are made up to a large extent of natives of education and high standing.

The American system of public schools is being extended throughout the archipelago with wonderful rapidity. Education, industry, ambition, cleanliness, decency, are imbuing the masses with a hope never before known in the islands. Disorder is being reduced to a minimum, peace and happiness have taken the place of savagery and terrorism, and in no other part of the world has civilization made such wonderful strides in such a brief period. It seems incredible that Americans of respectability could be found at this late date to criticise or try to hamper our government in this extremely beneficent work.

CHAPTER VI

OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MAKE THE RETENTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AN IMPERATIVE NECESSITY

WH

HEN war broke out with Spain, Commodore (now Admiral) Dewey was in Hong Kong. Under the laws of neutrality he was compelled to leave there at once. In all that part of the world the United States had not a single port where he could go for coal or provisions. There was only one of two policies before him, — to sail back to the United States or to attack the Spaniards in their own harbor.

The first plan would have left all our commerce with the far East at the complete mercy of Spanish cruisers. Our trade with China, Japan, Australia, and India would soon have been driven from off the face of the ocean, hundreds of millions of dollars of American property would have been destroyed, and our prestige ruined for a generation to come.

The second plan, the one bravely adopted by Dewey, involved enormous risks. To sail into a harbor filled with torpedoes and submarine mines, to face forts as well as war-ships, knowing well that defeat meant irretrievable disaster, that there was no friendly port nearer than thousands of miles, that reinforcements were not to be thought of, these were all serious matters. Had Dewey met defeat, not only would our immense commerce with the Orient have been placed at the mercy of the enemy, but our entire western coast line would have been liable to bombardment. We had nothing else in the Pacific capable of resisting the enemy's battle-ships.

Suppose it had been the war-ships of England, Germany, France, or Japan defending Manila instead of the pots and kettles of Spain, and Dewey faced the alternative which then confronted him, is it not clear that the history of the world might have been changed?

Dewey's victory at Manila entailed certain consequences. Before we pay too much heed to the radical anti-imperialists, who want to grant immediate Philippine independence, or to the more conservative secessionists, who hold out the expectation of autonomy for the islands in the future, more or less remote, it is worth while to consider this subject in all its bearings and relations.

To have given the Philippines "independence" as soon as they were securely wrested from Spain, and placed the civilized foreigners there at the mercy of the native bandits and military Jefes, with their hordes of ignorant peons back of them, would have been an act of perfidy unparalleled in history. Happily that phase of the case need not now be discussed, for the American people have rendered their verdict upon the party of national dishonor which advocated the proposition. There remains to be discussed the advantages of the retention of the Philippine Islands, (a) to the Filipinos; (b) to ourselves.

If civilization is a blessing, and this whole volume is an argument in the affirmative; if education, freedom, security, the right to own property, and the countless blessings which flow from good government are valuable privileges to be prized by intelligent men, then the administration of the government of the Philippine Islands by the United States is a good thing for the Filipinos. But without spending time on this phase of the case, let us inquire into the benefits, if any, which will accrue to ourselves by holding the Philippines permanently as a part of our territory.

These benefits may be divided into two classes: 1st, Commercial; 2d, Military.

No intelligent man should underestimate the importance of extending our foreign commerce. As Secretary of the Treasury Shaw justly remarked, when we export a million dollars of American products to foreign countries, that means at least eight hundred thousand dollars have been paid for labor in this country. Following this simple principle has made England inconceivably great; and so it will make us. For us to sell shoes or calicoes or other products is a blessing to both parties to the deal. It does the Filipinos good to wear our shoes; it does our workingmen and business men good to manufacture them and sell them. That nation will be secure in its foreign commerce for the next century which has its own colonial possessions to supply. England and France are secure on that point; Germany is in a worse fix, and we are scarcely as yet to be considered.

On the military, or rather the naval, side of this question every fact and argument urges us to hold on to the Philippines and acquire as many other naval bases as we can in other parts of the world.

In the broad theatre of international relations we have not yet risen much above the stage of peanut politics. John Hay seems to have been almost our first Secretary who had a grasp on world affairs. He merely made a start on the right road, for no one man, however great, can do more than merely direct the forces bound up in this republican empire of ours. If those forces are wanting in directive impulse, even a John Hay is as helpless among them as a canoe in a cataract.

The American people make our government, and up to the present

time the international relations of this Republic have been almost entirely disregarded for the more engrossing pastime of local politics. The great question before our "statesmen" has been, How many votes can lodging-house Jim control in the 'steenth assembly district? A man who has not been orthodox on this proposition could not be expected to have any standing with the local boss, at least not sufficient to get "recognition"; his opinions may safely be disregarded.

But to-day we must face new problems. Are we seriously looking into the future? To talk of isolation for the United States is idle, because we are not isolated, and never will be. We may become mean and cowardly, but never isolated. Are our officials laying foundations for the future, or are they merely serving the present? Who is there in the United States that is contemplating the destiny of this Republic, or even forecasting its development for the next fifty years? Let

us see.

We have an enormous commerce with Europe; suppose we had war with some great European nation, not a nation like Russia or Spain, with no navies, but a real power, where are our coaling-stations on the coast of Europe, or in the vicinity, which would enable our cruisers to protect our commerce with the neutral powers? Suppose this war were not with a single power, but with practically all of them combined, such as our Monroe Doctrine fanatics would apparently like to precipitate us into; where then would we find naval bases for fuel and supplies? If our commerce with India, with the east coast of Africa, with the Western Australasian Islands, were menaced by a hostile power, where would our war-ships make their headquarters ?

Our commerce with the east coast of South America is not worth considering, but such as it is, we ought to be able to defend it. Where would our war-ships make their base, if that should become necessary? Take the west coast of South America; are we any better off there? Even the eastern coast of Asia is but inadequately protected, because, although the Philippine Islands would be of incalculable service to us in case of an emergency, they are so far from the upper portions of China and Japan that by the time a war-ship steamed up there and got ready to fight it would need to steam back for more coal. In the event of war with a first-class naval power we ought to have half a dozen more coaling-stations along the coast of Asia.

Ask a statesman in Washington how we would proceed in the contingencies mentioned, and he will answer that our people are against imperialism. The strange thing is that the people who are so strongly opposed to imperialism that they do not want us to acquire any more coaling-stations, and want us to surrender what few we have, are the very people who seem most anxious to provoke a naval conflict by pushing the Monroe Doctrine to the front, and always with the threat that the mailed fist is back of it.

Suppose we turn from Washington to London, and ask an English statesman how they would defend English commerce with other parts of the world in event of hostilities with some naval power, would he have to shrug his shoulders and answer that they were placing their reliance on a Hague peace convention? Rather, he would tell us that they were putting their trust in God and the best battle-ships that money and brains could build.

And then, as naval bases for those battle-ships, he would put his finger on islands and ports almost innumerable, in every part of this earth. Every strategic point on the map of either hemisphere is flanked by British coaling-stations. Not only have they the mightiest navy on the planet, but they have the means for making that navy effective. In the event of war there is not a point reached by English commerce but that is flanked by British naval bases. I admire the English I am perfectly frank about it. I admire a nation which gets there, which does things. But what are we doing?

If we should go ahead and build a great navy, and if the time ever comes when we shall get into a real war, what will we do with our warships? Keep them around within reach of our present coalingstations? If so, then I can see the end of American commerce on the high seas, at least while the war continues.

The very spirit and policy of our government must be changed. Our statesmen should be looking ahead to the requirements and necessities of this nation in the next generation, in the next century. In every ocean and sea of this earth there should be found American harbors, defended and commanded by American forts; and in those harbors there should be American battle-ships and cruisers, manned by American officers and crews.

I. THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND NO ADMINISTRATION HAS ANY POWER TO PROMISE OR PROPOSE THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THIS UNION

The administration of Theodore Roosevelt never, so far as I am aware, unreservedly committed itself to the absolute and perpetual retention of the Philippine Islands. Distinguished members of the cabinet, however, used vague expressions, which lead to the inference that when the Filipinos are capable of self-government they will be given "independence." Secretary of War William H. Taft on more than one occasion made use of expressions calculated to mollify the anti-imperialists by intimating that in the future territorial independence would be granted the archipelago. Of course, Secretary Taft has not, and never has had, any more authority than any other citizen to bind the American people on such a proposition. But the attitude of Congress and of the Supreme Court towards the Philippine