II. His Immensity yet farther proves his Uni ty: For suppose there were many Gods, they could not be confusedly existent one in another, but each of them would have his peculiar Objects and Imploys, which destroys the notion of Immensity. III. God cannot be infinite in his Perfections, and yet be divided; no, that implies a Contradiction. For suppose there were many Gods, they must necessarily be something different from one another, otherwise there could not be many Gods. If they were in any thing different from one another, it must be either in Perfection or in Imperfection. It cannot be in Imperfection, because the Godhead could not then be infinitely Perfect. Neither can it be in Perfection, because then the one would have Perfections which were not in the other, and confequently the last would not be absolutely Perfect, or infinite in Perfection. IV. Whatsoever is multiplied, is for that same Reason very Imperfect; for where Unity alone is not fufficient, there only Multiplicity is requisite. Whereas that which has no need of being multiplied, is supreamly perfect, because all things are then centred in one. That Kingdom falls to decay, which is divided into several petty Royalties; whereas on the contrary, that Empire grows to a much more flourishing Perfection, which from several States is reduced into one. There are several Torches required to light us, and their Imperfection appears from their Multiplicity. But there needs but one Sun for that same purpose, because his Excellence consists in his Unity. As therefore we are informed by common Sense, either that there is no God at all, or that we must conceive the most perfect Idea of him that possibly can be framed ; so in like manner it informs us of his Unity. Twould be very strange that Alexander the Great, should have thought himself too perfect to have any Equals in the World, and boldly have affirmed, that it was impossible there should be Two Alexanders on the Earth, any more than Two Suns in the Heaven ; and yet that Man should be so audacious as to give God any Equals, and put up any Rival Pretenders against the Deity. V. Lastly, either God exists necessarily, or he does not: If he does not exist necessarily, he must have some precedent Principle, which determined him rather to exist, than not to exist, and then he cannot be a God. If he exists necessarily, he is of himself whatever he is; and if he be of himself whatever he is, nothing is wanting to him; for from whence could proceed his Imperfection ? And if nothing be wanting to him, he needs no Companions. Besides, if he exists of himself, he possesses all manner of Perfections, as we have proved already ; and if so, he cannot be multiplied, because many Infinites could not consist together, by reason the qualities of the one, would be absolutely the fame with the qualities of the other, and consequently there being do distinction betwixt them, they would be many, and yet not be many. This is a decisive proof. But methinks we have insisted too much upon ese Principles, which are so little contested in Dese Times. Let us now pass on to the rest Af God's Attributes which his Idea is composed especially to his Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice, Justice, which have an essential and necessary relation to Religion. CHAP. III. That Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice do neceffarily belong to the Idea of God. THat Deity which exifts necessarily of it self, and is but one, (as we have just now proved) is neither Matter, nor the effect of Matter; it cannot be Matter it self, because Matter is not only incapable of framing any such Projects and Designs as was the Production of the World, but likewise does not exist of it self, neither has it Motion, nor the determination of Motion, as it has been fhewed already. It cannot be therefore for that same Reason the effect of Mat ter. 'Tis no less ridiculous for some to affirm, that God is but a large Soul which animates the World in some proportion as our rational Soul animates our Body, makes Plants to grow on the Earth, produces Sensation in Brutes, Ratiocination in Men, and gives Thoughts without comparison far nobler to the Heavens and the Stars, whose Matter is much more fubtle and refined, than that of Terrestrial and Sublunary Bodies. I confess it seems at first, a pretty conceit to imagin, that the same Soul both at once, fuffers and is joyful; that it is sensible of Pain in a Man that expires in the midst of Torments, ments, but contrariwise is affected with Pleasure in a Man that wallows in his Voluptuousness; that it is afflicted and abused, while it exists in a Brute, but that it afflicts and torments in a Man. And lastly, That the Fury of the Oppressors, and the Complaints of the Oppressed, spring equally from the same Soul which animates all kinds of Beings. But perhaps they'll reply, that the different parts of Matter to which the Soul is united, occasion all these diversities and apparent contrarieties; and that Matter by its variety, determines the Soul to that diversity of Sensation, as it seems observable in our own Composition. But this Union of the Universal Soul to Matter, on purpose that it should depend upon it, and act conformably to its Laws, is a Second Fancy much more ridiculous and whimsical than the former. For this Union is either Free and Voluntary, or it is Necessary and Conftrained: If it be Constrained, or meerly Necessary, we then conceive God as an unhappy Being, that cannot set himself at liberty when he pleases, But if this Union be Free and Voluntary, we then conceive him as an odd-humour'd and unaccountable Spirit, that confines himself to act only according to the Laws of a Blind Matter, destitute of all Senfe. However, 'tis of no great moment to us, whether we confute these Speculations or not. We are verolling the Incredulous should still hug ancy, and we them the more That Par se by followas they be, hether God has has a Body or not, whether he be the Soul of the World or not, they must however necessarily acknowledge his Wisdom, Goodness and Justice, not to mention his Power, which of all his Attributes is the most undeniable; and that's as much as we desfire. For one of these Three things, we must necessarily grant, concerning those Vertues in general, either that they properly and really belong to God, or else that God has some certain qualities in himself answerable to those Vertues which produce, (if I may so speak,) the same Effect in him, as those Vertues do in us: Or lastly, that God has none of those Vertues in himself, nor any Qualities answerable to those Ver tues. If Knowledge and Wisdom, Justice and Goodness do properly and really belong to God, we need no longer to contend about them: And if God has any Perfections in himself answerable to those Vertues, then are we in the right to argue as if he properly possest them. But if he has none of those Vertues in hinıself, nor any Perfection answerable to those Vertues, it follows from thence, that the Existence of God must be thereby destroyed. For what was that which perswaded us of that Truth? 'Twas that Wisdom which we observe displayed all over the Universe, and of which there are so many signal Characters to be found within our selves. If therefore you annihilate God's Wisdom, as well as his Goodness and Justice, and if you likewife believe, he has no such Perfections in himfelf hare any ways answerable to those Vertu h not avoid calling into question Existence, and thereby you fall |