The disastrous event of the naval action in the West Indies may, indeed, and probably will now give a total alteration to the complexion of the campaign. This will, in all human probability, operate more than any other circumstance against the evacuation of the southern States; for what would have been a very hazardous line of conduct, and would have exposed the enemy to a fatal blow in case of a naval cooperation on this coast, may now be considered as a rational and prudent measure, on their part. But the mode of defensive war (which the enemy affect to have adopted, in which I would however place but very little confidence), and especially the detachment from Charleston, which must have weakened them considerably, will, I hope, enable you in all events to hold your own ground until the southern and middle States shall have made some efforts for your reinforcement, and until the pecuniary affairs of the continent in general shall be put in a better situation. Some little, I flatter myself, will be done, although I must confess my expectations for the campaign are not very sanguine. I feel with you, my dear friend, all the regret and mortification, that can possibly be conceived, from a consideration that we shall be able to avail ourselves so imperfectly of the weakness and embarrassments of our enemy; while, on the other hand, I think there is reason to apprehend from some late indications the enemy have given, by taking post at Oswego and extending themselves on the frontier, that they mean, availing themselves of our languor and looking forward to the hour of pacification, to

occupy as much territory as they are able to do, before a negotiation shall be entered upon. I wish we may be in a capacity to counteract their designs.

I have given my opinion to Congress through the secretary at war, that it will be advisable to make a permanent incorporation of all the troops southward of the Delaware in the manner you propose; but, as the observations did not apply to the other troops, these regiments ought to remain on their present establishment.

As to the movement and disposition of the French army, I will tell you exactly my idea and plan respecting it, and how the matter now rests. While we continued in the state of uncertainty, which has so long perplexed and prevented us from forming any projects whatever, I wished to have the corps of the Count de Rochambeau remain in a situation equally capable of looking either way, as circumstances might eventually require, being well persuaded in my own mind, that with their assistance (without the aid of a naval force) we should not at this time be able to do anything effectual against New York, defended by its present garrison; and, presuming still greater difficulties would oppose themselves to an attempt against Charleston, I proposed to postpone my final resolution until we should hear from the other side of the Atlantic. For, allowing your army, in conjunction with the French troops, to be completely competent to the object, the transportation by land of heavy artillery stores and apparatus appeared to me an inevitable obstacle, which I have fully explained

in my letter of the 23d of April last. Besides, the diminution of an army in so long a march, and the innumerable advantages the enemy must derive from the command of the water, were considerations with me. And, as I flattered myself we might be able to keep the enemy in check with our present force, both in the northern and southern departments, I therefore thought it expedient, that the select corps of our allies in Virginia should continue unimpaired as a corps de reserve in that State, until new information or circumstances should produce new orders from me; unless the Count de Rochambeau should first be apprized of some contingence or event, which should render a movement in his opinion proper; in which case the matter was left to his determination. I have this moment learned from his Excellency, the Minister of France, that the Count has already commenced his march northward. What circumstances have led to this, I am unable to say; but expect to see the Count himself in a few days (by appointment) at Philadelphia, where it is proposed to enter into a discussion of the possible objects and views of the campaign, so far as our general and imperfect knowledge of affairs will admit, and from whence I shall have the pleasure to inform you of any thing of moment, that may in the mean time take place, or ultimately be in contemplation.

Under an idea, that the French troops would certainly be withdrawn from Virginia at some moment of the campaign, and perhaps unexpectedly, I have long since written to Governor Harrison on that subject, and requested that a body of men might be in

readiness for the defence of the State on that occasion. Indeed I have written almost incessantly to all the States, urging, in the most forcible terms I could make use of, the absolute necessity of complying with the requisitions of Congress in furnishing their contingents of men and money, and am unhappy to say the success of these applications have not been equal to my expectation.

I am happy to assure you there was no foundation for the report of my having had a narrow escape in passing the Clove. In return, we have had a similar account respecting yourself, which I hope was equally groundless. Believe me, my dear Sir, I shall always consider myself deeply interested in whatever concerns you, and shall ever rejoice at your health, safety, and felicity.

Mrs. Washington, who is just setting out for Virginia, joins me in most affectionate regards to Mrs. Greene and yourself. I am, dear Sir, with the most perfect esteem, &c.

P. S. Although the campaign does not promise much activity, yet I shall wish you to keep me as regularly and accurately informed of the state of your department as possible, noting the strength, movements, and position of your own army, and that of the enemy. It may also be essential for me to be made. acquainted with the resources of the country and every thing of a military or political nature, which may be interesting to our future plans and operations.'

1 According to the proposal of Count de Rochambeau, a conference was held at Philadelphia, respecting the future operations of the campaign. The two commanders met there on the 15th of July. As no instructions had been re

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.

MY DEAR SIR,

HEAD-QUARTERS, 10 July, 1782.

The last post brought me your letter of the 19th of May. I must confess, that I am not at all astonished at the failure of your plan. That spirit of freedom, which at the commencement of this contest would have gladly sacrificed every thing to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public, but private interest, which influences the generality of mankind, nor can the Americans any longer boast an exception. Under these circumstances, it would rather have been surprising if you had succeeded, nor will you I fear succeed better in Georgia.1

ceived from the French court, it was not in the power of Count de Rochambeau to give any decided information as to the time a French fleet might be expected on the coast from the West Indies, or its strength when arrived. He had reason to suppose, however, that it would come to the northward; and, as the sickly season was approaching in Virginia, he had put his troops under marching orders about the 1st of July, and expected they would reach Baltimore before the end of the month. It was agreed, therefore, that the French army should remain a few days at Baltimore, till further instructions or intelligence should be received, and that, unless special reasons might appear to the contrary, the army should continue its march northwardly, and join the American forces on the Hudson. This plan was thought advisable, moreover, to prevent Sir Guy Carleton from sending detachments from New York to Jamaica, where they might be turned against the French in the West Indies.

An elaborate memoir, pointing out various plans of a campaign, was presented by General Washington to Count de Rochambeau, who forwarded it to the French court. Immediately after the interview General Washington returned to Newburg, where he arrived on the 27th of July.

The plan here mentioned, which Colonel Laurens was extremely anxious to carry into effect, was to raise a regiment of black levies in South Carolina. He brought the subject before the legislature of the State, and pursued it with all his zeal and influence, but the measure was not approved. "It was some consolation, however," said he, "to perceive that truth and philosophy had