parts, and securing the several communications from the Jerseys with small works and entrenchments, to prevent our people from paying them a visit; that the islanders have all joined them, seem well disposed to favour their cause, and have agreed to take up arms in their behalf. They look for Admiral Howe's arrival with his fleet and a large reinforcement; are in high spirits, talk confidently of success, and talk of carrying all before them when he comes. I trust through divine favour and our own exertions they will be disappointed in their views; and at all events any advantages they may gain will cost them very dear. If our troops will behave well (which I hope will be the case, having every thing to contend for that freemen hold dear) they will have to wade through much blood and slaughter before they can carry any of our works, if they carry them at all,—and at best be in possession of a melancholy and mournful victory. May the sacredness of our cause, inspire our soldiery with sentiments of heroism, and lead them to the performance of the noblest exploits."

What would an European captain think, if, when called to the command of an army on which the salvation of a whole country depended, instead of marshalling his soldiers for the conflict, distributing his orders with a confidence of seeing them strictly and speedily executed, however dangerous or difficult, and being always left to act at his own discretion, he were fettered in a command like that of Washington-entangled in all the intricate duties, in all the subordinate dependencies of the military system; to provide and contract for tent equipage, gun flints, and innumerable other articles of similar importance; and all this, with an authority, rather less absolute over his army,

in its operations, than a platoon officer has over his men-and, finally, to be made responsible for the success of a cause which might not be decided during the same juncture in which it had arisen, when the expense of supporting two regiments of horse could not be endured.

The requisites for the common soldier were to be found all over the country; for little education, and less of that romantick fervour, which is the life and spirit of an officer, are necessary in the ranks. The yeomanry were a vigorous race, enured to hardship, and from the nature of their employment, peculiarly fitted for some of the most laborious parts of a soldier's duty. They were accustomed to the use of the rifle, and many of them had hunted the Indian in his haunts; they were unequalled too, as General Burgoyne once said in his despatches, in the use of the spade and other entrenching tools; and to complete their character, those at least of the New England States, were pretty well informed on all subjects in which information would be useful to them, and uniformly educated with strict notions of religion. It is difficult for such men to be broken down to the formal drudgery of camp or garrison duty. They are easily led into battle, and easily continued in active warfare; for, unlike the natives of warmer climates they are not readily excited, nor readily quieted. The battle of Breed's Hill was a fair example of what might be expected from such men; but even they, with all their ardour and resolution, could longer support a cause which required a similar conflict at every little interval, than the wearisome routine of camp duty; privations and restraints of a nature, more irritating for their very insignificance, as there would have been no virtue in energy, 48

VOL. I.

no heroick fortitude in submitting to them. Amid such scenes, the only enthusiasm that men of cold blood, strong minds, and sound constitutional courage, ever experience, is soon dissipated or worn away. There is no opportunity for the active virtues to be seen, and few men of vigorous minds, free thoughts, or cultivated understandings, ever become remarkable for passive endurance, submission to calamity, fortitude and the other negative qualities of inferiour minds. All opportunity for distinction is lost in the crowd of ordinary men who have not sinew enough to throw off the burden that keeps them idle. An army composed of such materials as this under Washington, at the Declaration of Independence, are less to be depended upon within their camp, or even within their entretchments, if exposed to the regular approaches of a beseiging foe, and not called upon to resist an assault, than when in the open field, opposed to artillery, cavalry or even the bayonet. The most effective men in an army, calculated to achieve a speedy independence for a country, are those who suffer most from confinement. The spirit that is most on fire for action, and most terrible in battle, can least brook inactivity and restraint.

These reflections so naturally obtrude themselves upon the mind that they may be supposed to have been familiar with the leaders of the American army at the time and, in some measure to account for the impatience sometimes manifested by Washington, to employ his troops in active service, when it appeared peculiarly hazardous. His habits of caution were sometimes influenced by the consideration that all eyes were turned upon him; but that caution when it yielded, was overcome not by such reflections, but by a

knowledge of the character of the men he commanded. It was often less dangerous to invite, or even to engage in battle, than to continue in suspense. His intention to remain in the lines on Long Island, when he expected the enemy to storm them, is an example of this kind. It occurred at a period when his force was greatly overrated, and when the whole population of the country were awaiting in breathless anxiety, some gallant exploit which would annimate the soldiers, inspirit the friends of independence, give all ranks a confidence in the leader of the army, and if not appal or dishearten the enemy, at least teach him respect for his foes.

The affairs of Congress at this period continued to increase in dignity and interest. The surrender at the Cedars had never appeared satisfactory to the public. An inquiry was commenced on the 10th of July, in Congress.

The chief object of which, after satisfying the publick mind respecting the surrender, was the vigorous assertion of the lex talionis, as will appear by the following resolutions :

"Resolved, That all acts contrary to good faith, the laws of nature, or the customs of civilized nations done by the officers or soldiers of his Britannic Majesty, or by foreigners or savages taken into his service, are to be considered, as done by his orders, unless indemnification be made in cases which admit indemnification, and in all other cases unless immediate and effective measures be taken by him or by his officers for bringing to condign punishment the authors, abettors and perpetrators of the act."

"That the plundering the baggage of the garrison at the cedars, stripping them of their clothes, and de

livering them into the hands of savages, was a breach of the capitulation on the part of the enemy, for which indemnification ought to be demanded."

"That the murder of the prisoners of war was a gross and inhuman violation of the laws of nature and nations; that condign punishment shall be inflicted on the authors, abettors and perpetrators of the same; and that, for this purpose, it be required that they be delivered into our hands.”

"That the agreement entered into by general Arnold, was a mere sponsion on his part; he not being invested with powers for the disposal of prisoners not in his possession, nor under his direction; and that, therefore, it is subject to be ratified or annulled at the discretion of this house."

"That the shameful surrender of the post at the cedars is chargeable on the commanding officer; that such other of the prisoners as were then there shewed a willingness and desire to fight the enemy; and that major Sherburne and his forces taken with him, though their inferiority of numbers was great, fought the enemy bravely for a considerable time, and surrendered at last, but on absolute necessity; on which consideration, and on which alone, it is resolved, that the said sponsion be ratified, and that an equal number of captives from the enemy, of the same rank and condition be returned to them, as stipulated by the said sponsion."

"That previous to the delivery of the prisoners to be returned on our part, the British commander in Canada be required to deliver into our hands, the authors, abettors and perpetrators of this horrid murder committed on the prisoners, to suffer such punishment as their crime deserves; and also to make indemnifi