fide with any of there contrary Opinions. We fhail not meddle with the state of things unknown to us, but arguing only from what we know, thail reft contented to conclude, that as the fimple Existence of matter was not fufficient to produce the Wonders of Nature, but twas neceffary some External Principle should produce and direct its morion to that end; fo likewife that the motion of matter thus regulated and directed, was not fufficient to reflect upon its own Conceptions and manner of conceiving things, but there was an abfolute neceffity of fome caufe of a higher nature than matter, or its motion, to put us into a condition of Thinking. CHAP. VI. Containing a further Confideration of the Arguments for the Existence of God; together with the Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul, taken from the Principles of Philofophy. IN N the foregoing Chapters, we have but just opened this Matter; in this we shall search a little deeper into it, by going over the fame Principles again, which are too abstracted to be well understood at first view, unless by Perwery well exercised in fuch Speculations. are Two ways of confidering the Unione common to all Men who make of their Reason, and that is to observe al parts of it, the Connexion, Order and peculi peculiar Uses of those Parts, and endeavour to discover in them fome Characters of the Wisdom of their Maker; the other, which is peculiar to Philosophers, is to examin the Principles, the Springs and Causes of things, and to dive into the very composition of them: Both these ways equally lead us to the knowledge of God, but 'tis the last we must at present insist upon. We find in the World some matter, which exists and which moves after such a manner; and in some portion of this matter, we find a Principle which thinks, which reflects on it felf, which judges of common Attributes, and that abstracts; which applies the most perfect of its Idea, to a Being Infinitely Perfect, and whose Desires have no bounds. If matter does not derive all these Perfections from it self, they must come to it from without, and confequently there must be a God who imparted them to it. Thus the Existence of matter, motion, the differences of this motion, Thought, and the differences of Thought, the Idea we have of God, together with that fort of Infinity we find in our Defires, do all prove the Exiitence of God. I. Matter does not exist Effentially and of it self. To apprehend which Truth, we need only suppose this undeniable Principle, viz. That every Being is determined to exist, either meerly because it is a Being; so that 'tis essential to whatever exifts, to exist necessarily; or else that it is determined to exist, by the help of some external Principle, which is the cause of its being what it is; or lastly, that it is determined to exist by the fublime excellency of its own Nature; because having all manner of Perfections, it must needs have that of necessary existence, 時 1: canno afirmed, that matter is determeerly because it does exist, that is this moment, it does not that it has existed in that Int needs exift in that which mined to whic: to come. I coes not appear to us, thes of existence have any natureconexion one with another. Je zoiected perhaps, that every Be*ed to be, meerly because it is a : 30ng is determined not to exist, be:g, which Principle is certainly Trongist be a substance or an *st eat a Being in opposition to come zurg, and not an absolute nodo not believe that it has Smut always continue to be. vou, that the Principle of it, straga is matter or motion, has says subes, but they will not allow, that heat coubt adds something to there, has always existed; cover las falle that a Being is as abto exiit hereafter, and to do this time, meerly because ning is determined not to d never to have existed, because it The difference consists in this, that noameer negation, has no need of any n ercer to its non-existence; whereas a which is some thing positive, cannot exist swer than the principle of its existence es, which is not the general quality of ace we have already seen that there are woich do not always exist; but it must be, cause from whence it has received all all it has, or else the eminence of its own Perfections, which puts it in a condition above receiving any thing. 'Tis not by the eminence of its own Perfections that matter necessarily exists, since it is so far from having all perfections, that it has scarcely any at all; which gave occasion to some to say, 'tis Tabula rasa, potentia fimplicissima; which is capable of receiving any thing, but has nothing of its own. It may become bright, glittering, &c. but these are qualities 'tis in a capacity of acquiring, and which it had not before. Besides, according to the most rational part of Philosophers, they are mixt qualities, which are much less the motion of matter, than the Sensations of the Mind. A Being that is infinite, and has all manner of perfections, cannot but have that also of necessary existence; and a Being which necessarily exists, has all manner of perfections, those things are reciprocal. For did not an infinite Being neceffarily exist, 'twould be false to say, it had all manner of perfections; for the principal perfection would be wanting, which is to exist effentially of it felf, without the help or assistance of any other Beings. Should a Being of a neceffary existence want any perfections, it would be limited; and if 'twere limited, some principle or other must limit it; and if it had any Principle, it would not exist of it self, which overthrows the Supposition. Indeed, if it has not received its perfections, but derives them from itself, there's as much reason it should have all kind of perfections as any one of them, and have them all in an infinite, rather than a limited degree. For since it has no principle of its existence, neither has it any principle to limit its excellency and perfections to Ten or any other certain number of Degrees: Whence then could a Being that is of it self, whatever it is, be limited in its excellence ? Since therefore matter does not exist of it self, we must acknowledge a Supream Cause that gave it its existence. II. If the existence of matter does not seem to be neceffary, much less will its motion appear to be fo. For if we know enough of the nature of matter, to know that it cannot be made incapable of receiving motion, unless it ceases to be what it is, we do also understand it well enough, to know, that it would not cease to be what it is, though it were not in actual Motion. This needs not be proved in Cartesius's System of Philosophy, who pretends that Motion and Reft are Two Modes which matter does indifferently receive; neither will Aristotle's Party have any thing to except against the truth of this principle. As for Epicurus and his Followers, 'twould be cafie to convince them, by distinguishing Three forts of Bodies; viz. Sensible Bodies, Atoms which compose these Bodies, and the Parts which we must conceive to compose those parts. Sensible Bodies do seem sometimes to be at rest, and sometimes in motion; this is certain : But the difficulty is to know, whence this rest of fenfible Bodies does proceed, and whether it is not contrary to Nature. It is pretended by some, that the parts of sensible Bodies are at reft, because their Atoms being lock'd one into another, do as it were by a mutual conflict resist each other's wotion; and so by that Opposition, their course is stop'd. But |