearly a new street within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Acts.]-With respect to the last point taken on behalf of Lord Northbrook, every private road increases the value of house property in the neighbourhood; these roads, therefore, may be taken to be connected with lands or premises belonging to him, or they would produce a rack rent to him if let to the neighbouring house owners. As to the second objection made by both the appellants, sect. 77 of the Act of 1862 provides that these expenses shall be recoverable either before the work shall be commenced, or during its progress, or after its completion. And the Court of Common Pleas held, in Vestry of Bermondsey v. Ramsey (L. Rep. 6 C. P. 247), that an unsatisfied judgment against a former owner of premises was no bar to a subsequent action against a succeeding Occupier. [BLACKBURN, J.-That does not relate to the apportionment. The facts stated are not sufficient to show us whether the board have claimed any expenses beyond those of a single apportionment. Unless the other side will consent to an additional statement with respect to that matter, it will be necessary to obtain further facts from the magistrate.] Some of these expenses were incurred before any apportionment was made, and as far as they are concerned it seems that the claim cannot be enforced. [BLACKBURN, J.—In that case, according to Whitchurch v. Fulham Board of Works, the whole of the apportionment is bad.] The Board desire to have the judgment of the court on the other two points for their future guidance. COCKBURN, C.J.-Mr. Brown gives up the claim of the Board of Words against the appellants upon the present apportionment, as he feels he is unable to establish their right to the whole of the amount they have claimed. There are, however, two questions upon which he desires to have our judgment as a guide for future assessments. The first is, whether this Burnt Ash-lane, having been a highway repairable by the parish at the date of the passing of the Metropolis Management Act 1855, can be considered a new street within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862. The second question is, whether Lord Northbrook, being the proprietor of certain private roads which open into this Burnt Ash-lane, can be considered an owner of land within the meaning of the 77th section of the Amendment Act of 1862. With regard to the first point, I entertain no doubt that this road, as it now is, constitutes a new street according to the intention of the Legislature. It is ground which was formerly a highway, but now has two sides covered with houses, so as to assume the character of what is generally called a street. The arguments urged on behalf of the appellants fail to convince my mind that the term as used in the Metropolis Management Acts does not include in its meaning such a place as this. The definitions do not show such omission, nor do the Acts anywhere exclude the application of the word street to that which would otherwise, without reference to the definitions, be a street in the general acceptation of the word. It is plain to my mind that a highway converted into a street is not distinguishable for the purposes of these Acts from a piece of land, not before kept in repair as a road, converted into a similar street. With regard to the other point, the 77th section of the Act of 1862 leaves no reasonable doubt that these pieces of ground which have been used as private roads were intended to be assessed for the payment of these rates. Lord Northbrook either receives compensation for the use of the roads from the occupiers of the houses, or they enhance the value of the neighbouring houses and lands. He has therefore a valuable enjoyment of the roads in the same way as if they were lands which he might let. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. The first point made by the appellants is that this was at the time of the passing of the Act of 1855 a country lane repairable by the parish; and therefore, although it was subsequently converted into that which would be called a street in the natural acceptation of the term, yet it could not be considered a "new street" according to the technical definition of that expression. The Metropolis Management Act 1855, by sect. 105, enacts that, "In case the owners of the houses forming the greater part of any new street laid out or made, or hereafter to be laid out or made, which is not paved to the satisfaction of the vestry or district board of the parish or district in which such street is situate, be desirous of having the same paved, as hereinafter mentioned, or if such vestry or board deem it necessary or expedient that the same should be so paved, then and in either of such cases such vestry or board shall well and sufficiently pave the same, either throughout the whole breadth of the carriage way and footpaths thereof or any part of such breadth, and from time to time keep such pavement in good and sufficient repair; and the owners of the houses forming such streets shall on demand pay to such vestry or board the amount of the estimated expenses of providing and laying such pavement." Taking that provision alone, the Legislature seems to use the word street in the ordinary and popular sense. Then, by the interpretation clause of the Act of 1862, the expression "new street" shall apply to and include all streets, the maintenance of the paving and roadway whereof had not, previously to the passing of this Act, been taken into charge and assumed by the commissioners, trustees, surveyors, or other authorities having control of the pavements or highways in the parish or place in which such streets are situate. This is quite intelligible; it does not signify that the word may not from its context be inferred to mean that which in its natural sense is a street, but it provides that the word shall carry with it a more extensive meaning for certain purposes of the Act. As to the second point upon which the counsel for the appellants relied, the facts found in the case are not sufficient for us to form our judgment on either side. Mr. Brown thinks that, whatever further facts can be elicited by another inquiry, the board have in this instance demanded too much, and in consequence this particular apportionment cannot be enforced. No costs will be allowed on either side, but these orders must be quashed. The last question in dispute concerns the 77th section of the Act of 1862, by which "the owners of the land bounding or abutting on such street shall be liable to contribute to the expenses or estimated expenses of paving [Q. B. the same, as well as the owners of houses therein." Lord Northbrook is the owner of land adjoining that which he has turned into private roads, and although these roads cannot be let, they_are indirectly a source of benefit to his land, and I am unable to perceive why they should not be considered land within the application of that section. In the case of Bowditch v. The Wakefield Local Board of Health (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 567), we held under the Public Health Act that a trustee for a school who received no rent for the master's residence was still liable as an owner" for the paving of the street in which it stood. MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. 66 Judgment for the appellants without costs. Attorneys for appellant, Mr. Pound, Eagleton and Mason. Attorneys for appellant, Lord Northbrook, Parker and Son. Attorneys for respondents, Newman, Dale, and Stretton. Tuesday, Nov. 11, 1871. CRONSHAW v. WIGAN BURIAL BOARD. Incumbent's right to burial fees-New parish-Contribution of inhabitants to burial ground-20 § 21 Vict. c. 81, s. 5. In 1852, an order of council under 59 Geo. 3, e. 134, s. 16, authorised services and offices to be performed in a new church, assigned a district to it out of the parish in which it stood, and granted the incumbent the fees. The district formed part of a borough which separately main tained its own poor. There was no burial ground in the assigned district, and the persons dying in the district continued to be buried as before in the churchyard of the parish. No separate burial board has ever been appointed by, or ground provided for the district. The plaintiff was appointed incumbent of this church in 1854. The burial ground of the defendants for the whole borough was consecrated in 1856, the district of the said new church having contributed to the rates for providing it. The rectory of the parish became vacant and a new rector was appointed in 1864. Held, in an action for the fees paid to defendants for the burials, since the last avoidance of the rectory, of persons who had lived in the plaintiff's district, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. THIS was an action which had been brought by the plaintiff against the defendants for the recovery of fees claimed to be payable by the defendants to the plaintiff for burials in the burial ground provided by the defendants for the borough and township of Wigan, under the provisions of the statutes relating to the burial of the dead, between the 11th Sept. 1869 and the 23rd March 1870. The plaintiff declared for money received by the defendants for the use of the plaintiff and to this declaration the defendants pleaded that they never were indebted as alleged: whereupon issue was joined, and the following case was stated for the opinion of this court by the consent of the parties, and by the order of Mellor, J., dated the 11th July 1860. The rectory and ancient parish of Wigan comprises the borough and township of Wigan, and several outlying townships, and until a burial ground was provided for the said borough and township, under the statutes relating to the burial of the dead as after mentioned, the remains of the inhabitants of the said borough and township, and of such of the outlying townships as had not burial grounds attached to their respective churches, were interred in the churchyard of the ancient parish church, and on all such interments within the churchyard of the said ancient parish, a burial fee was payable by the custom of the said parish; and the rector of the said ancient parish was alone authorised and entitled to perform the rite of burial, and to receive the fees as aforesaid in respect thereof. In the year 1851, the Church of St. Thomas was built and consecrated in the said borough and township of Wigan as a chapel of ease under the provisions of the statutes 43 Geo. 3, c. 108; 58 Geo. 3, c. 45; and 59 Geo. 3, c. 134. A copy of the sentence of consecration bearing date the 1st Oct. 1851 is intended, if necessary, to form part of this case. The plaintiff was appointed incumbent of the said church of St. Thomas on the 25th March 1854. By an order of Her Majesty in Council made on the 11th Feb. 1852, upon the recommendation of the Commissioners for Building new Churches, under the 16th section of the said statute 59 Geo. 3, c. 134, and under and by virtue of any other power or authority in that behalf, vested in Her Majesty and the said commissioners, a particular district was duly assigned to the said church of St. Thomas, and the said order in council authorised banns of matrimony to be published, and marriages, baptisms, churchings, and burials to be solemnised and performed in the said church of St. Thomas, and directed that the fees to arise therefrom should be paid and belong to the incumbent of such church for the time being. A description of the bounds of the said district so assigned was also then duly enrolled in the High Court of Chancery, and registered in the office of the registry of the diocese, as required by the statutes in that behalf, and a copy of the said order and of the said description of the boundaries so assigned as aforesaid was inserted in the London Gazette, on the 24th Feb. 1852. A copy of this order in council is to be taken, if necessary, as part of this case. The plaintiff contends that from and after the passing of the New Parishes Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 104), s. 14, the said district so assigned as aforesaid to the said church of St. Thomas, became a separate and distinct parish for ecclesiastical purposes, such as is contemplated in the 15th section of the New Parishes Act 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 37), but as this is not admitted by the defendant, the parties have agreed to call St. Thomas throughout the remainder of this case a "district," without prejudice to the question which is hereby submitted to the decision of the court. There has never been any burying ground belonging to the said district of St. Thomas, nor has any vestry or meeting in the nature of a vestry of the said district appointed any burial board or provided a burial ground as aforesaid, but the remains of the parishioners and inhabitants thereof continued to be interred in the burial ground of the ancient parish church, until a burial ground was provided by the defendants for the borough and township of Wigan, under the statutes relating to the burial of the dead as after mentioned. [Q. B. The said district of St. Thomas does not separately maintain its own poor, but lies wholly within the borough and township of Wigan, which has separate overseers of the poor, and separately maintains its own poor. In the year 1854, under the provisions of the various statutes relating to the burial of the dead, a burial board for the borough and township of Wigan was duly established, and the said board afterwards duly provided under the said statutes a burial ground for the said borough and township. In the year 1856, the churchyard of the ancient parish church of Wigan was closed by the order of one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State. The burial ground so provided by the burial board, was, with a chapel erected thereon, on or about the 13th Aug. 1856, duly consecrated; from which time it became the burial ground for the said borough and township of Wigan, within the meaning, and according to the provisions of the said last mentioned statutes. The said district of St. Thomas contributed to the rates, out of which the said last mentioned burial ground was provided. At the time when the said last mentioned burial ground was so provided and consecrated as aforesaid, the Rev. Henry John Gunning was rector of the ancient parish of Wigan, but on his resignation the Hon. and Rev. George Thomas Orlando Bridgeman was on the 22nd Oct. 1864, instituted and inducted to the rectory of Wigan, and has since continued to be rector of the said parish. The plaintiff, as incumbent of the district of St. Thomas, has since the avoidance of the rectory of Wigan next after the passing of the New Parishes Act 1856, claimed under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 81, s. 5, to be entitled to perform, and has offered to perform, the religious service in the burials in the burial ground so provided by the said burial board, of the remains of the parishioners or inhabitants of the said district of St. Thomas, and also to be entitled to receive the same fees in respect of such burials, as if the said burial ground were exclusively the burial ground of the said district of St. Thomas. From the 24th Feb. 1868, until the 10th Sept. 1869, the defendants allowed the plaintiff to perform the religious service in the chapel, in the defendants' said burial ground, of the remains of the parishioners and inhabitants of the said district of St. Thomas, and paid to him the fees arising from the said burials, but since the last-mentioned date the defendants, in consequence of a claim to the same fees being made by the rector of Wigan, have refused to allow the plaintiff to perform any such religious service in the defendants' said burial grounds, and have retained the fees arising from the burial of the remains of parishioners and inhabitants of the said district of St. Thomas, until it shall be determined by the court whether the plaintiff or the rector of Wigan is entitled to receive them. The court upon the above statement is authorised to amend the pleadings if necessary for determining the questions at issue between the parties, and to draw any inferences of fact which may be necessary to the decision of the case in the same manner, and as fully as any jury might determine the same. The questions for the opinion of the court are whether the plaintiff is entitled to perform the service in the burial of the dead in the defendants' burial ground, and to receive the fees above claimed by him. If the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to perform such services in the burial, in the said burial ground provided by the defendants of the remains of parishioners or inhabitants of the said district of St. Thomas, and to receive fees in respect thereof, then the judgment in this case shall be entered for the plaintiff for the sum of 71. 168. 6d. If the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to perform such services, and to receive such fees as above claimed by him, then judgment shall be entered for the defendants. The costs of the cause, taxed on the higher scale, to abide the event. Manisty, Q.C, (with him Forbes) argued for the plaintiff. The question of plaintiff's right to these fees depends upon the 5th section of the Act to amend the Burial Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 81); "The vestry or meeting in the nature of a vestry, of any parish, new parish, township, or other district not separately maintaining its own poor, and which has had no separate burial ground, may appoint a burial board; and such vestry or meeting, and the burial board appointed by it, shall exercise and have all the powers which they might have exercised and had under the said Acts, and this Act, if such parish, new parish, township, or district had had a separate burial ground before the passing of the said Act of the 18th and 19th years of Her Majesty: provided always, that all the powers of any other vestry or meeting and burial board, if any, shall then cease and determine, so far as relates to such parish, new parish, township, or district as aforesaid; and until a burial ground shall be so provided as aforesaid, and consecrated for any new parish or district created or to be created pursuant to the provisions of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 94, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 104, or any or either of them, and to which the said Acts or any or either of them may apply, the incumbent of such new parish or district (if any burial ground has been or shall be provided under the herein recited Acts for the burial of the dead, or any or either of them, for any parish or parishes out of rates to which such new parish or district, or any part thereof, shall have contributed, or contribute, or be liable) shall, with respect to the burial in such last-mentioned burial ground of the remains of the parishioners or inhabitants of such new parish or district, or of such part thereof as shall have contributed or contribute as aforesaid, as the case may be, perform the same duties and have the same rights, privileges, and authorities, and be entitled to the same fees, and also the clerk and sexton of such new parish or district shall, when necessary, respectively perform the same duties, and be entitled to the same fees, in respect of such burials, as if the said burial ground were exclusively the burial ground of such new parish or district, subject, nevertheless, to all provisions to which the incumbents, clerks, and sextons of original parishes are respectively subject in and by the said Burial Acts, or any or either of them, provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the rights or privileges of any existing incumbent, clerk, or sexton, without the consent of such incumbent, clerk, or sexton respectively." effect of the involved language of this section, so far as it affects the present case, is, that the vestry The [Q. B. of any new parish not separately maintaining its own poor, and having no separate burial ground, may appoint a burial board; upon which such vestry and burial board shall have the powers conferred upon other burial boards by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 128. provided that the powers of other vestries and boards shall then deterinine, so far as they relate to the said new parish; and until a burial ground shall be so provided for any new parish which has been created pursuant to 19 & 20 Vict. c. 104, and to which the said Act may apply, the incumbent of such new parish (if such new parish has contributed to rates by which a burial ground has been provided) shall perform the same duties and be entitled to the same fees with respect to the burial of his parishioners in the burial ground to which his new parish has contributed, as if the said burial ground were exclusively the burial ground of the said new parish. The case finds that this district has contributed to the rates of the burial ground, and it remains only to show that this district is a new parish, which has been created pursuant to 19 & 20 Vict. c. 104, and to which the said Act may apply. This is commonly called Lord Blandford's Act, and by sect. 14 it is enacted that 'Wheresoever or as soon as banns of matrimony and the solemnization of marriages, churchings, and baptisms according to the laws and canons in force in this realm are authorised to be published and performed in any consecrated church or chapel to which a district shall belong, such district not being at the time of the passing of this Act a separate and distinct parish for ecclesiastical purposes, and the incumbent of which is by such authority entitled for his own benefit to the entire fees arising from the performance of such offices without any reservation thereout, such district or place shall become and be a separate and distinct parish for ecclesiastical purposes, such as is con templated in the 15th section of the first recited Act (viz., 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37), and the church or chapel of such district shall be the church of such parish, and all and singular the provisions of the said firstly and secondly recited Acts (the second is 7 & 8 Vict. c. 94) as amended by this Act relative to new parishes, upon their becoming such, and to the matters and things consequent thereon, shall extend and apply to the said parish and church as fully and effectually as if the same had become a new parish under the provisions of the said last-mentioned Acts." [Stopped by the court.] Holker, Q.C. (with him McConnell) for the defendants.-Hornby v. The Burial Board of Tort th Park (31 L. J. 643, Ch.) shows that an incumbent who has no burial ground in his district is not entitled to burial fees. [Manisty.-That case was decided upon statutes before that of 1857.] My construction of the 5th section of that Act is that the provision, by which the incumbent is to have fees for burials in a ground to be used partly by his district, relates only to the time between the appointment of a burial board and the provision of a burial ground. Here the case does not find that any burial board has been appointed. Further this must be a new parish under Lord Blandford's Act 1856, and the description of the district in the case exactly comes within the exception to the 14th section, "such district not being at the time of the passing of this Act a separate and distinct parish for ecclesiastical purposes." Now this was a separate and distinct parish under the Order in Council of 1851. Sect. 11 shows that the churches to which Lord Blandford's Act was intended to apply were those in which it was not lawful to perform the offices of the church. The 5th section of the Act of 1857 applied only to a new parish or district created by one of the Acts mentioned, as well as that to which one of them might apply. This district cannot be said to have been created by either of those Acts, for it is found expressly to have been made by an order in council under statutes of Geo. 3. [LUSH, J.-It could not have been a separate parish; for before Lord Blandford's Act it was necessary to obtain the consent of the patron of a district in order to make it so. The case does not so find, and therefore Lord Blandford's Act would apply to it.] If your Lordships think that this district was then made a new parish, the latter part of the 5th section of the Act of 1857 would apply to it; but then arises the question whether that section did more than provide for the interval between the appointment of a burial board, and the formation of a burial ground. Manisty was not heard in reply. The COURT [Cockburn, C.J., Mellor, Lush, and Hannen, JJ.] gave judgment for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. Attorneys for plaintiff, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for J. Park, Wiend, Wigan. Attorneys for defendant, Gregory, Rowcliffe and Co., for T. F. Taylor. 10 U thirty-five pounds. It was described in one count as an undertaking for the payment of money, and in another as a security. On the trial evidence was given that the prisoner having obtained a loan of 351., and being pressed for payment, obtained further time by giving as a security the instrument which purported to be signed by his brother-in-law, George Wickham. It was objected that though, if the instrument had been genuine it might have been evidence of an account stated by Wickham, from which the [C. CAS. R law would have implied a promise on his part to pay the money, and so would in effect operate as an undertaking to pay the money, and as a security for its payment; yet it was not in itself either one or other. I reserved the point, and left to the jury whether the instrument was forged by the prisoner with intent to defraud. The verdict was guilty. There was a second indictment against the prisoner on the same facts for a misdemeanor at common law for forging and uttering the same instrument. After the first trial he withdrew the plea of not guilty to this indictment, and pleaded guilty to it. I sentenced him to eight months' imprisonment on the indictment for misdemeanor, and to four months' imprisonment with hard labour on the indictment for felony, the latter sentence not to come into operation till after the decision of this court on the point reserved. The question is whether the instrument in question was either an undertaking or a security within the meaning of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 23. (a) If that question is answered in the affirmative, the sentence of imprisonment with hard labour is to come into operation concurrently with the residue of the sentence of imprisonment. If answered in the negative it is not to come into operation. COLIN BLACKBURN. No counsel appeared to argue on either side. KELLY, C.B.-The question in this case is whether the instrument set out in the indictment is an undertaking or security for the payment of money within the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 3, and the forgery thereof an offence within its provisions. The facts are, that the prisoner having obtained a loan of 351., and being pressed for payment, obtained further time by giving as a security an IOU for 351., purporting to be signed by himself and his brother-in-law, George Wickham. It was a genuine instrument so far as regards his own signature, but the name of George Wickham was forged. I am of opinion that this was clearly a security for payment of money within the Act. It was said that there was no consideration for the giving of it. That is not so, for there was forbearance obtained from the creditor. And now that Lord Tenterden's Act is repealed, and there is no necessity for the consideration to appear on the face of the instrument, it would have operated at all events as a guarantee by Wickham for the payment of 351. if his name had not been forged. BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. PIGOTT, B.-I also think that this was a security by Wickham to pay the debt for the prisoner. (a) This section enacts that, "Whosoever shall forge or alter, or shall offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any undertaking, warrant, order, authority, or request for the payment of money, or for the delivery or transfer of any goods or chattels, of any note, bill, or other security for the payment of money, or for procuring or giving credit, or any indorsement or assignment of any such undertaking, warrant, order, authority, or request, or any accountable receipt, acquittance, or receipt for money, or for goods, or for any note, bill, or other security for the payment of money, or any indorsement on, or assignment of any such accountable receipt with intent in any of the cases aforesaid to defraud, shall be guilty of felony." |
