some Truths, and you'll find, that instead of overcoming Certainty by Doubt, it will overthrow Doubt by Certainty: Because Certainty proceeds from a perswasive Evidence, whereas Doubt doth but keep the Mind in suspence; and a Doubt, such as we suppose, is an abstracted and remote Conception; but the Certainty we are speaking of, confits in inward Sense; besides, a Doubt draws its force from Darkness and Ignorance as its Original, but the knowledge of first principles is evident by its own light.

There is no less Injustice than Error, in making use of the Speculations of Scepticism, with a particular design against Religion; for if it be true that a Mathematician is not obliged to destroy the Opinion of those who doubt of every thing; if we are perswaded, that the Rules of Mechanicks may be certain, without such a scrupulous Examination, and if it was never heard of, that this Universal Doubt of the Scepticks has ever retarded any Business, or framed a considerable Obstacle to the Execution of any Design in the common Affairs of Life; is it reasonable that it should become formidable only when it is brought to attack the Foundations of Religion, and that an extravagant Hypothesis should lose that Name, because it countenances Incredulity?

After all, though the Truths of Religion are infinitely more certain in themselves than any other Truths, yet we could be satisfied, were they received with the same certainty as those first and common Truths which are the rule of our Actions and Conduct.

We are then no farther concerned than other Men, in the Speculations of these Philosophers, which as they make no Man call in question the Principles

of the Art he professes, or the Prudence by which he acts; fo we do not believe they ought to stop us one moment in establishing the Truths of Religion.

From this natural inclination Men have to doubt of every thing, (in order to destroy the Truths of Religion, together with all their other Knowledge, as by a common Shipwrack,) we shall only conclude, that there is no Doubt so Chimerical, no Opinion so absurd, which is not taken up by Incredulity, when it makes for its interest; which gives credit and weight to every thing that favours its Pretences: And fince it generally changes Certainty into Imaginary Doubts, 'tis no wonder if contrariwise upon some occasions, it changes the leaft Suspicions into Certainty.

This, I hope, no one will have reason to doubt of, if he does but carefully confider the manner whereby we shall prove the Existence of God. This being the first and fundamental Truth that produces all other Truths of Religion, and which all the rest do suppose, we must not omit any thing in order to its folid proof: And as there is nothing so suspicious as Incredulity, which is the more distrustful, the more essential and important the Truths to be proved are; we'll take all imaginable care to avoid the least suspicion of Deceit and unfair dealing. And this is the Method we design to follow.

First, We'll endeavour to dive into the Sourses of our Errors, to know whether this Opinion of ours, That there is a God, be not a Prejudice, or whether we can on the contrary assure our selves that it arises from the force and inward sense of known Truth. We'll afterwards reflect, by way of Enquiry, upon the Argumente which perfwade

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us of the Existence of God, and all the Difficulties that are or may be seemingly raised against them. We'll endeavour in the Third Place, to consider apart by themselves, the most probable Objections of Atheists; and lastly, we'll compare the Two Opinions together, by which it will appear, that Atheism is a down-right Extravagance, if there be any such thing as a true Atheist, which by way of Conclufion, we shall briefly take into confideration.

CHAP. II.

Wherein 'tis proved by Inquiring into the Principles of our Errors, that the Opinion asserting the Existence of God, is not a falfe Prejudice.

Though we ought not with the Scepticks, to

doubt of every thing, yet 'tis good however to distrust our Reason; because though Nature has bountifully given all Men a common Sense which in its first Notions, and in those Judgments it forms with an entire Liberty, cannot be a principle of Error, yet Experience convinces us, that Man is but too apt to deceive himself in Matters relating to his interest, or which are capable of being prepossessed.

'Tis certain there is within us a natural Light which cannot delude us, and Prejudices likewise which do impose upon us: Were it not for those Prejudices, we should never fall into Error, and without the help of this natural Light, we should

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never be free from it. All the difficulty consists in exactly distinguishing between Two so different Principles, which may certainly be done, by joyning Experience to Reason.

Twould be very difficult to refer our Prejudices or Errors to any other Causes, than to one of these Three, viz. To the nature of the things falling under our Knowledge, or the manner in which they are proposed to our Understanding, or else the Disposition of our Mind.

Notwithstanding, those things which fall under our Knowledge, may be in themselves somewhat hard and problematical, and therefore may seem likely to perplex our Understanding, and draw it into fome Error; yet we will not stick to maintain, that the nature of things alone, is not sufficient to occasion our false Prejudices. For Geometrical Demonstrations are very difficult, yet we judge rightly of them. Those things we call Indifferent, and of which we judge without either constraint or interest, are sometimes altogether Problematical ; and yet Common Sense is not prejudiced when it judges of them, because it doubts where it ought to doubt, and affirms where it ought to affirm, conceiving but a fimple Opinion of things that are probable, and judging with certainty of things that are evident. Not but it may, and often enough it does so happen, that Impatience, Pride, and Precipitation do contract within us an Habit which disposes us to judge pofitively of all things; which occasions a Thouand false Prejudices in our Understanding; but then the disorder proceeds from somewhat else, and we cannot accuse the nature of things for be

occasion of it.

Neither Neither would it be more reasonable to af

scribe it to the natural frame of our Understanding, fince in that case it must necessarily be so difposed, as to judge amiss of things, in what manner soever they were offered to it; and then we could not avoid being Scepticks. Nay, and something worse, because we should always think our selves in an Error, by the very Disposition of our Understanding. But as Experience, and the fense of almost an infinite number of Truths, (which cannot possibly be doubted of,) assure us to the contrary, that there is a certain natural Light within us which never deceives us, what remains but that our Errors proceed only from the Object's not being rightly proposed to our Understanding ?

Indeed as every thing hath several Faces, fo the same thing is not always offered to our Understanding under the same form; and as it is varioufly proposed to it by external causes, it often appears to one Mans Understanding, different from what it appears to that of another, or even from what it had at another time appeared to the fame. But what is constant and unchangeable, is the uniform Disposition of the Understanding, to judge of things according as they are reprefented to it.

There are Two forts of things which occasion the misrepresentation of Objects to our Understanding, or rather which are productive of all our false Prejudices; the one External, the other Internal: Among those of the first sort, I rank Example, Education, False Reasoning and Sophistry. Thus Example and Education make Sensuality and Drunkenness (which are Two great Vices in them

selves,) to be look'd upon in some Countries as light

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