during the whole of the war, and that, if the interest of our debt had doubled, during the war, our trade also had doubled during that period. At the breaking out of that war, the total official value of our exports and imports, was about 35 millions; in the last year of the war, they amounted to about 69 millions; at the former period, the annual interest of the national debt, was about 12 millions, at the latter period little short of 21 millions. Here the proportion is kept up, and, if it were still kept up, there would, perhaps, be little occasion for alarm. But, what is our present situation? We have all the interest of doubled debt to pay annually, while our trade has made a retrogade motion of five years; so that we have now a trade less than that of 1799, with a debt of 1803. Nothing can furnish so clear and so striking an illustration as a comparison in the proportion between the amount of the trade, and of the interest of the debt, in those two years respectively.

Interest of Debt

Amount of Imports and Exports 1798-57,733,955 £21,472,166, 1803- 55,436,231 25,066,211 Where, then, I repeat my question; where are we to look for the means of supporting the present war, and for discharging, at the same time, the annually increasing expenses of the debt? Am I again told that there will be little or no annual addition to these expenses, because the greater part of the supplies are, according to the Doctor's plan, to be raised within the year? In the first place, even the Doctor allows that he shall always take a loan (he should have said as long as he could get it), of 6 millions a year, and this year he is about to take a loan of 10 millions, to say nothing of the 6 millions for poor Ireland, three times as much as it has been usual to borrow annually for that country, and, the interest of which, if it be paid at all, must, in great part, be advanced, and indeed finally paid, by Great Britain. At any rate 10 millions a year will be wanted by way of loan, which together with funded Exchequer Bills, will, in course of five years, have swelled the annual interest of the debt to 30,000,000l. at least.

If what I have above advanced be not extremely erroneous, the conclusion is, that, in Consequence of our reduced trade, our present means are inadequate to our wants.Last year, which was half a year of war and half a year of peace, the total expenditure of the nation, including interest of the debt, amounts to 50 millions (I make all these statements from the official accounts.) The expenditure of the present year, when we consider the expenses that have been incurred

and have not yet come to account, we cannot estimate at less than 55 millions. But, suppose us to continue on in this inglorious defensive war, and suppose the annual expenditure, on account thereof, to be no greater than it was last year, how are we, with our present trade, to meet that expenditure? And, must we not, at the end of a year or two, withhold payment of the annually increasing interests of the debt, or crouch down at the feet of the enemy? Will it again be answered, that new taxes are to be levied? An addition to the reve. nue without an addition to the trade cannot take place; for, if we were to allow it to be possible, to carry on the war this year, for instance, without any loan at all, and, of course, without making any addition to the interest of the debt; if we were, for argument's sake, to allow, that the Doctor, accepting of the offer of a venerable prelate, were this year to squeeze the whole fifty millions out of the nation, what would be the consequence? Would not a squeezed nation be like a squeezed lemon? Would it not yield less and less at every squeezing? Do you not, by eating the seed, cut off the hope of a future harvest? And,. does not our present state itself afford us a practical illustration of this truth? Has not the Doctor heaped upon us loads of new taxes, and has not our trade, have not our future means of meeting those taxes, decreased in a fearful degree?-Since, therefore, we cannot, with our present trade, defray the annual interest of the debt and support the other branches of our expenditure, it follows, that, we must revive and extend our trade, or leave the interest of the debt unpaid, or diminish our other expenses by putting an end to the war, be the terms of the enemy what they may; and, those who think it impossible that our means should receive an extension, while in the hands of the right honourable Doctor, by whom they have been so much contracted; those who think it impossible, that our country should, under this man's administration, recover abroad that respect and influence which is absolutely necessary to counteract the commercial as well as the political and war-like hostility of France; those who think thus, must allow, that our only choice lies between bankruptcy and slavery, unless our affairs are speedily committed to other and abler hands.* 20th April.

WM. COBBETT.

* Several of the accounts, referred to in this address, have been laid before Parliament during the present session, and have not yet been pub

TRISH HALF-PAY.

SIR,From the observations relative to the Irish half pay officers, that occurred in course of the debate in the House of Commons on the 12th instant, I am convinced that those members who spoke in their behalf, and the public at large, are not acquainted with their situation; and you will confer a lasting obligation on them by inserting the following statement.Previous to the union of the two countries, the military establishments of each was distinct. That of Ireland had much less pay, allowances, pension, &c. &c. than that of England; and, officers as well as men, when they entered, either conceived themselves intitled to those fixed allowances. Circum. stances rendered it advisable to change the forces of the two countries, in course of the last war; and the first step taken by the late ministers, was, to augment the Irish pay, that the British regiments sent there might not suffer by the change. On the conclusion of the treaty of peace, several of those regiments were reduced, and not a doubt was entertained that their half-pay and pensions would either be increased, or that they would be reduced on the British half-pay. But such was not the case. They were placed, by the economical ministry, on the old Irish allowance; on an establishment to which they never belonged! I shall not detain you, Sir, by stating the loss sustained by the officers in consequence; but, the situation of the poor old soldiers of these regiments is so cruelly hard, that I beg your attention to it. Had they been permitted to complete their time of service in their own country, they would have received a pension of nine pounds a year; but, because they did so in Ireland, they are left with only six Irish pounds, and I can assert this to have been the case with many men, who, of the whole of their long service, had not passed more than one year in Ireland. This certainly has the appearance of injustice, and it will be most satisfactory to those concerned, to have it explained.- -I beg leave, before I conclude, to express my surprise at the reasons given by Lord Castlereagh against granting payment at par to those of ficers who are in England, "because it was

optional with them to reside here or in "Ireland." No man can know better than his lordship, that the majority of those officers are British. And does he really think

lished by me; but, they will all be found in the last number of the First Volume of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, which volume will be completed in about a fortnight from this time.

those officers imbibed such notions of Irish happiness as to give up their homes, their friends, and country to live there? Does his lordship think that if they had done so, they would still have been in existence, upon the balf-year's allowance, the only aid they have vet received from the Irish Treasury.—I am, Sir, your sincere friend.-AN OLD COL•

DIER.

NAVAL INQUIRY.

SIR,--Having in two former letters conveyed to you at some length, my remarks on the opposition made in the House of Commons to Mr. Pitt's motion for inquiry into the conduct of the Admiralty; and also on Lord St. V.'s claim to future confidence, from past services, I venture to address a third to you, which closes what I have to say on these subjects.In order to examine with accuracy, Lord St. V.'s fitness for his present situation, I will, for the moment, allow his former services, in the active duties of his profession, all the value and importance claimed for them by his most zealous partisans; I will allow his errors, as First Lord of the Admiralty, to have been inconsiderable, and of a nature easily rectified; and, that his general un popularity in the various departments of the navy is unmerited, I will further, for the sake of argument, allow, that though his lordship's health is bad, it yet permits him to attend his duties during half the year; yet, after accepting the whole of this liberal allowance, I presume no one will be prepared to assert, that Lord St. V., is the man best qualified to preside at the Admiralty, through a period so critical, that the neglects of a single day might sink this country into a province of France. And where is the man, who admitting Lord St. V.'s inability from any cause, and even to a trifling extent, will be hardy enough to maintain, his professional colleagues are so well chosen, that the customary objections which have been made for ages, against important offices devolving to the execution of deputies, are inapplicable with respect to them? If, in the present conflict, we ultimately obtain success, it must be by an exertion of mental and corporeal vigour in our rulers; whilst esteem and confidence towards them, must be added to scuse of duty in those who serve. I apprehend, therefore, that the inexpediency of Lord St. V.'s continuing the marine minister is, from the above reflection alone, fully established; it surely then becomes Parliament not to delay unnecessarily, even for a single day, the taking effectual steps for his removal, least events

should arise, rendering a change impracticable. The present general system of the Admiralty is, in my estimation, so pregnant with mischief to the state, that its continuance hourly endangers the safety of the country, and not only the welfare, but the very existence of our navy. To lull the

country, awakened in some degree, to a sense of that danger, the supineness of the present Admiralty has brought upon them, to strengthen the death-like slumber, Mr. Pitt's motion had a little roused it from, by a stimulus well timed, though ill supported, and in some degree, I regret to observe, ill conducted; (in a great measure from his having expected the papers he moved for would be granted) I say, that to lull the country into its former lethargy, the Admiralty has lately made some addition to our force under Lord Keith; they have ordered some gun-boats to be built, and a few armed vessels to be hired; these additions pompously announced and boasted of in Tucker's Gazette, are so inadequate to our wants, so wretchedly trivial in their amount, that they are here noticed, more to expose a paltry attempt at deceiving the public into a belief that all is now well, than from any opinion, on my part, that their security is increased. The gun-boats which the Admiralty has ordered to be built, are inconsiderable in point of number, nor are they to be finished in less than three months; and, if we are rightly informed, the attempt at invasion must long before this be terminated in some way or other. The Admiralty's attention has not, I believe, yet reached our large ships, for I have heard of no provision, even for supporting a continuance of our present number, daily preyed upon by increasing defects, and falling victims to unprecedented losses, from want of sufficient and timely repair. This destruction of our large ships, is one blessed effect of Lord St. V.'s economy! With this description of fo: ce, were the Admiralty instantaneously to adopt the wisest measures, our navy could not be saved from feeling the baneful consequences of former neglects. To secure our coasts effectually, to protect our trade and foreign. possessions, to be prepared against probable events, (such as a Spanish war, a Northern confederacy, or unreasonable pretensions on the part of America), we ought to have thirty sail of the line added to our present force, with a full proportion of frigates and smaller vessels; and to keep up this establishment, we ought to launch five or six sail of the line annually, during the continuance of war! Whereas, in the course of the two next years, and with assistance from

the merchants yards, I believe, only four ships of the line can be launched. It frequently happens that a 74 gun ship is 6 or 7 years building in the King's-yards in the merchants'-yards, (where exigency alone leads us to build,) not more than half that time is allowed, which accounts, in some sort, for the shorter duration of ships built in the latter; as their large timbers have not been so thoroughly seasoned, by long exposure before being covered in. From these premises, and the known deficiency of timber fit for the construction of large ships, the neglect of the present Admiralty may be justly appreciated. It is said, that within this last year, we have lost (wrecked or foundered) twelve ships of war, many of which were ships of the line; besides this, several in the same period have been found unserviceable. To what is such a rapid diminution of our navy to be attributed, whilst our ships have been little battered by shot, or strained by carrying sail, to attain, or avoid an enemy; but to their imperfect state, or the imprudent method of using them! I am aware, that it will be said, had we the great increase of ships I have proposed, men could not be procured to man them; but this I do not admit, supposing liberal bounties offered, and other proper means resorted to. The present Admiralty have certainly done much towards di-gusting our seamen with the naval service, by compelling those pressed, during the last war, to continue on board our ships up to this time; and, in many instances, without the smallest indulgence of leave to set foot on shore; nor have they had any advantage, beyond what a sailor entering to-morrow, becomes entitled to; yet the generosity of their nature, would make them, I am confident, disregard such grievances when called to defend all they hold dear. Br sides, a certain number of sea-fencibles, militia, and other troops, might indisputably be more profitably employed by forming part of the complement of these ships station ed to prevent invasion, than in any other mode of opposition; nor can we doubt their volunteering for such service if invited to do it.The Admiralty are fruitful in projects, for diminishing their unpopularity, by imposing upon and cajoling the people; it is through a stratagem of this nature, that their intention is signified of bringing for ward a bill to better regulate the "distribu

tion of prize-money:" this Mr. Tucker exultingly offers, and sarcastically calls it, "an instance of that oppression the Board "of Admiralty are accused of practising :" the phrase thus ironically used, may be lite