institutions and conditions. They sought a new order of things. They protested against European intolerance of civil and religious liberty. They were weary of dynastic rivalries and of predatory nationalism. They abhorred the European system of diplomacy in accordance with the principle of Balance of Power.

This great game of international politics had involved the American Colonies in more than one war of imperialism. By the time of the Holy Alliance, after our people had attended the practical school of experience and observation during the Napoleonic wars, they came to the conclusion that American foreign policy could never tolerate the extension of European rule or the intrusion of the European game of politics in the affairs of the free independent nations of the New World.

The Monroe Doctrine was not so much the creation of one man or of several men as the inevitable logic of facts and events. We were glad to be entirely free from all connection with European politics. We warned Europe to mind its own business, and we devoted ourselves to the agreeable task of minding our

own.

Under the operations of this beneficent national policy the nations of the New World found needed moral support in their infancy, and escaped the strain and the curse of European politics. They have had but slight knowledge of the tortuous operations of the pernicious principle of Balance of Power. This kind of game, fortunately, is foreign to the thoughts and the instincts of the peoples of this hemisphere. They have been able to achieve a free development that has proved of immense benefit to the world.

There are but few persons who openly advocate the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine in its entirety, though there are some who advocate the abandonment of one half of it, namely our policy of nonparticipation in the political affairs of Europe. Such persons evidently believe that there has been a substantial alteration of the circumstances on which that policy has been based. It is true that in 1812 through the clever duplicity of Napoleon we found ourselves drawn into a European war, and, unwittingly, on the wrong side of the contest for balance of power. We were glad to withdraw and thankful that we had no part in the Con

gress of Vienna. The New World had no desire to attempt the impossible task of "redressing the balance of the Old".

It is true that a century later the insensate ambitions of a feeble imitator of Napoleon drew us again into a European war. We entered it deliberately of our own free choice. We threw our weight against the enemy of all free nations throughout the world. We fought for ideals. We impressed these ideals on the hearts of many Europeans. We endeavored to have them embodied in the peace settlement. We went far in our eagerness to see these ideals realized in actual practice. We asked for no territorial or other rewards. We withdrew our troops from Europe and reaffirmed our loyalty to the traditional American policy of minding our own business. We abstained from any attempt to dictate to the European nations a settlement in detail of their many political problems. We accepted no responsibility either moral or otherwise for the solution of these problems.

The wisdom of this course would seem to be justified by all that has transpired since the Armistice in 1918. We have learned to our disillusionment and sorrow that the nations of Europe with rare exceptions have been unable-perhaps because of this very logic of circumstances that controls national policies-to abandon the old diplomatic game of Balance of Power. They did not seem to find in the League of Nations-with or without the United States the means of advancing their various interests or of obtaining the security they required.

This inability of Europe to alter essentially the rules of the game of international politics was evidenced in the treaties that ended the war. Austria was denied categorically the right of self-determination and became an object of charity. Hungary was mutilated and millions of Magyars placed under foreign domination. Punitive measures were adopted against Germany to keep that nation in a permanent state of inferiority or vassalage. The Eastern Question was treated very much in the same manner as by the Congress of Berlin. The Treaty of Sèvres sought to restore impossible situations and conditions. It was accompanied by separate agreements between Great Britain, France, and Italy defining their special privileges in Anatolia. The acute needs and moral claims of the peoples of the Near East

were forgotten. Greeks and Turks were pitted against each other to suit the rival aims of European politics.

It would be invidious to adduce other instances to stress the discouraging fact that the nations of Europe for the most part have been unable to accept and to apply to international politics the ideals of this hemisphere. They are all too apparent to the thoughtful and candid student of world affairs. The recent incident at Corfu alone is sufficient to make one justifiably skeptical of any basic alteration in the methods of European diplomacy.

The burden of proof is certainly with those who argue that circumstances have so fundamentally changed as to warrant the abandonment of the traditional American policy towards Europe. Their arguments rather have the trend to create the impression that the establishment of the League of Nations has completely altered conditions in Europe and that its beneficent activities have brought about a new era. They assert that the presence of the United States would have insured this stupendous alteration of circumstances, and that our absence has been responsible for much that is to be regretted. This, of course, is nothing but sheer speculation, and there is small profit in speculation concerning the problematic effects of things that never happened. We can only deal with things as they are.

The League of Nations is no longer an issue for theoretical or partisan discussion. It has been functioning actively for nearly five years. It has to be judged by its acts. In actual practice it has proved to be primarily a European concern and its interests are in the main of a political character.

The presence of many non-European nations in the League does not make it a world association. Its interests and activities are what determine its nature and these are found to be mainly European and political. A mere enumeration will suffice: The Silesian dispute; the Aaland Islands controversy; the Vilna and Memel questions; the quarrel between Albania and Jugo-Slavia; the Corfu incident; the rehabilitation of the finances of Austria and of Hungary; the boundary of Carelia; and other matters, some of which have been carried by the Council of the League even to the Permanent Court of International Justice. It is difficult to see how the non-European members of the League are

concerned either immediately or remotely in these complicated diplomatic problems affecting most intimately the nations of Europe.

Turn to the various non-political activities of the League, such as the relief of starving peoples in Russia and Greece. The mere suspicion of ulterior political aims on the part of the European nations rendered the efforts of the League in Russia of slight avail and made independent American action all the more imperative. Take the commissions of the League concerned with problems of transportation, communication, hygiene, of economic and other matters. They are preoccupied almost entirely with the European aspects of these problems. Take the great question of disarmament. The recommendations of the League's special commission on this subject are based on the sensible conclusion that it is primarily a local problem depending on "regional understandings" among groups of nations having inter-related interests. General disarmament in Europe awaits on local disarmament; and world disarmament awaits on Europe.

This is entirely natural. The European nations have a most complicated series of political and other problems of a continental nature. Their first duty is to regulate such matters among themselves. World questions must necessarily remain in the background. The League of Nations with its headquarters at Geneva in the very heart of Europe could hardly be anything else than primarily a European concern.

In the light of all the circumstances the United States can not rightly be expected to abandon its traditional policy toward Europe. The American people are apparently convinced five years after the Armistice that they have done wisely in refusing to accept any responsibility whatsoever for the peace settlements at Paris and for any other political adjustments reached by the nations of Europe. The Treaty of Versailles is generally discredited, and the truth of the statement made by General Smuts to President Wilson is now realized, that "the peace may well become an even greater disaster to the world than the war was."

The League of Nations was cursed from its inception by its complete identification with the Treaty of Versailles. The reparations provisions alone have hung like black clouds over the

League. The impossible attempt was made, as a French observer shrewdly remarked, "to organize the future before they had liquidated the past".

The United States was more than justified, therefore, in its refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and in its ratification of a separate treaty with Germany that affords the just basis for a durable peace between the two nations. With no selfish purposes, the United States remains in the fortunate position of amity and sympathetic understanding with the nations of Europe. We are happily freed from the necessity of pronouncing judgment on their contentions and policies. We are able to exercise a friendly moderating influence at times through our maligned "unofficial observers'', as was notably illustrated at the Lausanne Peace Conference. It was there recognized that the tactful disinterested attitude of our delegates aided immensely in the restoration of peace in the Near East.

The unfortunate attempt of some Americans to interpret the traditional policy of this country as one of selfish indifference is greatly to be deplored. It is in flagrant misrepresentation of the facts and is therefore most unjust. Never before has the world witnessed so generous a demonstration of practical sympathy and support in the billions of dollars lavishly poured out in gifts, loans, and in personal sacrifices, as that of the American Government and of the American people since the Armistice. Those lovers of mankind, The American Society of Friends, in their ministrations of mercy throughout Central Europe and Russia, have been visible witnesses that the American people are in no way committed to a policy of selfish isolation and unconcern respecting the interests and welfare of the peoples of all other lands. The Red Cross alone has spent over one hundred millions of dollars in its relief work in the Near East and the United States Congress has been prompt to prove our desire to help the stricken people of Japan. Only the blindest partizanship can minimize the significance of these facts.

Further striking proof of the fact that the United States is not pursuing a policy of selfish isolation is to be found in active cooperation in the non-political interests of the League of Nations. Such devoted friends of the League as the author of the Bok Plan