the sum awarded might be it is not said would be

the sum of

Frs. 18,483,000, the amount claimed. But it is always and only on the basis of indemnities for damages that this Honorable Commission has jurisdiction; and it is utterly powerless, even for good cause, to decree an unaccepted and unacceptable abandonment by either party of a mutual and reciprocal contract, or to award an act of rescission which has not, in effect, previously taken place."

These phrases show that the umpire thoroughly understands the heart of this case, and is rendering his decision with his eyes open. If such decision be wrong, the grave error cannot be accounted for on the ground of misapprehension or misconception. The vital question certainly is, whether or no rescission did previously take place. But even a cursory examination of the facts as stated in the above opinion makes it obvious that the government of Venezuela failed to perform in good faith any of its covenants whatever, and that furthermore, by the sheer force of arms (the soldiery not only of the once dominant régime, but of the successful revolution that followed), said government not only prevented this railway company from peaceable operation of its road, but crushed the company financially, laid waste its property, killed its manager, killed, imprisoned, or drove away its employees, seized its steamboats and trains, and appropriated them to its own use without compensation; and that, by divers other criminal and wicked methods, such as are practised only by savages, bandits, and anarchists, said government completed the destruction of this company, annulled its franchises, obliterated its property, so that where once a first-class railroad lay, there lie to-day merely its remnants, a rusted and decayed ruin. In view of these facts, Umpire Plumley's finding that the United States of Venezuela does not consent to the abandonment of the contract and that therefore the French Company of Venezuelan Railroads cannot by right abandon its contracts or its properties, is not merely pettifoggery-it is diabolism.

A specious and pusillanimous attempt to evade this absolutely vital and unescapable issue — rescission, voluntary or involuntary, of the contract, and abandonment of the property-may be discerned in that portion of the umpire's opinion now cited: "The umpire cannot entirely ignore the restrictive features of the contract between the claimant company and the respondent government which in terms and in fact strictly required, and still requires, that all doubts and controversies arising from that contract should be resolved by the competent tribunals of the respondent government. Certainly to consider and determine the question of its rescission is the most serious doubt, the most important controversy, which could grow out of, or arise from, the contract in question. A claim for damage may be regarded as ulterior to the contract, especially where the damage has accrued from the operation of the parties under the contract, but the question of its rescission is an entirely different proposition. The un

restricted agreement to submit to an arbitral tribunal the question of damages suffered by Frenchmen in Venezuela may properly be considered, if necessary, as equivalent to a suspension of the provision in the contract, were the damages claimed to be such as arose or grew out of the contract; but the agreement to submit a question of damages arising through operations performed under a contract, in no sense suggests a purpose to arm that tribunal with plenary power to consider and settle the question involved in the rescission of a contract, and therefore does not suggest an intent on the part of the High Contracting Powers to ask on the one hand or to grant on the other the suspension of the restrictive features referred to, which are contained in said contract. What is here said concerning the matter of rescission applies with equal force to the matter of abandonment. It is, therefore, the deliberate and settled judgment of the umpire that he cannot determine this claim on the basis of a declared and directed rescission or of abandonment, and can only decide the amount of the award, this to depend upon the ordinary basis of damages which have been suffered in Venezuela by the French Company of Venezuelan Railroads at the hands of those for whom the respondent government is responsible."

I had supposed that in Umpire Barge's decision in the Orinoco Steamship case the limit of judicial obliquity had been attained, but this abominable subterfuge by Umpire Plumley out-Barges Barge.

The French-Venezuelan umpire considers that the protocol under which he serves operates to overcome the no-reclamation clause in the contract for certain purposes, but that it cannot operate to overcome it for certain other purposes. Some cog-wheel must be out of gear in the thinking apparatus of him who can reach such a conclusion. If the no-reclamation clause was suspended at all by the protocol, it was suspended "for good and all."

The question of rescission, voluntary or involuntary, and abandonment, was as apt for decision by this commission as any other point at issue; and the French government ought to compel the re-submission of this case on this point, preferably to some respected tribunal such as The Hague, whose members are men of much higher calibre than the average members of an international mixed commission. This vital question of rescission and abandonment is, as has already been intimated, the very heart of the case, yet the umpire, though he appears to have perceived its intrinsic importance, waives it aside, seeking shelter under the assertion that the question is not within his jurisdiction; and withal throws out the cavalier suggestion that this despoiled company is at liberty to apply to the alleged courts of Ven

ezuela for relief.

As to the grounds upon which Umpire Plumley bases his absurd and inconsequential awards of damages, amounting only to about $75,000 gold, it would be wasting space to discuss them. Their inanities need no annotation.

Here are some remarkable views of this umpire, however, upon which it may be worth while to comment. Referring to the respondent government, he remarks: "It cannot be charged with responsibility for the conditions which existed in 1899, prostrating business, paralyzing trade and commerce, and annihilating the products of agriculture; nor for the exhaustion and paralysis which followed; nor for its inability to pay its just debts; nor for the inability of the company to obtain money otherwise and elsewhere. All these are misfortunes incident to government, to business, and to human life. They do not beget claims for damages."

What sort of an umpire is he who decides that a government is not responsible for its inability to pay its just debts, or for the acts of spoliation and outrage committed by it? This is most extraordinary doctrine, and I doubt if any reputable jurist could be found to sign his name to it, although it must be admitted that there are some wonderful decisions handed down in the name of the law. Does not Mr. Plumley know, does not every man of common sense know, that if the company were prevented by the illegal acts of the Venezuelan government from obtaining money, Venezuela ought in equity to be held liable for the damages growing out of such illegal acts? All the evidence in this case shows that the French Company of Venezuelan Railroads would have had ample capital with which to conduct its business, had not its business been molested, its property confiscated and destroyed, by the governments (old and new) of Venezuela. Will equity force a company to supply unlimited funds with which to operate an enterprise for the sole and exclusive benefit of a bandit aggregation like the Venezuelan government, which has never paid for any of the services rendered to it, but has added despoliation to extortion?

Umpire Plumley continues thus: "The claimant company was compelled by force majeure to desist from its exploitation in 1899; the respondent government from the same cause had been prevented from paying its indebtedness to the claimant company. The umpire finds no purpose or intent on the part of the respondent government to harm or injure the claimant company in any way or in any degree. Its acts and its neglects were caused and incited by entirely different reasons and motives. Its first duty was to itself. Its own preservation was paramount. Its revenues were properly devoted to that end. The appeal of the company for funds came to an empty treasury or to one only adequate to the demands of the war budget. When the respondent government used, even exclusively, the railroad and the steamboats, it was not outside its contractual right, nor beyond its privilege and the company's duty, had there been no contract. When traffic ceased through the confusion and havoc of war or because there were none to ride and no products to be transported, it was a dire calamity to the country and to all its people; but it was a part of the assumed risks of the company when it entered upon its exploitation."

What insufferable balderdash this is! If the company was compelled by force majeure to desist from its exploitation in 1899, as stated by Plumley, every one knows and the evidence shows that it was wholly blameless in this respect, and that this force majeure was nothing more or less than the criminal acts of the government of Venezuela, which not only violated its own contracts in every part and particular, but also prevented the company from exercising those rights of user and enjoyment of its own property which it possessed at common law independently of its contract with the government. Mr. Plumley would have us infer that the respondent government was prevented from paying its just debts to the claimant by force majeure, such as put the company out of business in October, 1899. But it was not so. Had this inability on the part of the Venezuelan government been caused by the criminal act of the railway company, then the cases would have been parallel, but in fact what prevented the government of Venezuela from paying its debts was not force majeure at all; it was the anarchistic condition of Venezuela, created by its own criminal conduct. It is absurd to contend that these two situations belong on the same plane. As for the assumption that "when the respondent government used, even exclusively, the railroad and the steamboats, it was not outside its contractual right, nor beyond its privilege and the company's duty, had there been no contract," it is based neither on reason, law, equity, nor common sense. It may be assumed that the respondent government under the circumstances might have rightfully used this property, had it made proper payments for such use, and saved the company harmless from all damages occasioned thereby. But to concede that Venezuela had any rights, contractual or otherwise, to seize this property and devote it to its own use without making a just payment for it, is not equity.

It is not worth while to waste more time or space in discussing this most unrighteous judgment. It gives to innocent and defenceless stockholders and bondholders about $75,000, to be paid some time in the distant future, when Castro gets good and ready to pay it, for property in which they invested in good faith, performing each and every stipulation in their agreements, more than $3,000,000. Venezuela repudiates each and every one of its obligations, and it escapes all responsibility, save for this miserable sum which will probably no more than pay the attorneys' fees of the defunct railway company.

In this case there are ample grounds upon which the French government may well demand a re-submission to a worthy tribunal. May The Hague Court of Arbitration never disgrace itself after the manner of so many of the mixed commissions!

It is time it has long been high time-that the Great American People realize the enormity of the crimes and outrages (robbery and murder in their train) committed against civilized men in the barbarous dictatorships of Latin America.

CHAPTER XXV

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ITS POSSIBILITIES

AND LIMITATIONS

I seems probable that

'N recent years international arbitration has assumed an important

civilized powers will from now on submit to tribunals international in character many questions such as have heretofore been adjusted diplomatically or threshed out by war.

It seems appropriate in this connection to consider the possibilities and limitations of international arbitration, and particularly to inquire if we may anticipate that any advancement of civilization in Latin America, any betterment in conditions there, will follow the adoption of this method for the settlement of controversies between nations.

There is a wide-spread belief that arbitration is the sovereign panacea for nearly all our international differences, and humanitarians of noble intellects and pure hearts have dreamed of the abolishment of war and the arrival of the millennium.

The writer cannot think of the regeneration of humanity as a consummation so easily attained.

There have been wars and rumors of wars from the beginning of time, and it is to be feared that they will run their course until the end. Civilization, such as it is, has come up painfully through unnumbered wars, through bloodshed, crime, injustice, and outrage. This is a world of strife, of struggle, of "dog eat dog." Life is impossible without the causing of pain and death. The vegetarian wishes to avoid the destruction of life, yet even as he walks he tramples the insects underfoot, and every ploughshare that upturns the earth in the cultivation of the fruits, grains, or garden products which he must consume for sustenance puts an end to thousands of living things. The human race cannot exist without the continuous destruction of the lives of animals, birds, fish, and insects; and these creatures in their turn prey upon others.

The peace advocate confronts as serious a state of facts as does the vegetarian. Let a man be weak or timid, and his fellow-men, even the most pious of them, ride over him roughshod or look upon him with contempt. So it is with nations. A powerful and resolute exec