Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

shall not fail to give them the result with all the expedition which the circnmstances require.—I once more recommend you to arrange every thing properly, before your departure, which relates to our correspondence. Believe me to be, with the most perfect consideration, Sir. Yours, &c.

NOTA MANUS.

No X-Sir,-Since the general (1) shews such confidence in his means; since he thinks that the present moment is singularly propitious for commencing the operations; since he is of opinion that, if we suffer it to escape, such favourable circumstances will not again occur, the friend (2) from hence cannot otherwise than comply with his wishes, and promise him all the assistance which depends on him. The friend must necessarily leave the under-parts of execution to the general on the spot, and who is more interested than any other, that the measures be well prepared and well combined, that the object do not miscarry. He wil, nevertheless, obscrve, that it is of the highest importance, that a place on the frontiers of France and Germany be made sure of as soon as possible, that the friend may have a free, prompt, active, and sure communication with the general, for the transmission of what may become necessary in future. Huningen is the best situated place for it, particularly as it is nearest to the scene of the principal operations.-One must at least establish trusty persons from stage to stage, from Besançon to Friburg, to carry and bring intelligence.It seems, that the very first operation must be, the seizure of Blois [Besancon] which will serve as an arsenal, and, in case of misfortune, as a place of defence. In this last case, a part of the insurgents might throw themselves on the Cavennes and the mountains of the ancient Vivarais, and maintain themselves there for a long time, provided that care be taken to manage a sure communication for receiving pecuniary succours, whether by way of Huningen, Metz [Basle], or Swisserland. After taking possession of Blois [Besançon], and brought the neighbouring provinces to an insurrection, not a moment must be lost in setting matters also in motion at Chalons [Paris]. Every thing must be previously prepared and disposed for taking advantage there of the first instant of that perplexity and that consternation of the actual Gov., whea it learns the movements in the provinces.Since it is certain, that a very great part of the army, as well officers as soldiers, is discontented with the arrestation of Moreau, it is natural that the general will satisfy them in this respect, in order to assure himself of their aid in the critical moment. The general cannot otherwise than perceive, that it will be of the utmost importance to him, and even of the last necessity, to adopt, as a general principle, the profiting of the assistance of all the disaffected, whoever they may be, and of uniting them all for the first moment, of what party soever, and declaring

(1) It should be observed here, that all which has been written to Mr. Drake on the subject of the general, of which mention is made in the last letter, and with relation to huissier, spoken of in other places, is a pure supposition, as the 'correspondent himself of Mr. Drake will declare, in the recital, which he purposes to give, on the conversations that he has had at London with the English Minister, and at Munich with Mr. Drake, on the subject of his mission(2) The friend is Mr. Drake, who speaks here of himself in the third person.

that the great object of the insurrection-being to put an end to the tyranny which weighs on France and on foreigners, all who are enemies of the actual Gov. will be regarded as friends by the insurrectionists; it being moreover very necessary that all the steps he taken with the greatest discretion (particularly towards the partisans of the Consul) in order not to awaken the apprehensions of this great number of persons, who still recollect the ills which they have su Tered at different epochas of the revolution. The system may be aunounced, in the thst proclamation, by two words: "Liberty and peace for France, and for the world!" These reflections are particularly recommended to the consideration of the general, while an opposite conduct will not fail to frighten the public in general, and, consequently, to engage the greatest number to unite themselves with the actual Gov., however detestable it is, rather than bring upon themselves a repetition of those revolutionary scenes, the recollection of which is still fresh in their minds.-The friend must also inform the general, that he has obtained the certainty that the arrestation of Moreau has excited a general discontent, and principally in Alsace. This general having a great number of partisans in that country, one might derive great advantage from this dissention, acting on the basis just now indicated.As to the pecuniary succours, the friend could have wished the general had informed him of what he shall want for the first movements, as well as what may be wanted in future. The friend must inform the ge eral, that this city not being a place of com inerce, it is always difficult, and often impossible, to find there bills of exchange on Paris, (particularly bills at a short date) and the friend is almost always compelled to seek them at a great distance from thence when he wants them. The general will then have the goodness to instruct the friend at once how this object may be aranged, by mentioning to him the sums of which he will stand in need, the periods when they must be furnished, by what channel they must be transmitted, and if the remittances must be made in bills of exchange on Paris, or in hard cash. In the latter case, one may send the friend some one that is to be trusted, provided with powers for receiving it, and for carrying it directly either to Châlons [Paris], or to Blois (Besançon, as it may be wanted. But it must be observed, that it will not be possible to amass a very large sum at once, neither in bills nor money: it is very nccessary, that it be pointed out as precise as possible the time when money will be wanted, to have time to provide it. As soon as the friend shall receive intimation to this purpose, he will take measures that the sums wanted be deposited with a sure person at Offenburg, at Stutgard, and in some other city near the frontier, who shall deliver them to him whom the general will send-at least if the general shall not deem it proper to point out a person to him, in whom he places an unlimited confidence to a fixed post in one of those cities (or rather at Friburg in the Brisgaw) particularly for taking care of this matter, which, perhaps, will be the most convenient plan. is to be supposed, that the general will find some funds in the chests of the State, of which he will make himself master; but in the possible case, that it be wanted immediately, before the remittances arrive, bons might be sent, payable to the bearer, at 2 or 3 weeks. The remittances arriving before the day of payment, they shall then be

[ocr errors]

honoured; and this punétuality of fulfilling these engagements, will not lail to give, a great credit to the insurrectionists. There are many circumstances which cannot be discussed in this letter, since one will not detain the traveller any longer, but he shall be told more by word of mouth.The general will now receive, by the bearer, the sum of 9,990 francs, making 10,114 livres 17 sous, 6 den. in 4 bills of exchange ou Paris, 3 of which are payable the 3d Germinal, and one the 5th. The friend has already taken his measures for procuring the sums which will be wanted in future.--Munich, March 16, 1804.-P. S. One may now write to the friend by means of the trusty person at Toulouse [Strasburg]. The address is to M. l'Abbé Dufresne, Ecclesiastical Counsellor at Munich, in Bavaria.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE D'ENGHUTEN.-It is stated in the foreign papers, and, it is to be feared, but too correctly stated, that the Duke D'Enghuien was shot, in the wood of Vincennes, on the night after his trial, which took place on the 21st of March. It appears, that he was first brought to Paris, from Ettenheim, on the evening of the 20th, in a coach and six, under escort of a party of gens d'armes; that he was carried to the Temple, but was not imprisoned there, an order being given to take him to the castle of Vincennes; that he was so much fatigued as to be scarcely able to keep his eyes open when put upon trial for his life; that he desired to speak with Buonaparte, but was refused; and that, in the presence of several of the republican generals, he met his fate with that courage which has ever belonged to his name.-There were persons who expected, that this gallant prince, the last of the Condés, would have been spared by Buonaparté, if froin no other motive, from that of policy: from a desire to have the honour of doing a merciful and magnanimous act, as well as from the fear of exciting the horror and the implacable resentment of the people of France. But, Buonaparté did not fail to perceive, that his clemency would have been attributed to the latter and not to the former motive; that it would, all the world over, and especially amongst the royalists in France, have been ascribed to fear of the effects of that attachment, which the people of France yet entertain for their sovereign and his family; and, that such an opinion would have been extremely injurious to him the Consul must have been convinced. Indeed, the means that were made use of to get possession of the unfortunate prince, clearly showed, that no mercy was to be expected.--The hopes which the "safe politicians" entertain as to the hatred which this deed will excite against Buonaparté, in the hearts of the people of

66

France, have alas! no other ground than that infatuation and cowardice, which led them to seek for peace and safety, in persecuting those who wished to keep that hatred alive. It is, indeed, shameful, it is scandalous to the last degree, to hear the sentiments, which this description of persons now utter. It is only about thirteen or fourteen months ago, that they were prosecuting a man for endeavouring to excite, amongst "the people of France, hatred of the person "and authority of the First Consul," and they now look for their own safety in the exciting of that hatred; and this they are not ashamed openly to avow! But, they will say, that the difference of our situation justifies this difference of sentiment and of conduct: we were then at peace with BuoLapartè, we are now at war with him. Do we, then, ourselves adopt the principle upon which the revolutionists of France acted; the principle that a state of war gives us a right to excite internal hatred against the government and the ruler of the nation with whom we are at war; that hateful principle which the Brissotines promulgated in the decree of November, 1792? Are we, at last, driven to adopt this barbarous principle, and thus to imitate those whose maxims we have so long and so justly reprobated?--The peace changed, with respect to us, the na ture of Buonaparte's authority. Till that degrading compact was signed, we had a right to consider him as an usurper, and to endeavour to subvert his power for the purpose of restoring the lawful sovereign; and, we have now an unquestionable right to ef fect the same object by legitimate war; but, after having acknowledged the legality of bis power, after having solemnly entered into bonds of "friendship" with him, after having acted with his co operation in settling the limits and governments of other countries, after this shall we claim the right to act against him in a manner contrary to all the principles which would have regulated our conduct in a war against any other pow er, with whom we had before been at peace? No: the law of nations, the voice of reason and of justice, say, no. By the of peace Amiens we not only established his power, but we deprived ourselves of the right to question the legitimacy of that power; and, we can never reproach him with being an usurper, without pronouncing our own condemnation, as the "friends" of usurpation. It were curious, indeed, for us to claim the right of considering him as an usurper, and a legitimate ruler, alternately, as it may suit our purpose; yet the claim of the safe politicians amounts to nothing short of this.

vour, that their discomfiture and their fall deprive us of the means of purchasing protection against the menaced assault of our enemy. From the circumstance of the execution of the Duke D'Enghuien having taken place in the night, it has been concluded, that Buonaparte was afraid to execute him by day-light. This seems to have no good foundation. The trial could not have closed much before, the hour when the execution is said to have taken place. The

with the people; and, indeed, the opinion that the people of France are at all disposed to favour an act hostile to the Consul is entirely unsupported by any facts that have reached this country. The ruling passion of a Frenchman's breast is the glory of France; the desire to see his country the mistress of the world; and, the only way to sink Buonaparté in the esteem of Frenchmen is to beat him. We may fret and revile and plot and whine as long as we please; we may lament, with Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt, the apathy and degradation of the powers. "of the continent," and, in the fullness of our compassion, may weep over the "blind"ness and servility of the people of France;" but, while the French armies remain in Hanover, and while we ourselves are besieged, however lofty may be our talk, we may rest assured, that the powers of the continent and the people of France will repay our lamentation and compassion with scorn.

"

They may claim, but the world will not grant; and, to the reputation of cowardice they will now most assuredly add that of perfidy.Mr. Otto, too, Lord Hawkesbury's worthy friend, our worthy friend Mr. Otto, has, it seems, made his seizure of emigrants, in the capital of the Elector of Bavaria. Well? Was not Mr. Otto drawn through the streets of London in triumph? Was not this mark of attachment to him applauded in the London news-papers? Was not Mr. Otto obliged to go incognito for fear of being hug-time of the execution could have little weight ged and squeezed to death? Did not the ministerial herd fawn upon him like spaniels? Did not the Mayor and Aldermen beslobber him in a manner most disgusting? And, as to emigrants, have not many of them starved to death in St. George's Fields, and did not a member of the last parliament, actually object to the granting of the remaining ones another farthing, in order that they might be famished into a compliance with the Consul's terms of re-admission? Shall we, then, be suffered undespised to set up our lamentations at the fate of those emigrants, who have fallen into the claws of our amicable friend Mr. Otto? But, did not the makers of the peace and their applauders basely desert the royalists of France? Did not the ministers omit to stipulate in behalf of the gallant remains of the royal and christian army of the west? Did they not even refuse to afford, to those who could have escaped, the means of reaching England and of existing after their arrival? In consequence of this abominable breach of national faith, was not the signing of the peace of Amiens the signal of the murder of all those who had remained faithful to their king and to their engagements with this country, twelve hundred of whom were put to death in the summer of 1802, and were weltering in their blood at the very moment that Lord Hawkesbury was giving dinners upon that service of Porcelaine de Seve which he received as a mark of Buonaparte's friendship? And, is it for us, is it for the safe politicians and their followers; is it for those who made and those who applauded the peace of Amiens, now to bewail the fate of the French emigrants, now to affect an abhorrence of Buonaparté for his severity towards that unfortunate description of men? The fact is this, and a shameful fact it is, that the far greater portion of the sorrow which we hear expressed, on this account, proceeds, not from any attachment to the persons or the cause of the French royalists, but from the conviction, that this country will not be able to derive any further aid from their efforts, that they no longer afford the hope of making a diversion in our fa

MR. DRAKE.—The under-plot, which, from the correspondence to be found in the former part of this sheet, this gentleman seems to have been engaged in, may serve as a tolerabie exemplification of the nature and effects of the "safe politician's" system. Mr. Drake appears to be the worthy representative of Lord Hawkesbury, of that "prudent and solid young man," to whom the foreign affairs of this country have been committed, and whom Mr. Pitt chose to describe as second to no man in England, himself and Mr. Fox excepted!--The authenticity of Mr. Drake's letters is questioned by some of the ministerial writers. will be a pleasing circumstance to find that this doubt has any foundation; but, at present, it appears to have none. Mr. Drake may soon be expected home; for the French will scarcely suffer him to remain at Munich, unless, indeed, they should think it an advantage to keep him in their neighbourhood as a Marplot.--These letters will serve strongly to corroborate the charge, which has been made against England, which will now be implicitly believed all over the Continent, and which belief will

It

facilitate the project of the French for cutting off a connexion, even of a formal diplomatic nature, between England and the states bordering upon France. It will draw round her another tier of states hostile to us; and, thus, the project of the "safe politicians" will finally have no other effect, than that of sinking our country still lower in the eyes of the world, while it will make the enemy still more secure on the side of the Continent, and leave him nothing to provide for but an attack upon these islands, whenever the time comes, whenever our own financial or other distresses or troubles shall render it favourable, for the making of that attack.

SIERRA LEONE PETITION-In the preceding sheet will be found a letter upon this subject. I was not unaware, that it would be the duty of government to provide for the Maroons; but, as to the Nova Scotia negroes, they, I believe, were brought away at the special request of the Sierra Leone Company. This matter must, however, be deferred till my next, when I shall have procured such information as will enable me to speak positively as to the terms upon which the negrees of both these classes were delivered over to the Company.

BP. OF LANDAFF'S SPEECH. It gives me great pleasure to be able to state, upon the best possible authority, that, in the speech, to which I referred in my last, p. 505, the Right Reverend Prelate did not allude to the standing army, and that he is incapable of either speaking or thinking of it with disrespect. This statement will, I am sure, afford the readers of the Register much greater satisfaction than they could have derived from any observations of mine on the sentiment which the newspaper reports represented the venerable Prelate to entertain. -The letter of a correspondent to his lordship, is, of course, now become unnecessary.

CAPTURE OF GOREE.-The ministers, who have long been boasting, that the ports of France are "hermetically sealed," have declared, that they possess no information as to the loss of this colony, which, in the debate of the 11th instant, they took occasion to represent as being of little importance. It is not altogether impossible, that some of them were unacquainted with the very existence of such a colony. They say, that it is

our custom to leave the settlements on the coast of Africa unprotected; and, the public will soon be informed by a petition from Liverpool, that the present ministers leave the trade of the West-Indies also unprotected. Nothing can stir out in the wind

ward islands without being captured by French privateers. As to trade, those islands are nearly blockaded, without costing the enemy a farthing. Privateers, manned with people of all nations, swarm in those seas; and the policy of Lord St. Vincent is, to prevent as much as possible the fitting out of English privateers, without which it is impossible to prevent the depredations of the enemy.

IRISH MILITIA.-Two bills are now before Parliament, one for enabling his Majesty to avail himself of the offers of such regiments of Irish militia, to the amount of 10,000 men, as may volunteer their services to go to any part of Great-Britain, and the other for raising an equal number of Irish militia, to supply the place of those who may be by the former measure removed from Ireland. To remove from the most vulnerable part of the empire ten thousand men who have attained to a certain degree of discipline, merely for the purpose of supplying their place with ten thousand men who have never yet touched a musket, was a project too grossly absurd to be generated in the minds of even the present ministers. It was, therefore, supposed, that this measure was intended as a preliminary step to the introduction of another, namely, the interchange of the British and Irish militias. In consequence of this supposition, a meeting was held, on the 10th instant, at the Thatched-House Tavern, composed of Lords Lieutenants of Counties and Members of Parliament, holding commissions in the mili tia of Great-Britain, who agreed and published certain resolutions, which will be inserted, at length, in the next number of the Regis ter, and which, after having described the nature of the militia establishment, concluded with stating, that, even if it were "wise and expedient to decide, at this mo "ment, the question of reciprocal service "between the militias of Great Britain and

Ireland, the magnitude and importance of "the question demanded a separate and "distinct consideration, and ought not to "be introduced into discussion, collate"rally and indirectly."-The former of the bills, mentioned above, was discussed in the House of Commons, on the 10th instant, when a division took place, for the bill 130, against it 54; the latter was discussed on the 11th instant, and produced a division of 94 for the bill and 37 against it. In this last debate, the subject of reciprocal service, or interchange of the militias was introduced; Sir John New port and Mr. Keene declared, that they voted for the former bi'l only upon the presumption, that it was prefatory to the

further and greater measure of an interchange of militias, and spoke with disapprobation of the resolutions of the Thatched House; but the ministers studiously avoided the subject of interchange, perceiving, perhaps, that it would be difficult to carry such a measure. What advantage could be hoped for from an interchange of miltias it is utterly impossible to conceive, while it might, and would be attended with immediate mischiefs. As a reason for the interchange, it has been said, that the Irish by coming to England will imbibe just notions of civil liberty, by becoming witnesses of the happiness attendant thereon, that they will be

[ocr errors]

enamoured of industry when they behold "the more orderly conduct of the people of "England,and the advantages resulting from "industrious habits," and that those Irish who have not the good fortune to come here, will derive very useful lessons of the same sort from the English militia that shall be sent to Ireland! This notion Mr. Fox truly characterized as "romantic;" and, surely, so fanciful a reason for so important a measure never before was urged, in or out of parliament, at the same time that it reflects but little credit either upon the Irish militia, or the people of Ireland. The gentlemen whose invention has furnished them with this argument seem to forget, that it is very likely for the Irish militia to communicate, immediately, some of their habits to the people of England, while, if they should chance to acquire any thing better in exchange, their carrying of that back to Ireland must be matter of very distant hope., And, if we were to allow, that the Irish militia, by coming to England, will imbibe the potions and adopt the habits of the people of England, does it not follow, that the English militia, by going to Ireland, will imbibe the notions and adopt the habits of the people of Ireland? Where, then, are we, in this respect, to look for the advantages of the interchange?The ministers, however, do not adopt this notion of a migration of armies for the sake of moral improvement, though it is by no means unsuited to that cant with which their professions generally abound. They perceive its absurdity, and rest their defence of the prefatory measure on the pretence of its tending to augment the disposable force of the United Kingdom; but how this augmentation is to be effected by locking up ten thousand more men in the militia service, it will puzzle even the ingenious Mr. Yorke to demonstrate, unless by "disposable force" he means such as is capable of being sent any where about the British Islands. Yes; they say, that it will

enable the ministers, when occasion of fers, to send abroad more of the regula army than could be otherwise spared. If this be the object, then it must be intended to entrust the safety of Great Britain altogether to militia and volunteers, for there is but a mere handful of regulars now in it. This a false pretence; obviously so, for, if it were in-. tended to augment the regular army, and if Ireland be the source would it not be better to let the Irish militia remain where they are, and to raise the additional ten thousand men for the regular army?-When the ministers were told, that they were depriving Ireland of disciplined militia men, in order to supply their place with undisciplined militia men, they answered, that, if an emergency arose, they could send to Ireland ten thousand regular troops. Why, then, do they bring the Irish militia away? Is it that we, with all our own militia and 400,000 volunteers, are incapable of defending Great Britain, without the aid of ten thousand Irish militia? Where, then, are we to look for the real cause, the mysterious motive for this measure? It is to be feared, that we must, after all, have recourse to the moralizing reason; for, to suppose that the Irish militia will fight better in defence of England, than in defence of Ireland, would be strange indeed; and, as to their loyalty, that, one would think, must have been more than sufficiently evinced by their spontaneous and gallant offer to extend the limits of their service, and that, too, with no other apparent desire than that of getting as near as possible to the flotillas and lines of the enemy. Besides, the ministers themselves have, it must be allowed, borne ample testimony to the zealous loyalty of the Irish militia; and yet, in the same breath, they propose a measure, whereby Ireland is to be deprived of the exertion of the effect of that noble sentiment. The truth is, that the ministers know not what to do with the Irish militia, or with any other part of the force that has been raised, The army of reserve, which is now to be put a stop to, has not yielded more than 23,000 effective men, though the country has paid more than a million and a half in bounties for that army. The source of recruiting is corrupted and poisoned, the regular army is crumbling away, and, if the war lasts but a few years, there will be nothing left but militia and volunteers.Another project is on foot for more balloting for the army. That project too will fail. There must be a radical change in the military system, or there will be no soldiers raised. The people will be wearied and disgusted, and peace must be made upon the enemy's own terms,

« ZurückWeiter »